Heredia v. CCI

Filing 24

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 11/6/2017. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AARON AUGUSTINE HEREDIA,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 1:16-cv-00788-JLT (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

v.
(Doc. 23)
CCI, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER DIRECTING CLERK’S OFFICE TO
CLOSE CASE

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the

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Eighth Amendment for failure to protect him from dangerous conditions. Despite twice receiving

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the required pleading and legal standards and dismissal of Plaintiff’s Original and First Amended

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Complaint for his failure to link any of the named defendants to his factual allegations, Plaintiff

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failed to link any individual state actors to any of his factual allegations in the Second Amended

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Complaint. Further, Plaintiff now fails to state any specific factual allegations regarding any

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particular incident to show that he was housed under dangerous conditions. Given that this is his

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third effort, it appears that Plaintiff is unable to state a cognizable claim and to link any state

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actors to his allegations. Because of this, the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with

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prejudice.
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ANALYSIS

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A.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

Screening Requirement

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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B.

Summary of the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff complains of an incident that occurred at California Correctional Institute

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(“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California and now names the following defendants: CCI Warden Kim

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Holland; FC Chariperson J. Jones; CCII T. Nipper; CCI(A) A. Tabias; Lt. Inmate Assessment, K.

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Large; and CSR A. Barkley.

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Plaintiff alleges that, due to an administration error, he was living on a level 3 yard, but

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was supposed to be on a level 2 yard -- which put his life in danger. After an incident, Plaintiff

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was shot, sprayed, hit, stripped, and denied “medical care for over five hours on more than one

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occasion.”

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Plaintiff fails both to link any of the individuals named as defendants to his factual

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allegations and does not even state factual allegations to show that he was attacked, let alone

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stated any cognizable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the SAC. Since Plaintiff has twice been

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given opportunity to amend his pleading to correct deficiencies, it appears that further leave to

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amend would be futile and need not be extended. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th

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Cir. 2012). This action is thus DISMISSED with prejudice.

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C.

Pleading Requirements
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

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exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

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U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).

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“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and

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the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

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cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

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Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual

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allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S.

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Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,

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580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally

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and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

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However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze

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v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may

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not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit

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Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

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268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-

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Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

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“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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Despite twice being informed that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v.

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Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,

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2012) (en banc), and that Local Rule 220 requires amended pleadings be “complete in itself,”

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Plaintiff’s allegations have become more and more sparse. The SAC does not contain any

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allegations from which to infer that Plaintiff’s mere placement on a level 3 yard placed him, as a

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level 2 inmate, in danger.
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2.

Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. ' 1983) requires that there be an actual connection or link

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between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

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Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423

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U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation

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of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

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participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

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do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

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(9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each

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named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of

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Plaintiff’s federal rights.

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As noted above, despite twice being informed of this requirement, Plaintiff fails to link

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any individual defendants to any of his factual allegations. The SAC fails to put any defendant on

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notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th

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Cir. 2004).

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D.

Legal Standards
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Eighth Amendment -- Failure to Protect

“The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

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are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832,

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114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Prison officials

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have a duty “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been

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interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714

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F.3d 1155, 1160 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040

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(9th Cir. 2005)).

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To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with

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deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Labatad, at 1160 (citing

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Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective

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and subjective components.
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First, objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious” and where a

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failure to prevent harm is alleged, “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions

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posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

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349, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and

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disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern,

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45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). A prison official must "be aware of facts from which the

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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the

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inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Liability may follow only if a prison

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official "knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by

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failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that any of the individuals he named as defendants

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knew that he was in the wrong housing unit, that being housed in a wrong unit posed a substantial

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risk of serious harm and that any of the named defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive

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risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff’s general allegations that the defendants knew he had been

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placed in the wrong housing unit are conclusory and need not be accepted as true. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 678.

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2.

Eighth Amendment -- Medical Care

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Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a

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prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need

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is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘“significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton

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infliction of pain.”’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner,

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439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th

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Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th

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Cir.1997) (en banc))

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To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must

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first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

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could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second,

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the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”
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Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096

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(quotation marks omitted)).

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As to the first prong, indications of a serious medical need “include the existence of an

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injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

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treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

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activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060,

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1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

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1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff again fails to allege what

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medical condition he had that might constitute a serious medical need.

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As to the second prong, deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than

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negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or

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safety.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319).

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Deliberate indifference is shown where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial

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risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”

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Id., at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

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prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680

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F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “A prisoner need not show his harm was

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substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the

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defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin, 974

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F.2d at 1060.

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Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

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(9th Cir.2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

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which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

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‘must also draw the inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison

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official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the

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Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe,

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Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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Plaintiff merely alleges that the named defendants “didn’t allow me medical care for over
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5 hrs on more than one occasion.” (Doc. 23, p. 5.) Plaintiff does not allege what injury he had

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that needed medical attention in less than 5 hours. Indeed, such a delay is common in most

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emergency rooms for non life-threatening conditions; the fact he is a prisoner does not entitle him

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to a greater level of care. Further, Plaintiff fails to link any individual defendant to his allegations

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to show that any of them specifically knew that Plaintiff suffered from any medical condition and

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intentionally chose action contrary to his medical needs.

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3.

Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff was also twice previously informed that supervisory personnel are generally not

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liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior

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and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him

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and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607

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F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,

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442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of

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supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory

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defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew

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of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so

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deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of

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the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

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citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983,

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liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a

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theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action -

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where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a

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misnomer." Id. Knowledge and acquiescence of a subordinate's misconduct is insufficient to

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establish liability; each government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.

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A>[B]are assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a Aformulaic recitation of the

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elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of ruling on a motion to

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dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an assumption of truth.@ Moss,

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572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch
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allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but rather

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because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast in the

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form of a factual allegation.@ Id. Thus, any allegations that supervisory personnel such as a

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Warden is somehow liable because of the acts of those under his or her supervision does not state

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a cognizable claim.

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Despite previously being given these standards for claims against supervisory personnel,

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Plaintiff fails to state anything other than legal conclusions against all of the defendants -- let

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alone any of the supervisory defendants named in this action.

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ORDER
The Second Amended Complaint neither links any of the named defendants to factual

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allegations, nor states any cognizable claims. Given the persistent deficiency in Plaintiff’s

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pleading, despite having previously been provided the requisite legal standards, it appears futile to

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allow further amendment. Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212-13.

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Accordingly, the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice and the
Clerk of the Court is directed to close the action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

November 6, 2017

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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