McLaughlin v. Castro et al

Filing 17

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to 16 Dismiss Non-Cognizable Claims signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 06/20/2019. Referred to Judge Drozd; Objections to F&R due by 7/8/2019. (Flores, E)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARTIN McLAUGHLIN,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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J. CASTRO, et al.,

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Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:17-cv-1597-DAD-JLT (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO DISMISS NON-COGNIZABLE
CLAIMS
(Doc. 16)
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

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Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint asserting claims against employees of the

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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation1. (Doc. 16.) Generally, the Court is
required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous,
malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Though the pleading is captioned “First Amended Complaint,” it is actually Plaintiff’s third attempt to state a
cognizable claim and, therefore, the Second Amended Complaint. See Doc. 1 (Complaint), Doc. 12 (First Amended
Complaint).
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I.

Pleading Standard

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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is entitled to relief. . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiffs must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility

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demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual

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allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.

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Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under section 1983,

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a Plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws

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of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person

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acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v.

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Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Under section 1983 the Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners

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proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and

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to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the

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plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

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Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff brings this action against several individuals for conduct occurring while he was

housed at California State Prison in Corcoran, California. He names Chief Deputy Warden J.

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Castro, Correctional Counselor D. DeAcevedo, Correctional Counselor J. Perez, Correctional

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Officer M. Riley, Correctional Sergeant E. Magallanes, and Correctional Lieutenant J. Amaya.

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Plaintiff seeks $52,000 in damages.

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Plaintiff’s allegations can be fairly summarized as follows:

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A.

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On March 4, 2017, Defendant Riley searched Plaintiff’s cell and attempted to confiscate a

Search of Plaintiff’s Cell

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pair of Plaintiff’s prescription eyeglasses. Plaintiff told Riley that it would be illegal for him to

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take the glasses, and Riley responded that he “was the law” while tossing them. When Plaintiff

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told Riley that he would file a 602 inmate grievance, Riley warned him to be careful “cause this is

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his house and he’ll do what he … pleases.”

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B.

False Charge

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On March 5, 2017, Plaintiff and a second inmate were handcuffed and placed in a holding

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cage without explanation. Defendant Magallanes, Riley’s supervisor, then approached Plaintiff

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with an Administrative Segregation Placement Notice accusing Plaintiff and the second inmate of

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“Extortion by Means of Threat by Way of GBI [Great Bodily Injury].” When Plaintiff refused to

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sign this fabricated notice, which was authored by Riley, Magallanes said, “You Blacks make

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yourselves look guilty when you don’t cooperate.” When Plaintiff told Magallanes that the report

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was fabricated by Riley after Plaintiff threatened to file an inmate grievance, Magallanes slapped

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the door of Plaintiff’s holding case and warned Plaintiff to “stay in his place” because “this is our

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house.” Magallanes also said, “All you Blacks hiding out over here in the E.O.P. (Enhanced Out

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Patient) Program should be ashamed of yourselves preying on these little white boys.” As this

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Defendant was leaving, he laughed and said, “You monkeys won’t be that long in the hole.”

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C.

Administrative Segregation Placement Committee Hearing

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On March 15, 2017, Plaintiff appeared before Defendants Perez, DeAcevedo, and Castro

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for an administrative segregation placement hearing. Even though Plaintiff informed these

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Defendants of the fabricated notice, Castro told him that “Here at Corcoran it is just not smart of a

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Black inmate to be making waves.” DeAcevedo said, “you will sit back here 60 days so you

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might get a little pail [sic] but the time for you to file anymore 602’s (grievance forms) will run

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out.” Lastly, Perez told Plaintiff not to cry “cause even if these charges are false, this hole time

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will help him fix his skills to not get caught the next time.”

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In administrative segregation, Plaintiff was housed with 70-80 other EOP inmates in very

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noisy conditions (“the majority of these prisoners … kick[ed] on their cell doors all day and all

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night”) in a cell that was “invaded with rats and flies.” On “a few different occurences [sic],”

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Plaintiff killed a rat to show staff and asked for an exterminator to no avail.

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D.

RVR Hearing

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On April 11, 2017, Defendant Amaya held a hearing on the Rules Violation Report

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drafted by Riley. Amaya denied Plaintiff certain due process rights, including the ability to call

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any witnesses and to present documentary evidence. Additionally, Amaya was not an impartial

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fact finder since he did not in fact hold a hearing at all.

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III.

Discussion

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A.

Retaliation

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“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

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basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

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because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

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exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

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correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted).

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Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under

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§ 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional

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rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as

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preserving institutional order and discipline). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he

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was engaged in was constitutionally protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or

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motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no

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legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring

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retaliatory motive from circumstantial evidence).

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Plaintiff accuses Riley of initiating a false charge against him after Plaintiff stated that he

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would file an inmate grievance following March 4, 2017 the cell search. He also claims that, even

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though Magallanes was aware of the circumstances surrounding the false charge, he warned

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Plaintiff to “stay in his place” because “this is our house.” Finally, Plaintiff claims that after he

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informed them of the false charge and the reason it was issued, Castro said, “here at Corcoran it is

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just not smart of a Black inmate to be making waves”; DeAcevedo said, “you will sit back here

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60 days so you might get a little pail [sic] but the time for you to file anymore 602’s (grievance

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forms) will run out”; and Perez said, “he shouldn’t cry now cause even if these charges are false,

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this hole time will help him fix his skills to not get caught the next time.” These allegations are

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sufficient to proceed against each of these Defendants on a First Amendment retaliation claim.

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B.

Due Process
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False Charge

Plaintiff again asserts allegations regarding the filing of false charges against him. He was

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previously informed that false charges alone are not actionable under § 1983 because falsely

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accusing a person of misconduct does not violate a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

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the United States. For a false accusation to be potentially actionable, the false charge must

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implicate some constitutional right, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process. An

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allegation of a false charge that results in discipline that is not severe enough to amount to a

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deprivation of a protected liberty interest under Sandin – that is, by imposing an atypical and

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significant hardship or by inevitably affecting the duration of confinement – does not state a claim

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under § 1983. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002) (no § 1983 claim

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was stated for allegedly false charges because the disciplinary confinement imposed was too short

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to amount to an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). Even if the false charge does

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result in discipline that amounts to the deprivation of a protected liberty interest under Sandin, a

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§ 1983 claim is not stated if the inmate is afforded the procedural protections required by federal

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law at the disciplinary hearing. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 654; Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450,

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452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986); Hanrahan v. Lane,

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747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has thus not stated a claim based on a false

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charge.

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Administrative Segregation

Plaintiff next asserts a due process claim premised on his placement in administrative

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segregation for 60 days. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.

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Constitution protects individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property

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without due process of law. Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause

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may arise from two sources: the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v.

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Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones

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pertaining to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an

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unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether they are authorized by state

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law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493

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(1980) (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990)

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(involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs)). Deprivations that are less severe or more

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closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a

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procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real

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substance.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be

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limited to freedom from restraint that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate

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in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a]

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sentence.” Id. at 484, 487.

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A due process claim might be made for some administrative segregation placement

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decisions. When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for

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administrative reasons and a liberty interest of real substance is implicated, due process requires

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that prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the

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prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of the charges against him or the reasons segregation is

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being considered, and allow the prisoner to present his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801

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878y77F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S.

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472. Due process also requires that there be some evidence to support the prison officials'

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decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05.

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Assuming that the conditions of administrative segregation that Plaintiff describes in the

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pleading (daily excessive noise and a vermin infestation) implicate a liberty interest of real

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substance, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim because his allegations demonstrate that he

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received notice on March 5, 2017, an informal nonadversary hearing ten days later, and an

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opportunity to present his views. In addition, there appears to have been some evidence to support

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the transfer to administrative segregation in the form of the RVR initiated by Defendant Riley.

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Therefore, Plaintiff received all the process that he was due under the circumstances.

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Administrative Hearing

Plaintiff brings a due process claim premised on the process that he received in the context

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of the RVR hearing on the extortion charge. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a

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criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not

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apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation omitted). However, an inmate

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subject to disciplinary sanctions that include the loss of good time credits must receive (1)

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twenty-four-hour advanced written notice of the charges against him, id. at 563-64; (2) “a ‘written

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statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons’ for the disciplinary

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action,” id. at 564 (citation omitted); (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary

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evidence where doing so “will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional

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goals,” id. at 566; (4) assistance at the hearing if he is illiterate or if the matter is complex, id. at

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570; and (5) a sufficiently impartial fact finder, id. at 570-71. A finding of guilt must also be

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supported by “some evidence in the record.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).

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Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated with respect to the RVR hearing

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in that defendant Amaya found Plaintiff guilty after failing to hold a hearing or accepting

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Plaintiff’s written statement. While these allegations are generally sufficient to state a due process

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claim, Plaintiff’s prior pleading included detailed allegations describing how he filed an

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administrative grievance following his guilty finding, that he was granted a re-hearing, and that

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the guilty finding was reversed. The previous screening order held that these allegations

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demonstrated Plaintiff’s due process claim related to the first RVR hearing failed. See, e.g.,

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Shotwell v. Brandt, 2012 WL 6569402, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012) (no due process violation

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where Plaintiff’s RVR was ordered reissued and reheard, the Plaintiff was found not guilty at the

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second hearing, and the Plaintiff suffered no credit loss or any other punishment).

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By omitting allegations in the second amended complaint regarding the second RVR

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hearing and the reversal of the guilty finding, Plaintiff paints an incomplete picture related to his

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due process rights. In any event, the Court will accept these allegations as true for purposes of this

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screening order. PAE Gov’t Servs. v. MPRI, Inc., 514 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2007). However, As

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described in the concurring opinion in Shirley v. University of Idaho, College of Law, 800 F.3d

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1193, 1194, a finding that a claim can proceed despite inconsistent allegations does not preclude

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the availability of “collateral consequences in the litigation, including possible sanctions under

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Rule 11 or undermining the Plaintiff’s credibility.” Thus, Plaintiff should consider long and

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hard whether he wants to proceed on this claim. Notably, if the defense files a motion for

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summary adjudication and demonstrates that the guilty finding on the RVR was overturned and

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demonstrates that the plaintiff has violated Rule 11 by filing a false pleading, the conditions

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would be ripe for the Court to award monetary or other sanctions, which could be enforced no

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matter the ultimate outcome of this litigation. Should Plaintiff choose not to proceed on this

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claim, he may file a notice that he voluntarily dismisses this claim before any defendant appears

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in this action.

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C.

Equal Protection

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Plaintiff also presents an equal protection claim based on comments made by several of

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the Defendants regarding Plaintiff’s race. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

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Amendment provides that ‘[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

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protection of the laws.’” Angelotti Chiropractic v. Baker, 791 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2015)

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(quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat

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all similarly situated people equally. This does not mean, however, that all prisoners must receive

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identical treatment and resources.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114,

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1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). To state an equal protection claim, a claimant “must

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allege facts plausibly showing that ‘the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

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against [them] based upon membership in a protected class’” such as race, religion, or national

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origin. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166

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(9th Cir. 2005)); see also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1975) (noting that “suspect

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distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” are protected classes for equal protection

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purposes). “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a

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Plaintiff's protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in

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original) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)).

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Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is directed at Perez, DeAcevedo, and Castro, who are

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accused of placing Plaintiff in administrative segregation because of his race. However, of the

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comments attributed to these Defendants, only Castro referenced Plaintiff’s race (“Here at

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Corcoran it is just not smart of a Black inmate to be making waves.”). While DeAcevedo told

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Plaintiff that he “might get a little pail [sic],” this does not suggest that his decision to retain

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Plaintiff in administrative segregation was based on Plaintiff’s race. Furthermore, the comment

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attributed to Perez do not reference Plaintiff’s race at all, and the Court declines to attribute racial

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motivation or discrimination to DeAcevedo or Perez based on comments made by Castro.

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Although Plaintiff does not formally assert this claim against Magallanes, liberally

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construing the pleading leads the Court to conclude that Plaintiff states a colorable equal

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protection claim against this Defendant as well based on his comments that “All you Blacks

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hiding out over here in the E.O.P. (Enhanced Out Patient) program should be ashamed of

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yourselves preying on these little white boys,” and “you monkeys won’t be that long in the hole.”

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Accordingly, this claim may proceed against Castro and Magallanes.

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IV.

Conclusion

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Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff be allowed to proceed

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only on the following claims: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim against Riley, Magallanes,

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Castro, Perez, and DeAcevedo; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Amaya;

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and (3) a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Castro and Magallanes. All other

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claims should be dismissed as not cognizable.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after

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being served with the findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with

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the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

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Recommendation.” A party may respond to another party’s objections by filing a response within

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14 days after being served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure

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to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson

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v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th

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Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

June 20, 2019

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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