Santos v. Mims

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING Complaint, Without Prejudice, for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim for Relief, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 4/19/17. CASE CLOSED. (Marrujo, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WILLIAM ANTHONY SANTOS, SR.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
MARGARET MIMS,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:17-cv-00134-SAB (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF
[ECF No. 1]

Plaintiff William Anthony Santos, Sr. is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

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rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to the

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jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on February 10, 2017. Local Rule 302.

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, filed January 31, 2017.

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County,

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Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings

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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now

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higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive

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screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow

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the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer

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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely

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consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff contends that Fresno County Sheriff Margaret Mims is allowing “modern day slavery”

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to take place against parties in two separate criminal actions. Plaintiff’s sister, children, and mother of

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his children have been the victim of human trafficking throughout the city and county of Fresno.
Plaintiff seeks an order to stop the human trafficking, compensatory damages, punitive

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damages, and trial by jury.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

Section 1983 Liability

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The Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,

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but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor,

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490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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[Section 1983] creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Section 1983 does not create any
substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by
governmental officials. To prove a case under section 1983, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate that (1) the action occurred “under color of state law” and (2) the action resulted
in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right. [citation omitted].
Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
At a minimum, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a

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person was acting under color of state law at the time the act complained of was committed; and (2)

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that person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

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or laws of the United States. Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). To warrant relief under the

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Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that defendant’s acts or omissions caused the

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deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.

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1993). Thus, the statute plainly requires that there be an actual causal connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

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Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

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B.

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“Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a

Standing

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particular matter to the court for adjudication,” and a federal court is obliged to examine plaintiff’s

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standing pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution. See Justice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,

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3310 (1977).

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A plaintiff generally has standing to assert claims for the violation of his/her own legal rights

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and do not have standing to assert claims for the violations of the legal rights of other persons. See

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Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). There is an exception to the general rule, if “the
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litigant can demonstrate that he or she has suffered a concrete, redressable injury, that he or she has a

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close relation with the third party, and that there exists some hindrance to the third party’s ability to

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protect his or her own interests.” Edmonson v. Leesville, 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991).
There are no facts whatsoever to indicate that Plaintiff has standing to challenge the alleged

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human trafficking violations, or that Plaintiff can, by way of amendment, establish standing to

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challenge the alleged constitutional violations to third party individuals. Thus, although the Court

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would generally grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of his pro se status, amendment is futile in this

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instance because the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824

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(9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to

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amend). Accordingly, the instant complaint must be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a

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cognizable claim for relief. See Fleck & Assoc., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1106-07 (9th

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Cir. 2006) (dismissal for lack of standing is without prejudice).

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IV.

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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed, without

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prejudice, for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief and the Clerk of Court is directed to

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terminate this action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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April 19, 2017
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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