Wilkins v. Stanislaus County et al

Filing 12

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS regarding dismissal of action for failure to state a claim 10 and denial of motion for certification of interlocutory appeal 11 signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 1/16/2018. Referred to Judge Dale A. Drozd; Objections to F&R due within 14-Days. (Lundstrom, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KEENAN WILKINS,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
STANISLAUS COUNTY, et al.,

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Defendants.

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1:16-cv-01858-DAD-BAM
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL
(Doc. Nos. 10, 11)
FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

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I.

Screening Requirement and Standard

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Plaintiff Keenan Wilkins (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 3, 2017, the Court

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screened Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend. (Doc. No. 5.) Plaintiff filed

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a first amended complaint on January 8, 2018, along with a motion for certification of an

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interlocutory appeal of the Court’s initial screening order. (Doc. Nos. 10, 11.) Plaintiff’s first

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amended complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (Doc. No. 10.)

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or

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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken

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as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,

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Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

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sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

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for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United

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States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant

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acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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Plaintiff’s Allegations

II.

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Plaintiff is currently housed at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility. Plaintiff names the

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following defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1) Stanislaus County; (2) Angela

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Segundo, Deputy Clerk; (3) Gloria Green, Deputy Clerk; (4) Rebecca J. Fleming, Clerk,

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Executive Officer; (5) Michelle Salcido, Deputy Clerk and (6) Julie C. Dodge, Family Law

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Facilitator.

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Plaintiff asserts that multiple individuals acted or conspired to deny, interfere with and

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obstruct his rights to Equal Protection and Access to Courts between February 2013 and

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November 2016. Plaintiff alleges that he was served with a divorce action filed in Stanislaus

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County Superior Court, No. 686620, which threated not only his parental/custody rights as to his

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two minor children, but also his property and financial rights.

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On February 4, 2013, Plaintiff served a motion for counsel. Thereafter, on April 22, May

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13, May 20 and May 27, 2013, Plaintiff served notices, letters and objections that he had not
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received any ruling on his motion for counsel, but his correspondence was ignored by the court

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clerks. In July 2013, Plaintiff learned that Deputy Clerk G. James never sent the court’s order

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denying counsel dated February 8, 2013.

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On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff received response documents from Defendant Segundo.

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Plaintiff completed the forms and returned them to Defendant Segundo with a notice. The

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response was not filed, and was returned to Plaintiff with no reason or explanation. On March

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28, 2013, Plaintiff resubmitted the documents to the Court with a notice to Defendant Segundo.

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These documents were never filed or returned.

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On April 11, 2013, a default judgment was granted against him. Plaintiff alleges that

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default was entered by Defendant Salcido without any notice to Plaintiff. Plaintiff petitioned for

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relief, which was granted.

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Plaintiff asserts that he began to serve numerous motions that Defendant Fleming allowed

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Deputy Clerks not file in violation of state law and in violation of Plaintiff’s rights to Equal

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Protection and Access to the Courts. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant G. James refused to file

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Plaintiff’s challenge for cause, motion to compel discovery and other motions.

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Plaintiff filed a writ of mandate in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court

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reportedly ordered an informal response indicating whether Plaintiff filed a request for order to

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comply with discovery and, if so, how the court ruled on the request. Plaintiff asserts that on

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November 26, 2013, Defendant Green falsified a response to the Court of Appeal that no such

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motion was filed or heard by the court. Plaintiff alleges that he filed/served those motions on

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September 20, 2013 and October 28, 2013. The Court of Appeal then denied the writ of

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mandate.

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On December 9, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that the trial court issued an order against

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Plaintiff, taking away his parental custody, property and financial rights. On September 16,

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2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s judgment, which was denied on

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November 10, 2016.

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Facilitator, seeking the next step after the denial. Defendant Dodge sent Plaintiff a letter dated

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November 21, 2016, denying him any help, information or assistance in violation of his rights to

Plaintiff then wrote a letter to Defendant Dodge, the Family Law

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Equal Protection as to similarly situated individuals seeking help from the Facilitator’s Self-Help

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Office.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, along with damages.

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III.

Discussion

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A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

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Plaintiff names Stanislaus County as a defendant.

However, Plaintiff’s allegations

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against Stanislaus County are more properly characterized as allegations against Stanislaus

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County Superior Court. Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the Stanislaus County Superior

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Court because such suits are bared by the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Sacramento

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Cty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the

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Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because such suits are barred by the

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Eleventh Amendment”).

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Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to pursue damages claims against court employees in

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their official capacities, he may not do so. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money

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damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official

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capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations

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omitted). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state

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officials in their personal capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319

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F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003), or suits for injunctive relief brought against state officials in their

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official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 680 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Thus, Plaintiff may only proceed against defendants in their individual capacities for

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monetary damages and in their official capacities for injunctive relief.

Nevertheless, as

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explained below, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim against any of the defendants—

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whether in their individual or in their official capacities.

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B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

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Court clerks have “absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

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violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process ... unless [the]

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acts were done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr.Court, 828 F.2d
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1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). This includes merely administrative acts that are a part of the judicial

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function, including a clerk’s filing or refusing to file documents with the court. Id.; see In re

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Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Here, Plaintiff’s assertions regarding accepting or rejecting documents for filing, entering

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default judgment, and submitting responses to inquiries from the appellate court are all tasks part

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of the judicial process. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against

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the Stanislaus County Superior Court Clerks or other court employees. See, e.g., Sermeno v.

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Lewis, No. 1:16-cv-01582 LJO-BAM (PC), 2017 WL 117879, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017)

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(state superior court clerks entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for allegedly refusing or failing to

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file plaintiff’s documents); Palacios v. Fresno County Super. Ct., No. 1:09cv0554 OWW DLB,

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2009 WL 3416173, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009).

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C. Access to Courts

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Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

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518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). However, the right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas

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petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. In order to state a claim for the denial of court

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access, a prisoner must establish that he suffered an actual injury. Id. at 349. “[A]ctual injury [is]

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actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the ability to meet a

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filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415

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(2002) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3); Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014,

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1018 (9th Cir. 2011).

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As indicated above, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable access to courts claim against the

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superior court’s employees because they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Plaintiff also

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cannot state a cognizable access to courts claim against any defendant because such a claim is

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limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions and civil rights actions, and does not include

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divorce proceedings in state court. Even if this were not the case, Plaintiff has not identified any

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actual injury suffered as a result of his inability to file documents. First, Plaintiff complains

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about the lack of response to his motion for the appointment of counsel. However, Plaintiff was

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not prevented from filing the motion for appointment of counsel and, as admitted, he ultimately
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learned that the court had denied his motion. Second, Plaintiff complains that he submitted

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documents to the court that were never filed and default was entered against him. However,

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Plaintiff admits that after default was entered, he successfully petitioned for relief. Third,

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Plaintiff complains that he was not able to file certain documents, such as a challenge for cause,

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motion to compel discovery and other motions. However, Plaintiff also admits that he was able

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to pursue his allegations regarding unfiled documents with the state appellate court. There is no

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indication that any court employees prevented Plaintiff from filing documents with the appellate

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court. Fourth, Plaintiff complains that the trial court issued an order against him on December 9,

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2013, taking away his parental custody, property and financial rights. However, Plaintiff admits

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that he was able to file a motion to vacate the judgment, which was denied. Although Plaintiff

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did not receive the hoped-for assistance from the Family Law Facilitator after the denial, there is

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no indication that Plaintiff was wholly unable to submit documents relating to his divorce

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proceedings or that he was unable to pursue any post-judgment remedies, if available.

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D. Equal Protection

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The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

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alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal

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protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated

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against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, Serrano v. Francis,

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345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.

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2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a

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rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,

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564 (2000); see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); N.

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Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable Equal Protection claim. Plaintiff’s complaint does

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not provide any facts to support a claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his

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membership in a protected class or that similarly situated individuals were treated differently.

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Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendant Dodge, the Family Law Facilitator, purportedly

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denied Plaintiff the help proffered to similarly situated individuals is not sufficient.
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IV.

Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal

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The Court intends to recommend that this action be dismissed in its entirety for failure to

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state a claim. Following dismissal of this action, Plaintiff may seek a direct appeal, if he so

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chooses, and an interlocutory appeal will no longer be necessary. Therefore, the Court will

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recommend that Plaintiff’s motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal be denied as moot.

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V.

Conclusion and Recommendations

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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. Despite being provided with the

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relevant legal and pleading standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the identified

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deficiencies, and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130

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(9th Cir. 2000).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

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1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A; and

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2. Plaintiff’s motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal be denied as moot.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

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fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may

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file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

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Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the

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magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.

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2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

January 16, 2018

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A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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