Singh v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
24
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, 22 . Order signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 3/15/2019. (Timken, A)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
RASHPAL SINGH,
12
13
14
15
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00446-SAB
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)
(ECF No. 22)
Defendant.
16
17
Petitioner Brian C. Shapiro (“Counsel”), attorney for Rashpal Singh (“Plaintiff”), filed the
18
instant motion for attorney fees on February 15, 2019. Counsel requests fees in the amount of
19
$19,075.25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff has not objected to the request.
20
I.
21
BACKGROUND
22
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint challenging the denial of social security benefits on
23
March 30, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) On March 22, 2017, the magistrate judge’s order issued granting
24
in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s social security appeal and judgment was entered in favor of
25
Plaintiff. (ECF No. 17.) The matter was remanded for further administrative proceedings. (ECF
26
No. 17.)
27
On remand, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled as of November 14, 2011, and past
28
benefits were awarded in the amount of $63,059.00 for petitioner and $13,242.00 in child benefits
1
1
for a total backpay award of $76,301.00.1 (ECF No. 22-2 at 6-14; ECF No. 22-3.2) The
2
Commissioner withheld $19,075.25 from the past-due benefit for attorney fees. This amount
3
equals twenty-five percent of the retroactive benefit award. (See footnote 1.)
4
5
By the instant motion, Petitioner seeks $19,075.25 for 22.5 hours spent working on
Plaintiff’s case.
6
II.
7
LEGAL STANDARD
8
In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a
9
judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the
10
court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due
11
benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such
12
award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
13
The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 406(b)
14
fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the
15
claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.”
16
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful
17
attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test
18
it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). Agreements
19
seeking fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded are not
20
enforceable. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148. The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the
21
fees requested are reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148.
Gisbrecht v.
22
In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the
23
character of the representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 800. Ultimately,
24
an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA.
25
1
26
27
28
Although the letters do not indicate the total amount awarded, twenty-five percent of each amount was withheld to
pay attorney fees. Plaintiff had $15,764.75 withheld (ECF No. 22-3 at 2) and the attorney fee withheld for the child
benefits was $3,310.50 (id. at 7). The award amount was determined by multiplying the amount withheld by 4.
2
All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the
CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.
2
1
28 U.S.C. § 2412. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.
2
The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under
3
Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met
4
his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the
5
standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney
6
exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of
7
past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the
8
benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586
9
F.3d at 1151.
10
III.
11
DISCUSSION
12
The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the
13
requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807-08. Here, the fee agreement
14
between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides for a fee consisting of “25 percent of the backpay
15
awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court.” (Social
16
Security Representation Agreement, attached to Motion, ECF No. 22-1.) Plaintiff has been
17
awarded benefits for the period from May 2012 through January 2019 in the amount of
18
$76,301.00. (ECF No. 22-3.) In determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court
19
is to apply the test mandated by Gisbrecht.
20
There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance.
21
Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff.
22
Although this action does involve more than six years of backpay, there is no indication that
23
Counsel was responsible for any substantial delay in the court proceedings. Plaintiff agreed to a
24
25 percent fee at the outset of the representation and Petitioner is seeking $19,075.25 which is 25
25
percent of the backpay award. The $19,075.25 fee is not excessively large in relation to the past-
26
due award of $76,301.00. In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent
27
nature of this case and Counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. Hearn v.
28
Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
3
1
In support of the motion, Petitioner submits a log of the time spent in prosecuting this
2
action. (ECF No. 22-4.) The log demonstrates that Petitioner expended 19 hours and a paralegal
3
expended 3.5 hours on this action. (Id.) When considering the total amount requested by
4
Petitioner, the fee request translates to $847.79 per hour for the services of Petitioner and the
5
paralegal in this action. In Crawford the appellate court found that a fee of $875 and $902 per
6
hour, for time of both attorneys and paralegals, was not excessive. Crawford, 486 F.3d at 1152
7
(dissenting opinion).
8
The Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the amount of
9
work Petitioner performed in representing Plaintiff in court. Petitioner’s representation of the
10
claimant resulted in the action being remanded for further proceedings and ultimately benefits
11
were awarded. Counsel also submitted a detailed billing statement which supports the request.
12
(ECF No. 22-4.)
13
The award of Section 406(b) fees is offset by any prior award of attorney fees granted
14
under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. In this instance, Petitioner has
15
previously been awarded $3,800.00 in EAJA fees and the award of fees under Section 406(b)
16
must be offset in that amount. (ECF No. 21.)
17
VI.
18
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
19
20
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to
Section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
21
1.
22
Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the
amount of $19,075.25 is GRANTED;
23
2.
Pursuant to counsel’s request, this amount shall be paid directly to Brian Shaprio,
24
Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. The Commissioner is to remit to Plaintiff
25
any remainder of his withheld benefits; and
26
///
27
///
28
///
4
1
3.
Petitioner is ordered to refund $3,800.00 of the Section 406(b) fees awarded to
2
Plaintiff as an offset for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
3
2412(d).
4
5
6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
March 15, 2019
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?