Miranda v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 16

ORDER Remanding the Action Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(G); ORDER Directing Entry of Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff Genevieve Miranda and Against Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 07/11/20147. CASE CLOSED.(Flores, E)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GENEVIEVE MIRANDA, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 NANCY A. BERRYHILL1, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 1:16-cv-00509 - JLT ORDER REMANDING THE ACTION PURSUANT TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(G) ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF GENEVIEVE MIRANDA AND AGAINST DEFENDANT NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 17 Genevieve Miranda asserts she is entitled to a period of disability and disability insurance 18 benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the decision denying 19 her application for benefits, asserting the administrative law judge erred in evaluating the record, 20 including the credibility of her subjective complaints. Because the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal 21 standards, the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 22 405(g). BACKGROUND 23 24 Plaintiff filed applications for benefits on September 27, 2012, in which she alleged disability 25 beginning June 18, 2012. (Doc. 9-3 at 13) The Social Security Administration denied the applications 26 at the initial level and upon reconsideration. (Id.; Doc. 9-5 at 2-11) Plaintiff requested a hearing, and 27 1 28 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substitutes Nancy A. Berryhill for her predecessor, Carolyn W. Colvin, as the defendant. 1 1 testified before an ALJ on September 8, 2014. (Doc. 9-3 at 13) The ALJ determined Plaintiff was not 2 disabled under the Social Security Act, and issued an order denying benefits on October 3, 2014. (Id. 3 at 14-20) Plaintiff filed a request for review of the decision with the Appeals Council, which denied 4 the request on February 9, 2016. (Id. at 2-4) Therefore, the ALJ’s determination became the final 5 decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 6 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW District courts have a limited scope of judicial review for disability claims after a decision by 8 the Commissioner to deny benefits under the Social Security Act. When reviewing findings of fact, 9 such as whether a claimant was disabled, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner’s 10 decision is supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ’s 11 determination that the claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court if the proper legal standards 12 were applied and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health & 13 Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 14 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 15 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 16 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). The record as a whole 17 must be considered, because “[t]he court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that 18 detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 19 DISABILITY BENEFITS 20 To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish she is unable to 21 engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 22 that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if: 24 25 26 his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 27 28 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 2 1 Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, 2 the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the claimant is able to engage in other substantial 3 gainful employment. Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984). ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION 4 To achieve uniform decisions, the Commissioner established a sequential five-step process for 5 6 evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920(a)-(f). The process requires 7 the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff (1) engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of 8 alleged disability, (2) had medically determinable severe impairments (3) that met or equaled one of the 9 listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether Plaintiff (4) had 10 the residual functional capacity to perform to past relevant work or (5) the ability to perform other work 11 existing in significant numbers at the state and national level. Id. The ALJ must consider testimonial 12 and objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. 13 A. 14 Relevant Medical Evidence In January 2011, Plaintiff was working as a teacher’s aide. (Doc. 9-8 at 4) Plaintiff had a “fast 15 heartbeat while sitting” and reported that she thought she had anxiety. (Id.) She was diagnosed with 16 atherosclerotic heart disease, angina, diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia. (Id. at 7) 17 In February 2011, Plaintiff had a cardiac stress test, ultrasound, and echocardiographic report. 18 (Doc. 9-8 at 9-11) Dr. Reddy found “no reversible or fixed perfusion defect,” and Plaintiff’s heart had 19 “a normal left ventricular chamber size, all thickness, and wall motion.” (Id. at 9) Dr. Reddy also 20 found the ultrasound results were normal. (Id. at 10) However, with the echocardiographic report, Dr. 21 Reddy found Plaintiff had “[m]ild concentric left ventricular hypertrophy.” (Id. at 11) 22 Dr. Reddy again administered a cardiac treadmill stress test a year later, in February 2012. 23 (Doc. 9-8 at 22) Dr. Reddy found the results were normal, and “reveal[ed] no reversible or fixed 24 perfusion defect.” (Id.) 25 In April 2012, Plaintiff described having “many years of dysesthesia in the lower extremities” 26 to Dr. Yao Lin. (Doc. 9-8 at 31) She reported that she had “a burning pain” in the plantar region of her 27 feet, which was “associated with [a] similar symptom in the lateral forelegs.” (Id.) In addition, 28 Plaintiff complained of pain in her lower back, which was not associated with muscle spasms or 3 1 weakness. (Id.) Dr. Lin found Plaintiff had “5/5 strength in all four extremities,” but her reflexes were 2 “1/4 in all extremities.” (Id.) Dr. Lin also found Plaintiff’s “pinprick and temperature sensations 3 reduced in the right leg.” (Id.) 4 Plaintiff had an EMG and nerve conduction study on her legs performed by Dr. Helen Liu on 5 April 25, 2012. (Doc. 9-8 at 33) Dr. Liu found Plaintiff had “abnormal” results, and found “a mild 6 axonal sensory polyneuropathy in distal legs which can be seen in [a] diabetic patient.” (Id.) 7 In May 2012, Plaintiff continued to report pain in the plantar region of her feet, forelegs, and 8 low back. (Doc. 9-8 at 28) Plaintiff also told Dr. Lin that she had numbness in the “1st three fingers of 9 both hands.” (Id.) Dr. Lin found Plaintiff had “5/5 strength in all four extremities,” but her reflexes 10 11 were “2/4 in all extremities.” (Id. at 29) Dr. Liu administered an EMG and nerve condition study on Plaintiff’s arms on May 31, 2012. 12 (Doc. 9-8 at 38) Dr. Liu found Plaintiff had “[m]oderately severe right median nerve entrapment 13 neuropathy at [her] wrist that is consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome.” (Id.) Dr. Liu also found 14 “[m]ild left median nerve entrapment neuropathy at [her] wrist that is consistent with carpal tunnel 15 syndrome.” (Id.) Further, Dr. Liu found “mild axonal sensory polyneuropathy.” (Id.) 16 In June 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Chinh Nguyen “for diabetic foot care.” (Doc. 9-8 at 55) 17 Plaintiff reported Lyrica was “helping somewhat,” but she continued to have “generalized pain to her 18 feet.” (Id.) Dr. Nguyen opined Plaintiff had palpable pulses and “some hypersensitivity to the toes.” 19 (Id.) Plaintiff did not go to her next three appointments and was not seen again by Dr. Nguyen until 20 September, when she reported she was “doing fairly well.” (Id.) However, Dr. Nguyen found Plaintiff’s 21 “[n]erve sensation [was] decreased at the toes.” (Id.) 22 On September 7, 2012, Dr. Carols Santivanez opined that Plaintiff needed to be “off work till 9- 23 7-13.” (Doc. 9-8 at 46) On September 11, Dr. Santivanez completed a disability questionnaire. (Id. at 24 47-49) Dr. Santivanez opined that Plaintiff had diabetic neuropathy and osteoporosis, which made her 25 “unable to perform regular duties.” (Id. at 47-48) Dr. Santivanez indicated he did not know what 26 accommodations would make it possible for Plaintiff to return to work, and recommended she receive 27 “medical leave for one year.” (Id. at 48) On September 25, Dr. Santivanez opined that Plaintiff would 28 “have medical impairments to work for 4-5 years.” (Id. at 45, 63) 4 In February 2013, Plaintiff had a one-year follow up appointment with Dr. Reddy. (Doc. 9-8 at 1 2 82-83) Plaintiff reported she had shortness of breath when she was “sitting down and when she [was] 3 doing housework, she [found] herself out of breath.” (Id. at 82, emphasis omitted) Dr. Reddy 4 recommended that Plaintiff lose weight, exercise, and eat a good diet with “lots of fruits and vegetables 5 [and] cut back on salt intake.” (Id. at 83, emphasis omitted) Dr. Santivanez completed a medical source statement on March 21, 2013. (Doc. 9-8 at 84-89) 6 7 According to Dr. Santivanez, Plaintiff was able to occasionally lift and carry up to 10 pounds but could 8 never lift 11 or more pounds. (Id. at 89) Dr. Santivanez believed Plaintiff was limited to occasionally 9 reaching, handling, fingering, feeling, pushing, and pulling with both arms. (Id. at 91) He opined 10 Plaintiff could frequently climb stairs, ramps, ladders, or scaffolds; balance, stoop; kneel; crouch; 11 crawl; and use foot controls. (Id. at 86-87) Dr. Santivanez believed that without interruption, Plaintiff 12 could sit for seven hours, stand for six hours, and walk for six hours. (Id. at 85) Dr. Santivanez opined 13 that Plaintiff had some environmental limitations but could tolerate frequent exposure to unprotected 14 heights, moving mechanical parts, pulmonary irritants, and vibrations. (Id. at 88) He indicated also 15 that Plaintiff could tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat, and occasionally 16 operate a motor vehicle. (Id.) Dr. Santivanez did not complete the portions of the questionnaire 17 requesting that he identify any “particular medical or clinical findings” supporting his assessments. 18 (See id. at 84-89) On May 8, 2014, Dr. Santivanez wrote a letter in which he stated: “Ms. Miranda has been 19 20 diagnosed with the following medical conditions: Osteoporosis, Diabetes, and Diabetic Neuropathy. 21 Due to the medical conditions listed she is unable to work.” (Doc. 9-8 at 3) 22 B. 23 Administrative Hearing Testimony Plaintiff testified before the ALJ at a hearing on September 8, 2014. She reported she last 24 worked as a teacher’s assistant in June 2012. (Doc. 9-3 at 30, 42) She said her legs felt weak and her 25 “spine was hurting” while she worked. (Id. at 30) Plaintiff stated that she went to a doctor for testing, 26 and was diagnosed with carpal tunnel and neuropathy, or “nerve damage of the legs.” (Id. at 30-31) 27 She testified that after receiving the diagnoses, she returned to her doctor and “told him how [she] was 28 feeling,” and “he told [Plaintiff] that he would take [her] off work for a while.” (Id. at 31) 5 1 She reported that she sees her doctor “on a monthly basis,” and he also diagnosed Plaintiff with 2 osteoporosis. (Doc. 9-3 at 31) Plaintiff said she has pain in her spine and neck, and her doctor told her 3 that “the diabetes is not making it any better.” (Id.) Plaintiff reported her diabetes had “just gotten 4 worse,” and was causing pain in her feet. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff said she had numbness in her 5 fingers and hand, which “tingle[d] at the tip,” the same way her feet tingled. (Id. at 32) She testified 6 that she was taking Lyrica twice a day for this nerve pain. (Id. at 32-33) Plaintiff said the pain in her legs worsened when she walked, and estimated she was able to 7 8 walk or stand for “about ten, fifteen minutes” before the pain increased. (Doc. 9-3 at 37-38) She 9 reported that sitting in a chair also caused pain in her tailbone and spine. (Id. at 40) She testified that a 10 couple months prior to the hearing, she started elevating her feet by sitting in a recliner about “four 11 time[s] a day” because her legs would swell and feel heavy. (Id. at 34, 38, 41) 12 C. 13 The ALJ’s Findings Pursuant to the five-step process, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not engage in substantial 14 activity after the alleged onset date of June 18, 2012. (Doc. 9-3 at 15) Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff 15 had “the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with peripheral neuropathy and bilateral 16 carpal tunnel syndrome.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined these impairments did not meet or 17 medically equal a listed impairment. (Id. at 16) Next, the ALJ opined: 18 19 20 21 22 23 [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift an/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She could sit 7 hours in an 8-hour workday, and stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. This capacity most closely approximates light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she cannot perform repetitive manipulative activities, but could perform non-repetitive manipulative activities frequently, including reaching. She could occasionally push or pull with the bilateral upper extremities. She could frequently push or pull with the bilateral lower extremities and frequently bend, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl, balance and climb stairs and ramps. She could only occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could frequently work around hazards or vibrations but only occasionally drive as a job task. She must avoid more than occasional exposure to temperature extremes. 24 (Id. at 16) With this residual functional capacity, the ALJ found Plaintiff was “capable of performing 25 past relevant work as a Day Care Worker and Teacher’s Aide.” (Id. at 19) Thus, the ALJ concluded 26 Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. (Id. at 20) 27 28 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS Appealing the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the credibility 6 1 of her subjective complaints. (Doc. 13 at 5-9) According to Plaintiff, “the ALJ failed to articulate 2 clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [her] testimony.” (Id. at 8) On the other hand, Defendant 3 contends that “the ALJ appropriately found Plaintiff’s testimony not fully credible.” (Doc. 14 at 4) 4 A. Plaintiff’s Credibility 5 In assessing credibility, an ALJ must determine first whether objective medical evidence shows 6 an underlying impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 7 alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 8 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Where the objective medical evidence shows an underlying 9 impairment, and there is no affirmative evidence of a claimant's malingering, an “adverse credibility 10 finding must be based on clear and convincing reasons.” Id. at 1036; Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 11 Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008). 12 Factors that may be considered by an ALJ in assessing a claimant’s credibility include, but are 13 not limited to: (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, (2) inconsistencies in testimony or between 14 testimony and conduct, (3) the claimant’s daily activities, (4) an unexplained, or inadequately 15 explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment, and (5) testimony from 16 physicians concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which the claimant 17 complains. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 18 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (the ALJ may consider a claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, 19 inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and conduct, and a claimant’s daily activities when 20 weighing the claimant’s credibility). 21 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff “alleges an inability to work due to diabetic neuropathy, 22 osteoporosis, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and a heart murmur.” (Doc. 9-3 at 17) In addition, 23 the ALJ stated: 26 After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision. 27 (Id.) The ALJ then summarized the medical record, beginning with Plaintiff’s EMG and nerve 28 condition study in April 2012. (See id. at 17-19) 24 25 7 1 In general, “conflicts between a [claimant’s] testimony of subjective complaints and the 2 objective medical evidence in the record” can constitute “specific and substantial reasons that 3 undermine . . . credibility.” Morgan v. Commissioner of the SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 4 The Ninth Circuit explained, that while a claimant’s “testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground 5 that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant 6 factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 7 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) 8 (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a 9 factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis”). 10 Importantly, however, if an ALJ cites the medical evidence to support an adverse credibility 11 determination, it is not sufficient for the ALJ to simply state that the testimony is contradicted by the 12 record. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (“general findings are an 13 insufficient basis to support an adverse credibility determination”). Rather, an ALJ must “specifically 14 identify what testimony is credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Greger 15 v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 16 1996) (the ALJ has a burden to “identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines 17 the claimant's complaints”); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (an ALJ must identify 18 “what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible”). Here, the summarized the record and stated 19 there was “no objective evidence or opinion suggesting the need for lying down or elevating her legs, 20 or sleeping during the day.” (Doc. 9-3 at 19) 21 As the Ninth Circuit explained, “summariz[ing] the medical evidence supporting [the] RFC 22 determination... is not the sort of explanation or the kind of ‘specific reasons’ [the Court] must have in 23 order to ... ensure that the claimant’s testimony was not arbitrarily discredited.” See, e.g., Brown- 24 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). As a result, “the observations an ALJ makes as 25 part of the summary of the medical record are not sufficient to establish clear and convincing reasons 26 for rejecting a Plaintiff’s credibility.” Argueta v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102007 at *44 (E.D. 27 Cal. Aug. 3, 2016). Although Defendant identifies reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility based 28 upon the ALJ’s summary of the medical records (see Doc. 13 at 8-9), these reasons were not clearly 8 1 identified by the ALJ to support the adverse credibility determination. Importantly, the Court is 2 “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (emphasis in 3 original) (quoting Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)); Bray v. Comm'r, 554 F.3d 4 1219, 1229 (9th Cir. 2009) (the Court cannot engage in “post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit 5 what the [ALJ] might have been thinking”). Because the ALJ offered no more than a summary of the 6 medical evidence—and Plaintiff’s “testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully 7 corroborated by objective medical evidence” —the objective medical record fails to support the adverse 8 credibility determination. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494; Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. Consequently, Court finds the ALJ failed to properly set forth findings “sufficiently specific to 9 10 allow a reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds.” 11 Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. 12 B. 13 Remand is Appropriate The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or to 14 order immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v. Apfel, 15 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Except in rare instances, when a court reverses an administrative 16 agency determination, the proper course is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 17 explanation. Moisa, 367 F.3d at 886 (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)). Generally, an 18 award of benefits is directed when: 19 20 (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 21 22 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, an award of benefits is directed 23 where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record is 24 fully developed. Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 The Ninth Circuit explained that “where the ALJ improperly rejects the claimant’s testimony 26 regarding his limitations, and the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited,” the 27 testimony can be credited as true, and remand is not appropriate. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. However, 28 courts retain flexibility in crediting testimony as true, and a remand for further proceedings regarding 9 1 the credibility of a claimant is an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 348 (affirming the 2 district court’s order remanding for further proceedings where the ALJ failed to explain with sufficient 3 specificity the basis for rejecting the claimant’s testimony); Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 642 (9th 4 Cir. 1995) (remanding the case “for further proceedings evaluating the credibility of [the claimant’s] 5 subjective complaints …”). Consequently, the Court finds a remand for further proceedings and re- 6 evaluation of Plaintiff’s testimony is appropriate. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 7 8 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal 9 standards in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility, and administrative decision should not be upheld. See 10 Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 510. Because remand is appropriate for further proceedings, the Court offers no 11 findings related the remaining issue identified in Plaintiff’s opening brief. 12 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 13 1. proceedings consistent with this decision; and 14 15 The matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further 2. The Clerk of Court IS DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Genevieve 16 Miranda and against Defendant, Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social 17 Security. 18 19 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 11, 2017 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10

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