McCoy v. Holland et al

Filing 11

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Grant Plaintiff's 7 Motion to Remand Action to State Court, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 2/9/17. Referred to Judge Drozd. Objections to F&R Within Fourteen Days. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LAKIETH LEROY McCOY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
HOLLAND, et al.,

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Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-01333-DAD-JLT (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT
(Doc. 7)
14-DAY DEADLINE

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I. FINDINGS
Plaintiff initially filed this action in Kern County Superior Court, (Doc. 1, pp. 8-19), and

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Defendants removed it to this Court (Id., pp. 1-6). Plaintiff filed a motion for remand which

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should be GRANTED since federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.

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A. Legal Standards

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Section 1441(a) of Title 28 provides that a defendant may remove from state court any

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action Aof which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.@ The vast

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majority of lawsuits “arise under the law that creates the cause of action.” Am. Well Works Co. v.

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Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.

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Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Federal courts Ashall have original jurisdiction of all civil

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actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1331.

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However, “a case may [also] arise under federal law ‘where the vindication of a right under state
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law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law,’ ” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808

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(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vac. Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (emphasis

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added)), but “only [if] . . . the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a substantial

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question of federal law,” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28 (emphases added).

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For removal to be proper, it must be clear from the face of the complaint that federal

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subject matter jurisdiction exists. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840-41

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(1989) (per curiam). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the

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well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

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question is presented on the face of the plaintiff=s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc.,

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v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th

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Cir. 2009); Marin General Hosp. v. Modesto Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir.

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2009); Hall, 476 F.3d at 687.

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The removal statute is strictly construed against removal and the defendant bears the

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burden of establishing grounds for removal. Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.

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28, 32 (2002); Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2012); Fossen v.

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Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, Inc., 660 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011); Hunter, 582

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F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). Courts must consider whether federal jurisdiction exists, Rains

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v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996), and must reject federal jurisdiction if

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there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance, Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d

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1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042

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(citations omitted).

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B. Discussion

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Plaintiff makes two arguments to support his motion to remand: (1) that Defendants

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removal violated the “rule of unanimity” (Doc. 7, pp. 4-5); and (2) that this Court lacks subject

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matter jurisdiction since his claims do not arise under federal law (id., p. 5).1 Defendants respond

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that Plaintiff's Complaint “is primarily a constitutional civil rights claim that must remain in

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Since federal subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, it is dispositive and the unanimity of defendants need not be
addressed.

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Federal Court.” (Doc. 8, p. 1.)

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The pivotal question is whether the Complaint presents a federal question on its face.

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Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted); Marin General

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Hosp,.581 F.3d at 944 ; Hall, 476 F.3d at 687 (citation omitted). State-law causes of action

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“invoke[ ] federal-question jurisdiction only if [they] necessarily raise a stated federal issue,

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actually disputed and substantial.” Nevada, 672 F.3d at 674 (alteration and internal quotation

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marks omitted).

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In the Complaint, Plaintiff contends that the “Guard One” welfare checks2 were

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negligently implemented at CCI which amount to a breach of duty, harassment, and intentional

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infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-19.) Plaintiff argues that he did not intend his

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pleading to present any federal questions; that he only pled state law claims and did not plead any

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claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983; and that he intentionally did not mention the

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Constitution or any federal constitutional rights in the Complaint. (Doc. 7, p. 5.)
Defendants counter that while Plaintiff’s stated causes of action arise under California

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law, the central focus of the Complaint is “constitutional” and that the Complaint states causes of

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action for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and retaliation. (Doc. 8, p.2.) However,

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this contention is not supported by a review of Plaintiff=s complaint. Libhart v. Santa Monica

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Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979) (existence of federal jurisdiction determined by

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the complaint at the time of removal).
None of Plaintiff’s allegations show that the “Guard One” procedure was implemented in

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deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff as required for a “conditions of

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confinement” claim as Defendants assert. See Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d

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1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir.

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2002). In fact, Plaintiff alleges that the “Guard One” procedure was implemented to provide for

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inmates’ safety by ensuring prison staff conducted welfare checks to see if suicidal and otherwise

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emotionally fragile inmates were not in need of “dire medical attention” or had harmed

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The “Guard One” system utilizes a metal mechanism in the center of the cell door that is touched with a wand by
correctional staff, triggering a loud “bang” every 30 minutes. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-12.)

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themselves. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11.)
Plaintiff’s allegations also do not show that the “Guard One” procedure was implemented

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out of retaliatory animus for Plaintiff’s protected conduct to state a retaliation claim as

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Defendants assert. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s allegations

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actually show that the “Guard One” procedure was implemented to advance a legitimate goal of

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the correctional institution -- ensuring the safety of suicidal and emotionally fragile inmates.

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Plaintiff states no allegations to show that he had engaged in protected conduct, let alone that

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either of the Defendants were aware he engaged in any such activities. Further, Plaintiff alleges

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that correctional staff encouraged Plaintiff and other inmates who complained about the “Guard

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One” procedure to file inmate grievances as a potential means for effecting change.

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The only mention of federal law in the Complaint is on the page before the last, under the

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“Prayer for Relief” where Plaintiff requests an order granting him “a declaration that the acts and

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omissions described herein violated his rights under both state and federal law.” (Doc. 1, p. 18.)

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However, requests for declaratory relief do not provide subject matter jurisdiction and are

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regularly dismissed from §1983 actions because they are subsumed by determinations on claims

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for damages.

See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 565-66 n.8.

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Plaintiff could have filed this action under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and attempted to state

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cognizable claims for violation of his federal constitutional rights, as well as violations of

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California law, but he chose not to. The Complaint delineates five state law claims for relief:

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negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of duty, and harassment. (Doc. 1,

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pp. 15-16.) None of these causes of action are cognizable, or require elements similar to claims

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which would be cognizable under federal law to “necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually

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disputed and substantial.” Nevada, 672 F.3d at 674. Further, Plaintiff exercised his right to rely

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exclusively on state law by filing suit in state court utilizing the state legal process. Caterpillar,

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Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and it

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should therefore be remanded to the Kern County Superior Court.3

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Since subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and so dispositive, unanimity of defendants need not be addressed.

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II. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff=s motion to remand the action to
state court, filed September 29, 2016 (Doc. 7), be GRANTED.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14

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days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

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objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned “Objections to

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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.

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Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th

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Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

February 9, 2017

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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