Schinkel v. Sullivan

Filing 10

ORDER DISCHARGING 8 Order to Show Cause; FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss Action Without Leave to Amend, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 12/29/16. Objections to F&R Due Within Twenty-One Days. (Marrujo, C)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LARRY SCHINKEL, 12 13 14 Plaintiff, v. SULLIVAN, 15 Defendant. 16 Case No. 1:16-cv-00818-AWI-JLT (PC) ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Docs. 1, 8, 9) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1) 21-DAY DEADLINE 17 18 Plaintiff seeks to proceed on claims under the Eighth Amendment for an incident in May 19 2015 when Correctional Cook Sullivan refused to unlock the door to the restroom which forced 20 Plaintiff to defecate in a mop bucket. Plaintiff fails and is unable to state any cognizable claims 21 on this incident which requires dismissal of this action. 22 A. Screening Requirement 23 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 25 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 26 frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 27 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 28 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 1 1 per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 2 as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 3 not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 4 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015). 5 B. 6 Plaintiff alleges that on May 2, 2015, while performing his job duties at Pleasant Valley Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint 7 State Prison, he informed Correctional Cook Sullivan that he needed to use the restroom. She 8 refused to unlock it and told him to return to work. Plaintiff complied, but shortly thereafter 9 began to experience lower abdominal pain and so again requested to use the restroom. This time, 10 Cook Sullivan ordered him to return to work, which Plaintiff did with great reluctance and 11 increasing discomfort. He continued to attempt to hold his bowel movement until increasing pain 12 and desperation caused him to defecate in a mop bucket, much to his discomfort and 13 embarrassment. Thereafter, Cook Sullivan issued Plaintiff a rules violation report for defecating 14 in the mop bucket.1 Plaintiff also alleges that prison personnel at PVSP ignore violations of 15 inmate rights and that the Appeals Coordinator’s Office ignores their complaints of violations and 16 frivolously screens out inmate grievances, changes them, delays them, and/or completely ignores 17 them. 18 Plaintiff names Cook Sullivan and PVSP as the only Defendants in this action and seeks 19 monetary damages as well as removal of Cook Sullivan from her position supervising inmates.2 20 For the reasons discussed in detail below, Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims and his 21 allegations are not amendable to correction. Thus, leave to amend need not be extended and this 22 action should be dismissed with prejudice. C. 23 Pleading Requirements 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 24 25 1 26 27 28 The Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this action is not barred by Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). (Doc. 8.) The OSC is DISCHARGED as Plaintiff responded by providing a copy of the Modification Order which dismissed the RVR from his C-File. (Doc. 9.) 2 Plaintiff also requested that the RVR be reversed, but this request was rendered moot by the modification order Plaintiff recently filed. (See Doc. 9, p. 3.) 2 1 "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 2 exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 3 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 5 "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 6 the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 7 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 8 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 9 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 10 Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 11 plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 12 allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 13 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 14 While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 15 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 16 and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 17 However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 18 v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 19 not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 20 Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 21 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal- 22 Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 23 omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and 24 “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 25 plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 26 2. Linkage Requirement 27 The Civil Rights Act requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 28 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. 3 1 ' 1983; See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 2 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation 3 of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 4 participates in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 5 do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 6 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each 7 named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 8 Plaintiff=s federal rights. 9 Other than his specific allegations against Cook Sullivan, Plaintiff generally complains 10 that PVSP personnel ignore violations of inmates’ rights, which is too amorphous to put any other 11 state actors on notice of Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 12 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). Such allegations are also too conclusory to be facially plausible. 13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 14 15 16 D. Claims for Relief 1. Eighth Amendment -- Conditions of Confinement The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 17 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 18 Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, no matter where they are housed, prison 19 officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, 20 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 21 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To establish a violation of the Eighth 22 Amendment, the prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference. . . .” 23 Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. 24 County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 25 The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. 26 First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer at 834. 27 Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate 28 health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). 4 1 Objectively, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement 2 claim and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are 3 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 4 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). Temporarily unconstitutional conditions 5 of confinement generally do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Anderson v. 6 County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995) ref Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir. 7 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (in evaluating 8 challenges to conditions of confinement, length of time the prisoner must go without basic human 9 needs may be considered). 10 To be cognizable, temporary conditions of confinement must be severe or prolonged. 11 Subjection of a prisoner to lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an 12 infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 13 1005, 1006 (10th Cir.1987) (Eighth Amendment claim established by allegations that prisoner 14 was placed naked in a lice-infested cell with no blankets in below forty-degree temperatures, 15 denied food or served dirty food, and left with his head in excrement while having a seizure); 16 McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 366-69 (4th Cir.1974) (prisoner placed naked in bare, concrete, 17 “mental observation” cell with excrement-encrusted pit toilet for 48 hours after he allegedly set 18 fire to his cell; prisoner had no bedding, sink, washing facilities, or personal hygiene items, and 19 he was not seen by a doctor until after he was released), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Gates 20 v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1302 (5th Cir.1974) (punishment of prisoner by confinement in small, 21 dirty cell without light, hygienic materials, adequate food, heat; prisoner also was punished 22 through administration of milk of magnesia); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d 23 Cir.1972) (prisoner confined for five days in strip cell with only a pit toilet and without light, a 24 sink, or other washing facilities), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). 25 Cook Sullivan’s refusal to unlock the restroom for Plaintiff which caused him to defecate 26 in a mop bucket was no doubt unpleasant and may have caused Plaintiff to experience pain via 27 momentary abdominal cramps while holding in his bowel movement. However, at most, it 28 amounted to a temporary condition which is not near severe enough to state a cognizable claim 5 1 2 3 under the Eighth Amendment. 2. Due Process -- Inmate Appeals/Grievances Plaintiff appears to grieve the general processing and reviewing of inmate grievances by 4 PVSP personnel by asserting a “denial of right to address abuse, institutional coverup (sic) and 5 the condoning of such abuse.” The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of 6 liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, in 7 order to state a cause of action for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the 8 existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. AStates may under certain 9 circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.@ Sandin v. 10 Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited 11 to freedom from restraint which Aimposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 12 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.@ Id. 13 "[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 14 procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in 15 processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure), citing Mann v. 16 Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right 17 only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 18 Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see 19 also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure 20 confers no liberty interest on prisoner). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 21 requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. 22 DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 23 Actions in reviewing prisoner=s administrative appeal generally cannot serve as the basis 24 for liability under a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who 25 knows about a violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution 26 himself is not correct. AOnly persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. 27 Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the 28 violation.@ Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir.2005) accord George v. Smith, 507 6 1 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance 2 v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992-93 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, Plaintiff fails and is unable to state a 3 cognizable claim for the general handling/mishandling of inmate grievances at PVSP. 4 5 3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity -- PVSP Though, Plaintiff names PVSP as a defendant, he may not sustain an action against a state 6 prison. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an 7 un-consenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 8 1991); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico 9 Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. 10 Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state 11 agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources 12 Defense Council v. California Dep=t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks v. 13 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 14 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency 15 entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 16 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). AThough its language might suggest otherwise, the Eleventh 17 Amendment has long been construed to extend to suits brought against a state by its own citizens, 18 as well as by citizens of other states.@ Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053 (citations omitted). AThe 19 Eleventh Amendment=s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as 20 defendants, and applies whether the relief is legal or equitable in nature.@ Id. (citation omitted). 21 Because PVSP is a part of the California Department of Corrections, which is a state agency, it is 22 immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 23 24 25 4. California Law a. Negligence Plaintiff states that the acts he complains of amounted to a “negligent disregard of the 26 safety and welfare” of inmates at PVSP. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) “An action in negligence requires a 27 showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, 28 and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. 7 1 [Citations.]” Regents of the Univ. of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 240 Cal. 2 App. 4th 1296, 1310, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 458 (2015), reh'g denied (Oct. 26, 2015) quoting 3 Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 4 P.2d 207 (Ann M.) [disapproved on another ground in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 5 527, fn. 5, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 327, 235 P.3d 988].) 6 "In order to establish liability on a negligence theory, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, 7 causation and damages. The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence 8 of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection against 9 unintentional invasion. Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has 10 been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. To say that 11 someone owes another a duty of care is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid 12 to analysis in itself. [D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of 13 those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 14 protection. [L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions 15 that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” Los Angeles 16 Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomaniac, Inc. 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 908 (2015) (citations 17 and quotations omitted). Plaintiff fails to state any allegations upon which to establish the 18 elements for a negligence claim. 19 b. California Tort Claims Act 20 However, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged elements for a negligence claim, under 21 the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), set forth in California Government Code sections 810 22 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against a public employee or entity 23 unless the plaintiff first presented the claim to the California Victim Compensation and 24 Government Claims Board (“VCGCB” or “Board”), and the Board acted on the claim, or the time 25 for doing so expired. “The Tort Claims Act requires that any civil complaint for money or 26 damages first be presented to and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 27 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776 (1995). The purpose of this requirement is “to provide the public 28 entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if 8 1 appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 2 447, 455 (1974) (citations omitted). Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” 3 constitutes an element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official. State v. 4 Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Thus, in the state courts, “failure to 5 allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement 6 subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” Id. at 7 1239 (fn.omitted). 8 9 To be timely, a claim must be presented to the VCGCB “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Govt.Code § 911.2. Thereafter, Aany suit brought against 10 a public entity@ must be commenced no more than six months after the public entity rejects the 11 claim. Cal. Gov. Code, ' 945.6, subd. (a)(1). 12 Federal courts must require compliance with the CTCA for pendant state law claims that 13 seek damages against state employees or entities. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th 14 Cir.1969); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th 15 Cir.1995). State tort claims included in a federal action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may 16 proceed only if the claims were first presented to the state in compliance with the applicable 17 requirements. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th 18 Cir.1988); Butler v. Los Angeles County, 617 F.Supp.2d 994, 1001 (C.D.Cal.2008). Plaintiff fails 19 to state any allegations to show compliance with the CTCA upon which to proceed on negligence 20 claims under California law. 21 22 c. Supplemental Jurisdiction Finally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has 23 original jurisdiction, the district court Ashall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims 24 in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy 25 under Article III,@ except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). A[O]nce judicial power exists 26 under ' 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is 27 discretionary.@ Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). AThe district court 28 may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the 9 1 district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 2 1367(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013); Herman 3 Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Watison v. 4 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2012) (even in the presence of cognizable federal 5 claim, district court has discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over novel or complex 6 issue of state law of whether criminal statutes give rise to civil liability). The Supreme Court has 7 cautioned that Aif the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be 8 dismissed as well.@ United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 9 Thus, even if Plaintiff has complied with the CTCA, jurisdiction over his claims under 10 California law should not be exercised since Plaintiff fails and is unable to state a cognizable 11 claim under § 1983 upon which to proceed in this Court.3 12 CONCLUSION 13 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against any of the named Defendants, and given 14 the tenor of his allegations, he is unable to do so. Plaintiff need not be granted leave to amend as 15 the defects in his pleading are not capable of being cured through amendment absent fabrication. 16 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that the order to show cause is 17 18 DISCHARGED, and Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the order to show cause, filed on December 19 27, 2016 (Doc. 9), is MOOT. Also based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed 20 21 without leave to amend. These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 22 23 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within 21 24 days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 25 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s 26 Findings and Recommendations.@ 27 28 3 Plaintiff is not prohibited from pursuing an action on his allegations against Cook Sullivan in state court. 10 1 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the 2 waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) 3 (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 5 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: December 29, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.

Why Is My Information Online?