Cowart v. Chavez et al

Filing 9

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATION to Dismiss Action Without Prejudice re 8 Amended Complaint, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 6/22/16. Referred to Judge Ishii. Fourteen Day Deadline. (Gonzalez, R)

1
2
3
4
5
6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8
9

GARDELL COWART,

10

Plaintiff,

11
12

CASE No. 1:16-cv-0368-AWI-MJS (PC)
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION TO
DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE

v.
(ECF NO. 8)
D. CHAVEZ, et al.,
FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

13

Defendants.

14
15

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42

16

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint was previously dismissed with leave to amend for

17

failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 1, 7.) Before the Court for screening is Plaintiff’s First

18

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8.)

19

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

20

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

21

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if

22

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which

23

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

24

II.

PLEADING STANDARD

25

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

26

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

27

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

28

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

1

1

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

2

(1989).

3

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

4

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

5

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

6

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d

7

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

8

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

9

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

10

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

11

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

12

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

13

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

14

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere

15

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are

16

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

17

III.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

18

At all relevant times Plaintiff was an inmate housed at California Substance Abuse

19

Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California. He names the following CSATF

20

correctional staff as Defendants: Correctional Officer (“CO”) D. Chavez and Correctional

21

Lieutenant (“Lt.”) S. Deathriage.

22

Plaintiff’s claims can be summarized essentially as follows:

23

On September 10, 2015, in the middle of a staph infection outbreak at CSATF,

24

Plaintiff cleaned the area around his bunk in a shared dorm. CO Chavez came to inspect

25

the area and then later called Plaintiff into the building’s main office where she directed

26

Plaintiff to sign a document authorizing the removal of funds in the amount of $22.11

27

from Plaintiff’s trust account. This withdrawal was for the alleged destruction or damage

28

of certain items, including sheets, a laundry bag, and a blue chambray shirt. Plaintiff
2

1

denies having destroyed or damaged any state-issued property. When he refused to

2

sign the document, CO Chavez threatened to freeze Plaintiff’s trust account and to issue

3

a Rules Violations Report (“RVR”) for destruction of state property. Plaintiff did not sign

4

the document, and an RVR issued.

5

On September 23, 2015, a hearing was held on the RVR. Plaintiff appeared at the

6

hearing, presented testimony, and offered evidence. The hearing officer, Lt. Deathriage,

7

found Plaintiff guilty after improperly relying on CO Chavez’s statements. Lt. Deathriage

8

said, “How do I know you didn’t do it? You inmates think you know everything, you don’t

9

know shit." Plaintiff was assessed a 60-day loss of credit, a 90-day loss of privileges,

10

and a confiscation of Plaintiff’s appliances.

11

After receiving a final copy of the RVR on October 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed an

12

inmate appeal on November 10, 2015. Due to delays caused by prison staff, this appeal

13

was ultimately denied as untimely.

14
15

Plaintiff seeks damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
IV.

ANALYSIS

16

State prisoners may not challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a

17

section 1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief. Wilkinson v.

18

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Often referred to as the favorable termination rule or the

19

Heck bar,1 this limitation applies whenever state prisoners “seek to invalidate the

20

duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier

21

release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the

22

unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Id. at 81 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “a

23

state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief

24

sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state

25

conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action

26

would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81-82.

27
28

1

See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

3

1

The favorable termination rule applies to prison disciplinary proceedings if those

2

proceedings resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior credits. Edwards v. Balisok,

3

520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997).

4

In the Court’s prior Screening Order, Plaintiff was advised that this action may be

5

barred by Heck because success in this lawsuit would necessarily invalidate the prison

6

disciplinary finding that Plaintiff was guilty of destroying state-issued property, and the

7

disciplinary, which assessed the loss of good-time credits, has not been reversed or

8

expunged. In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that this action is not Heck-

9

barred because, following a period of good behavior, he will receive “credit forfeiture

10

restoration” of the 60-days assessed against him pursuant to California administrative

11

procedures and that therefore success in this action would not affect the duration of his

12

confinement.

13

If the credits were restored to Plaintiff, Heck’s favorable termination rule arguably

14

would not bar this action pursuant to Ramirez v Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2003),

15

because success here would not affect the length of Plaintiff’s confinement.2 See Garcia

16

v. Chavez, 1:09-cv-1648-AWI-SKO, 2011 WL 3715514, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010)

17

(“[B]ecause the time credit forfeited by Petitioner has been restored, Petitioner's claim

18

concerning the invalidity of the disciplinary procedures does not directly or necessarily

19

affect the fact or duration of his custody.”); but see Green v. Delgado, 1:14-cv-0297-LJO-

20

JLT, 2015 WL 7252356, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2015) (“Since the 61 days of good time

21

credits which Plaintiff forfeited as a result of the guilty RVR finding were restored merely

22

for a period of Plaintiff's good behavior such restoration does not meet the “favorable

23
2

24
25
26
27
28

In Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the application of Heck “turns solely on whether a
successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative
sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s confinement.” Id. at 856. There, a prisoner brought a civil
rights action under § 1983, not a habeas petition, to challenge procedures used in imposing disciplinary
sanctions of ten days of disciplinary detention, 60 days loss of privileges and a referral to administrative
segregation. 334 F.3d at 852-53. He was not subject to a loss of good time credits. Id. He sought
expungement of the disciplinary record from his file and an injunction prohibiting the state from considering
it “when they fix plaintiff's terms and decide whether plaintiff should be released on parole.” Id. at 859 n.6.
The Court of Appeals held that the favorable termination rule does not apply to prison disciplinary
sanctions that do not necessarily affect the fact or length of a prisoner's confinement. Id. at 854-58.

4

1

termination” requirement to reverse the dispositive grant of summary judgment.)

2

However, Plaintiff has not alleged that the credits have been restored to him. Instead, he

3

asserts that they may be restored at some point in the future, and that restoration is not

4

certain (“Classification will make the final determination whether inmate is eligible for

5

restoration.”). Plaintiff also does not allege that he is serving an indeterminate life

6

sentence such that any loss of good-time credits would not have any impact on the

7

length of Plaintiff’s confinement. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858 (“[W]here ... a successful §

8

1983 action would not necessarily result in an earlier release from incarceration ... the

9

favorable termination rule of Heck and Edwards does not apply.”) As it stands, then, the

10

good-time credits have not been restored, and Plaintiff’s claims remain within the

11

purview of Heck.

12

Plaintiff alleges in this case that defendant Chavez falsified the RVR against him

13

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s refusal to sign a document and that Lt. Deathriage improperly

14

found Plaintiff guilty at the RVR hearing by failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s

15

testimony and evidence. A favorable finding on these claims would necessarily imply the

16

invalidity of the disputed disciplinary finding. For this reason, the Court concludes that

17

Plaintiff’s claims are Heck-barred and must be brought in a petition for writ of habeas

18

corpus.

19

V.

20
21
22

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
The findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District

23

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

24

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendation, the

25

parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned

26

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” A party may respond

27

to another party’s objections by filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being

28

served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
5

1

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal.

2

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923

3

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

4
5
6
7

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

June 22, 2016

/s/

Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6