Morales v. Davey et al

Filing 29

ORDER DENYING 28 Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Post-Screening ADR Project, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 1/18/19. (Martin-Gill, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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1:17-cv-01673-JLT (PC)

JOSE LORENZO MORALES,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
DISMISS POST-SCREENING ADR
PROJECT

Plaintiff,

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v.

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GAMBOA, et al.,

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(Doc. 28)
Defendants.

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On January 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Motion to Dismiss Post-Screening

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Alternative Dispute Resolution Project, Conferences Within 30 Days and Amend Forwith (sic) to

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Maximize Resolution with Defendants.” (Doc. 28.) Plaintiff seeks to amend his pleadings in this

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action and to initiate immediate settlement discussions with defense counsel via telephone

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conferences rather than waiting for the settlement conference scheduled for March 19, 2019. The

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order that referred the case to the Post-Screening ADR Project stayed this action to facilitate

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settlement. (Doc. 23.) Plaintiff’s motion is thus construed as a motion to lift the stay so that he

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might file an amended complaint.

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A district court has the inherent power to stay its proceedings. This power to stay is

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“incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its

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docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North

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American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d

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1068, 1077 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the power to stay proceedings comes from the power of

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every court to manage the cases on its docket and to ensure a fair and efficient adjudication of the

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matter at hand). This is best accomplished by the “exercise of judgment, which must weigh

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competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55. In determining

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whether a stay is warranted, courts consider the potential prejudice to the non-moving party;

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hardships or inequities to the parties; and the judicial resources that would be saved by

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simplifying the case or avoiding duplicative litigation if the case before the court is stayed.

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CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir.1962).

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The Ninth Circuit “has sustained or authorized in principle Landis stays on several

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occasions,” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir.2005), all of which furthered

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resolution of the actions and lessened judicial involvement. See CMAX, Inc., 300 F.2d 265 (stay

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affirmed where a common carrier by air sued shippers in multiple actions for moneys on alleged

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failure to pay the full amount of the government approved tariff so that highly technical tariff

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questions, probative in all of the cases, could be developed); Leyva v. Certified Grocers of

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California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1979) (truck drivers sued their employer for unpaid wages

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under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (count I), and under their collective

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bargaining agreement (count II), stay for arbitration proceedings under the Federal Arbitration

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Act affirmed); Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.1983)

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(suit to enforce a contract forming a joint venture which contained an arbitration clause, district

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court held that the clause applied to some but not all of the counts in the complaint, stayed the

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entire suit pending arbitration, not limited to the counts subject to arbitration as arbitrable and

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non-arbitrable counts in the complaint overlapped a great deal both factually and legally

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warranted the stay.); contra Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (finding injunctive relief action against

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ongoing and future harm brought by Attorney General would be damaged by stay).

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The stay was imposed in this action “to allow the parties to investigate the plaintiff’s

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claims, meet and confer and participate in a settlement conference” (Doc. 23, p. 1) based on the

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Court’s experience that the later settlement negotiations take place, the more monies will have

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been expended in defending the action which otherwise might have been available in settlement
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to Plaintiff. In other words, Plaintiff’s best opportunity to receive the highest sum to resolve this

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action is likely before defense efforts are initiated. This weighs heavily in preserving the stay for

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potential settlement.

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Further, Plaintiff requests the stay be lifted to allow him to amend his pleadings.

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However, at least on what Plaintiff presents in his motion, such amendment will likely not be

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allowed since the statements in Plaintiff’s motion are little more than generalized conclusory legal

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statements that need not be accepted as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), which

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are not linked to actions by any individual state actors, Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and

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Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir.

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2011). Thus, amending the complaint is likely to be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

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(1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1319 (9th Cir. 1984)

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(Foman factors to be considered when assessing the propriety of leave to amend: (1) bad faith;

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(2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether

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prior amendment has occurred.)

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion, filed on January 16, 2019 (Doc. 28), to lift the stay

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imposed by the Order Referring the Case to Post-Screening ADR Project, (Doc. 23), is DENIED.

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The plaintiff is encouraged to make a settlement offers and engage in settlement discussions

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immediately and as previously ordered (Doc. 27).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 18, 2019

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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