Dixon v. Beard et al

Filing 10

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 9/1/2016 regarding 3 MOTION to Dismiss and 6 MOTION for Voluntary Dismissal. Referred to Judge Anthony W. Ishii; Objections to F&R due by 9/19/2016. (Lundstrom, T)

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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 DANIEL STEVE DIXON, 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 v. JEFFREY BEARD, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 1:16-cv-00133-AWI-BAM (PC) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 3) AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL (ECF No. 6) FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 16 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 18 19 I. Background On October 6, 2015, Plaintiff Daniel Steve Dixon (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner 20 proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief (“Petition”) in 21 Tuolumne County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1, pp. 5-84.) Plaintiff named a number of 22 defendants in his Petition, including Defendant John C. Kelso, in his capacity as Receiver for the 23 California state prison medical care system, pursuant to Plata v. Schwarzenegger, et al., C01– 24 1351–TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2008). (Id. at pp. 11-12, ¶ 8 & n.2.) Plaintiff’s Petition generally 25 alleges that his request for soft-sole shoes due to medical issues is being wrongfully denied. 26 On January 28, 2016, Defendant Kelso removed this action to this federal district court 27 by filing a notice of removal. (ECF No. 1, pp. 1-2.) Defendant Kelso asserted in the notice of 28 removal that he, as the Receiver appointed under Plata, may remove this civil action pursuant to 1 1 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), (3), because the claims in the Petition are directly related to the exercise 2 of the Receiver’s federal court-ordered authority and duties. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, on February 3 3, 2016, Defendant Kelso moved for an order dismissing Plaintiff’s Petition without leave to 4 amend for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the 5 alternative for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 3.) 6 Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant Kelso’s motion. Instead, on February 25, 7 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of his action, without prejudice, under 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), with a supporting declaration. (ECF No. 6.) On March 1, 9 2016, Defendant Kelso filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss and/or for summary 10 judgment, noting Plaintiff did not file an opposition to his motion, but acknowledging that 11 Plaintiff has requested a voluntary dismissal of this action. (ECF No. 7.) On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant Kelso’s reply, stating that his 12 13 motion for voluntary dismissal was his timely response to Defendant Kelso’s motion. He further 14 asserted that he provided sufficient legal support for his request for a voluntary dismissal. (ECF 15 No. 9.) The Court finds the time for responses and replies to the parties’ motions have expired, 16 17 and the motions are deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 18 II. 19 Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal The Court will first address Plaintiff’s motion for a voluntary dismissal of this action, 20 without prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), because the determination 21 of that motion affects whether the Court may consider the merits of Plaintiff’s Petition, and 22 specifically Defendant Kelso’s motion to dismiss that Petition. See Duke Energy Trading & 23 Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once the notice of dismissal has 24 been filed, the district court loses jurisdiction over the dismissed claims and may not address the 25 merits of such claims or issue further orders pertaining to them.”). 26 “[U]nder Rule 41(a)(1)(i), a plaintiff has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his 27 action prior to service by the defendant of an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” 28 Commercial Space Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Boeing Co., Inc., 193 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) 2 1 (quotation and citation omitted). “[A] dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is effective on filing, no 2 court order is required, the parties are left as though no action had been brought, the defendant 3 can’t complain, and the district court lacks jurisdiction to do anything about it.” Id. at 1078. 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), a plaintiff may request dismissal after an 5 opposing party has served a motion for summary judgment “only by court order, on terms that 6 the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). “A motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant 7 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) should be granted unless a defendant can show that it 8 will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result of the dismissal.” Hepp v. Conoco, Inc., 97 F. 9 App’x 124, 125 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “Legal prejudice is prejudice to ‘some legal 10 interest, some legal claim, [or] some legal argument.’” Maxum Indem. Ins. Co. v. A-1 All Am. 11 Roofing Co., 299 F. App’x 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Westlands Water Dist. V. United 12 States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996)). 13 In this case, it is not entirely clear which provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 41(a) that Plaintiff relies upon in seeking a voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff’s motion cites to Rule 15 41(a)(2). (ECF No. 6, p. 1.) His arguments in the motion and response briefs, however, rely on 16 Black v. United States, No. CV-08-102-RHW, 2009 WL 192469 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2009). In 17 Black, the court found that the plaintiff was permitted to voluntarily dismiss his action, without 18 prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1). 19 The facts of the Black case are similar to the facts in this matter. In Black, the defendants 20 filed a motion to dismiss, styled as a motion for summary judgement in the alternative. The 21 plaintiff asked the court to dismiss the case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), because 22 the defendants had not filed any answer. The defendants objected, arguing that due to their filing 23 of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in the alternative, Rule 41(a)(2) applied. 24 The court in Black noted that despite the defendants’ styling their motion as a motion for 25 summary judgment in the alternative, they did not provide a statement of facts as required for a 26 proper Rule 56 motion under the local rules. Thus, the defendants’ motion was properly 27 characterized as a motion to dismiss. Further, the Black court recognized that under Ninth Circuit 28 precedent, the filing of a motion to dismiss does not trigger Rule 41(a)(2). Id. at *1. See also 3 1 Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 2 supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for summary judgment until the 3 district court acts to convert the motion by indicating, preferably by an explicit ruling, that it will 4 not exclude those materials from its consideration. Until the district court has so acted, a plaintiff 5 is free to file a proper notice of dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1).”). In this case, Defendant Kelso’s motion asserts that Plaintiff’s Petition fails to state a 6 7 claim for relief against him. Defendant Kelso states that Plaintiff alleges a violation of California 8 Penal Code (“CPC”) § 2625(d) for depriving him of his soft-soled shoes. Defendant Kelso 9 argues that the Petition admits on its face that Plaintiff’s primary care physician, several 10 department physicians, and the prison medical personnel and administration, have determined 11 the shoes were not medically necessary, undermining this claim. (ECF No. 3-1, pp. 10-11.) (See 12 Petition, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 26-35). Defendant Kelso further argues that there is no private right of 13 action under CPC § 2625(d) anyway. (Id. at 11.) Defendant Kelso next argues that Plaintiff 14 cannot state a claim against him for any violation of the correctional appeals procedures due to 15 dissatisfaction with the appeals process, nor can he state a claim for any violation of prison 16 administrative statutes based merely on the fact that the Receiver was copied on correspondence 17 concerning Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id. at 12-13.) Finally, Defendant Kelso argues that Plaintiff has no 18 cognizable claim for declaratory or injunctive relief, as Plaintiff may not dictate his medical 19 course of treatment simply because he disagrees with the medical personnel’s decisions, and 20 because his request for injunctive relief is precluded by Plata. (Id. at 13-15.) 21 Defendant Kelso’s arguments in support of summary judgment are limited to the Court’s 22 consideration of the exhibits Plaintiff attached to and referred to in the Petition. Defendant Kelso 23 argues that these exhibits are consistent with the allegations of the Petition, that the medical staff 24 and officials determined Plaintiff’s soft-soled shoes were not medically required. (ECF No. 3-1, 25 pp. 10-11.) Defendant Kelso has not submitted any extrinsic evidence in support of summary 26 judgment, nor has he filed a statement of undisputed facts in support of a motion for summary 27 judgment, as required by the Local Rules. Local Rule 260(a). 28 /// 4 Defendant Kelso’s motion is properly characterized solely as a motion to dismiss under 1 2 Rule 12(b)(6). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court considers 3 evidence outside the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 4 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond. 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1998). A court may, 6 however, consider exhibits attached to the complaint, Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 7 & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989), and documents incorporated by reference 8 into the complaint, Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 9 2002), without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Thus, 10 since Defendant Kelso only relies on the Petition and the attached exhibits referred to in the 11 Petition in his motion, the motion would not be converted into any motion for summary 12 judgment under Rule 56. 13 Based on the foregoing, Rule 41(a)(2) has not been triggered in this case by Defendant 14 Kelso’s motion, and Plaintiff is entitled to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), 15 which he accomplished by filing his request for voluntary dismissal on February 25, 2016. For 16 these reasons, the Court shall not consider the merits of Defendant Kelso’s motion to dismiss, 17 which has been rendered moot by Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of this action. 18 III. Conclusion and Recommendations 19 For the reasons set forth above, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 20 1. 21 Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss this action, without prejudice, (ECF No. 6), be GRANTED; and Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 3) be DENIED, as moot. 22 2. 23 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 24 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 25 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties 26 may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 27 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file 28 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the 5 1 magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: /s/ Barbara September 1, 2016 6 A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6

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