Jackson v. Arnold
Filing
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ORDER DENYING Petitioner's 17 Motion to Appoint Counsel, signed by Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson on 6/8/18. (Marrujo, C)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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KENNETH A. JACKSON,
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Petitioner,
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ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
v.
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Case No. 1:17-cv-01670-JDP
ERIC ARNOLD,
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(Doc. No. 17)
Respondent.
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Petitioner Kenneth A. Jackson is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a
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writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 21, 2018, the court received the
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instant motion, in which petitioner requests appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 17.) In support of
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his request, petitioner submits that his case involves “substantial and complex procedural, legal or
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mixed legal and factual questions.” (Id. at 3.)
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A petitioner in a habeas proceeding does not have an absolute right to counsel. See
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Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1958) (“The Sixth Amendment has no
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application here . . . .”). There are three specific circumstances where appointment of counsel is
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required in habeas proceedings. First, appointment of counsel is required for an indigent person
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seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C §§
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2254 or 2255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Second, appointment of counsel may be required if
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an evidentiary hearing is warranted. See Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases 8(c).
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Third, appointment of counsel may be necessary for effective discovery. See Rules Governing
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Section 2254 and 2255 Cases 6(a). None of these situations is present at this time.
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This court is further authorized to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a habeas
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proceeding if the court determines that the interests of justice require the assistance of counsel.
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See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).
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However, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not entitled to
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appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is
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necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. In assessing whether to
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appoint counsel, the court evaluates the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as
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the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se, considering the complexity of the legal
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issues involved. See Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).
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The court cannot conclude at this point that counsel is necessary to prevent a due process
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violation. The legal issues currently involved are not exceptionally complicated and petitioner
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has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court finds that
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appointed counsel is not necessary to guard against a due process violation and that the interests
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of justice do not require the appointment of counsel at this time.
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The court may revisit this issue at a later stage of the proceedings if the interests of justice
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so require. If petitioner later renews his request for counsel, he should provide a detailed
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explanation of the circumstances that he believes justify appointment of counsel.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for the appointment of
counsel (Doc. No. 17) is DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
June 8, 2018
/s/
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Jeremy D. Peterson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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