Roadrunner Intermodal Services, LLC v. T.G.S. Transportation, Inc.

Filing 217

ORDER GRANTING Ex Parte Application to QUASH Bruce W. Honeyman, PH.D.'s Subpoena to Testify at Deposition and Produce Privileged Records signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 5/30/2019. (Sant Agata, S)

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1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 6 JEFFREY COX, 7 v. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Case No. 1:17-cv-01056-DAD-BAM Plaintiff, ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, CENTRAL CAL TRANSPORTATION, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and DOES 1 through 50, ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE APPLICATION TO QUASH BRUCE W. HONEYMAN, PH.D.’S SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY AT DEPOSITION AND PRODUCE PRIVILEGED RECORDS (DOC. No. 211) Defendants. ________________________________/ ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant/CounterPlaintiff, 16 17 v. 18 JEFFREY COX, 19 Plaintiff/CounterDefendant. _________________________________/ 20 21 22 ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 23 Plaintiff, 24 25 26 v. T.G.S. TRANSPORTATION, INC., a California corporation, and DOES 1-10, 27 Defendants. _________________________________/ 28 /// 1 1 On May 16, 2019, non-party Bruce W. Honeyman, Ph.D. (“Dr. Honeyman”) filed an ex parte 2 application pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 for an order to quash a subpoena issued by 3 Roadrunner Intermodal Services, LLC (“Roadrunner”) requiring Dr. Honeyman to appear at a 4 deposition on May 17, 2019, and to produce confidential records and testimony. 5 Following a review of the application, the Court permitted Roadrunner and Mr. Jeffrey Cox to file 6 responses to the ex parte application to quash. The Court also set the matter for hearing on May 31, 7 2019, and stayed the deposition of Dr. Honeyman pending resolution of the motion. (Doc. No. 212.) (Doc. No. 211.) 8 On May 24, 2019, Roadrunner filed an opposition to the ex parte application. (Doc. No. 214.) 9 Mr. Jeffrey Cox also filed a response indicating that he does not oppose the application for an order to 10 11 12 13 14 quash. (Doc. No. 215.) The Court found the application suitable for resolution without oral argument, vacated the hearing and the matter was deemed submitted. (Doc. No. 216.) Having considered the moving and response papers, and for the reasons that follow, Dr. Honeyman’s ex parte application for an order to quash the subpoena will be granted. 15 I. Background 16 On March 11, 2019, Mr. Cox served his expert disclosures, which included information 17 regarding Dr. Honeyman as a non-retained expert. (Doc. No. 215-1, Declaration of Christopher Rusca 18 (“Rusca Decl.”) at ¶ 5 and Ex. B.) Dr. Honeyman is a licensed psychologist and is the treating 19 therapist for Mr. Cox and Mr. Cox’s wife. (Id.) Mr. Cox also identified a retained expert, Stephanie 20 Rizzardi, Ph.D., who reportedly opined, among other things, that based on the “best available 21 information,” Mr. Cox has and would incur over $14,000 in damages as a result of seeking marital 22 counseling due to the alleged wrongful termination. (Doc. 214-3, Declaration of Todd Pickles 23 (“Pickles Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2, 3 and Ex. 2.) 24 On March 22, 2019, Roadrunner emailed counsel for Mr. Cox a copy of the deposition 25 subpoena for Dr. Honeyman. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Dr. Honeyman was never personally served with the 26 subpoena and document demand. 27 (“Humphrey Decl.”) at ¶ 8.) Nevertheless, counsel for Dr. Honeyman timely objected to the subpoena 28 on March 29, 2019, and notified all counsel that there were no authorizations for release of the therapy (Doc. No. 211-2, Declaration of Kathleen A. Humphrey 2 1 records. (Id. at ¶ 9; Rusca Decl. at ¶ 10.) Mrs. Cox reportedly refused to provide a waiver. (Doc. 2 215-1, Rusca Decl. at ¶ 9; Humphrey Decl. at ¶ 10 (“[A]ll counsel have been repeatedly notified that 3 Mrs. Cox has specifically instructed that she does not want her private therapy records released.”)). 4 Based on Dr. Honeyman’s objections and issues regarding Mrs. Cox’s refusal to waive any 5 privilege, on April 2, 2019, Mr. Cox served all parties with a notice of the de-designation of Dr. 6 Honeyman as a non-retained expert. (Doc. 215-1, Ex. A to Rusca Decl.) 7 On May 2, 2019, counsel for Roadrunner contacted counsel for Dr. Honeyman by email to 8 advise that Roadrunner intended to proceed with the deposition of Dr. Honeyman despite Mrs. Cox’ 9 lack of consent. (Doc. 211-2, Humphrey Decl. at ¶ 12.) 10 On May 8, 2019, Roadrunner reportedly inquired whether the other parties would be willing to 11 allow the deposition of Dr. Honeyman after the non-expert discovery deadline, which expired on 12 February 22, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 14; Doc. No. 111.) On the same date, Roadrunner served Dr. Honeyman 13 with an amended subpoena and noticed the deposition for May 17, 2019. (Doc. 211-2, Ex. C to 14 Humphrey Decl.) May 17, 2019 was the last day to complete expert discovery. (Doc. No. 195.) 15 Dr. Honeyman filed the instant application to quash on May 16, 2019. (Doc. 211-1.) As noted 16 above, the Court permitted both Roadrunner and Mr. Cox to file responses to the application and 17 stayed the deposition of Dr. Honeyman and the related document production pending resolution of the 18 application. (Doc. 212.) 19 II. 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs the deposition and records subpoena at issue here. 21 Rule 45 provides that a party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena “must take 22 reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). The court must enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction on a 24 party or attorney who fails to comply. Id. Pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3)(A), the court must quash or 25 modify a subpoena that: 26 27 28 Legal Standard (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies, or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden. 3 1 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Further, pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii), the court may quash or modify 3 a subpoena if it requires “disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion….” 4 45(d)(3)(B)(ii). III. 5 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. Discussion A. Summary of Dr. Honeyman’s Position 7 Dr. Honeyman reports that he is not a party to this lawsuit and is not a retained expert. Instead, 8 he is the marital therapist for Mr. Cox and his wife, Mrs. Cox. Dr. Honeyman contends that he would 9 be in breach of his ethical duties as a California psychologist and could lose his license if forced to 10 testify and provide documents without written authorizations from both Mr. Cox and Mrs. Cox. It is 11 Dr. Honeyman’s understanding that Mrs. Cox does not intend to provide authorization permitting him 12 to testify or produce records. (Doc. No. 211-1 at 3.) 13 Dr. Honeyman reportedly notified Roadrunner that as a result of Mrs. Cox’ refusal to waive the 14 psychotherapist-patient privilege, he “cannot disclose anything that was said in confidence to him 15 during or for treatment notwithstanding Mr. Cox’s willingness to waive said privilege.” (Id. at 4.) 16 According to Dr. Honeyman, Roadrunner has insisted the deposition proceed despite the fact that he 17 “cannot offer any testimony without breaching his ethical duties as a psychologist in California and 18 placing his license in jeopardy.” (Id.) Dr. Honeyman contends that if he were forced to provide 19 testimony and documents without authorizations for release, he would be in violation of HIPAA and 20 the Medical Information Act concerning patient confidentiality. Dr. Honeyman argues that he should 21 not be unduly burdened and forced to breach his ethical duties and threaten his medical license based 22 on Roadrunner’s untimely and improper subpoena. 23 Dr. Honeyman therefore seeks to quash the subpoena as required under the provisions of Rule 24 45(d)(3)(a)(iii) and (iv) because it requires disclosure of privileged or other protected mater where no 25 exception or waiver applies, and it subjects him to undue burden. Additionally, Dr. Honeyman asserts 26 that the Court may quash the subpoena pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii) because it would require 27 disclosure of an unretained expert’s opinion. 28 /// 4 1 B. Summary of Roadrunner’s Position 2 Roadrunner first argues that Mr. Cox has waived the privilege as to evidence relating to 3 counseling because he has placed his mental and emotional state directly at issue and because he is 4 seeking as actual damages regarding the medical costs associated with treatment by Dr. Honeyman. 5 (Doc. No. 214 at 7-8.) Roadrunner argues that it would be inequitable for Mr. Cox to place his 6 treatment with Dr. Honeyman at issue and seek damages for the counseling costs, but bar Roadrunner 7 from obtaining evidence from Dr. Honeyman because Mrs. Cox has not given consent to the 8 deposition. Roadrunner also argues that it has not seen any declaration or admissible evidence stating 9 Mrs. Cox position. 10 Nevertheless, Roadrunner explains that it is not arguing that Mr. Cox’ waiver also serves to 11 waive Mrs. Cox’ privilege, nor is it seeking to obtain discovery of Mrs. Cox’ statements, Dr. 12 Honeyman’s observations of her demeanor, or any other confidences of Mrs. Cox. 13 Roadrunner seeks the following discovery, reportedly narrowly tailored to the issues Mr. Cox has 14 placed at issue: 15 16 17 18 19 Rather, (1) Dr. Honeyman’s testimony and notes concerning Cox’s statements; (2) Dr. Honeyman’s testimony and notes observations of Cox’s demeanor and other such matters; (3) Any opinions or conclusions that Dr. Honeyman formed concerning whether Cox was seeking counseling related to Cox’s allegations of wrongful termination or due to “alternate stressors,” (4) Information relating to the frequency and expected duration of the counseling, and (5) The costs of the counseling. 20 21 (Doc. No. 214 at 9.) 22 Roadrunner alternatively suggests that if the Court finds it impossible for Dr. Honeyman to 23 separate the confidences of Mr. Cox from those of his wife, then Mr. Cox should be precluded from 24 offering evidence relating to Dr. Honeyman’s treatment and counseling, including the costs associated 25 with that treatment. (Id.) Roadrunner contends that fundamental fairness compels either narrow 26 discovery of Dr. Honeyman on the subjects that Mr. Cox has placed at issue or Mr. Cox must be 27 precluded from offering evidence shielded from discovery by the privilege, particularly evidence 28 regarding damages. (Id. at 11-12.) 5 C. 1 Summary of Mr. Cox’ Position 2 Mr. Cox reports that while his is willing to waive the psychotherapist-privilege, Mrs. Cox is 3 not. Although he initially designated Dr. Honeyman as an unretained expert, when it became clear 4 that non-party Mrs. Cox was unwilling to waive the privilege, Mr. Cox immediately sought to 5 withdraw the designation even though it would prejudice his case and he may be precluded from 6 calling Dr. Honeyman as a witness. 7 Mr. Cox now argues that because Dr. Honeyman is no longer a retained or non-retained expert 8 and the deadline for non-expert discovery is closed, Roadrunner should be precluded from deposing 9 Dr. Honeyman. Even if that were not the case, Mr. Cox contends that the law is clear that Dr. 10 Honeyman cannot testify because Mrs. Cox is unwilling to waive the psychotherapist-client privilege. 11 Mr. Cox explains that in diversity cases such as this one, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is 12 governed by state law and under California state law, a waiver by one spouse in marital therapy does 13 not act as a waiver for the other. Mr. Cox therefore contends that all communications within a marital 14 therapy session are encompassed by the privilege and in order to discuss Dr. Honeyman would require 15 a waiver from both Mr. Cox and Mrs. Cox. Mr. Cox asserts that this is true even if he had conditional 16 communications with Dr. Honeyman outside the presence of Mrs. Cox those communications also 17 would be privileged because they were made for the benefit of Mrs. Cox’ treatment. (Doc. No. 215 at 18 5.) 19 D. Analysis 20 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the deposition of Dr. Honeyman should not be 21 permitted because the deadline to complete non-expert discovery expired more than three months ago, 22 and Dr. Honeyman is no longer designated as a retained or non-retained expert. However, even if he 23 remained a non-retained expert, any request to order compliance with the amended subpoena is 24 untimely. Roadrunner did not serve the amended subpoena sufficiently in advance of the expert 25 discovery cutoff so that the Court could effectively address this dispute before expiration of the 26 allotted time for discovery. See Doc. No. 195 at 4 (discussion of discovery cutoffs and limits). 27 Setting aside the untimely nature of the subpoena and discovery at issue, the motion to quash 28 should be granted. First, the subpoena must be quashed because it requires disclosure of privileged 6 1 matter to which no exception or waiver applies. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(a)(iii.) In diversity cases 2 such as this one, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is governed by the state law of California. Fed. 3 R. Evid. 501. California law recognizes the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Cal. Evid. Code § 4 1014. 5 protected. Id.; see also Farrell L. v. Superior Court 203 Cal.App.3d 521, 527 (1988). Further, 6 disclosures from family members to assist in treatment also are privileged. Grosslight v. Superior 7 Court 72 Cal.App.3d 502, 508 (1977). Thus, all communications (and related documents) during the 8 therapy sessions involving Dr. Honeyman are encompassed by the privilege, whether made by Mr. 9 Cox or Mrs. Cox in the course of treatment. In the absence of Mrs. Cox’ authorization or waiver of 10 the privilege, the subpoena would require disclosure of privileged or other protected matter. It is 11 evident to the Court that Mrs. Cox has not waived the psychotherapist-privilege and has not authorized 12 Dr. Honeyman to provide testimony or documents concerning the marital counseling provided to Mr. 13 and Mrs. Cox. Even if Mr. Cox is willing to waive the privilege, his waiver alone is not sufficient. 14 Cal. Evid. Code § 912(b). Communications disclosed in group therapy, such as martial therapy, are privileged and 15 Second, the subpoena must be quashed because enforcement would place an undue burden on 16 Dr. Honeyman and subject him to possible professional repercussions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(3)(a)(iv). 17 Dr. Honeyman has represented that it is impossible to separate his testimony and the records without 18 breaching Mrs. Cox’ confidentiality. In the absence of Mrs. Cox’ authorization, Dr. Honeyman would 19 be unduly burdened and forced to breach his ethical duties by responding to the subpoena. 20 For these reasons, the Court finds that the subpoena requiring Dr. Honeyman to testify and 21 produce records in this action should be quashed. Mr. Cox is cautioned, however, that in the absence 22 of Dr. Honeyman’s testimony, he may be precluded from introducing evidence concerning Dr. 23 Honeyman’s treatment or the costs associated with that treatment. Motion in limine practice is the 24 appropriate vehicle to address evidence preclusion. 25 IV. 26 For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 27 1. 28 Conclusion and Order The ex parte application to quash Bruce W. Honeyman, Ph.D.’s subpoena to testify at deposition and produce privileged records is HEREBY GRANTED; and 7 1 2. The Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition in a Civil Action and the Requests for 2 Documents, 1-30 attached thereto and served on non-party Bruce W. Honeyman, Ph.D., 3 is HEREBY QUASHED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 4 5 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: /s/ Barbara May 30, 2019 A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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