M.A.D. Inc. v. Dubois

Filing 3

ORDER Sua Sponte Remanding Matter to the Merced County Superior Court, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 12/28/16. CASE CLOSED. (Verduzco, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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M.A.D., INC. dba Salvadori Property
Management,
Plaintiff

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v.

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CASE NO. 1:16-CV-1926 AWI ESG
ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING
MATTER TO THE MERCED COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT

DAWN DUBOIS,
Defendant

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Defendant removed this case from the Superior Court of Merced County on December 27,

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2016. See Court’s Docket Doc. No. 1. Defendant asserts that the basis for removal is the

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presence of a federal question. Specifically, Defendant contends that she filed an answer to

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Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer complaint that alleged Plaintiff violated aspects of 42 U.S.C. § 3604.

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It is through the invocation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604 that Defendant asserts that jurisdiction exists.

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See id.

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A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action

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sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell

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& Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441) is

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strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka,

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599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010); Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582

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F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited jurisdiction of

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the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

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jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582

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F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means

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that “the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042;

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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a

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removed case “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

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instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485

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(9th Cir. 1996); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district

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court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Gibson

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v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is

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mandatory, not discretionary.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see

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California ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, the court

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“must dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or not a

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party has filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995).

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“The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

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complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States,

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215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838; Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485.

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Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the

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plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation

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of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at

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1014. Accordingly, a case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense or counterclaim.

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See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 66-67, 70 (2009); K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas,

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653 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Here, Defendant has not shown that removal was appropriate. The complaint filed by

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Plaintiff is an unlawful detainer action that is based entirely on state law. As mentioned above,

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Defendant relies on her answer to establish federal question jurisdiction. However, invocation of

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the 42 U.S.C. § 3604 either as a counterclaim or defense is insufficient to establish federal

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question jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 66-67, 70; Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; K2 Am.

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Corp., 653 F.3d at 1029; California, 215 F.3d at 1014; Recht Family P’ship v. Furlong, 2016 U.S.
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Dist. LEXIS 82080, *4-*5 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2106); Wasatch Pool Holdings, Inc. v. Bailey, 2015

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69307, I3-*4 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2015). Because there is no federal question

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appearing in Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant has failed to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.

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Remand to the Merced County Superior Court is appropriate and mandatory. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c);

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Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257; Page, 45 F.3d at 133.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, per 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), due to this Court’s

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lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this case is REMANDED forthwith to the Superior Court of

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Merced County.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 28, 2016
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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