The Estate of Jason Alderman et al v. City of Bakersfield et al

Filing 52

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO BIFURCATE MONELL CLAIMS 41 signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 8/28/2018. (Thorp, J)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12
13

THE ESTATE OF JASON ALDERMAN;
JUDY EDENS, an individual; A.K., by and
through his guardian ad litem NENA
CHAVEZ; and S.A., by and through his
guardian ad litem STEPHANIE ELLIOTT,

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Plaintiffs,
v.

No. 1:16-cv-00994-DAD-JLT

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO BIFURCATE MONELL
CLAIMS
(Doc. No. 41)

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD;
BAKERSFIELD POLICE
DEPARTMENT; OFFICER CHAD
GARRETT, an individual; OFFICER
RICK WIMBISH, an individual; and
DOES 1-50,
Defendants.

21
22

Plaintiffs, the Estate of decedent Jason Alderman, A.K., by and through his guardian ad

23

litem Nena Chavez, and S.A., by and through his guardian ad litem Stephanie Elliott,

24

(“plaintiffs”) brought this civil rights action against defendants the City of Bakersfield,

25

Bakersfield Police Department, officer Chad Garrett (“officer Garrett”), and Officer Rick

26

Wimbish (“officer Wimbish”) (hereinafter jointly “defendants”). Following the Final Pretrial

27

Conference held on July 16, 2018 (Doc. No. 40), defendants have moved to bifurcate the issue of

28

the liability of officers Chad Garrett and Rick Wimbish from plaintiffs’ Monell claims brought
1

1

against the City of Bakersfield for purposes of trial. (Doc. No. 41.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition

2

on August 6, 2018. (Doc. No. 45.) Defendants filed a reply on August 9, 2018. (Doc. No. 46.)

3

Having considered the parties’ briefings and for the reasons explained below, the court will deny

4

defendants’ motion to bifurcate.

5

BACKGROUND

6

This case involves the death of Jason Alderman (“decedent” or “Mr. Alderman”), who

7

was shot by Bakersfield Police Department (“BDP”) officer Chad Garrett on August 22, 2015.

8

Officer Rick Wimbish was also present during the incident. Mr. Alderman was shot as he was

9

attempting to exit a restaurant after breaking into it. Plaintiffs initiated this suit on July 11, 2016

10

and describe the six causes of action they have brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state

11

law as follows: (1) violation of civil rights – 42 U.S.C § 1983; (2) violation of civil rights –

12

Monell claim; (3) violation of civil rights – familial relationship; (4) violation of civil rights –

13

familial relationship (Monell); (5) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; and (6) wrongful

14

death – negligence. (See Doc. No. 1 at 6–13.)

15
16

Notably, in the two years following the initiation of this action by the filing of the
complaint, neither party has filed any dispositive motions.

17

LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states that district courts “may order a separate trial

18
19

of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims” for

20

purposes of convenience, avoiding prejudice, economy, or expediency. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. “Rule

21

42(b) . . . confers broad discretion upon the district court to bifurcate a trial, thereby deferring

22

costly and possibly unnecessary proceedings pending resolution of potentially dispositive

23

preliminary issues.” Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002);

24

see also Estate of Lopez v. Suhr, No. 15-CV-01846-HSG, 2016 WL 1639547, at *4 (N.D. Cal.

25

Apr. 26, 2016) (“Rule 42(b) confers broad authority and gives the district court virtually

26

unlimited freedom to try the issues in whatever way trial convenience requires.”) (internal

27

citations omitted). A district court’s decision of whether to bifurcate a trial is reviewed for an

28

/////
2

1

abuse of discretion. Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir.

2

2004).

3

The determination of whether to bifurcate a trial should be based on factors including

4

“potential prejudice to the parties, potential confusion to the jury, and the relative convenience

5

and economy which would result.” Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 2005), order

6

clarified, No. CV 02-204744MMMMANX, 2005 WL 283361 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2005); see also

7

Clark v. I.R.S., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (D. Haw. 2009) (decision to bifurcate should be based

8

on whether the issues are significantly different; whether the issues are tried before a jury or the

9

court; whether discovery favors bifurcation; whether the evidence on the issues overlaps; and

10

whether bifurcation will prejudice the party opposing the motion). “Absent some experience

11

demonstrating the worth of bifurcation, separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely

12

ordered.” Afshar v. City of Sacramento, No. CIV S-04-1088LKKJFB, 2007 WL 779748, at *1

13

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

14
15

DISCUSSION
The court is not persuaded that the benefits of bifurcation outweigh its potential

16

complexities and likelihood of prejudice to plaintiffs. Defendants argue that the court should

17

bifurcate the issue of the defendant officers’ liability from the Monell claims to prevent evidence

18

of prior shootings or lawsuits from unfairly influencing the question of whether the individual

19

officers’ use of force was reasonable in this instance. (Doc. No. 41-1 at 15–16.) Defendants also

20

argue that “a finding of no liability on the party [sic] of individual officers will serve as a bar to

21

consideration of any Monell issues against the employing municipality . . . .” (Id. at 16.) Finally,

22

defendants argue that there is a significant risk of confusion and prejudice if the court were to

23

simultaneously try both the individual liability and Monell claims. Each of these arguments are

24

considered in turn below.

25

The use of limiting instructions has been recognized as an effective manner to prevent the

26

jury’s consideration of prejudicial evidence. The defense correctly contends that evidence of

27

prior officer-involved shootings should not be considered in determining whether the individual

28

officers’ use of force was excessive in this instance. See Gates v. Rivera, 993 F.2d 697, 700 (9th
3

1

Cir. 1993) (holding that evidence as to whether the police officer had previously shot anyone

2

should have been excluded in the trial of a § 1983 action alleging excessive force, as the

3

“question to be resolved was whether, objectively, his use of force had been excessive.”)1

4

However, the court can prevent the jury’s consideration of prior officer-involved shootings in

5

determining individual liability by giving limiting instructions. See Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los

6

Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 806–07 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Though some of the evidence relevant to the

7

Monell claims was irrelevant to individual liability, the district court’s many limiting instructions

8

cured any possible prejudice.”); Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir.

9

2015) (district court’s concern of permitting evidence implicating Rule 404(b) could “have been

10

cured short of categorical exclusion by an appropriate limiting instruction.”). “Ordinarily, a

11

cautionary instruction is presumed to have cured prejudicial impact.” Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d

12

995, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000). The court finds that the potential prejudice of evidence of prior

13

officer-involved shootings can be cured by limiting instructions and thus, this argument does not

14

weigh in favor of bifurcation.
Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs will be unable to prevail on Monell claims without a

15
16

finding of liability on the part of the individual officers in this case (Doc. No. 41-1 at 16) is

17

subject to question under some recognized circumstances.

18

[W]e explicitly rejected a municipality's argument that it could not
be held liable as a matter of law because the jury had determined that
the individual officers had inflicted no constitutional injury. If a
plaintiff established he suffered constitutional injury by the City, the
fact that individual officers are exonerated is immaterial to liability
under § 1983.

19
20
21
22

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and

23

citations omitted), overruled on other grounds in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060

24

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir.

25

2012); Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 916–17 (9th Cir. 2002); M.H. v. County of Alameda, 62

26

1

27
28

Evidence of prior complaints of excessive force against a defendant officer may not be admitted
to prove character, but may be admissible to show that the municipality had “proof of
knowledge” in the context of a Monell claim. Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010,
1028 (9th Cir. 2015).
4

1

F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1082, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
In this case, the court cannot conclude that plaintiff’s Monell claims are solely premised

2
3

on a theory that first require a finding of liability on the part of defendant officers Garrett and

4

Wimbish. Because neither party engaged in any substantive pretrial motion practice, the court is

5

limited to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint in identifying plaintiffs’ theories of Monell

6

liability. In that regard, the complaint alleges both policies of action and inaction by the City of

7

Bakersfield that, if proven, may constitute constitutional injuries to plaintiffs independent of

8

defendant officers Garrett and Wimbish. See Fairley, 281 F.3d at 917. For example, plaintiffs’

9

complaint alleges that the City of Bakersfield engaged in misconduct in investigating decedent’s

10

death, including improperly withholding information from plaintiffs and backdating the autopsy

11

report (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 24–27) and that such misconduct was part of an official custom or policy

12

(id. at ¶ 51–52). If proven, this allegation may suffice as the basis for an independent

13

constitutional injury inflicted by the defendant City that is unaffected by potential exoneration of

14

the individual officers. See Fairley, 281 F.3d at 916. This example alone warrants declining to

15

bifurcate the trial, as exoneration of the individual officers in the first phase of a bifurcated trial

16

would not preclude a jury verdict imposing Monell liability on the City in the second phase of the

17

trial.

18

Without assurance that resolution of the first phase of the trial could be dispositive of the

19

entire case, bifurcating the Monell claims from the individual claims appears to have no purpose

20

other than resulting in duplicative proceedings undermining judicial economy. Defendants argue

21

that there is a significant risk of confusion if the court were to simultaneously try both the

22

individual liability and Monell claims, in part due to the multitude of facts relating to prior

23

incidents of alleged officer impropriety. (Doc. No. 41-1 at 17–18). However, any confusion or

24

prejudice that defendants may face can be combatted with limiting jury instructions and will

25

certainly be less significant than precluding plaintiffs from presenting a theory of Monell liability

26

for which the municipality may be liable, independent of the individual defendants.

27

/////

28

/////
5

1

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to bifurcate the Monell claims (Doc.

2

No. 41) for purposes of trial is denied.

3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

4
5

Dated:

August 28, 2018
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6