Williams v. Batra et al

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim for Relief and Directing Clerk of Court to Enter Judgment signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 8/18/2017. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL B. WILLIAMS,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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SANJEEV BATRA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:17-cv-00732-SAB (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR
RELIEF AND DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT
TO ENTER JUDGMENT
[ECF No. 8]

Plaintiff Michael B. Williams is a state civil detainee appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in

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this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff

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consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on June 12, 2017. Local Rule 302.

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed August 17, 2017.

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court

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shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pleadings of detainees are construed liberally and are afforded the

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benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

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F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's

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factual allegations,” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), and “a liberal interpretation of

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a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled,”

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Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of

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Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Also, while a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true,

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courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d

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677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient

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factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v.

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United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant

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acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff originally filed a civil rights complaint against medical doctor Defendant Sanjeev

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Batra on December 30, 2016, alleging unlawful confinement in the hospital medical unit, improper

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medical treatment, and retaliation. The action was dismissed on March 6, 2017, which is pending

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appellate review.

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On April 6, 2017, Defendant Batra conspired with Defendant Underwood, and various other

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hospital officials to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by mixing his Lantus and Humalog insulins

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with other unknown chemicals in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior complaint regarding the improper

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medical treatment.

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On April 23, 2017, Plaintiff got into a head argument with Defendant Underwood regarding his
tempering with his insulins. On April 24, 2017, Plaintiff appeared before the unit-2, team committee
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to gain the return of his access to his hall-card which was put on hold by Underwood on April 23,

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2017. The only question asked of Plaintiff by hospital Psychologist, Brett Follett, is whether Plaintiff

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was going to physically retaliate against Underwood for his involvement in mixing Plaintiff’s insulins.

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Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of fifteen million dollars.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

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A viable claim of retaliation by a civil detainee entails five elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged

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in protected conduct; (2) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against the plaintiff;

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(3) the adverse action was “because of” the plaintiff’s protected conduct (i.e., “retaliatory motive”);

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(4) the adverse action “would chill or silence a person or ordinary firmness from future First

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Amendment activities;” and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.

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See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Retaliation

Retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse action by a defendant after protected

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speech; rather, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a connection between the two.

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See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the

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logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”). Therefore,

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although “the timing and nature” of an allegedly adverse action may “properly be considered” as

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circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive, the official alleged to have retaliated must also be

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alleged to have been aware of the prisoner’s protected conduct. See Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan,

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874 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995); Wood v.

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Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that “mere speculation that defendants acted out of

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retaliation is not sufficient” and affirming judgment where there was “nothing in the record to indicate

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[defendant] even knew about [an] earlier [law]suit.”)

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Plaintiff’s conclusory claim of retaliatory motive in allegedly mixing his insulins is insufficient

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to give rise to a claim for retaliation. There are no facts from which the Court can infer that

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Defendants acted out of retaliation. Plaintiff’s bare assertion that he was retaliated against falls short

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of supporting the claim that adverse action was taken against him. Indeed, Plaintiff’s prior complaint
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regarding misconduct by Defendant Batra was dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for

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relief. Thus, at the time of the alleged retaliation the action had been dismissed by the Court on

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March 6, 2017, for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff’s claim is not plausible

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because it is based solely on the unsupported assumption that Defendant Batra knew about the

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previous lawsuit. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim.

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B.

Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction

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Plaintiff objects to the authority of the undersigned Magistrate Judge to dismiss the case for

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failure to state a cognizable claim because there has been no consent by Defendants. (Compl. at 4-5.)

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Plaintiff is mistaken.

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On June 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a signed consent to jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate

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Judge, dated June 7, 2017. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff checked the box yes, “[t]he undersigned hereby

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voluntarily consents to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings in this

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case.” (Id.)

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“Upon the consent of the parties,” a Magistrate Judge “may conduct any or all proceedings in a

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jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

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Plaintiff is the only “party” to the proceeding to date, and he has voluntarily consented to the

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jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Defendants have not been served

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because pursuant to the Court’s screening authority he has not stated a cognizable claim for relief to

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warrant a response. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. V. Brenneke, 551 F.3d 1132, 1135

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(9th Cir. 2009) (“A federal court is without personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant

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has been served in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.”) When, as here, Plaintiff has voluntarily

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consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction and the Defendants have neither been served with process

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nor appeared in the action, a Magistrate Judge may properly exercise consent jurisdiction over the case

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pursuant to section 636(c)(1), including by ordering dismissal of the action for failure to state a

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cognizable claim for relief. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1119-21 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding

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that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights action, sua sponte and

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, when the prisoner voluntarily consented by filing out the proper form,

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and no defendant had yet been served in the action); see also Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th
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Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants. However, because they had

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not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.

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Therefore, lack of written consent from the defendants did not deprive the magistrate judge of

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jurisdiction in this matter.”) Accordingly, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s claim that the undersigned

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Magistrate Judge does not have the authority to dismiss the action for failure to state a cognizable

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claim for relief.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Plaintiff was

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previously notified of the applicable legal standards and the deficiencies in his pleading, and despite

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guidance from the Court, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is largely identical to the original

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complaint. Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff’s original and first amended complaint, the Court is

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persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to allege any additional facts that would support a claim for a due

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process violation or access to the court, and further amendment would be futile. See Hartmann v.

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CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may not deny leave to amend when

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amendment would be futile.”) Based on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the Court finds that

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further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th. Cir. 2000); Noll v.

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Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446-1449 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

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This action is dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; and
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The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

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August 18, 2017
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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