Mendoza v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

ORDER REGARDING Plaintiff's Social Security Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 3/18/2019. CASE CLOSED.(Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GEORGE LUIS MENDOZA,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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) Case No.: 1:17-cv-01210-BAM
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) ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S
) SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT
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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff George Luis Mendoza (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

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Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance

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benefits (“DBI”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income under

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Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs,

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which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe.1

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Having considered the briefing and record in this matter, the Court finds the decision of the

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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole

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The parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including
entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. Nos. 7, 8.)

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and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court affirms the agency’s determination to

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deny benefits.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

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In April 2006, the Commissioner found Plaintiff disabled as of July 1, 2005, and awarded him

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benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. AR 24.2 Following a continuing disability

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review, the Commissioner determined Plaintiff was no longer disabled as of June 1, 2013. AR 24, 98-

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101, 102-05. After Plaintiff requested reconsideration, a State agency disability hearing officer held a

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hearing and affirmed that Plaintiff was no longer disabled as of June 1, 2013, due to medical

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improvement. AR 115-38. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge

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(“ALJ”). On March 1, 2016, ALJ Sharon Madsen held a hearing and issued a decision on March 23,

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2016, finding that medical improvement had occurred, and Plaintiff was not disabled as of June 1,

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2013. AR 21-43, 44-66. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council

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denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR 1-6. This appeal followed.

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Hearing Testimony

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The ALJ held a hearing on March 1, 2016, in Fresno, California. Plaintiff appeared with his

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non-attorney representative, Gilbert Olguin. Impartial Vocational Expert (“VE”) Cheryl R. Chandler

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also appeared. AR 24.

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In response to questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he has a driver’s license,

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graduated from high school and completed some college units. AR 49. He does not need any help

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showering or dressing. He does household chores, such as dishes, sweeping and folding clothes. He

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does not cook, shop or socialize. On a typical day, he wakes up, eats and sits. He has trouble walking

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for long distances or standing. He uses his phone, watches TV, talks to his parents, and showers every

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night before going to sleep. He sometimes naps. AR 49-50.

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When asked about his medical issues, Plaintiff testified that his blood pressure is under control

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with medications. He uses inhalers as needed for asthma and a CPAP machine for sleep apnea. As to

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his Henoch-Schonlein purpura (“HSP”), Plaintiff testified that he has weakness, pain and swelling in

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References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

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his legs, along with lesions. He must elevate his feet every day for a couple of hours. Plaintiff also

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testified that he has side effects from his medications, including drowsiness, dizziness, fainting,

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nausea, and diarrhea. As to his kidneys, Plaintiff is taking medications and being seen regularly by his

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doctor. AR 50-53. Plaintiff further testified that he has constant lower back pain. To ease his pain,

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Plaintiff will lie down or take pain medication. AR 54-55.

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When asked about his abilities, Plaintiff testified that he can lift and carry about 10 pounds.

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On average, he can stand about 10 or 15 minutes and can walk two blocks. He can sit for “quite a

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while.” AR 55-56.

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When asked about his depression and anxiety, Plaintiff testified that socializing, going out to

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places where there are a lot people and communicating with others cause him anxiety. His depression

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affects his everyday life, but he gets some help with medication and counseling. AR 56-58.

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In response to questions from his representative, Plaintiff testified that he originally was found

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disabled because of severe depression, OCD, ADD and mental problems. He still suffers from OCD,

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constantly washing his hands and cleaning his surroundings and personal things. He also has ADD,

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and has problems concentrating and with forgetting things. Plaintiff described his health condition as

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“not good,” because he constantly feels fatigue, weakness and has trouble walking, standing and

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sleeping. AR 58-61. He did not think he could work because of his condition. AR 61.

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Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ elicited testimony from VE Cheryl Chandler. The

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ALJ asked the VE hypothetical questions. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume

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a hypothetical person of Plaintiff’s age, education and work background. If this person could lift and

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carry 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently, sit, stand or walk six to eight, but was restricted

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to simple, routine tasks, the VE testified that there would be a world of unskilled medium along with

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light and sedentary jobs available. AR 63.

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For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person who could lift and carry

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20 pounds occasionally, 10 frequently, could stand or walk six to eight and needed to avoid

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concentrated exposure to cold, heat and wet environments and concentrated exposure to heights and

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dangerous machinery, also with simple routine tasks and occasional public contact. The VE testified

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that there would be jobs for this person, such as inspector, hand packaging, marker, and garment

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sorter. AR 64.

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For the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person who could lift and carry

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20 pounds occasionally, 10 frequently, could sit six to eight and stand or walk two and everything else

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the same as hypothetical number two for postural and environmental, with simple, routine and

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occasional public. The VE testified that there would be jobs, such as nut sorter, toy stuffer and

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assembly work, assembler. AR 64-65.

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For the fourth hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to add to hypothetical number three that this

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person would be off task about 15 percent of the day. The VE testified that there would be no work

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for this person. AR 65.

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Medical Record

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The relevant medical record was reviewed by the Court, and it will be referenced below as

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necessary to this Court’s decision.

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The ALJ’s Decision

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Using the Social Security Administration’s sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined

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that Plaintiff’s most recent favorable decision finding him disabled was dated April 24, 2006. At that

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time, Plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments:

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disorder and a panic disorder. However, as of June 1, 2013, the date that Plaintiff’s disability ended,

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he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity. The ALJ identified Henoch-Schonlein purpura,

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immunoglobulin A-associated vasculitis, stage two chronic kidney disease, obesity, borderline

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intellectual functioning and obsessive-compulsive disorder as Plaintiff’s medically determinable

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impairments as of June 1, 2013. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that since June 1, 2013, Plaintiff

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had not had an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled any of the listed

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impairments. AR 26-28.

an obsessive-compulsive

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Beginning on June 1, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff continued to have severe impairments.

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However, based on those impairments, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

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perform a range of work at the sedentary exertional level. Specifically, the ALJ determined that

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Plaintiff could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand and walk two
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hours and sit six to eight hours in an eight-hour workday. He also needed to avoid concentrated

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exposure to cold, heat, wet environments, heights, and dangerous machinery and was limited to

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performing only simple, routine tasks with occasional public contact. AR 28-33. Plaintiff did not

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have any past relevant work, but with his RFC, there were jobs existing in the national economy that

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Plaintiff could perform, such as nut sorter, toy stuffer and assembler. AR 33-35. The ALJ therefore

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concluded that Plaintiff’s disability ended on June 1, 2013, and he had not become disabled again

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since that date. AR 35.

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SCOPE OF REVIEW

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Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to

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deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this

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Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.

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42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales,

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402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112,

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1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be

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considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the

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Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the

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evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards.

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Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s

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determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,

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and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of

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Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

E.g.,

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Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ erred in

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her evaluation of the state agency physicians’ opinions and in developing Plaintiff’s mental RFC.

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Plaintiff also argues that there is an unresolved conflict between the VE’s testimony and the

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occupational requirements of the representative jobs.

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DISCUSSION3

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A.

Mental RFC

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to state a valid and reasonable basis for rejecting

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the mental limitations specifically articulated by the state agency physicians, Dr. H. Amado and Dr.

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Pamela Hawkins. (Doc. No. 13 at 9-10.)

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On April 24, 2013, Dr. Amado completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.

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AR 507-09. Dr. Amado opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the ability to understand and

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remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration

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for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and be

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punctual within customary tolerances. AR 507. Plaintiff also had moderate limitations in the ability

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to interact appropriately with the general public, respond appropriately to changes in the work setting

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and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. AR 508. Dr. Amado further opined that

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Plaintiff was able “to perform simple 1-2 step tasks with adequate [concentration], persistence and

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pace” and “to interact appropriately with others but would fare best in a low-stress nonpublic setting.”

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AR 509. He also was able to adapt to the usual changes in a work setting. Id.

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Similarly, on November 12, 2013, Dr. Hawkins completed a Mental Residual Functional

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Capacity Assessment. AR 782-85. Dr. Hawkins opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the

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ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, carry out detailed instructions, maintain

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attention and concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain

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regular attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances. AR 782. Plaintiff also had moderate

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limitations in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

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psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number

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and length of rest periods.

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limitations in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public, respond appropriately to

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changes in the work setting and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. Id. Dr.

AR 783.

Dr. Hawkins further opined that Plaintiff had moderate

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The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including
arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific argument or
brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

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Hawkins summarized that Plaintiff was “limited to understanding and remembering simple one and

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two step tasks,” could “maintain concentration, pace and persistence for simple tasks” and “would be

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best suited to work with minimal social demands and no public contact.” AR 784. Dr. Hawkins also

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indicated that Plaintiff could “adapt to a low demand work setting consistent with simple work,” and

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“[f]or greatest success, changes should be introduced gradually.” Id.

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In evaluating these opinions, the ALJ reasoned as follows:

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I credit and give substantial weight to the opinions of Drs. Amado [] and Hawkins []
because they are consistent with the other evidence. For example, they are consistent
with and adequate [sic] account for the claimant’s mental impairments, especially in light
of the unremarkable mental status examination findings, which showed normal thought
content with a logical thought process, normal concentration, good memory, good
insight, appropriate speech, and a cooperative attitude []. The opinions are also
consistent with recent reports, showing a normal attention span, and normal ability to
concentrate [].

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AR 32.

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Following consideration of the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that

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Plaintiff could perform jobs involving simple, routine tasks with occasional public contact. AR 28.

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Relying on this mental RFC and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform

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the representative jobs of nut sorter (DOT Code 521.687-086), toy stuffer (DOT Code 731.658-014)

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and assembler (DOT Code 734.687-018). AR 34-35.

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Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by giving substantial weight to the state agency

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physicians who opined that Plaintiff was limited to one- and two-step tasks, but by also failing to

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include that limitation in Plaintiff’s mental RFC. Plaintiff further asserts that there is a conflict

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between an individual limited to one- and two-step tasks and jobs identified by the VE requiring Level

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2 reasoning in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Plaintiff’s argument relies, in part, on

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Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Limitation to Simple, Routine Tasks

Courts have recognized that in Rounds, the Ninth Circuit made a critical distinction between a

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limitation to simple, routine tasks and a limitation to “one- and two-step tasks.”

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Berryhill, No. CV 17-07404-AFM, 2018 WL 3689560, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2018) (noting critical

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See Jones v.

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distinction between a limitation to “simple routine and repetitive tasks” and a limitation to “one- or

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two-step instructions.”); Wilson v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-01861-SKO, 2018 WL 1425963, at *34-35

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(E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2018) (“Both parties appear to agree that there is a critical distinction between the

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“simple one-or two-step instructions” assessment by Dr. Kalman and the “simple” work with “routine

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and repetitive tasks” limitation adopted by the ALJ, and both cite Rounds v. Commissioner Social

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Security Administration in support.”).

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performing simple, routine tasks is consistent with Level 2 reasoning, an RFC to one- to two-step tasks

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is not.” Jones, 2018 WL 3689560, at *2 (citing Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1003-1004 & n.6 (holding there

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is an apparent conflict between RFC limiting claimant to one- and two-step tasks and the demands of

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Level 2 reasoning; also noting that unpublished decisions of Ninth Circuit have concluded that an RFC

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limitation to “simple” or “repetitive” tasks is consistent with Level 2 reasoning); Grigsby v. Astrue,

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No. ECV 08-1413 AJW, 2010 WL 309013, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (“Level 2 reasoning jobs

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may be simple, but they are not limited to one- or two-step instructions. The restriction to jobs

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involving no more than two-step instructions is what distinguishes Level 1 reasoning from Level 2

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reasoning.”) (emphasis in original). Following Rounds, district courts in this circuit have found

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reversible error in cases where the ALJ gave significant weight to opinions that a claimant was limited

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to one- to two-step tasks, but assessed an RFC that only limited the claimant to simple, routine tasks.

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See Striet v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv-00673-MMD-WGC, 2019 WL 386227, at *7 (D. Nev. Jan. 11,

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2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 317CV00673MMDWGC, 2019 WL 383996 (D. Nev.

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Jan. 30, 2019) (collecting cases); Jones, 2018 WL 3689560, at * 2 (finding reversible error where

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ALJ’s RFC limited claimant to simple, routine tasks, but failed to either incorporate or provide

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sufficient reasons to reject physician’s opinion that claimant could understand, remember, and carry

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out two-step commands) (collecting cases).

“The distinction is important because while an RFC to

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In this case, although the ALJ did not incorporate the one and two-step limitations identified by

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the state agency physicians, Plaintiff’s argument overlooks that the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to

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simple, routine tasks reflects the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Steven C. Swanson. On

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April 21, 2013, Dr. Swanson, a clinical psychologist, opined, in relevant part, that Plaintiff could

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“understand, carry out and remember simple instructions,” “maintain concentration,” and “respond
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appropriately to usual work situations,” and that “[c]hanges in routine would not be very problematic

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for him.” AR 503. The ALJ assigned “significant weight” to this portion of Dr. Swanson’s opinion

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(AR 31), and it is consistent with the RFC limitation of Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks. Dr.

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Swanson’s opinion alone may constitute substantial evidence supporting the RFC assessment. See

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Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that examining physician’s

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“opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence” supporting RFC assessment “because it rests on his

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own independent examination of” claimant); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)

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(when “opinion of a nontreating source is based on independent clinical findings,” it “may itself be

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substantial evidence”). Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Swanson’s opinion.

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Even assuming, however, that the ALJ erred either by failing to incorporate simple one- and

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two-step tasks in the RFC or by failing to explain why this limitation was rejected, any such error is

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harmless. An error is harmless if it is nonprejudicial to the claimant or is “inconsequential” to the

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ALJ's “ultimate nondisability determination”. See Stout v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050,

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1055 (9th Cir. 2006). As the Commissioner points out, the jobs of nut sorter (521.687-086) and

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assembler (734.687-018) both require only Level 1 reasoning, which is described as applying

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“commonsense understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions,” and is consistent with

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an RFC for performing one and two-step tasks. See Nut Sorter, DICOT 521.687-086 (G.P.O.), 1991

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WL 674226; Assembler, DICOT 734.687-018 (G.P.O.), 1991 WL 679950; see also Rounds, 807 F.3d

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at 1002 (identifying close similarity between RFC for performing one- and two-step tasks and Level 1

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reasoning and explaining that Level 1 reasoning entails the ability to “[a]pply commonsense

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understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions”). Grigsby, 2010 WL 309013, at *2

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(“The restriction to jobs involving no more than two-step instructions is what distinguishes Level 1

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reasoning from Level 2 reasoning.”). Because Plaintiff could perform those two jobs with an RFC for

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either simple, routine tasks (as testified to by the VE) or one- to two-step tasks (as indicated in the

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DOT), the ALJ’s purported error is not prejudicial and is inconsequential to the ALJ’s ultimate

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nondisability determination.

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Social Interactions

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Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred because she omitted from the RFC “either the ‘low-

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stress’ as phrased by Dr. Amada [sic] or the ‘low demand’ work setting described by Dr. Hawkins.”

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(Doc. No. 13 at 10.)

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The Commissioner counters that Plaintiff’s assertion of error is “mistaken because such

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observations were simply recommendations about the best work environment for Plaintiff, not

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concrete functional limitations that the ALJ was required to consider in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC.”

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(Doc. No. 18 at 15.) The Court agrees.

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As the Commissioner suggests, an ALJ may reasonably decline to adopt the opinion of a

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physician “offered as a recommendation, not an imperative.” Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006; Carmickle v.

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Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). In this case,

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Dr. Amado opined that Plaintiff would “fare best in a low-stress nonpublic setting.” AR 509

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(emphasis added). While Dr. Amado identified the “best” setting for Plaintiff, there was no indication

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that such a setting was the most that Plaintiff could tolerate or that it was a necessary functional

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limitation. Thus, the ALJ was not required to adopt this portion of Dr. Amado’s opinion offered as a

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recommendation. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1165; see also Fox v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-4738-JPR,

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2017 WL 3197215, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) (where physician stated that claimant would

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“do best” in a low stress job with no public contact, that statement reflected the physician’s “stated

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preferences, not requirements, for work that would accommodate [claimant’s] limitations;” finding

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ALJ “not required to address every word of [physician’s] opinion.”); Leach v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

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No. CV 10-1128-PK, 2011 WL 7082543, at *8 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2011), report and recommendation

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adopted sub nom. Leach v. Astrue, No. 3:10-CV-01128-PK, 2012 WL 195515 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2012)

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(determining that RFC is “not an assessment of the ideal conditions under which the claimant will do

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best, fare best, or otherwise excel;” ALJ did not err by failing to include in RFC a physician’s

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recommendation of conditions in which claimant would “fare best”).

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As to Dr. Hawkins, she opined that Plaintiff could “adapt to a low demand work setting

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consistent with simple work” and “[f]or greatest success, changes should be introduced gradually.”

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AR 784 (emphasis added). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ accommodated the “low demand
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setting consistent with simple work” recommended by Dr. Hawkins by correspondingly limiting

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Plaintiff to “simple, routine work.”4

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Hawkins’ opinion regarding those situations in which Plaintiff would have the “greatest success,” as

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such an opinion reflects a recommendation, not an imperative. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1165.

However, the ALJ was not required to accommodate Dr.

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Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to address the disagreement between Dr.

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Amado and Dr. Hawkins regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others. (Doc. No. 13 at 10.) As

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indicated above, the ALJ was not required to include Dr. Amado’s recommendation that Plaintiff

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would “fare best in a low-stress nonpublic setting.” AR 509. Similarly, the ALJ was not required to

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adopt Dr. Hawkins’ opinion that Plaintiff “would be best suited to work with minimal social demands

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and no public contact.” AR 784. As with Dr. Amado’s statement, Dr. Hawkins’ statement reflects a

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recommendation regarding the best situation for Plaintiff, not the most that he could tolerate.

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Moreover, both physicians opined that Plaintiff only had moderate limitations in the ability to interact

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appropriately with the general public and no other significant social interaction limitations. AR 508,

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783. There is nothing to indicate that the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to occasional public contact

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failed to account for Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in the ability to interact with the general public.

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Accordingly, the Court does not find error.

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B.

VE Testimony

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had a duty to identify and resolve a conflict between the VE’s

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testimony and information in the Occupational Outlook Handbook (“OOH”) and O*Net Online

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(O*Net) regarding non-economic data before finding that Plaintiff could perform other work in the

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national economy.5 (Doc. No. 13 at 12-16.) Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.

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No case, regulation, or statute suggests that an ALJ must sua sponte take administrative notice

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of the OOH or O*Net. See Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 and n. 6 (9th Cir. 2018).

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As noted above, even if the ALJ’s RFC assessment should have included a limitation to one
and two-step tasks, not merely “simple, routine work,” the VE identified jobs consistent with the
demands of simple work.
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Plaintiff requests that the court take judicial notice of certain sections of the O*NET OnLine
DOT crosswalk search and Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational
Outlook Handbook. (Doc. No. 13-1.) For the reasons discussed in the opinion, the information in these
publications is immaterial and unnecessary to the Court’s determination. Accordingly, the request for
judicial notice is HEREBY DENIED.
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Although an ALJ is required to investigate and resolve any apparent conflict between the VE’s

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testimony and the DOT, regardless of whether a claimant raises the conflict before the agency, there is

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no authority suggesting that the same is true for the OOH or the O*Net. See SSR 00-4P; see also

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Holden v. Berryhill, 722 F. App’x 675, 676 (9th Cir. 2018) (reiterating holding in Shaibi that ALJ has

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no obligation to sua sponte take judicial notice of the OOH; finding no error in ALJ’s decision to rely

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on the VE’s testimony without consulting the OOH); Watts v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-07736-JEM, 2018

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WL 4961567, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2018) (noting ALJ need not sua sponte resolve conflicts as to

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sources other than the DOT); Kirby v. Berryhill, No. SA CV 18-497-E, 2018 WL 4927107, at *3 (C.D.

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Cal. Oct. 10, 2018) (holding “an ALJ is under no obligation to consult the OOH or to attempt to

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reconcile conflicts between the OOH and vocational expert testimony”) (collecting cases); Bennett v.

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Berryhill, No. 2:17-CV-555-EFB, 2018 WL 4449415, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018) (finding

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Plaintiff’s argument that VE’s testimony not consistent with OOH foreclosed by Ninth Circuit

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authority); Wagner v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 3956485, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (“The ALJ had no

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obligation to address the VE’s deviation from other sources such as O*NET or OOH”); Beamesderfer

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v. Berryhill, No. ED CV 17-0868 SS, 2018 WL 2315956, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) (“While

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Agency guidelines require an ALJ to investigate and elicit a reasonable explanation for any conflict

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between the DOT and VE testimony. . . the guidelines do not require the ALJ to resolve conflicts

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between VE testimony and other vocational publications or information . . . .”).
CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

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evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court

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DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

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The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill,

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Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff George Luis Mendoza.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

/s/ Barbara

March 18, 2019

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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