Arana v. Frazier

Filing 25

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to dismiss action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to obey a court order, and failure to prosecute 24 signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 1/15/2019. Referred to Judge Dale A. Drozd; Objections to F & R's due within 14-Days. (Lundstrom, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MAURICIO ARANA,

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Case No. 1:17-cv-01702-DAD-BAM (PC)

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

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(ECF No. 24)

v.

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE
TO OBEY A COURT ORDER, AND
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

FRAZIER, et al.,

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FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

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I.

Background
Plaintiff Mauricio Arana (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United

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States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

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On November 30, 2018, the Court issued a screening order granting Plaintiff leave to file

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a third amended complaint within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 24.) The Court expressly warned

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Plaintiff that the failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s order would

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result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court

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order and for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff’s third amended complaint was due on

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or before January 2, 2019, and Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise

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communicate with the Court.
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II.

Failure to State a Claim

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A.

Screening Requirement

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous

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or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as

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true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

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572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

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sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

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for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S.

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Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted

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unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff’s Allegations

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B.

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Plaintiff is currently housed California State Prison, Corcoran (“Corcoran”). Plaintiff

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names the following defendants: (1) B. Frazier, Correctional Officer, Tehachapi State Prison;

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(2) K. Nouwels, Lieutenant, Corcoran; (3) M. Hodges, Captain, Corcoran; and (4) P. Hurlbut,

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Lieutenant, Corcoran.

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In Claim 1, Plaintiff alleges that on June 5, 2017, Defendant Frazier used excessive force
by spraying Plaintiff with O.C. pepper spray without cause while Plaintiff was locked in a holding
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cell. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Frazier lied to cover up his misconduct.
In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges that on July 27, 2017, Defendant Hurlbut adjudicated a

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hearing for a rules violation against Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Hurlbut violated

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Plaintiff’s due process rights by finding exigent circumstances to assist in covering up the

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excessive force claims against Defendant Frazier. Plaintiff further alleges that all defendants

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violated his due process rights by lying about the reasons to uphold the disciplinary hearing.

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Plaintiff asserts that he has added to his complaint all overseeing authorities who conducted the

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appeals process.

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C.

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Discussion
1.

Eighth Amendment – Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Frazier violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using
pepper spray on Plaintiff without cause and while Plaintiff was in a holding cell.
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and

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from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

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2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual

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Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)

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(citations omitted). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must

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provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994) (quotations omitted).

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For claims of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-

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faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Relevant factors for this consideration include “the extent of injury...[,]

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the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used,

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the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the

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severity of a forceful response.’ ” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 1078, 1085 (1986)).

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Although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use

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of force to cause harm always violates the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether or not

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significant injury is evident. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10; Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th
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Cir. 2002).

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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not include sufficient factual allegations for the Court to

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assess whether he has stated a claim for excessive force. Plaintiff’s complaint does not describe

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the circumstances involved resulting in the use of pepper spray, nor does it allege any facts

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demonstrating any specific injury, significant or otherwise.

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2.

Due Process – Fourteenth Amendment

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

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process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, inmates do not have

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any due process right to be free from false disciplinary charges. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808

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F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (inmates have “no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being

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falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty

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interest,” provided that they are “not...deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process

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of law.”); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir.1989) (“Sprouse’s claims based on the

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falsity of the charges and the impropriety of Babcock’s involvement in the grievance procedure,

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standing alone, do not state constitutional claims.”). Accordingly, any assertion by Plaintiff that

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the charges against him were false fails to state a cognizable claim.

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To the extent Plaintiff is challenging the fairness of the disciplinary proceedings, he also

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fails to state a claim. “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and

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the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S.

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at 556. With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural requirements

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that must be met are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the

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prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his

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defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for

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taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when

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permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional

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goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues

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presented are legally complex. Id. at 563–71. If the five minimum Wolff requirements are met,

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due process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir.1994), abrogated
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on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 115. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

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include any factual allegations to suggest that he was denied any of the Wolff procedural

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requirements.

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Appeals Process

Plaintiff appears to assert a claim against Defendant Nouwels and Hodges based on their

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review of an inmate appeal of Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. However, Plaintiff may not pursue

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any claims against prison staff relating to the processing or review of his administrative appeals.

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The existence of an inmate appeals process does not create a protected liberty interest upon which

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Plaintiff may base a claim that he was denied a particular result or that the appeals process was

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deficient. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639,

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640 (9th Cir. 1988).

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III.

Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order

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A.

Legal Standard

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Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with

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any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . .

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within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their

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dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where

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appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A

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court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action,

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failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46

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F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

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963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring

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amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987)

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(dismissal for failure to comply with court order).

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In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors:

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(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its

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docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

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cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779
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F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).

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B.

Discussion

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Here, Plaintiff’s third amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the

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Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his

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case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.

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The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a

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presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action.

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Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against

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dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d

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639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose

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responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes

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progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products

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Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in

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dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262;

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Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s November 30, 2018 screening

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order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a

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recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and

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for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 24, p. 6.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that

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dismissal could result from his noncompliance.

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Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that

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would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further

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unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this

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action, making monetary sanctions of little use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is

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likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case.

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IV.

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Conclusion and Recommendation
Accordingly, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY

RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, for
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failure to obey a Court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action.
These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

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(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written

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objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

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Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual

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findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v.

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Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

January 15, 2019

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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