Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe
ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion 6 for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference. Order signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 10/25/2016. (Timken, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,
Case No. 1:16-cv-01067-AWI-SKO
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX
PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
SERVE A THIRD PARTY SUBPOENA
PRIOR TO RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE
JOHN DOE, subscriber assigned IP address
Plaintiff Malibu Media, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against John Doe
22 (“Defendant”) on July 24, 2016, alleging infringement claims pursuant to the United States
23 Copyright Act of 1976. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff claims Defendant is a persistent online infringer of
24 Plaintiff’s copyrighted films. On September 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to serve a
25 third-party subpoena prior to a Rule 26(f) conference. (Doc. 6.) As Defendant has not yet been
26 identified by name, no opposition was filed. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court finds
27 Plaintiff’s motion suitable for decision without oral argument, and no hearing on this matter shall
1 be set. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED subject to the noted
2 restrictions herein.
Plaintiff is a limited liability company that produces copyrighted adult films. Defendant is
5 alleged to have used the BitTorrent file distribution network to download adult pornographic films
6 subject to copyrights held by Plaintiff. Defendant has been identified in this lawsuit only by an
7 Internet Protocol address (“IP Address”) assigned to a customer on a specific date by an Internet
8 Service Provider (“ISP”) and through which the copyrighted works were allegedly downloaded.
BitTorrent technology has been described by several courts, including the district court in
10 Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15-cv-4369 (AKH), 2015 WL 4092417, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6,
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol that allows users to
transfer large files over the internet by breaking the complete file (the “Seed”) into
small pieces to be downloaded in parts. Other users (“Peers”) downloaded a small
“torrent” file that contains an index of the pieces and directions for connecting to
the Seed. When Peers connect to the Seed, they download pieces of the file at
random, and begin sharing each piece once it has completed downloading. After
all the pieces are downloaded, the BitTorrent software reassembles the pieces into a
complete file for the Peer to view.
BitTorrent is distinguishable from other file sharing protocols by its users’
ability to upload and download files simultaneously. This non-sequential download
structure reduces the bottleneck of traffic, which allows for faster download speeds.
The Peers that are uploading and downloading the same Seed file from each other
at a given point in time are collectively called a “Swarm.” Members of a Swarm
are able to see the IP addresses of other Peers to whom they are connected. In
addition, BitTorrent “tracks” the pieces of a file as it is shared, so Peers can identify
the IP addresses from which the file was downloaded.
23 Id. (citing Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1, 288 F.R.D. 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), Next Phase
24 Distribution, Inc. v. John Does 1-27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y 2012), In re BitTorrent Adult Film
25 Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to serve a third-party subpoena prior to a Federal Rule
27 of Civil Procedure 26(f) discovery conference, requesting permission to initiate discovery to
28 identify the account subscriber associated with the IP Address used to download Plaintiff’s
1 copyrighted films, notwithstanding the provision of Rule 26(d)(1) that precludes a party from
2 seeking discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).
3 Plaintiff contends a Rule 45 subpoena to the ISP must be permitted to obtain the identity of the
4 customer assigned the IP Address on the dates1 in question to ascertain the identity of the person
5 responsible for unauthorized downloading of the copyrighted works produced by Plaintiff.
6 Plaintiff maintains there is no other way for it to obtain this information.
Generally, a party may not conduct discovery before the parties have met and conferred
10 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) “except in a proceeding exempted from initial
11 disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court
12 order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant’s identity is
13 unknown at the time the complaint is filed, a court may grant the plaintiff leave to take early
14 discovery to determine the defendant’s identity “unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover
15 the identit[y], or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti,
16 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). District courts in the Ninth Circuit have permitted expedited
17 discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference upon a showing of “good cause.” See, e.g., In re
18 Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing
19 Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). “Good cause exists
20 where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice,
21 outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig.,
22 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff Has Established Good Cause to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena
District courts within the Ninth Circuit have typically found good cause supporting early or
25 expedited discovery in cases where the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement accomplished
26 through distribution of the work over a peer-to-peer network, and where the plaintiff sought early
In its complaint, Plaintiff specifically identifies 55 of its separate works that Defendant allegedly downloaded,
copied, and distributed without authorization from December 2014 to May 8, 2016. (Docs. 1-3 and 1-4, Exhibits A
1 discovery to obtain the identities and contact information of the alleged infringers from associated
2 ISPs. See, e.g., Berlin Media Art E.K. v. Does 1 through 146, No. S-11-2039 KJM GGH, 2011
3 WL 4056167, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (unpublished) (granting leave to serve Rule 45
4 subpoena to identify doe defendant); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-10, No. 2:12-cv-36235 ODW (PJWx), 2012 WL 5382304 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012).
In applying the good cause standard in cases where the unknown defendant is an
Balancing Interests in the Context of Copyright Infringement
8 anonymous internet user, courts give careful consideration to the diverging interests of both the
9 party seeking the discovery and the unknown Doe defendant:
With the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious
acts, such as defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement,
entirely on-line. The tortfeasor can act pseudonymously or anonymously and may
give fictitious or incomplete identifying information. Parties who have been
injured by these acts are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually discovering
the identity of the tortfeasor.
In such cases the traditional reluctance for permitting filings against John
Doe defendants or fictitious names and the traditional enforcement of strict
compliance with service requirements should be tempered by the need to provide
injured parties with a forum in which they may seek redress for grievances.
However, this need must be balanced against the legitimate and valuable right to
participate in online forums anonymously or pseudonymously. People are
permitted to interact pseudonymously and anonymously with each other so long as
those acts are not in violation of the law. This ability to speak one’s mind without
the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one’s identity can foster
open communication and robust debate. Furthermore, it permits persons to obtain
information relevant to a sensitive or intimate condition without fear of
embarrassment. People who have committed no wrong should be able to
participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass
them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court’s order to
discover their identity.
24 Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). As it pertains to
25 copyright infringement cases involving the internet, many courts have documented growing
26 concerns about “copyright trolls,” “roughly defined as plaintiffs who are ‘more focused on the
27 business of litigation than on selling a product or service or licensing their [copyrights] to third
1 parties to sell a product or service.’“ Malibu Media, LLC, 2015 WL 4092417, at * 2 (quoting
2 Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1105, 1108 (2015)).
“The paradigmatic troll plays a numbers game in which it targets hundreds or
thousands of defendants, seeking quick settlements priced just low enough that it is
less expensive for the defendant to pay the troll rather than defend the
claim.” [Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 Iowa L. Rev.
1105, 1108 (2015)]. The lawsuits most frequently target anonymous John Does for
alleged infringement related to the use of BitTorrent. Indeed, of “the 3,817
copyright law suits filed in 2013, over 43% were against John Does and more than
three-quarters of those related to pornography.” Id. at 1108–09. But almost none
ever reaches a hearing. Rather, the “lawsuits are filed to take advantage of court
ordered discovery [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)] to break the veil of anonymity that
separates IP addresses from the account information of actual human
beings.” Id. at 1109; see also Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 241
(S.D.N.Y.2012). They then use this information to quickly negotiate settlements
on mass scale without any intention of taking the case to trial. [footnote omitted]
See, e.g., Media Prods., Inc., DBA Devil’s Film v. John Does 1–26, No. 12–cv–
3719, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (explaining that the settlements in these
BitTorrent cases are “are for notoriously low amounts relative to the possible
statutory damages, but high relative to the low value of the work and minimal costs
of mass litigation. Cases are almost never prosecuted beyond sending demand
letters and threatening phone calls.”).
15 Malibu Media, LLC, 2015 WL 4092417, at * 2.
The danger of copyright trolls is particularly acute in the context of pornography. In these
17 cases, “there is a risk not only of public embarrassment for the misidentified defendant, but also
18 that the innocent defendant may be coerced into an unjust settlement with the plaintiff to prevent
19 the dissemination of publicity surrounding unfounded allegations.” Media Prods., Inc., No. 1220 cv-3719, at 4; see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-5, No. 12-cv-2950 (JPO), 2012 WL
21 2001968, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (“This Court shares the growing concern about
22 unscrupulous tactics used by certain plaintiffs, especially in the adult film industry, to shake down
23 the owners of specific IP addresses from which copyrighted adult films were allegedly
The abuses of Malibu Media in particular have been discussed by a court in the Southern
26 District of New York:
However, Malibu’s corporate strategy relies on aggressively suing for
infringement and obtaining accelerated discovery of the IP address holder’s identity
from the ISP. It then seeks quick, out-of-court settlements which, because they are
hidden, raise serious questions about misuse of court procedure. Judges regularly
complain about Malibu. For example, in May, Judge Timothy Black of the
Southern District of Ohio surveyed some of Malibu’s questionable conduct in
litigations across the country. See Order to Show Cause, ECF Doc. No. 15, Malibu
Media, LLC v. Ryan Ramsey, No. 14–cv–718 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2015). He found
that, while “Malibu Media asserts that it is necessary to invoke the Court’s
subpoena power to ‘propound discovery in advance of a Rule 26(f) conference’ . . .
[,] not a single one of these 60 cases [filed in this district over the previous 12
months] has even progressed to a Rule 26(f) conference.” Id. at 5. Indeed, most
are dismissed even without the issuance of a summons. Id. Malibu’s motive is to
use the federal courts only to obtain identifying information in order to coerce fast
settlements. Id. at 8 (citing Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1–54, No. 12–cv–1407,
2012 WL 30302, at *5 (D. Colo. July 25, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does,
923 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1345–46 (M.D.Fla.2013)).
Malibu effectuates its strategy by employing tactics clearly calculated to
embarrass defendants. For example, in recent complaints filed in the Wisconsin
federal courts, an attached “Exhibit C” listed additional pornographic videos
downloaded to the defendants’ IP addresses using BitTorrent. The titles in Exhibit
C were extremely racy and lewd, and the district court sanctioned Malibu when it
learned that Malibu did not even own the copyrights for the titles; rather, it had
gratuitously listed them to coerce larger, faster settlements by further shaming
defendants. See Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe subscriber assigned IP address
184.108.40.206, 2013 WL 4821911 (W.D. Wis. Sep. 10, 2013); Malibu Media, LLC
v. Doe, No. 13–cv–536, 2013 WL 6579338, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2013).
When courts have attempted to place restrictions on the subpoena to prevent
Malibu from abusing the process to extort defendants, Malibu has flagrantly
disregarded them. For example, after one court issued “two orders unambiguously
ordering [Malibu] to file [the identified IP-registrant’s name] under seal,” Malibu
filed it publicly anyway. Order to Show Cause, ECF Doc. No. 17, Malibu Media,
LLC v. Austen Downs, 14–cv–707 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2015). And in the Eastern
District of New York, Magistrate Judge Gary Brown took additional precautions to
protect John Doe’s identity by explicitly instructing that “the subpoenaed
information be sent directly to the Court, ex parte and under seal.” Patrick Collins,
Inc. v. Doe 1, 288 F.R.D. 233, 236 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012). Malibu instead
served subpoenas that requested the identifying information be sent directly to
Plaintiff’s counsel. Id.
23 Malibu Media, LLC, 2015 WL 4092417, at * 4.
Despite these concerns, most district courts have permitted Plaintiff to serve ISPs with
25 third-party subpoenas to discover the identity of the customer associated with the relevant IP
26 Address. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-cv-4381 (JFK), 2015 WL 4923114
27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-16, No. 12-cv-1847-AJB (DHB),
1 2012 WL 3809128 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012).2 The service of these subpoenas, however, has been
2 subject to restrictions aimed at protecting the privacy and the interests of the individuals whose
3 identity is discovered pursuant to the subpoenas. With this interest-balancing framework in mind,
4 and particularly the concerns highlighted regarding these cases, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s
5 request to serve a third-party subpoena in this case and whether good cause exists to do so.
In evaluating whether a plaintiff has established good cause to learn the identity of Doe
Good Cause Factors
8 defendants through early discovery, courts examine whether the plaintiff (1) identifies the Doe
9 defendant with sufficient specificity that the court can determine that the defendant is a real person
10 who can be sued in federal court, (2) recounts the steps previously taken to locate and identify the
11 defendant, (3) demonstrates that the action can withstand a motion to dismiss, and (4) establishes
12 that the discovery is likely to lead to identifying information that will permit service of process.
13 Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578-80; Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 15-00908 LB,
14 2015 WL 1205167, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015).
Here, Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing under each of the four factors to permit it to
16 serve a third-party subpoena to identify Defendant.
Sufficient Specificity and Recounting Steps to Identify Defendant
Plaintiff has identified Defendant with sufficient specificity and has set forth the steps it
19 has taken to do so. Its investigator Tobias Fieser is employed by IPP International UG (“IPP”), a
20 company that provides forensic investigation services to copyright owners. (Doc. 6-4, Fieser
21 Decl., ¶¶ 1-5.) IPP’s forensic software monitors the BitTorrent file distribution network for the
22 presence of infringing transactions involving Plaintiff’s works and identifies IP addresses that are
23 being used by infringers to distribute Plaintiff’s copyrights works within BitTorrent. (Doc. 6-4,
24 Fieser Decl., ¶ 6.) Upon review of IPP’s forensic activity logs, Fieser determined that a computer
25 using the IP Address identified in Plaintiff’s complaint connected to IPP’s servers and transmitted
26 a full copy, or portion, of at least one of the digital media files identified by the file hash values set
Other district courts, however, have refused to grant Malibu Media’s motion to serve a third-party subpoena. See
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15-cv-4369, 2015 WL 4092417, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC
v. Doe, No. 15-cv-1883, 2015 WL 3651566, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015).
1 forth in Exhibit A to the complaint.3
(Doc. 6-4, Fieser Decl., ¶¶ 9-11.)
The IP Address
2 identification is sufficient, at this stage, to indicate a real person used the network to download the
3 copyrighted file. Moreover, Plaintiff sufficiently set forth the steps it has taken to locate and
4 identify Defendant, despite that it has been unable to further identify Defendant by name. See
5 Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-118, No. C 11-01567 LB, 2011 WL 1431612 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
6 14, 2011). The first two good cause factors are satisfied.
Sufficiency of Complaint to Withstand a Motion to Dismiss
Ability to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
To be entitled to early discovery, Plaintiff must establish its complaint can withstand a
10 motion to dismiss. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 579. “Copyright is a federal law protection
11 provided to the authors of original works of authorship.” Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102,
12 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-103). “To establish [copyright] infringement, two
13 elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
14 elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
15 361 (1991). Plaintiff alleges it is the owner of the Copyrights-in-Suit (as identified in an exhibit to
16 the complaint); using BitTorrent, Defendant copied and distributed constituent elements of each of
17 the original works covered by the Copyrights-in-Suit; and Plaintiff did not permit or consent to
18 Defendant’s distribution of its works. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 31-33.) It appears Plaintiff has stated a prima
19 facie claim for copyright infringement that can withstand a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff bears the burden to establish jurisdictional facts, which includes personal
22 jurisdiction over the defendant. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 579. Plaintiff has identified the IP
23 Address associated with the allegedly infringing downloading and copying, and it is located in
24 Bakersfield, California.
This location is within the geographical boundaries of this judicial
25 district. (Doc. 1, ¶ 5; Doc. 1-3, Exhibit A (identifying location of IP Address).) Further, the
26 complaint alleges each of Defendant’s acts of copyright infringement occurred in this district and
Exhibit A contains a list of 51 hash numbers associated with particular copyrighted titles and the dates they were
allegedly downloaded by Defendant. (Doc. 1-3, Exhibit A.)
1 that Defendant or its agents reside or may be found in this district. (Doc. 1, ¶ 7.) At this stage, it
2 is likely that the complaint can withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
3 because Defendant has an IP Address traced to a location in this district. See 808 Holdings v.
4 Collective of December 29, 2011, No. 12-cv-00186, 2012 WL 1648838 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2012).
“In copyright infringement actions, venue is proper ‘in the district in which the defendant
7 or his agent resides or may be found.’“ Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d
8 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1400(a)).
As noted above, Plaintiff has
9 determined the alleged infringing activity occurred through an IP Address within this judicial
10 district; thus, it is likely Plaintiff will be able to survive a motion to dismiss for improper venue
11 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). See Malibu Media, LLC, 2012 WL 3809128, at
Subpoena Likely to Lead to Discovery of Identifying Information
It appears Plaintiff has obtained and investigated the available data pertaining to the
15 alleged infringements and there is no alternative means to ascertain Defendant’s identity other
16 than by subpoenaing the ISP. (Doc. 6-1, 17:15-24); Malibu Media, LLC, 2012 WL 3809128, at *3
17 (IP Addresses obtained sufficiently established investigation efforts, particularly where there is no
18 other practical measures to identify Doe defendants). The information Plaintiff seeks through
19 service of the subpoena will likely to lead to identifying information, including Defendant’s name
20 and address, which should allow Plaintiff to effect service of process on Defendant.
In sum, Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing on all four good cause factors to permit it
22 to pursue discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference.
The Cable Privacy Act, 47 U.S.C. §551, generally prohibits cable operators from
Cable Privacy Act
25 disclosing personally identifiable information regarding subscribers without the prior written or
26 electronic consent of the subscriber. 47 U.S.C. §551(c)(1). The cable operator, however, may
27 disclose this information if the disclosure is made pursuant to a court order and the cable operator
1 provides the subscriber with notice of the order. Id. § 551(c)(2)(B). The ISP Plaintiff intends to
2 subpoena is a cable operator within the meaning of the Act.
Based on the factors discussed above, the Court finds the privacy concerns of the
5 Defendant are balanced with the need for discovery by allowing Malibu to subpoena the ISP to
6 discover Defendant’s identity using the IP Address associated with the allegedly infringing
7 downloads. The restrictions set forth below are intended to provide additional safeguards to
8 Defendant’s privacy interests. This Court takes very seriously the concerns noted by Judge
9 Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York4 and Judge Wright of the Central District of
10 California,5 among many others, regarding the potential for abuse in cases such as this. Although
11 Plaintiff is permitted to serve a third-party subpoena, it is cautioned that any abuses of the judicial
12 system or the discovery process will not be taken lightly.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
On balance of the interests involved, the Court finds Plaintiff has established good cause
15 for the issuance of a third-party subpoena in an attempt to identify Defendant. For the reasons set
16 forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Plaintiff’s motion to serve a third-party subpoena is GRANTED subject to the
18 restrictions noted below;
Plaintiff may immediately serve a Rule 45 Subpoena (“Subpoena”) on the ISP
20 AT&T Internet Services to obtain information to identify Defendant John Doe, specifically his or
21 her name and address. The ISP is not to release the subscriber’s telephone number or email
22 address. A copy of this Order shall be attached to the Subpoena;
AT&T Internet Services shall have 30 days from the date of service of the
24 Subpoena upon it to serve Defendant John Doe with a copy of the Subpoena and a copy of this
25 Order. AT&T Internet Services may serve Defendant using any reasonable means, including
See Malibu Media, LLC, 2015 WL 4092417.
See Malibu Media, LLC, 2012 WL 5382304.
1 written notice sent to his or her last known address, transmitted either by first-class mail or via
2 overnight service;
Defendant shall have 60 days from the date of service of the Subpoena and this
4 Order upon him or her to file any motions with this Court contesting the Subpoena (including a
5 motion to quash or modify the Subpoena), as well as any request to litigate the Subpoena
6 anonymously. AT&T Internet Services may not turn over the Defendant’s identifying information
7 to Plaintiff before the expiration of this 60-day period. Additionally, if the Defendant or ISP files
8 a motion to quash the Subpoena, the ISP may not turn over any information to Plaintiff until the
9 issues have been addressed and the Court issues an Order instructing the ISP to resume turning
10 over the requested discovery. A Doe Defendant who moves to quash or modify the Subpoena, or
11 to proceed anonymously, shall at the same time as her or his filing notify the ISP so that the ISP is
12 on notice not to release any of the Defendant’s contact information to Plaintiff until the Court
13 rules on any such motions;
If the 60-day periods elapse without the Defendant or ISP contesting the Subpoena,
15 the ISP shall have 10 days to produce the information responsive to the Subpoena to Plaintiff;
Upon service with the Subpoena, AT&T Internet Services shall preserve any
17 subpoenaed information pending the resolution of any timely-filed motion to quash; and
Any information ultimately disclosed to Plaintiff in response to a Subpoena may be
19 used by Plaintiff for the sole purpose of protecting Plaintiff’s rights as set forth in the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
October 25, 2016
Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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