Martinez v. County of Tulare et al

Filing 17

ORDER DENYING Defendant San Diego County's 7 Motion to Dismiss, signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 11/14/2016. (The matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for purposes of conducting a conference and issuing a scheduling order.) (Gaumnitz, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARIA EVA MARTINEZ,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

No. 1:16-cv-01140-DAD-SKO

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT SAN
DIEGO COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

TULARE COUNTY, SAN DIEGO
COUNTY, and DOES 1-100,

(Doc. No. 7)

Defendants.

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Plaintiff Maria Eva Martinez filed this action on August 3, 2016 alleging: (1) violations of

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the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against the Tulare County defendants; (2) interference

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with a constitutionally protected right in violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 against the

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Tulare County defendants; (3) false arrest and imprisonment against all defendants; (4)

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negligence against all defendants; and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress against all

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defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 26, 2016, defendant County of San Diego moved to

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dismiss the claims against it, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint failed to state claim upon which

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relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 7.) On

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September 22, 2016, plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 11.) On

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September 30, 2016, the County of San Diego filed a reply. (Doc. No. 15.) On October 6, 2016,

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the court heard oral arguments. At that hearing, attorney Caitlin Blythe appeared telephonically
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on behalf of plaintiff and Senior Deputy County Counsel Ricky Sanchez appeared telephonically

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on behalf of the defendant County of San Diego. After hearing oral argument the court took the

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motion under submission for decision. For the reasons that follow, the County of San Diego’s

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motion to dismiss will be denied.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In her complaint plaintiff alleges the following. On Friday, September 4, 2015, plaintiff

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Maria Eva Martinez, as a passenger in her co-worker’s car, attempted to enter the United States at

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the Otay border crossing. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) Martinez provided an INS border agent with her

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California driver’s license and United States passport and was detained based upon an arrest

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warrant issued at the request of the Tulare County Sherriff’s Department and District Attorney’s

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Office. (Id.) The warrant had been issued for a Maria Eva Gonzalez, a.k.a. Maria Eva Martinez,

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from Bakersfield, California, for the theft of a wallet in Tulare County. (Id.)

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The border agents handcuffed Martinez and referred to her as “Maria Gonzalez” even

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though she explained to them that her name was Maria Eva Martinez as both her driver’s license

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and passport confirmed. (Id.) Moreover, plaintiff has never lived in Bakersfield. (Id.)

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Nonetheless, the agents performed a pat-down search, took her into custody and fingerprinted and

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photographed her. (Id.) Two San Diego Sherriff’s Deputies then arrived at the INS border

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station to transport Martinez and another male detainee to the San Diego County Jail. (Id.) The

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Sherriff Deputies handcuffed Ms. Martinez and placed her in the rear seat of their patrol car, next

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to a male detainee who had been spitting on INS agents and had a mask over his face. (Id. at 5–

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6.) While in the patrol car, the shoulder straps of Ms. Martinez’s clothing fell off of her shoulders

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exposing most of her upper breasts. (Id. at 6.) Because she was handcuffed, Ms. Martinez could

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not pull her shoulder straps up to cover her breasts. (Id.) She also noticed that the male prisoner

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was able to remove his mask. (Id.) After the patrol car arrived at the San Diego Men’s jail, Ms.

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Martinez was kept handcuffed in the back of the car for two hours while the male detainee was

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booked. (Id.)

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The San Diego Sherriff’s Deputies then booked Martinez into the San Diego County
Women’s jail. (Id.) She was again fingerprinted there. (Id.) The contents of her purse were
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inventoried and she was forced to throw away a small pocket knife, which her son had given her

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fifteen years earlier. (Id.) She was subjected to additional invasive body searches in front of

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male officers, handcuffed, and placed in a prison cell. (Id.) With every officer she encountered,

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Ms. Martinez repeatedly told them she was innocent and that she was not the person they were

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looking for pursuant to the arrest warrant. (Id.)

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The prison cell Ms. Martinez was placed in included only a metal slab for a bed and had

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what appeared to her to be vomit on the walls. (Id.) The cell was freezing cold and there were no

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blankets or pillows. (Id.) Ms. Martinez was then transferred to another cell that had walls

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covered in what appeared to be feces, blood, and vomit. (Id. at 7.) During her cell transfer,

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Martinez again protested her innocence, and asked to speak with a jail supervisor. (Id.) Martinez

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told the supervisor that she had committed no crime and she was not the person subject to the

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arrest warrant. (Id.) She asked the supervisor to call Tulare County officials to verify that she

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was not the person subject to the arrest warrant. (Id.) The supervisor refused and Martinez

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remained in the “cold, filthy” cell. (Id.)

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The following day, September 5, 2015, Martinez posted bail. (Id.) Once finally released,

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she recovered her cell phone and was able to call her co-workers to come get her. (Id.) Because

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she had only been allowed to make local calls, Ms. Martinez had not been able to call anyone she

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knew while in custody. (Id.) As a result of her arrest, filming for a film project Ms. Martinez

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was working on was disrupted and her professional reputation in the Spanish language film and

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television industry was damaged. (Id.)

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The Tulare County Sheriff’s Department and District Attorney’s Office had photographs

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of Maria Eva Gonzalez, the actual suspect for whom the warrant had been issued, a surveillance

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video showing her pick up a wallet, and a description identifying her as 170 pounds, five feet six

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inches tall, and with black eyes. (Id. at 2, 8-10.) Following Ms. Martinez’s release from custody,

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her husband contacted the Tulare County District Attorney’s office. (Id. at 10.) A Tulare County

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Deputy District Attorney compared plaintiff Martinez’s DMV records and driver’s license

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photograph to the photographs of the actual suspect, Maria Gonzalez, and acknowledged that

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Martinez’s appearance did not match that of the actual suspect. (Id.) Ms. Martinez is nearly fifty
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pounds thinner and is taller than the true suspect and, unlike Maria Gonzalez, has brown, not

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black, eyes. (Id. at 3.) Moreover, Martinez resides in Orange, California, has never lived in

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Bakersfield, and, as of September 2015, had never even been to Tulare County. (Id.) On

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September 15, 2015, the Porterville County Court dismissed the complaint against Ms. Martinez

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after she was required to appear in court. (Id. at 10.)

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LEGAL STANDARD

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The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal

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sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.

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1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

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sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

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F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

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claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the

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court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light

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most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v.

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United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In general, pro se complaints are held to less

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

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520-21 (1972). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the

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form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

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Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than

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an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

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pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the

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elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676

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(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove
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facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have

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not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,

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459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

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In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted

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to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not

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physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s

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complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

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250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

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ANALYSIS

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Defendant County of San Diego moves to dismiss the false arrest and imprisonment,

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negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims brought against it by plaintiff.

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(Doc. No. 7-1.) Each of these claims is discussed in turn below.

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A. False Imprisonment Claim
Defendant County of San Diego argues that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable false

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imprisonment claim against it because she was merely received by the two San Diego Sheriff

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Deputies for the purpose of transporting her to the San Diego County Jail and was not arrested by

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those deputies. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 4.) Defendants note that under California Penal Code § 142(a) it

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is a misdemeanor crime punishable by a fine or imprisonment for a peace officer to refuse to

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receive or arrest a person charged with a criminal offense. (Id.)

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However, these arguments as a basis for dismissal fail because a cognizable false

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imprisonment claim can be grounded not only upon a false arrest but also upon a prolonged

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detention as well. See Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1998).

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In this regard, false imprisonment is the “unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.”

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Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757 (1997). False arrest is not a different tort; it is

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merely “one way of committing a false imprisonment.” Collins v. City & County of San

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Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673 (1975). A second way of committing a false imprisonment

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is through an unlawful prolonged detention. Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1379-80. A jailer, and

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derivatively the public entity which employs the jailer, may be liable if the jailer knows that the
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imprisonment is unlawful or if there is “some notice sufficient to put him, as a reasonable man,

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under a duty to investigate the validity of the incarceration.” Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles,

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12 Cal. 3d 710, 719 (1974).

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Here, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in her complaint in support of a claim that the

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San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputies and a supervisor at the San Diego County Women’s Jail

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were made aware of sufficient information placing them under a duty to investigate the validity of

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plaintiff’s incarceration. Apparently, the basis for Ms. Martinez’s arrest was that her name

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matched not the name of a suspect, but an alias purportedly used by that suspect for whom an

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arrest warrant had been issued. However, plaintiff alleges in her complaint that both her United

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States passport and California driver’s license plainly indicated to the deputies that Maria Eva

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Martinez is her true name and not an alias. Plaintiff’s passport further indicated that she lived in a

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different city than that listed on the warrant as the residence of the actual suspect.

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According to the allegations of her complaint, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputies

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had access to plaintiff’s passport and driver’s license. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that with every

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officer she encountered in San Diego County, she repeatedly informed than that she was innocent

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and was not the person named in the arrest warrant. She also alleges that she told a supervisor at

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the San Diego County Women’s jail that she had committed no crime and she was not the person

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subject to the warrant. Finally, plaintiff alleges that she even asked the jail supervisor to call

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Tulare County law enforcement officials to verify that she was not the person subject to the arrest

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warrant, but that the jail supervisor refused to do so. After plaintiff posted bail, her husband

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confirmed with the Tulare County District Attorney’s office that she, in fact, was not the suspect.

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Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the San

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Diego Sheriff’s Deputies and the supervisor at the San Diego County Women’s jail were

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provided reasonable notice requiring some investigation on their part into the validity of

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plaintiff’s incarceration.

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In their reply, defendant County of San Diego argues that since plaintiff was arrested on

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September 4, 2015 and released the next day, no duty to her was breached. In this regard,

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defendant contends the decision in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) establishes a standard
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under which officials have three days to investigate claims of innocence. (Doc. No. 15 at 3.) In

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Baker, however, the Supreme Court was addressing a due process claim brought under the United

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States Constitution and specifically noted that “[s]ection 1983 imposes liability for violations of

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rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. . . .

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false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because

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the defendant is a state official.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 146. Indeed, the Court observed that

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“[g]iven the requirements that an arrest be made only on probable cause and that one detained be

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accorded a speedy trial, a sheriff executing a valid arrest warrant is not required by the

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Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on

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mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent. Nor is the official maintaining

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custody of the person named in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform an error-free

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investigation of such a claim.” Id. at 138. The Court concluded in Baker that “[w]hatever claim

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this situation might give rise to under state tort law, it gives rise to no claim under the Fourteenth

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Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 137.
California tort law, however, is clear that a “jailer has long been held liable for false

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imprisonment if he knew or should have known of the illegality of the imprisonment.” Sullivan,

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12 Cal.3d at 717–18. “The test requires either that the sheriff have actual knowledge that the

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imprisonment of the plaintiff is unlawful or alternatively that he have some notice sufficient to

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put him, as a reasonable man, under a duty to investigate the validity of the incarceration.” Id. at

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719; see also Lopez v. City of Oxnard, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7 (1989) (“A police officer must use

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reasonable prudence and diligence to determine whether a party being arrested is the one

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described in the warrant. The officer may not refuse to act upon information offered him which

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discloses the warrant is being served on the wrong person.”) Here, plaintiff has alleged sufficient

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facts to support the inference that the San Diego Sheriff’s Deputies and the supervisor at the San

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Diego County Women’s jail were on notice, as reasonable people, to investigate the validity of

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her incarceration pursuant to an arrest warrant for Maria Gonzalez. Yet, plaintiff alleges, they

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made no effort to confirm whether plaintiff was the suspect, of a different name, for whom the

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arrest warrant had been issued. 1

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Accordingly, the court concludes plaintiff has alleged a cognizable false imprisonment
claim against defendant County of San Diego.

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B. Negligence Claim

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Defendant County of San Diego next argues that under California Government Code

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§ 815.2(a), it cannot be vicariously liable for the conduct of Tulare County law enforcement

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officials in having the arrest warrant in question issued. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 4–5.) However, the

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negligence claim brought by plaintiff against the County of San Diego is clearly not based on the

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alleged conduct of Tulare County officials, but rather on the alleged failure of its own employees

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to perform their duty of investigating whether plaintiff Maria Eva Martinez was the subject of the

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arrest warrant for a suspect named Maria Gonzalez under the circumstances presented to them.

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(See Doc. No. 11 at 12.) A jailer has the duty to investigate the validity of an incarceration after

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being provided sufficient notice calling the validity of the incarceration into question. Sullivan,

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12 Cal.3d at 719. This is similar to the duty that gives rise to plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim

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grounded on her prolonged detention. See Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1381. Accordingly, the same

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allegations that support a cognizable false imprisonment claim are sufficient to support a

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cognizable negligence claim by plaintiff against defendant County of San Diego.
Defendant County of San Diego also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim to the

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extent it is based upon a theory of negligent hiring, training, and supervision. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 6.)

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Defendant argues that there is no statutory basis for such liability to be imposed against it. (Id.)

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Public entities in California are immune from direct common law claims of negligence

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under the California Tort Claims Act, California Government Code § 815(a), unless there is a

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statutory basis for such a negligence claim. Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31

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Cal. 4th 1175, 1179-80 (2003). However, the California Supreme Court has held, for instance,

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As noted above, no such effort was apparently made here despite the fact that plaintiff’s
passport and driver’s license reflected a name other than that of the subject of the arrest warrant.
Moreover, it is alleged that, as it turns out, Tulare County law enforcement officials had
photographs, video, and a physical description of the actual suspect whose true name was not the
same as plaintiff’s.
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that a public school district can be vicariously liable under California Government Code § 815.2

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for the negligence of supervisors who allegedly fail to “properly hire, train and supervise” a

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school employees because of the “special relationship” arising from “the mandatory character of

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school attendance and the comprehensive control of students exercised by school personnel.”

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C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., 53 Cal.4th 861, 868-79 (2012). This “special

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relationship” gives rise to a duty of care to use reasonable measures to protect students from

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foreseeable injury at the hands of third parties acting negligently or intentionally. Id. at 870.

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Likewise, there is a “special relationship” between one jailed and her jailers that creates a

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similar duty of care. Giraldo v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 250–

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51 (2008) (holding that there is a “special relationship” between a jailer and a prisoner due to the

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vulnerability and dependence of prisoners giving rise to a duty of care on the part of jailers to

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protect the prisoner from foreseeable harm inflicted by a third party); see also Lum v. Cty. of San

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Joaquin, 756 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1254–55 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding that a “special

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relationship” exists between arresting officers and arrestees). Accordingly, a cognizable

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negligence claim has also been stated by plaintiff against the County of San Diego based upon a

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theory of negligent hiring, training, and supervision.

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Finally, defendant County of San Diego argues that the immunity offered under California

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Government Code § 844.6(a)(2) protects it from liability. (Doc. No. 7-1 at 7.) However, neither

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the immunity afforded by§ 844.6(a)(2), nor that provided by any other governmental immunity

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provision, protects the county from a false imprisonment claim brought pursuant to California

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Government Code § 815.6. See Sullivan, 12 Cal.3d at 722 (“no provision for governmental

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immunity protects the county in an action for false imprisonment”); see also Cousins v. Lockyer,

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568 F.3d 1063, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2009). Since plaintiff’s negligence claim is “based on” and

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“derivative of” her state false imprisonment claim, California’s statutory immunities do not apply.

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See Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1072 (“To the extent Cousins’ negligence and negligent infliction of

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emotional distress claims are ‘based . . . on the same facts,’ ‘are derivative of,’ and are ‘related’ to

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his false imprisonment claim, both Martinez and Asgari require that we reverse their dismissal as

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to the AG because California’s statutory immunities do not apply.).
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Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim will be denied.
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is also derivative of her false

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imprisonment claim. See Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1381–82 (“Martinez’s claims for intentional and

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negligent infliction of emotional distress, and his wife’s claim for loss of consortium, are

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derivative of the false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Because the false imprisonment

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claim grounded on prolonged detention survives summary judgment, these claims survive as

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well.”) Because plaintiff has stated a cognizable false imprisonment claim, defendant’s motion to

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dismiss her derivative negligent infliction of emotional distress claim will also be denied.

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CONCLUSION

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For all the reasons discussed above,

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1) Defendant County of San Diego’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 7) is denied;

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2) The matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for purposes of

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conducting a conference and issuing a scheduling order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

November 14, 2016
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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