Larson v. Harman-Management Corporation et al

Filing 99

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 97 Request to Seal Documents and Motion for Leave to File Redacted Documents, signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 1/30/2018. (Gaumnitz, R)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12

CORY LARSON, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

13
14
15
16

No. 1:16-cv-00219-DAD-SKO

v.
HARMAN-MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and 3SEVENTY, INC.,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST
TO SEAL DOCUMENTS AND MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE REDACTED
DOCUMENTS
(Doc. No. 97)

Defendants.

17
18

Plaintiff Cory Larson (“plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Harman-Management

19

Corporation and 3Seventy, Inc. (“defendants”) on February 17, 2016, alleging violations of the

20

Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (the “TCPA”). (Doc. No. 1.) On

21

February 1, 2017, the court entered a stipulated protective order, which provided that a producing

22

party may designate certain documents as including confidential information. (Doc. No. 60.) On

23

January 23, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 98.) In connection

24

with the motion for class certification, plaintiff filed a notice of a request to file documents under

25

seal and a motion for leave to file redacted documents on the public docket pursuant to Local

26

Rule 141. (Doc. No. 97.) Plaintiff seeks to seal certain documents filed in connection with the

27

motion for class certification. (Id. at 3.) Additionally, plaintiff requests that the court accept

28

plaintiff’s redacted memorandum of points and authority in support of plaintiff’s motion for class
1

1

certification for submission and entry on the public docket. (Id.) No opposition was received

2

from defendants within three days, as provided for in Local Rule 141(c). For the reasons that

3

follow, plaintiff’s request to seal and motion to file redacted documents are denied.

4

LEGAL STANDARD

5

All documents filed with the court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News,

6

Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (“It is well-established that the fruits

7

of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public.”).

8

Pursuant to Rule 5.2(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court “may order that a filing

9

be made under seal without redaction.” However, even if a court orders such a filing, it may

10

“later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the

11

public record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(d). “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to

12

inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’”

13

Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v.

14

Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)).

15
16

Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors
Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 2010).

17

[J]udicial records attached to dispositive motions [are treated]
differently from records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those
who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to
dispositive motions must meet the high threshold of showing that
“compelling reasons” support secrecy. A “good cause” showing
under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to
non-dispositive motions.

18
19
20
21

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (citations omitted). The reason for the difference between the two

22

standards is that “[n]ondispositive motions are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the

23

underlying cause of action, and, as a result, the public’s interest in accessing dispositive materials

24

does not apply with equal force to non-dispositive materials.” Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n,

25

605 F.3d 665 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
Under the “compelling reasons” standard applicable to dispositive motions such as the one

26
27

at issue here:

28

/////
2

1

[T]he court must conscientiously balance the competing interests of
the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records
secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal
certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling
reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying
on hypothesis or conjecture.

2
3
4
5

Id. at 1178–79 (internal quotation marks, omissions, and citations omitted). 1 The party seeking

6

to seal a judicial record bears the burden of meeting the “compelling reasons” standard. Id. at

7

1178; Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003).

8

“In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to . . . justify sealing court records exist when

9

such ‘court files might . . . become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to

10

gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade

11

secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). “The mere fact that the

12

production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to

13

further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. “The

14

‘compelling reasons’ standard is invoked even if the dispositive motion, or its attachments, were

15

previously filed under seal or protective order.” Id. at 1178–79.
DISCUSSION

16

Here, plaintiff has filed a request to seal documents filed in connection with his motion for

17
18

class certification (Doc. No. 98), which is more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.

19

For that reason, plaintiff is required to make a showing of “compelling reasons” warranting the

20

1

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

While courts frequently use the terms “dispositive” and “non-dispositive” motions in this
context, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that the “compelling reasons” standard applies whenever
the motion at issue “is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Center for Auto
Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). In some instances, the
proposed filing of documents under seal in connection with motions for preliminary injunction,
for sanctions, or in limine, though such motions are not dispositive, may be subject to the
“compelling reasons” test, predicated on the right of access and the need to “provide the public
with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of its fairness.”
Id. at 1097–1101 (quoting Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d
Cir. 1993)). The motion for class certification at issue here is clearly more than tangentially
related to the merits of the case, and were that motion to be denied in its entirety, it would almost
certainly be dispositive of this case. See Aldapa v. Fowler Packing Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00420DAD-SAB, 2017 WL 2546606, at *2, n. 2 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2017); Cohen v. Trump, Case No.
13-cv-2519-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 3036302, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (“A class
certification motion is thus more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.) (citing cases).
3

1
2

filing of the documents in question under seal. Plaintiff has not made the required showing here.
Typically, “compelling reasons” are found where the records in question might be used

3

“to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade

4

secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Here, plaintiff merely states that he does not object to

5

sealing items (a), (b), (c), and (g) because they satisfy the requirements of the parties’ stipulated

6

protective order. (Doc. No. 97 at 3.) Plaintiff’s implied contention that sealing is proper in light

7

of the parties’ stipulated protective order is unpersuasive. In this regard, that stipulated protective

8

order does not identify or discuss the “compelling reasons” standard and, accordingly, the

9

presumption of access to court records has not been rebutted. See Gregory v. City of Vallejo, No.

10

2:13-CV-00320-KJM, 2014 WL 4187365, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014); see also Kamakana,

11

447 F.3d at 1183 (concluding that “[a]lthough the magistrate judge expressly approved and

12

entered the protective order, the order contained no good cause findings as to specific documents

13

that would justify reliance by the United States” and, therefore, “the claimed reliance on the order

14

is not a compelling reason that rebuts the presumption of access”) (citations and internal

15

quotation marks omitted).

16
17

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiff’s request to seal documents filed in connection with the motion for

18

class certification and motion for leave to file redacted documents (Doc. No. 98) is denied

19

without prejudice to its renewal based upon the required showing of compelling reasons for

20

sealing.

21

IT IS SO ORDERED.

22

Dated:

January 30, 2018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23
24
25
26
27
28
4