Hollingsworth v. Kernan et al

Filing 15

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that the instant action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim re 14 Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint filed by Louis Hollingsworth ; referred to Judge Ishii, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 7/10/18. Objections to F&R due by 8/13/2018(Martin-Gill, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No.: 1:17-cv-01477-AWI-SAB (PC)

LOUIS HOLLINGSWORTH,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF
ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE
GRANTED

Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT KERNAN, et al.,

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(ECF No. 14)

Defendants.

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff Louis Hollingsworth is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on April 25, 2018.
(ECF No. 14.)

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II.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate

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that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v.

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Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings

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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

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1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss

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v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant

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has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

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liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d

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at 969.

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Notwithstanding any filing fee, the district court must perform a preliminary screening

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and must dismiss a case if at any time the Court determines that the complaint “(i) is frivolous or

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malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

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against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v.

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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis

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complaints, not just those filed by prisoners); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(dismissal required of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune

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defendants); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has

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discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v.

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Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a

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claim).

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III.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff names as defendants H. Shirley, Chief Deputy Warden of Wasco State Prison,
and D. Meeks, Head Librarian at Wasco State Prison.

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Plaintiff alleges as follows: On or about May 23, 2017, Plaintiff received an order at

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Wasco State Prison that his writ of habeas corpus had been denied. Plaintiff requested access to

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the law library to conduct legal research on how to respond by traverse to the denial of his writ,

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emphasizing a court deadline. Plaintiff should have received a response in three working days,

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and should have been placed on Priority Library User status.

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Instead, Plaintiff was placed on the general library user list by Defendant Meeks, some
two weeks later.

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On or about June 9, 2017, Plaintiff informed Defendant Shirley about his being deprived

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of his access to the courts, but as of June 26, 2017, no response has been offered. Plaintiff did not

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receive access to the law library until June 22, 2017, at which point it was too late. Plaintiff’s

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thirty-day filing period had come and gone, and he was barred, with prejudice.

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IV.

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DISCUSSION

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“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities

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to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners

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with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v.

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Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir.2009) (same). The

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right of access to the courts, however, is limited to non-frivolous direct criminal appeals, habeas

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corpus proceedings, and § 1983 actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354–55 (1996).

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In order to frame a claim of a denial of the right to access the courts, a prisoner must

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allege facts showing that he has suffered “actual injury,” a jurisdictional requirement derived

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from the standing doctrine. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with

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respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to

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present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348 (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also
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Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[f]ailure to show that a

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‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal” to a claim for denial of access to legal

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materials) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & 353 n. 4).

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The provision of an adequate law library (or legal assistance) is not an end in itself, “but

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only the means for ensuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of

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fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430

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U.S. at 825). Indeed, there is no “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.”

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Id., at 351. Therefore, a prisoner’s complaint will not survive screening if it simply alleges facts

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showing “that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical

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sense.” Id.

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Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a

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litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a

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meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536

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U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). For backward-looking claims, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a

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‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3)

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a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.”

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Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076 (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14).

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A prisoner must allege the denial of the necessary tools to litigate a non-frivolous claim

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attacking a conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415;

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Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3. Plaintiff need not show that he would have been successful on the

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merits of his claims, but only that they were not frivolous. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1085 &

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n.12 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

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fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To properly plead a denial of access to the

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courts claim, “the complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement

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should describe any remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.”

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Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417-18 (footnote omitted).

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In this case, Plaintiff is making a backwards-looking claim related to his habeas corpus

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action. He has not met the requirements for showing that he was frustrated in pursuing a non-

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frivolous claim. In this original complaint, Plaintiff included a copy of an order which appeared

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to show that he filed a petition in a habeas proceeding while his direct appeal was pending, and it

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was denied. He further alleges that he was seeking library access to prepare a response to the

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writ. However, he cannot base a claim on the denial of access to prepare a response to a court’s

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denial of his habeas petition. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 354–55; Madrid v. Gomez, 190

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F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir.1999); Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir.1995) (“[W]e

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conclude the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the constitutional right of access requires a

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state to provide a law library or legal assistance only during the pleading stage of a habeas or civil

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rights action.”). Plaintiff has also not shown that he had a non-frivolous claim, and he cannot do

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so as his petition was dismissed because he had a direct appeal pending.

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Finally, it appears Plaintiff’s complaints related to the law library involve either the

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frequently and length of his law library visits. He pleads that he was a general law library user

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but was seeking priority access. The Court cannot infer here that Plaintiff was denied the means

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to prosecute some non-frivolous habeas claim merely because he did not have a higher priority

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law library access.

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V.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff’s amended complaint is not found to state a cognizable

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claim. Plaintiff was previously provided these standards, but has not cured the deficiencies in his

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pleading despite being given an opportunity to amend. His allegations are largely the same as in

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his prior complaint. Therefore, further leave to amend is not warranted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

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F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

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279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for

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dismissal without leave to amend).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the instant action be dismissed for
failure to state a cognizable claim.
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This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

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days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written

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objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

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Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834,

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838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

July 10, 2018
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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