Anna Marie Rangel v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

ORDER on 1 Social Security Appeal signed by Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson on 9/18/2018. CASE CLOSED.(Lundstrom, T)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

ANNA MARIE RANGEL,

12

Plaintiff,

13

v.

14

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

15

Case No. 1:17-cv-00706-JDP

ORDER ON SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL
(Doc. No. 1)

Defendant.
16
17

I.

18

Plaintiff Anna Marie Rangel has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking

INTRODUCTION

19

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)

20

denying her applications for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance

21

Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. No. 1.) The case has been submitted on the parties’ briefs. The court

22

will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

23
24
25
26
27
28
1

1

II.

THE DISABILITY EVALUATION STANDARD

2

A person has a “disability” under the Social Security Act of 1935 if the claimant cannot

3

“engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

4

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

5

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

6

1382c(a)(3)(A). The physical or mental impairment must be an anatomical, physiological, or

7

psychological abnormality “demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

8

diagnostic techniques.” Id. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). The impairment must be sufficiently

9

severe that the claimant cannot perform her previous work and cannot—considering her age,

10

education, and work experience—engage in substantial gainful work that exists in the national

11

economy. See id. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The Commissioner must consider the

12

combined effect of all the claimant’s impairments, regardless of whether any individual

13

impairment is on its own severe enough to constitute a disability. See id. §§ 423(d)(2)(B),

14

1382c(a)(3)(G).

15

The Social Security Administration has a sequential, five-step process for evaluating a

16

claimed disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(f). If a claimant is determined

17

to be either disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequence, the analysis ceases without a

18

consideration of subsequent steps. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At step one, the

19

Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful

20

activity. Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the Commissioner considers whether the

21

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit his or her

22

ability to perform basic work activities. See id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the

23

Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of

24

impairments that meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”). See

25

id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant

26

can perform his or her past jobs. See id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). At step five, the

27

Commissioner determines whether the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant

28

numbers in the national economy. See id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). The claimant bears the
2

1

burden of proof at steps one through four, but the Commissioner bears the burden at step five.

2

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

3

III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

4

Rangel has filed an application for SSI claiming disability beginning February 7, 2012.

5

AR 16.1 The decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to deny benefits on September

6

21, 2015 became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Commissioner’s Appeals

7

Council denied Rangel’s request to review the appeal. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20

8

C.F.R. §§ 404.981; 416.1481. The ALJ’s decision is now before this court for review.

9

IV.

10

THE COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION

The ALJ found that Rangel is not disabled. AR 15-24. At step one, the ALJ found that

11

Rangel had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of her

12

disability, February 7, 2012. AR 16. The ALJ then found severe impairments at step two:

13

“obesity; hyperlipidemia; dysfunction, major joints; osteoarthrosis and allied disorders; essential

14

hypertension; affective disorders; and degenerative disk disease.” AR 16. At step three, the ALJ

15

found that Rangel did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

16

medically equaled one of the listing impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404 P, Appendix 1. AR 17.

17

The ALJ also determined at step three that Rangel had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

18

to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she
can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally; can frequently climb ramps and stairs;
can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds or crawl; and can frequently stoop,
kneel, crouch and crawl. The claimant can never be exposed to unprotected heights,
moving mechanical parts or extreme cold. Finally, the claimant is limited to
performing simple, routine tasks.

19
20
21
22

AR 19. The ALJ therefore proceeded to step four.
23
24
25
26

Relying on a Vocational Expert’s (“VE”) testimony at step four, the ALJ found that
Rangel had past relevant work of “home attendant,” “change person,” “janitor,” and “foster
parent.” AR 22-23. The ALJ determined that Rangel could no longer perform her past relevant
work. AR 23.

27
28

1

All “AR” citations refer to the administrative record. (Doc. No. 10.)
3

1

At step five—after considering Rangel’s age, education, work experience, and RFC in

2

conjunction with the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 2—the

3

ALJ concluded that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that

4

the claimant can perform.” AR 23. The ALJ thus concluded that Rangel was not disabled as

5

defined in the Social Security Act. AR 24.

6

V.

DISCUSSION

7

Rangel argues on appeal that the ALJ improperly rejected her pain and symptom

8

testimony, and the reasons provided by the ALJ were not supported by substantial evidence.

9

(Doc. No. 14 at 5.) A district court will set aside the Commissioner’s final decision denying

10

benefits only if that decision is either (1) not supported by substantial evidence or (2) based on a

11

legal error. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2017).

12

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; [i]t

13

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

14

conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y

15

of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). In evaluating whether a decision

16

of the Commissioner was based on substantial evidence, the court reviews the “entire record as a

17

whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the

18

Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of

19

supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

20

quotation marks and citations omitted). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

21

reversing the Commissioner’s final decision, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of

22

the Commissioner—it must affirm under the substantial evidence standard. Id.; see Revels, 874

23

F.3d at 654 (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s

24

decision should be upheld.” (quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007)). The

25

court reviews only the reasons provided by the Commissioner in the disability determination and

26

may not affirm based on a ground upon which the Commissioner did not rely. See Revels, 874

27

F.3d at 654. The court will find legal error if it concludes that the Commissioner applied the

28

wrong legal standard. See Wellington v. Colvin, 2016 WL 224184, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19,
4

1

2016), aff’d sub nom. Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2017).

2

In evaluating Rangel’s limitations to formulate the RFC, the ALJ’s decision denying

3

disability benefits stated that Rangel’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

4

limiting effects of [her pain] symptoms are not entirely credible.” AR 22. An ALJ must engage a

5

two-step analysis in determining whether a claimant’s testimony concerning subjective pain or

6

symptoms is credible. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). “First, the

7

ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an

8

underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other

9

symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he claimant is not required to

10

show her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has

11

alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.”

12

Id. The claimant is not required to produce objective medical evidence of the pain or its severity.

13

See id. Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject a claimant’s testimony

14

about the severity of the pain “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing

15

so.”2 Id. at 1015; see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming the

16

application of the two-step analysis in Garrison after Social Security Ruling 16–3p (2016)).

17

Here, the ALJ took issue with Rangel’s testimony that her pain was so intense that she

18

could not work at all. AR 22. In discounting this testimony, the ALJ pointed out that Rangel

19

“had been a full-time caregiver to her mother for 12 years, performing very heavy exertional

20

work.” AR 22. The ALJ further noted that the objective medical evidence supports a limitation,

21

but Rangel could still perform “light exertional work.” AR 22 (citing MRI of Cervical Spine on

22

12/10/2014 by Physician Reynaldo Garcia, Exhibit 8F, pages 3-4, AR 574-75). The ALJ thus

23

provided two reasons for discounting Rangel’s credibility: (1) inconsistency with the medical

24

evidence in the record; and (2) Rangel’s prior “heavy” executional work. See AR 22.

25

Rangel asserts that the reasons provided by the ALJ are unsupported by substantial

26
27
28

“The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.”
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924
(9th Cir. 2002)).
5
2

1

evidence. Regarding the inconsistency with the objective medical evidence, Rangel argues that

2

the ALJ did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons; the ALJ merely recited the

3

evidence in support of the RFC conclusion without identifying what evidence was inconsistent

4

with Rangel’s testimony. (Doc. No. 14 at 7.) The court disagrees.

5

On pages 19-22 of administrative record, the ALJ considered and discussed the medical

6

evidence in detail. See AR 19-22. Importantly, no medical opinion provided a greater limitation

7

from Rangel’s pain symptoms than what was incorporated by the ALJ into the RFC. See id.

8

Consultative examiner Roger Wagner, M.D., examined Rangel on July 14, 2013 and concluded

9

that she had no limitations with: (1) standing and walking with normal breaks; (2) sitting; (3) did

10

not need an assistive device; (4) lifting; (5) could frequently perform postural activities; and (6)

11

could frequently stoop and perform manipulative activities. AR 21, 540-41. The state agency

12

medical consultants, A. Nasarbadi and R. Fast, agreed that Rangel can perform medium

13

exertional work.3 AR 21, 91-92, 122-23. Medium exertional work is defined by regulation to

14

involve “lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

15

weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).

16

The ALJ formulated an RFC that was more restrictive than the medical evidence by

17

limiting Rangel to “light” exertional work, which is defined by regulation to involve “lifting no

18

more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10

19

pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). By limiting Rangel’s RFC to light exertional work instead of

20

medium, which is what the medical evidence indicated, the ALJ partially credited Rangel’s

21

testimony concerning pain. This was reasonable considering that there was no objective medical

22

evidence in the record to support Rangel’s testimony that she could not perform work at all due to

23

her pain. Therefore, the court concludes that inconsistency with the objective medical evidence

24

was a “specific, clear, and convincing reason” for partially discrediting Rangel’s testimony

25

concerning pain.4 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Astrue, 371 F. App’x 785 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that

26

3

27
28

A. Nasarbadi’s evaluation occurred on July 30, 2013, AR 91-92, and R. Fast conducted an
evaluation on January 9, 2014, AR 122-23.
4
The court need not reach Rangel’s argument concerning the ALJ’s other reasoning for partially
discrediting Rangel’s pain and symptom testimony because any error would be harmless.
6

1

ALJ’s finding that claimant was “not entirely credible” was supported by specific, clear and

2

convincing reasons, including that the objective medical evidence was inconsistent with her

3

testimony about the severity of her symptoms). The ALJ’s decision denying Social Security

4

benefits is therefore supported by substantial evidence.

5

VI.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

6

Plaintiff Anna Marie Rangel’s appeal from the administrative decision of the

7

Commissioner of Social Security is denied, and the decision of the Commissioner of Social

8

Security is affirmed. The clerk of court is directed to (1) enter judgment in favor of defendant

9

Commissioner of Social Security and (2) close this case.

10
11

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12
Dated:
13

September 18, 2018
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7