Martinez v. Davey

Filing 27

ORDER Dismissing Second Amended Complaint without Leave to Amend, Clerk to Close Case, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 9/29/17. CASE CLOSED. (Gonzalez, R)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9
10

RICARDO MARTINEZ,

11

Plaintiff,

12
13

v.
D. DAVEY, et al.,

14

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-1658-MJS (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF NO. 23)
CLERK TO CLOSE CASE

15
16

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights

17

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of a

18

magistrate judge. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is before the

19

Court for screening.

20

I.

Screening Requirement

21

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any

22

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if

23

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which

24

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

25

II.

Pleading Standard

26

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

27

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

28

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
1

1

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

2

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

3

(1989).

4

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

5

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

6

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

7

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d

8

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

9

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

10

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

11

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

12

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

13

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

14

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

15

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere

16

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are

17

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

18

III.

Relevant Procedural Background

19

Plaintiff initiated this action on June 20, 2016, in the Northern District of California

20

asserting claims arising under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

21

based on conduct occurring at California State Prison (“CSP”) in Corcoran, California.

22

Plaintiff named D. Davey, the CSP Warden; the unidentified Chief Medical Officer at

23

CSP; and approximately 27 Doe Defendants. Upon review of the allegations asserted in

24

the complaint, the case was transferred to this court on November 2, 2016. (ECF No. 7.)

25

On January 4, 2017, Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed for failure to state a

26

claim. His allegations were found woefully insufficient to state a cognizable claim, and

27

the undersigned declined to review the 150 pages of attachments to his complaint to

28

determine if they included facts giving rise to a cognizable cause of action. (ECF No. 11.)
2

1

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was then screened on April 7, 2017. (ECF No.

2

20.) There, Plaintiff asserted a number of unrelated claims against D. Davey, a warden

3

whom Plaintiff no longer associated with CSP (instead, with California Substance Abuse

4

Treatment Facility / State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSATF”)); Dr. Scharffenberg, a

5

primary care physician (“PCP”) at CSATF; Dr. J. Lewis, the Deputy Director of an

6

unspecified department / agency; and the Federal Receiver “who controls the prison’s

7

medical care.” That pleading was also dismissed, though this time for failure to comply

8

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20’s joinder requirement since it included a number

9

of claims that did not arise from the same or a related transaction. In addition, Plaintiff’s

10

allegations against Warden Davey, Dr. Lewis, and the Federal Receiver were dismissed

11

for failure to link these Defendants to any deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.

12

IV.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

13

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings suit against D. Davey, the

14

Warden now again associated with CSP; Dr. Anthony Enenmoh, a physician at CSP; Dr.

15

Edgar Clark, a physician at CSP; Dr. Scharffenberg, Plaintiff’s PCP at CSATF; Dr. J.

16

Lewis, the Deputy Director of an unspecified department / agency; L.W. Muniz, Warden

17

of Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) in Soledad, California; E. Gitova, a nurse at

18

SVSP; Dr. Lawrence Gamboa; and the Federal Receiver “who controls the prison’s

19

medical care.”

20

As with his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s operative pleading includes a

21

number of unrelated allegations, some of which are summarized here to demonstrate

22

how distinct they are:

23

A.

Allegations against Dr. Scharffenberg

24

On December 12, 2015, Dr. Scharffenberg denied a recommendation from a

25

neurosurgeon specializing in spinal cord tumors. In addition, Plaintiff alleges, but without

26

relevant supporting facts, that Dr. Scharffenberg failed to (1) provide an MRI of Plaintiff’s

27

cervical spine, (2) perform a second MRI to the lumbar spine, (3) provide a wedge pillow,

28

(4) provide a Tens unit for pain relief as ordered by neurosurgeon specialists, (5) provide
3

1

for a pulmonary specialist, (6) remove cataracts, (7) provide a wheelchair, and (8)

2

provide a CT scan of Plaintiff’s abdomen and pelvis.

3

B.

Allegations against Nurse Gitova and John Doe

4

On September 18, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a sick call to Nurse Gitova for trouble

5

breathing with severe chest pain. Plaintiff also requested that his sugar levels be

6

checked and for “emergency additional medical services.” Instead of treating Plaintiff,

7

Nurse Gitova directed that he be returned to his cell.

8

When Plaintiff was placed in waist restraints for the cell return, he fainted and fell.

9

John Doe, an individual employed in the medical triage, applied a treatment of ammonia

10

on the side of Plaintiff’s nose to revive him. This caused a severe burn on the inside and

11

outside of Plaintiff’s nose. Plaintiff was then returned, unresponsive, to his assigned bed.

12

C.

Allegations against Warden Muniz

13

On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff accidentally spilled coffee. When Plaintiff went to

14

get a towel to wipe the spill, he returned to find another inmate cleaning it. Plaintiff

15

alleges his right of access to the courts was somehow denied by Warden Muniz in the

16

context of this incident.

17

In September 2016, October 2016, and January 2017, Plaintiff submitted requests

18

for an Olsen review of his health records. Warden Muniz allegedly failed to provide these

19

records.

20

D.

21

On December 26, 2016, Plaintiff was escorted to the shower by a female

22

correctional officer. Once there, Plaintiff tripped and fell. He previously informed “health

23

care” about his high risk of falling, but “health care” failed to “provide for, of services and

24

treatments.” Plaintiff also partially blames the fall on incorrect waist handcuffs placed

25

upon him by the female correctional officer.

26
27

Allegations against Doe Defendants

At the central triage, the examining doctor declined to provide an x-ray or other
exam to find the source of Plaintiff’s numbness and severe pain.

28
4

1

E.

2

On January 30, 2017, Dr. Gamboa denied Plaintiff health care, including a

3

Allegations against Dr. Gamboa

contrast MRI of the lumbar spine.

4

F.

5

Although Dr. Enenmoh and Dr. Clark were made aware of Plaintiff’s risk of falling,

6

Allegations against Dr. Edgar Clark and Dr. Enenmoh

safety procedures were not implemented to reduce the risk.

7

G.

8

Though not entirely clear, Plaintiff accuses Warden Davey of interfering with

9
10

Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts in the context of an administrative appeal that had
blue color ink on it.

11
12
13

Allegations against Warden Davey

Plaintiff seeks unspecified relief.
V.

Analysis
Plaintiff again brings a number of unrelated claims against named Defendants

14

and other individuals who, while not named in the caption, he apparently wishes to sue

15

as Defendants. Plaintiff was previously informed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

16

18(a) allows a party to “join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it

17

has against an opposing party.” However, Rule 20(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to sue multiple

18

defendants in the same action only if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly,

19

severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,

20

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and there is a “question of law or

21

fact common to all defendants.” “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but

22

Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against

23

Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits ...”

24

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

25

Though Plaintiff’s claims relate, generally, to his medical needs, the specific

26

instances described do not arise from the same or even a related transaction so as to be

27

brought in a single lawsuit. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint will therefore be

28

dismissed.
5

1

Plaintiff was previously informed that if he chose to amend his complaint, he

2

would have to file a proper pleading that complied with the standards spelled out for him;

3

he would also have to decide which transaction or occurrence he wished to pursue in the

4

action. Plaintiff has not done so. Moreover, Plaintiff generally fails to include facts linking

5

Defendants to a violation of his constitutional rights.

6

The Court must now determine whether to allow Plaintiff leave to further amend.

7

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading

8

only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should

9

freely grant leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When determining

10

whether to grant leave to amend, courts weigh certain factors: “undue delay, bad faith or

11

dilatory motive on the part of [the party who wishes to amend a pleading], repeated

12

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

13

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment [.]”

14

See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Although prejudice to the opposing party

15

“carries the greatest weight[,]...a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors”

16

can justify the denial of leave to amend. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316

17

F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Furthermore, analysis of these factors can

18

overlap. For instance, a party’s “repeated failure to cure deficiencies” constitutes “a

19

strong indication that the [party] has no additional facts to plead” and “that any attempt to

20

amend would be futile[.]” See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981,

21

988, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding dismissal of

22

complaint with prejudice when there were “three iterations of [the] allegations — none of

23

which, according to [the district] court, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss”); see

24

also Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2000)

25

(affirming dismissal without leave to amend where plaintiff failed to correct deficiencies in

26

complaint, where court had afforded plaintiff opportunities to do so, and had discussed

27

with plaintiff the substantive problems with his claims), amended by 234 F.3d 428,

28

overruled on other grounds by Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir.
6

1

2007); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. # 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997)

2

(denial of leave to amend appropriate where further amendment would be futile).

3

Plaintiff was previously informed of the prerequisites to assertion of a cognizable

4

claim or claims, of the need to limit his claims, and the need to include facts linking

5

specific Defendants to specific unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff nevertheless not only

6

perpetuates the previous pleading problems, but he now adds new claims against

7

Defendants at different institutions. It is clear that the Court’s admonitions and

8

instructions have been ignored. No useful purpose would be served by giving them

9

again and inviting yet another attempt to comply.

10
11

VI.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Second Amended

12

Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is directed to close

13

this case.

14
15
16
17

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

September 29, 2017

/s/

Michael J. Seng

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7