Martinez v. Davey

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 1/3/17. Amended Complaint Due Within Thirty Days. (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RICARDO MARTINEZ,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE No. 1:16-cv-1658-MJS (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND

v.
(ECF NO. 1)
D. DAVEY, et al.,
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a

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civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction

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of a magistrate judge. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s June 20, 2016, Complaint is before the

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Court for screening.1

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I.

Screening Requirement

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The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

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portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if

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the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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II.

Pleading Standard

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

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This case was transferred from the Northern District of California on November 2, 2016. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.)

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

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vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

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(1989).

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

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(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

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(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

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law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d

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1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere

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possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are

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accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

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At all relevant times Plaintiff was an inmate housed at Corcoran State Prison in

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Corcoran, California (“CSP”). He names the following individuals as Defendants: D.

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Davey, CSP Warden; the unidentified Chief Medical Officer at CSP; and (presumably) 27

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John and Jane Does. These Defendants are named in their official and individual

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capacities.

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In the complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations are bare: “I’m under multiple violation [sic]

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of my right 1st 5th 6th 14th amendment hindering outgoing mail denied adequate medical

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care 8th amend [sic] violation victim of assault and battery. Having problem with my back

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need a cane to walk. I receive injury breach of contract. … Victim of assault and battery

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by 27 officers at [CSP].”

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Attached to the complaint are nearly 150 pages of health care service request

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forms and medical records. A cursory review of these attachments reveals complaints

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concerning the provision of medical care that Plaintiff has received while housed at CSP.

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Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
IV.

Analysis

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A.

Short and Plain Statement

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” The minimal

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and unadorned allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not meet this minimum requirement.

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Moreover, the Court will not examine 150 pages of attachments to the complaint

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to try to determine if, somewhere therein, might lay facts giving rise to a cognizable

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cause of action. Even if the factual elements of a cause of action are contained

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somewhere within those pages, Plaintiff’s failure to organize them into a “short and plain

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statement of the claim” is grounds for dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a). Sparling

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v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1)

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(“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”). The Rule requirements can be

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met within 15 or 20 typewritten pages, or equivalent handwritten pages, without

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attachments. (In this latter regard Plaintiff is advised that factual allegations in his

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complaint will be taken as true at this stage of the proceedings; he need not and shall

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not provide supporting evidence now.)

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend. The Court

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will, however, provide the following legal standards that must be considered if Plaintiff

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chooses to file an amended complaint.

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B.

Linkage and Supervisory Liability

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Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must

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demonstrate that each Defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.
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See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the Defendants and the deprivation alleged to

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have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691,

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695 (1978).

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Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates

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under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Since a government

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official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions,

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Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution

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through his own individual actions by linking each named Defendant with some

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affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 676.

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Liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under § 1983 only if the

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supervisor: (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or

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directed the violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.

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Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

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(9th Cir. 1989). Defendants cannot be held liable for being generally deficient in their

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supervisory duties.

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C.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

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“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against

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a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of

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Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the

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Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their

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personal capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d

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483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003), or suits for declaratory or injunctive relief brought against state

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officials in their official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. System, 939 F.2d 676, 680

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fn.2 (9th Cir. 1991).

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D.

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The use of Doe defendants is generally disfavored in federal court. Wakefield v.

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Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 E.2d

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637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff is hereby informed that the Court cannot order the

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Marshal to serve process on any Doe defendants until such defendants have been

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identified. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Foston, No. 1:12-cv-00026 WL 4816216, at *3 (E.D.

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Cal. Sept. 6, 2013). Plaintiff may, under certain circumstances, be given the opportunity

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to identify unknown defendants through discovery prior to service. Id. (plaintiff must be

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afforded an opportunity to identify unknown defendants through discovery unless it is

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John and Jane Doe Defendants

clear that discovery would not uncover their identities).

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E.

Eighth Amendment

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

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prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits

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cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer

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v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “... embodies broad and

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idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v.

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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).

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A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are

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met: (1) objectively, the official's act or omission must be so serious such that it results in

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the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2) subjectively, the

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prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting

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harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

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official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Medical Indifference

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A claim of medical indifference requires: 1) a serious medical need, and 2) a

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deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

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Cir. 2006). A serious medical need may be shown by demonstrating that “failure to treat

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a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and
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wanton infliction of pain.’” Id.; see also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th

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Cir. 1992) (“The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find

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important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

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significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and

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substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for

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medical treatment.”).

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The deliberate indifference standard is met by showing: a) a purposeful act or

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failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and b) harm caused by

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the indifference. Id. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung,

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391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not

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only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

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risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057

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(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

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risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how

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severe the risk.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Gibson v, Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d

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1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care”

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does not, by itself, state a deliberate indifference claim for § 1983 purposes. McGuckin,

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974 F.2d at 1060 (internal quotation marks omitted); See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106

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(“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical

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condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth

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Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

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because the victim is a prisoner.”). “A defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to

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respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate indifference

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to be established.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

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2.

Excessive Force

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When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial

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inquiry is “... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

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discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
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1, 6-7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and

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sadistic” standard, as opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to

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most Eighth Amendment claims, is applied to excessive force claims because prison

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officials generally do not have time to reflect on their actions in the face of risk of injury to

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inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether

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force was excessive, the court considers the following factors: (1) the need for

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application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship between the need for

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force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably perceived by

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prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See

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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether

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force was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521,

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1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503

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U.S. at 7-9. Finally, because the use of force relates to the prison's legitimate

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penological interest in maintaining security and order, the court must be deferential to

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the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22.

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F.

First Amendment

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Prisoners have a “First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v.

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Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, prison officials cannot read legal

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mail, although they may scan it and inspect it for contraband. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762

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F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Interference with outgoing prisoner mail is justified under the First Amendment if

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the following criteria are met: (1) the regulation furthers “an important or substantial

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government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and (2) “the limitation

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on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the

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protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416

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U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (limited by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989),

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only as test relates to incoming mail).

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V.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and must be

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dismissed. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he may not rely on the contents of

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his attachments. He must instead assert specific facts linking his allegations to particular

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Defendants, as discussed supra. A first amended complaint must state what each

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named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts

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on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

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Plaintiff is also advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

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be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an

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“amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

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55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no

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longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

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original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

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sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

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Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed

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under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a

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right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

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omitted).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

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amend;

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Plaintiff’s June 20, 2016, Complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to

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Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty days from the

date of this Order;

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Absent further Order of this Court for good cause shown, Plaintiff’s First

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Amended Complaint shall be no longer than 20 pages and include no attachments;

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and,
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Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint meeting the above criteria

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within thirty days will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without

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prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 3, 2017

/s/

Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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