Mosley v. Stewart

Filing 21

ORDER Granting the Defendants' 19 Motion to Stay, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 8/15/18. CASE STAYED. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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QUINCY MOSLEY,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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S. STEWART,

CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00852-DAD JLT (PC)
ORDER GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO STAY
(ECF No. 19)

Defendant.

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Plaintiff proceeds in this action on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against

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Correctional Officers Stewart, Castillo, and Ventura, whom plaintiff accuses of attacking him

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without provocation on September 2, 2015, at Kern Valley State Prison. Following that same

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incident, plaintiff was charged in Kern County Superior Court, People v. Mosley, Case No.

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DF012442A, with violating California Penal Code § 4501.5, criminal battery on a non-confined

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person, for attacking defendant Stewart. A trial is presently scheduled in that case for September

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17, 2018.1 Defendants now move to stay this federal suit pending resolution of the state criminal

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action pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Plaintiff has not filed an opposition or a

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statement of non-opposition.

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See Superior Court of California, County of Kern, Criminal Case Search,
https://www.kern.courts.ca.gov/online_services/criminal_case_search.

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Generally, there is a strong policy against federal intervention in pending state judicial

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processes in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45

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(1971); see also Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “Younger

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abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and

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federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City

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of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). Specifically, Younger directs federal courts to

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abstain from granting relief that would interfere with pending state or local criminal proceedings.

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Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 968.

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Younger and its progeny, however, should not be regarded as blind deference to states’

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rights or an abrogation of the federal courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation” to adjudicate

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claims within its jurisdiction. Colorado River Water Conservation Deist. v. United States, 424

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U.S. 800, 817 (1976); see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Instead, the federal courts are required to

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engage in a delicate balancing process to determine when Younger abstention is appropriate.

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The following three requirements must be satisfied before a federal court may properly

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invoke the Younger abstention doctrine: “(1) ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) implication

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of an important state interest in the proceedings; and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal

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questions in the proceedings.” World Famous Drinking Emporium Inc., v. City of Tempe, 820

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F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (en

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banc) (Younger principle applies to damages actions).

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Where applicable, Younger abstention is mandatory. Absent exceptional circumstances,

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the district courts do not have discretion to avoid the doctrine if the elements of Younger

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abstention exist in a particular case. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d at 1092 (citation omitted). The

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recognized exceptional circumstances are limited to “a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or

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some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.’” Id. (quoting

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Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)).

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Defendants argue that all three requirements are met here: (1) People v. Mosley was

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initiated before this action was filed and it remains pending in the Kern County Superior Court,

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(2) the Kern County District Attorney’s Office has charged plaintiff with criminal battery on
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defendant Stewart, conduct that it obviously deems “socially harmful” and “punishable,”

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Younger, 401 U.S. at 51-52, and (3) plaintiff has an opportunity to litigate his Eighth Amendment

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excessive force claim as a defense to defendant Stewart’s use of force.

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The court agrees as to the first two Younger requirements, namely, that there is an

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ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates an important state interest. As for the third

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requirement, plaintiff bears the burden to establish “that state procedural law bar[s] presentation

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of [his] claims[ ]” in the state court proceedings. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-15

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(1987) (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432 (1979)). Plaintiff, however, has not responded

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to the defendants’ argument that plaintiff has an opportunity to argue at his state criminal trial that

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defendant Stewart used excessive force during the incident at issue. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.

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327, 338 (1977) (stating that Younger requires that parties to state-court actions “be accorded

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only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings,

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and their failure to avail themselves of such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures

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were inadequate”).

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Accordingly, all the elements for the court to invoke the Younger abstention doctrine are

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present, there appear to be no exceptional circumstances that would render it inapplicable. In

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finding that Younger principles apply to actions seeking damages as well as actions seeking

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equitable relief, the Ninth Circuit found that “federal courts should not dismiss actions where

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damages are at issue; rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state proceedings are

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completed.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 968; accord Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of

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Capitola, 583 F.3d 674, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[B]ecause in damages cases there may yet be

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something for the federal courts to decide after completion of the state proceedings ... [t]he

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district court—quite appropriately—did not dismiss under Younger but stayed the proceedings

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pending the final decision of the California courts.”). That damages actions should be stayed

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rather than dismissed is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

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384 (2007), that where a plaintiff files a civil claim “related to rulings that will likely be made in

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a pending or anticipated criminal trial[ ], it is within the power of the district court, and in accord

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with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case ... is ended.” Id. at 393-94.
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As the Supreme Court explained, “If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil

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suit would impugn that conviction, Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),] will require

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dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.” Wallace, 549

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U.S. at 394.

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Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

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The defendants’ motion to stay (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED;

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2.

The action STAYED. Within 15 days of the conclusion of the trial of People v.

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Mosley, Kern County Superior Court Case No. DF012442A, the defendants SHALL file a status

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report detailing the outcome of the case pending resolution, whether they believe the stay should

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be lifted and the impact, if any, the outcome of the criminal trial has on this proceeding.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

August 15, 2018

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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