Jon of the Family Knutson v. California Department of Human Services et al

Filing 2

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 9/12/2017. Amended Complaint due within 30 days. (Hall, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JON OF THE FAMILY KNUTSON,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES,

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Defendants.
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) Case No.: 1:17-cv-1209 - AWI - JLT
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) ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH
) LEAVE TO AMEND
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Plaintiff contends the California Department of Human Services, Kern County Division of

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Child Support Customer Services, Jonathan Shugart, and Ralph McKnight are liable for due process

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violations related to child support orders. (See Doc. 1 at 1) Because Plaintiff fails to clearly allege

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facts to support a claim, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

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I.

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Screening
The Court shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that an action or appeal is

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“frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary

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relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). A claim is

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frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or

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not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

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25, 32-33 (1992).

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II.

Pleading Standards
General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A

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pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief

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sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent

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standards” than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

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A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and

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succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a

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plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

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U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

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Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d

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266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

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[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint pleads
facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should

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assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal

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conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id.

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The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim,

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“notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court

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“may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a
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claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

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Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). However, leave to amend a complaint may be granted

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to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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III.

Discussion and Analysis

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Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in his complaint. Rather, the complaint is filled with legal

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argument and citations to case law, statutes, and Black’s Law Dictionary. From this, the most the

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Court can glean is that Plaintiff is unhappy with the child support orders issued in Kern County

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Superior Court Case No. S-1501-FL-599021.2 (See Doc. 1 at 18)

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The court docket in Case No. S-1501-FL-599021 indicates the case was initiated in August

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2006 for the dissolution of the marriage between Plaintiff and Lisa Knutson, which involved minor

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children. On July 26, 2016, the Honorable Ralph McKnight modified the child support order, and

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ordered Plaintiff “to pay the sum of $4,173.00 per month for the support” of the minor children.

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In the spring of 2017, Plaintiff requested the modified child support order vacated. Jonathan

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Shugart represented the Department of Child Support Services at the hearing on April 3, 2017, and

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reported the Department was not served. The matter was continued, and in the interim Mr. Shugart

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conferred with both Plaintiff and Lisa Knutson. On June 20, 2017, Commissioner McKnight observed

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Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing, and denied his motion “for lack of prosecution.”

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A.

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides a cause of action against any

Due Process

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“person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

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United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

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or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In other

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words, to prove a violation of § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant deprived him of

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The Court takes judicial notice of the dockets in the cases of Kern County Superior Court Case No. S-1501-FL599021. The Court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir.
1993). The docket of the Kern County Superior Court is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and
judicial notice may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987);
Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial
Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989).

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a constitutional or federal right, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff

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contends the defendants are liable for violations of his due process rights.

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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “No State shall. . . deprive any

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person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV §1. This

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clause guarantees both procedural and substantive due process. The procedural due process component

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protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty or property by the government, while substantive

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due process protects individuals from the arbitrary deprivation of liberty by the government. Portman

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v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993); Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th

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Cir. 2006). Plaintiff fails to address clarify whether he believes the defendants are liable for a violation

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of his substantive due process rights or his procedural due process rights. Further, Plaintiff fails to

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identify a property interest or liberty protected by the Constitution, such that the Court may be able to

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determine the claim upon which Plaintiff seeks to proceed.

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Given the lack of allegations concerning what actions were taken, by whom, and when, the

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Court is unable to find Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for a violation of his due process rights.

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Therefore, the claim must be DISMISSED.

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B.

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The commissioner presiding over Plaintiff’s case has absolute immunity. Forrester v. White,

Judicial Immunity

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484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). The Ninth Circuit explained: “Judges and those performing judge-like

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functions are absolutely immune for damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”

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Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911,

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913 (9th Cir. 1982)). Thus, the doctrine of judicial immunity protects “judicial independence by

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insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at

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225 (1988).

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Such absolute judicial immunity is lost “only when [the judge] acts in the clear absence of all

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jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202,

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1204 (9th Cir. 1988). Even when a judge is accused of acting maliciously, corruptly, or erroneously,

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judicial immunity remains. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“judicial immunity is not
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overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th

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Cir. 1999) (“A judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done

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maliciously, or are in excess of his authority”). Plaintiff has not set forth any allegations demonstrating

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that judicial immunity should not apply here, and defendant Ralph McKnight is entitled to absolute

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immunity for the orders issued related to Plaintiff’s obligation to pay child support.

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C.

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Plaintiff challenges the rulings Commissioner McKnight related to the child support orders.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

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Importantly, however, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party may not seek appellate review in

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federal court of a decision made by a state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

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(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Ninth Circuit explained,
Typically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subjectmatter jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in state court seeks what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district
court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the losers’
federal rights.

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Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

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Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court from

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appellate review of “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

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judgments rendered before the district court proceeding commenced . . .”). Accordingly, the district

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court lacks jurisdiction over “claims . . . ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s decision such

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that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334

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F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 485)).

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In this case, Plaintiff’s request that the Court “terminate” the support order issued in Case No.

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S-1501-FL-599021 is a forbidden de facto appeal of the state court’s order directing Plaintiff to pay

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child support. Indeed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal review of state court decisions

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regarding proceedings in family court. See, e.g., Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829

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(9th Cir. 2013) (finding a plaintiff’s claims challenging the outcome of her child custody proceedings

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were properly dismissed); Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir.

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2006) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the case “because the complaint is nothing more than

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another attack on the California superior court’s determination in [the plaintiff’s] domestic case”); see
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also Oliver v. Owens, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159259 at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (finding the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited review of “multiple improprieties related to a restraining order”

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issued by the state). Accordingly, the Court is unable to grant Plaintiff the relief requested under the

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Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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IV.

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Conclusion and Order
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support his claim for a violation of due process. Thus, the

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Court is unable to determine whether leave to amend would be futile, and leave to amend should be

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granted. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128

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(dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend for failure to state a claim is proper only where

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it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that an opportunity to amend would be futile).

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Plaintiff will be given one opportunity to file an amended complaint to clearly identify the due

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process claim upon which he seeks to proceed and to allege facts in support of that claim. Plaintiff’s

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amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must be entitled “First

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Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original

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complaint. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d at 1474; King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d at 567. Thus, after the

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First Amended Complaint is filed, the prior pleadings no longer serve any function in the case. See

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Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). The amended complaint must be “complete in itself

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without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

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Further, Plaintiff is advised that legal argument is not necessary and will be disregarded by the

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Court. The Court will only consider the facts alleged by Plaintiff in his First Amended Complaint,

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rather than any legal conclusions or arguments. If Plaintiff fails to identify a property interest or

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liberty from which he has been deprived, the Court will find he is unable to state a claim for a violation

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of his due process rights, and the action will be dismissed.

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Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

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Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend; and;

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Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL file a First

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Amended Complaint.

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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the action may be dismissed for failure to
prosecute and failure to obey the Court's order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

September 12, 2017

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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