Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 7

ORDER Directing Clerk to Issue Summons, Social Security Case Documents, and Scheduling Order; ORDER Directing Service of the First Amended Complaint, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 2/27/2018. (Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LARRY KEITH WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.
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Case No.: 1:17-cv-0760-JLT
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE
SUMMONS, SOCIAL SECURITY CASE
DOCUMENTS, AND SCHEDULING ORDER
ORDER DIRECTING SERVICE OF THE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT

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Larry Keith Williams seeks to proceed with an action for judicial review of the administrative

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decision denying an application for Social Security benefits. For the following reasons, the Court finds

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service of the First Amended Complaint is appropriate.

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I.

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Screening Requirement
When an individual is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the

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complaint and shall dismiss a complaint, or portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious or

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fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant

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who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A plaintiff’s claim

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is frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or

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not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

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25, 32-33 (1992).
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II.

Pleading Standards

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General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A

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pleading must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of the

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claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may

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include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and

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succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The

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purpose of the complaint is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him, and the grounds

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upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The

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Supreme Court noted,
Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Vague

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and conclusory allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

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268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

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[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should
assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal
conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. The Court may grant leave to amend a
complaint to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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III.

Discussion and Analysis
Plaintiff seeks review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying disability

benefits. (Doc. 4) The Court may have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of
such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner may allow. Such action
shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in
which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business . . . The court shall
have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,
with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.
Id. Except as provided by statute, “[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner shall be
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).
Except as provided by statute, “[n]o findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner shall be

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reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). The Supreme Court

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noted the purpose of the legislation was “to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility

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claims.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977). Thus, the regulations operate as a statute of

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limitations a claimant to appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. Bowen v. City of New York, 476

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U.S. 467, 479 (1986); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 n. 9 (1976)). Because the time limit is

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“a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,” it “must be strictly construed.” Id.

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According to Plaintiff, the Appeals Council denied his request for review of the decision

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rendered by the administrative law judge on March 27, 2017, at which time the decision became the

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final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 4 at 2, ¶ 8) Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for review would

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be due within sixty-five days of the date of Appeal’s Council’s notice, or no later than May 31, 2017.

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See 42 U.S.C. §405(g) (noting that a claimant is “presumed” to have received the notice of denial

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within “5 days after the date of such notice”). However, Plaintiff did not initiate this action until June

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1, 2017. Thus, it appears the statute of limitations may have run on the request for review.

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As the Ninth Circuit observed, “[a] petition to review a decision of the [Commissioner] must

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be brought within the statutory time limit.” Tate v. United States, 437 F.2d 88, 89 (9th Cir. 1971).

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Accordingly, courts have determined that where a claimant files an action even one day late, the

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statute of limitations mandates a dismissal of the action. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510 (5th
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Cir. 2000) (affirming judgment in favor of Commissioner where the claimant missed the statute of

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limitations by one day); Davila v. Barnhart, 225 F.Supp.2d 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing

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complaint although filed “only one day late,” observing that “courts have not hesitated to enforce the

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60-day period as a firm limit”[citations omitted]); O’Neill v. Heckler, 579 F.Supp. 979, 980-81 (E.D.

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Pa. 1984) (“[e]ven one day’s delay in filing the action is fatal”); Oliver v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. 2011

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WL 2669275 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011) (dismissing a complaint filed one day after the deadline).

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Though it appears that the statute of limitations may have run before the plaintiff filed the

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complaint, the Court declines, at this time, to determine that Plaintiff is unable to proceed in this

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action. The “sixty day period is not jurisdictional, but is instead a statute of limitations which the

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Secretary may waive.” Banta v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IV.

Conclusion and Order

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Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

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Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security;

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to issue summons as to the defendant, Nancy A.

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The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to issue and serve Social Security Case

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Documents, including the Scheduling Order, Order regarding Consent, the Consent

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Form, and USM-285 Forms; and

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3.

The U.S. Marshal is DIRECTED to serve a copy of the First Amended Complaint,

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summons, and this order upon the defendant as directed by Plaintiff in the USM

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Forms; and

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4.

Any motion addressing the statute of limitations in this action SHALL be filed within
forty-five days of the the date of service of the First Amended Complaint.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

February 27, 2018

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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