Alvarado v. County of Tulare
Filing
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ORDER vacating 17 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending dismissal of certain claims and defendants 18 Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint. Referred to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. Objections to F&R's due within 14-Days. Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 4/19/2019. (Lundstrom, T)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DANIEL DEAN ALVARADO, JR.,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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COUNTY OF TULARE, et al.,
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Defendants.
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ORDER VACATING FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(ECF No. 17)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
(ECF No. 18)
FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
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Case No. 1:17-cv-01396-LJO-BAM (PC)
I.
Background
Plaintiff Daniel Dean Alvarado, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a former pretrial detainee in Bob Wiley
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Detention Center proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff
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initiated this action on October 3, 2017, in the United States District Court for the Northern
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District of Illinois, Eastern Division. (ECF No. 1.) The action was transferred to this Court on
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October 17, 2017. (ECF Nos. 4-6.)
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On July 26, 2018, the Court issued a screening order granting Plaintiff leave to file a first
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amended complaint within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 16.) After more than thirty days had
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passed and Plaintiff failed to file a first amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the
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Court regarding this action, the undersigned issued findings and recommendations regarding
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dismissal of this action for failure to obey a court order and failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 17.)
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On November 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a document which the Court construes as the first
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amended complaint, in lieu of objections. (ECF No. 18.) As it appears Plaintiff has attempted to
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comply with the Court’s original order directing him to file an amended complaint, and in light of
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Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court HEREBY VACATES the findings and recommendations
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issued on October 31, 2018.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on November 16, 2018, is currently
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before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 18.)
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II.
Screening Requirement and Standard
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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
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or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b);
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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
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pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken
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as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores,
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Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
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sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
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for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S.
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Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted
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unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the
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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
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III.
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Plaintiff’s Allegations
The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the
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Bob Wiley Detention Center in Tulare County, California. Plaintiff appears to name the
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following defendants: (1) Tulare County; (2) Bob Wiley Detention Center; (3) Sheriff Michael
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Boudreaux; and (4) R. Rales.1 (ECF No. 18, p. 9.)
As discussed in the Court’s prior screening order, Plaintiff’s original complaint failed to
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comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, as it was disjointed, confusing, and difficult to
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understand. (ECF No. 16, p. 2.) Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does little to cure this
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deficiency. Plaintiff has included more than thirty pages of allegations unrelated to any potential
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civil rights claims. However, as best as the Court can determine, Plaintiff’s relevant allegations
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are as follows:
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On August 2, 2015, Plaintiff was arrested and taken to the Bob Wiley Detention Center.
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Plaintiff does not specify why he was arrested. Plaintiff was fingerprinted and booked. Later that
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day, while Plaintiff was being released, Defendant Rales commanded Plaintiff to “execute
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commercial instruments” using a pencil. Then Defendant Rales, with intent to injure by bodily
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harm, lifted Plaintiff from a stationary position, vertically up off his feet, and moved Plaintiff’s
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body horizontally until Plaintiff’s head made contact with the concrete wall of the first cell
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located to the left side of the Booking Intake area. This action was done without notice, consent,
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or authorization from Plaintiff. Plaintiff lost consciousness. When Plaintiff regained
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consciousness, Defendant Rales did not offer medical care, but instead transported Plaintiff to exit
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the Bob Wiley Detention Center. When Plaintiff had fully regained consciousness, he transported
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himself for medical care. Plaintiff had cranial x-rays which revealed a fractured skull at the
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crown. (ECF No. 18, p. 13.)
On May 5, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested from his daughter’s home and taken to the Bob
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Wiley Detention Center. Plaintiff was held “for Ransom Demand” at Bob Wiley Detention
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Center until May 16, 2017. Plaintiff claims monetary damages for the 288 hours of “False Arrest
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Plaintiff appears to refer to the same individual defendant as “RJRales,” “Ralez,” and “R.
Rales.” For ease of understanding, the Court will refer to this defendant as “Defendant Rales.”
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without statutory jurisdiction, Kidnapping & Hostage Taking” of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18, p. 14.)
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IV.
Discussion
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A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
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As noted, Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 8. Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual
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allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
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omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly,
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550 U.S. at 556–557; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
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Plaintiff’s complaint is not short and is not a plain statement of his claims. Plaintiff’s
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complaint, save for the sections summarized above, lacks clear factual allegations, and the Court
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cannot determine what happened, when it happened, or who was involved. Despite being
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provided the relevant legal standards, Plaintiff has failed to clearly and succinctly include
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sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that is plausible on its face, with the exception of the
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excessive force claim discussed below.
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B.
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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
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Linkage Requirement
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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between
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the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See
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Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The
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Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional
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right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
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affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
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deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Here, Plaintiff fails to link the named defendants, aside from Defendant Rales, to any
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constitutional violation.
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C.
Defendant Tulare County
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A local government unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a
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respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Ewing v. Cty. of Stockton, 588
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F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2003). In
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order to establish municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must show that a “policy or custom” led
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to the plaintiff’s injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A claim against a local government unit for
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municipal or county liability requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or
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practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation ... suffered.” Galen v. Cty.
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of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the
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custom or policy was adhered to with “deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of [the
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jail's] inhabitants.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016), citing
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City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989).
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Plaintiff’s complaint does not adequately allege a deliberate policy, custom or practice
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that was the moving force behind any constitutional violation or that any such custom or policy
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was adhered to with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s general and conclusory allegation that his
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second arrest established a fact pattern by Defendant Tulare County is not sufficient.
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D.
Bob Wiley Detention Facility
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The Bob Wiley Detention Facility is not a proper defendant in this action. A county jail
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or detention facility is not a proper defendant under § 1983. See Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara,
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928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not
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an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted);
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Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability
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on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County
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Jail is not a ‘person.’”).
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E.
False Arrest and Imprisonment
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“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth
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Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v.
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City & Cty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). To state a claim under § 1983
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for false arrest and imprisonment, however, a plaintiff must allege facts “to demonstrate that there
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was no probable cause to arrest him.” See Cabrera v. City of Huntingdon Park, 159 F.3d 374,
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380 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing George v. City of Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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Probable cause “exists when under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting
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officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the person
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arrested] had committed a crime.” Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991)
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(quoting United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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Here, Plaintiff appears to allege generally that there was no probable cause for his arrests.
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However, general, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff has failed to
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allege facts to support a lack of probable cause for his arrests.
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F.
Excessive Force
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Plaintiff appears to have been a pretrial detainee during his incarceration at the Bob Wiley
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Detention Center. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a pretrial
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detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
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135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). To state an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth
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Amendment, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used
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against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id.
At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cognizable
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claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Rales.
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V.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the findings and
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recommendations issued on October 31, 2018, (ECF No. 17), are VACATED.
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Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against Defendant
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Rales for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Plaintiff has
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failed to state any other cognizable claims. Despite being provided with the relevant pleading and
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legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his complaint and thus further
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leave to amend would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:
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1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against Defendant Rales for
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excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed from this action for failure to state a
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claim.
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***
These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge
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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
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(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file
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written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
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Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within
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the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual
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findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v.
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Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
/s/ Barbara
April 19, 2019
A. McAuliffe
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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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