Canada v. Niebert

Filing 13

ORDER DENYING 7 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order AS MOOT signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 9/15/2017. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RONALD LEE CANADA,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
NIEBERT,

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Case No. 1:17-cv-00873-BAM (PC)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AS
MOOT
(ECF No. 7)

Defendant.

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Plaintiff Ronald Lee Canada (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

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forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to

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magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8.)

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I.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

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Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order against

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Defendant Niebert and the two Doe Defendants, now identified as correctional officers Keister

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and Takahashi. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff states that the three Defendants all used unnecessary force

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on him, and he fears for his life being housed at Kern Valley State Prison. Plaintiff does not

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otherwise state what relief he seeks against the Defendants.

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II.

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The analysis for a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to that for a

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Legal Standard

preliminary injunction, Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7
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(9th Cir. 2001), and “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of

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right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A

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plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

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that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

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equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 (citations

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omitted). An injunction may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to

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relief. Id. at 22 (citation omitted).

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for
preliminary injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it

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have before it an actual case or controversy. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983);

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Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.

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464, 471 (1982). If the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no

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power to hear the matter in question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18

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U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find

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the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation

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of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

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Federal right.”

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Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison

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officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491–93 (2009); Mayfield v.

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United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the parties

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in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. Summers, 555

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U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969.

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III.

Discussion

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Plaintiff brings suit against Defendant Niebert and two Doe Defendants, now identified as

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correctional officers Keister and Takahashi, for the use of unnecessary force. In the instant

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motion, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order against the Defendants, but does not state

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what specific form of relief he seeks.

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To the extent Plaintiff seeks transfer from Kern Valley State Prison to another institution,

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Plaintiff is informed that convicted prisoners have no reasonable expectation that they will remain

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in any particular facility, and prison officials have broad authority to transfer prisoners from one

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facility to another. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S.

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236 (1976). “[A] prisoner’s liberty interests are sufficiently extinguished by his conviction that

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the state may generally confine or transfer him to any of its institutions, indeed, even to a prison

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in another state, without offending the Constitution.” Bravo v. Hewchuck, 2006 WL 3618023, *1

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(N.D. Cal. 2006) (citations omitted). Also, according to Plaintiff’s notice of change of address,

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he was transferred from Kern Valley State Prison to California Men’s Colony on July 25, 2017.

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(ECF No. 9.) Thus, any request related to transfer and Plaintiff’s fears for his safety while housed

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at Kern Valley State Prison are now moot based on his transfer to California Men’s Colony. See

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Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (stating that transfer to another

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prison renders request for injunctive relief concerning prison conditions moot absent some

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evidence of an expectation of being transferred back).

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IV.

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Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary

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Conclusion and Order

restraining order, (ECF No. 7), is DENIED as moot.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

September 15, 2017

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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