Kovalenko v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

ORDER DENYING 25 Plaintiff's Request for a Third Extension of Time Without Prejudice, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 5/21/2018. (Hall, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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PAVEL KOVALENKO,
Plaintiff,

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v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.
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Case No.: 1:17-cv-0166 - JLT
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR
A THIRD EXTENSION OF TIME WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

On May 18, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation for Plaintiff to have an extension of time file a
reply to Defendant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 25)
The Scheduling Order allows for a single extension of thirty days by the stipulation of the

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parties (Doc. 10-1 at 4), which was previously used by Plaintiff in this action. (Docs. 19, 20) Beyond

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the single extension by stipulation, “requests to modify [the scheduling] order must be made by written

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motion and will be granted only for good cause.” (Doc. 10-1 at 4) Accordingly, the Court construes

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the stipulation of the parties to be a motion to amend the Scheduling Order.

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Defendant filed her opposition to the motion on April 27, 2018. (Doc. 24) Pursuant to the

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deadlines ordered by the Court, Plaintiff was to file any reply within fifteen days (Doc. 10-4), or no

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later than May 14, 2018, as the deadline fell upon a Saturday. However, Plaintiff delayed seeking an

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extension until May 18, 2018, without any explanation. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserted he was

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seeking “a first extension of seven business days that should not significantly prejudice the parties or
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the Court,” and requested an amended deadline of May 23, 2018.1 (Doc. 25 at 1) However, this fails to

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satisfy the good cause required both by the Court’s Scheduling Order and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure after the deadline has passed.

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As the Ninth Circuit stated, scheduling orders are “not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered,

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which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

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975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, a scheduling order is “the heart of case management.”

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Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3rd Cir. 1986). Therefore, parties must “diligently

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attempt to adhere to the schedule throughout the course of the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186

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F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Because Plaintiff offers no reason either for missing the deadline or

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for the need of an extension, the Court is unable to find good cause exists for the extension at this time.

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Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time is DENIED
without prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

May 21, 2018

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, this is the third extension requested, not the first. (See Docs. 19-20, 22-23)

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