Paula Gordon v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., et al.

Filing 99

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 89 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 5/18/2019. (Hall, S)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAULA GORDON, Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 NEXSTAR BROADCASTING, INC., et al., Defendants. 15 16 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 1:18-cv-0007 - DAD - JLT ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY (Docs. 69, 71) Paula Gordon contends she suffered sexual harassment as an employee of the defendants. She 17 18 alleges the defendants are liable sexual harassment, discrimination and retaliation in violation of the 19 Fair Employment and Housing Act, violation public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional 20 distress. Plaintiff seeks to compel additional discovery, including deposition testimony and the 21 production of documents, related to an investigation performed regarding her claims. Nexstar contends 22 Plaintiff is not entitled to this additional information. (Doc. 90) The Court finds the matter suitable for decision without oral argument. The Court considered 23 24 the filings of the parties and conducted an in camera review of the documents discussed by the plaintiff 25 in her motion. Accordingly, the motion is taken under submission pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For 26 the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is GRANTED in PART. 27 I. 28 Background Plaintiff alleges she was hired in December 2012 as an account executive, “to perform in the 1 1 business of television media sales,” and her “$120,000 salary was based on commission only.” (Doc. 2 14 at 5, ¶ 15) She contends that after the defendants hired Erik Mendoza as a sales manager in August 3 2013, she “suffered from constant and egregious sex harassment.” (Id., ¶ 16) Plaintiff asserts she “was 4 subjected to a constant stream of sex harassment, including, inappropriate touching, and obscene and 5 sexually vulgar comments and exhibitions.” (Id., ¶17) She alleges that “acts of harassment were 6 performed in front of other persons, including persons working both for and working with Defendants.” 7 (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “Defendants “tolerated, acquiesced, encouraged, failed to protect, failed to 8 investigate and allowed to exist, a hostile, oppressive, dangerous and violent work environment for 9 Plaintiff as created by [Mendoza].” (Id.) 10 Plaintiff alleges that in February 2016, she complained to her supervisor Derek Jeffery, the 11 General Manager of Nexstar, that “Adam Chase, would constantly threaten Plaintiff’s job by stating he 12 could take away any of her business accounts.” (Doc. 14 at ¶¶ 8, 19) She asserts, “Mr. Chase took 13 away at least eight (8) of Plaintiff’s accounts and inexplicably gave many of them to [Mendoza].” (Id. 14 at 7, ¶19) Plaintiff reports she cried in front of Jeffrey, who responded that Plaintiff was “being way too 15 emotional” and said he “wouldn’t go to [his] boss crying.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that “[i]n June 2016, 16 once Mr. Chase left his position with Defendants, [Jeffery] told Plaintiff that Mr. Chase ‘hated’ 17 Plaintiff because ‘he (Mr. Chase) hated women, particularly strong women.’” (Id. at 8, ¶19) 18 She asserts that in July 2016, Mendoza was promoted to local sales manager, a position which 19 made him Plaintiff’s supervisor. (Doc. 14 at 6, ¶18) Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the promotion, 20 she described Mendoza’s “constant egregious and sexually inappropriate comments and actions” to 21 Alma Navarrete, the General Sales Manager and another supervisor over Plaintiff. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 20) 22 Navarrete told Plaintiff to “[j]ust ignore him.” (Id. at 8, ¶ 20) She contends that year, she also described 23 Mendoza’s “offensive and vulgar sexual comments and physical touching, photos and videos to 24 Navarrete, who “discouraged Plaintiff from filing a complaint with Defendants.” (Id., ¶ 23) Plaintiff 25 asserts that Navarrete reported this conversation to Jeffery. (Id.) 26 According to Plaintiff, Mendoza was “investigated by Defendants for sexually harassing 27 another subordinate” after another female account executive, Alyssa Duran, reported Mendoza as 28 sexually harassing her in November 2016. (Doc. 14 at 8, ¶ 21) Plaintiff asserts she was not interviewed 2 1 related to Mendoza’s behavior toward Duran but was instead asked to “describe her ‘relationship’ with 2 her fellow female Account Executive.” (Id.) She alleges Ms. Duran was on leave during the 3 investigation while Mendoza kept working, and after the leave ended, Navarrete told Plaintiff: “[W]e 4 are going to make sure Duran quits. We aren’t going to give her another account. She is out of here.’” 5 (Id., ¶ 22) Plaintiff contends that from this, she “learned what Defendants do to women who complain 6 of sex harassment.” (Id.) 7 On January 12, 2017, Navarrete told Plaintiff that Jeffery wanted to meet with her. (Doc. 14 at 8 8, ¶ 24) Plaintiff asserts that during the meeting, Jeffery informed Plaintiff that Navarrete had reported 9 Plaintiff’s complaints of sexual harassment and abuse by Mendoza.” (Doc. 14 at 8-29, ¶ 24) Jeffery 10 asked Plaintiff if Mendoza made “just comments,” to which Plaintiff responded the harassment was 11 also physical. (Id. at 9, ¶ 24) According to Plaintiff, Jeffrey responded, ““You should have done what 12 my wife would have done, you should have kicked Erik in the balls.” (Id.) Jeffrey then “abruptly” 13 ended the meeting with Plaintiff and Navarrete. (Id.) Later that day, Navarrete went to Plaintiff and 14 said Plaintiff was jeopardizing [Navarrete’s] job by telling her the information about Mendoza.” (Id., 15 ¶ 25) In response, Plaintiff told Navarrete that she could not “pick and choose” what information she 16 told Jeffrey and asked why Navarrete did not tell Jeffrey about Mendoza “showing pictures of his 17 penis and videos of him masturbating.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Navarrete then responded: “Don’t 18 tell me! I don’t want to know!” (Id.) 19 Plaintiff asserts she again met with Jeffery regarding Mendoza’s conduct the following day, on 20 January 13, 2017. (Doc. 14 at 9, ¶ 26) Jeffery again asked Plaintiff whether it “[w]as … more than just 21 comments.” (Id.) She alleges that she responded, “yes, as I told you, it was also physical. Alma 22 [Navarrete] knows everything.” (Id.) Plaintiff added, “I told Alma everything last year.” (Id.) She 23 contends that after the meetings with Jeffery and Navarrete, her “sex harassment complaints were just 24 ignored” and “Defendants did not contact Plaintiff regarding her sexual harassment allegations and 25 complaints.” (Id., ¶ 27) 26 On January 24, 2017, Plaintiff fold Jeffery “that her medical doctor ordered her on a leave of 27 absence to address Plaintiff’s trauma and non-stop hostile workplace.” (Doc. 14 at 9, ¶ 28) In April 28 2017, while Plaintiff remained on leave, she “voluntarily participated in an investigation conducted by 3 1 an attorney who was hired by Defendants to investigate Plaintiff’s sex harassment claims.” (Id. at 9-10, 2 ¶ 29) She asserts the investigation concluded in June 2017, and “[t]he investigator found that Defendant 3 Mendoza had sexually harassed Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 30) 4 According to Plaintiff, “Defendants demanded that Plaintiff immediately return to work.” (Doc. 5 14 at 10, ¶ 31) She asserts that she “was suffering severe emotional distress from the abuse and 6 mistreatment by Defendants,” and “feared that if she returned to work, she, like other sex harassment 7 victims of Defendants, would be retaliated against by the Local Sales Manager, her bosses, and the 8 entire management team.” (Id.) On July 31, 2017, Plaintiff was fired, and replaced by Lupe Carbajal, 9 “who Defendants[] knew had sexually harassed Plaintiff at a previous job.” (Id., ¶¶ 32- 33) 10 Plaintiff filed claims with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which 11 “granted the right to sue.” (Doc. 14 at 13, ¶ 45) On September 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in 12 the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (See Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 1) Plaintiff identified the following causes 13 of action: (1) statutory harassment, (2) gender discrimination in violation of California’s Fair 14 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (3) violation of public policy, (4) retaliation in violation of 15 FEHA, (5) and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See id. at 10, 19-26) 16 Nexstar filed a notice of removal on October 31, 2017, thereby removing the action to the 17 Central District of California. (Doc. 1) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 14), after which 18 she also voluntarily dismissed The CW Network as a defendant (Doc. 25) and voluntarily dismissed 19 the first cause of action for harassment as to Derek Jeffery and Alma Navarrete (Doc. 26). Thus, the 20 defendants remaining in the action are Nexstar Broadcasting, Telemundo 17.3, KGET-TV 17, and 21 Erik Mendoza. (See Doc. 14 at 10) On December 28, 2017, the Central District transferred the action 22 to the Eastern District of California, thereby initiating the action before this Court. (Doc. 45) T 23 On January 10, 2018, Nexstar filed its Answer, denying Plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful 24 conduct. (Doc. 50 at 2) In addition, as its Eighth Affirmative Defense, Nexstar stated: “Any recovery 25 on Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred in whole or in part 26 because Defendant exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any alleged unlawful 27 behavior, including conducting a prompt and thorough investigation after receiving Plaintiff’s 28 workplace complaint.” (Id. at 8) 4 The Court issued new civil case documents and set a scheduling conference for April 2, 2018. 1 2 (See Docs 48, 56) At the scheduling conference, the parties were directed to complete non-expert 3 discovery no later than February 15, 2019. (Doc. 58 at 2) The parties began discovery and participated 4 in mid-discovery status conference with the Court on September 10, 2018. (Doc. 64) At that time, 5 Plaintiff indicated she had served “a request for production and special interrogatories on Defendant 6 Nexstar…” and Nexstar reported the company had “responded to all pending discovery requests to 7 date.” (Doc. 63 at 1, 2) Nexstar’s production included the investigation report and “entire investigation 8 file, including the investigator's notes, outline, written questions, and correspondence with all witnesses 9 interviewed, with the limited exception of communications between defense counsel Angel Sevilla and 10 [the] investigator….” (Doc. 90 at 14) As to the information withheld, Nexstar provided privilege logs. 11 (Id.; see also Doc. 90-4) Plaintiff now seeks additional discovery related to the investigation performed by Nexstar. 12 13 The Court held an informal telephonic conference with the parties on April 8, 2019. (Doc. 88) Because 14 the dispute was not resolved, Plaintiff was authorized to file a motion to compel the additional 15 discovery. (Doc. 88) On April 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a notice of the motion now before the Court. 16 (Doc. 89) The parties filed a joint statement regarding the discovery dispute on May 6, 2019. (Doc. 91) 17 II. 18 19 20 21 22 23 Scope of Discovery The scope and limitations of discovery are set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In relevant part, Rule 26(b) states: Unless otherwise limited by court order, parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged manner that is relevant to any party’ claim or defense - including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things . . . For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the accident. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the 25 existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 26 probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevance is interpreted broadly, 27 based on the general principal that litigants have a right to ‘every man’s evidence’ . . . and that wide 28 access to relevant facts serves the integrity and fairness of the judicial process by promoting the search 5 1 for the truth.” Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993), quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 2 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (internal citation omitted). A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer when a deponent fails 3 4 to answer a question. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Once the party seeking discovery establishes that a 5 request seeks relevant information, “[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery 6 should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” 7 Global Ampersand, LLC v. Crown Eng'g & Constr., 261 F.R.D. 495, 499 (E.D. Cal. 2009), quoting 8 Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Blankenship v. Hearst 9 Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (requiring defendants “to carry heavy burden of showing why 10 discovery was denied”). 11 III. Discussion 12 Nexstar reports that when the company responded to Plaintiff’s request for production of 13 documents, it “produced 90% of EXTII’s investigation file, including the investigator's preliminary and 14 final reports, notes, outline, written questions, witness statements, and correspondence with all witnesses 15 interviewed.” (Doc. 90 at 12) Nexstar also produced privilege logs identifying withheld the documents, 16 including: communications between the investigator, Allison Underwood (a licensed attorney), and 17 Nexstar’s counsel; documents identified as “attorney work product,” such as an interview chart and a 18 draft investigation report containing attorney notes; and notes that included communications regarding 19 the scope of the investigation by Ms. Underwood. (See, e.g., Doc. 90-4 at 2) 20 Plaintiff maintains the investigation “was controlled and limited by Nexstar’s present defense 21 counsel, who refused to allow the investigator… to speak with Ms. Duran.” (Doc. 90 at 8) Plaintiff 22 deposed Ms. Underwood and asserts that “Ms. Underwood was precluded from answering questions 23 regarding her communications with Defense Counsel.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, there was “no 24 attorney-client relationship between EXTTI and Jackson Lewis or Nexstar,” such that the identified 25 communications would be privileged. (Id. at 9) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that Nexstar “was required 26 to produce the entirety of the discovery file based on the holding of Wellpont v. Superior Court (1997) 27 59 Cal.App.4th 110,” because Nexstar raised its investigation as an affirmative defense. (Id. at 10) 28 Consequently, Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to further deposition testimony Ms. Underwood. 6 1 (See id. at 8-12) In addition, Plaintiff seeks to compel Nexstar to produce documents withheld from 2 the investigation file, including: 3 • communications to Defense Counsel regarding the Duran investigation; 4 • communications about the any request by Ms. Underwood to interview Ms. Duran and responses thereto; • any question posed at deposition to Ms. Underwood that relate to the scope of the investigation, including any but not limited to communications related to her request to interview Ms. Duran; • the retainer agreement and; • numerous documents identified on Defendant’s Privilege Logs (PRIV 03, PRIV05, 0000404, 000423, 000436, 2100207, 2100762, 1302124, 2100551, 900012, 9900030, 900028, 900187, 900188, 900189, 900391, [and] 900106 that related to the “scope” of the investigation.1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (Doc. 90 at 12) Nexstar maintains that it is not obligated to disclose the communications, asserting its “defense 12 13 counsel made those communications in anticipation of litigation.” (Doc. 90 at 12) Nexstar observes 14 that in Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1226-27 (1998), the 15 Court of Appeals held the privilege is not “waived by the employer’s pleading of the adequacy of its 16 prelitigation investigation as a defense to an action for employee discrimination or harassment.” (Id.) 17 A. Attorney-Client Privilege 18 The attorney-client privilege protects communications “(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is 19 sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to 20 that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) 21 from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection be waived.” United States 22 v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.2010). Because the content of the client’s communication would 23 be known if the attorney’s advice was not also protected, the rule prohibits this disclosure as well. 24 25 26 27 28 Though not discussed by either party, the Court notes not all of the documents identified here are “related to the ‘scope’ of the investigation,” because, according to the plaintiff, some were created before Nexstar even contemplated conducting an investigation. (Doc. 90-2 at 78, document numbers 2100207, 2100762, 1302124, 2100551) Plaintiff offers no discussion or analysis related to these documents or the other documents not reviewed by the Court in camera. Though the defense bears the burden of demonstrating the applicability of a privilege, the plaintiff has failed to “put in play” the documents not reviewed by the Court by failing to assert in any fashion how the information contained in them bear on liability or damages. The Court declines to manufacture arguments for her. Thus, the motion as to these documents is DENIED as abandoned. 1 7 1 2 Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977). Documents prepared by clients to adequately inform an attorney about the factual situation so 3 that the lawyer can render reliable advice, are protected. This protection is provided when the 4 statements “are based on or would tend to reveal the client’s confidential communications.” Matter of 5 Fischel, 557 F.2d at 211. As such, communications to counsel may be protected by the attorney-client 6 privilege if they were made for purposes of evaluating the scope of the investigation and in 7 anticipation of litigation. 8 B. 9 The immunity from disclosure provided by work-product doctrine applies to documents 10 prepared by counsel which reflect the attorney’s mental impressions in preparation for or during 11 litigation. United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2011). “To qualify for work-product 12 protection, documents must: (1) be ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial’ and (2) be 13 prepared ‘by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative.’” Id. at 568 (citation 14 omitted). Where documents are prepared for reasons in addition to the prospect of litigation, the party 15 asserting the privilege must demonstrate the document was prepared "because of" litigation. Id. 16 Work-Product Work product protection, unlike attorney client privilege, is not absolute and can be overcome 17 by a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent of the materials through other 18 means. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(3). Nevertheless, in ordering discovery of such work product the court 19 must “protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of 20 an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Id. 21 Nexstar maintains the documents from its counsel, Mr. Sevilla, “to Ms. Underwood (which 22 Plaintiff now seeks) necessarily contains Mr. Sevilla’s mental impressions, conclusions, or legal 23 opinions in anticipation of litigation.” (Doc. 90 at 16) Nexstar maintains Mr. Sevilla “made those 24 communications in anticipation of litigation.” (Id. at 12) As such, the Court finds the documents 25 identified on the privilege log such as “[n]otes containing attorney client communicaiton(sic)” and an 26 interview chart (see Doc. 90-4 at 2) are protected under the work-product privilege. 27 C. Analysis 28 As noted above, Plaintiff relies in part on Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court of 8 1 Los Angeles County, 59 Cal. App. 4th 110 (1997) to support the production of documents and 2 additional discovery. In Wellpoint, the plaintiff filed an initial complaint and a law firm was brought 3 in to investigate. The court found that hiring the law firm created a prima facie presumption that the 4 attorney-client privilege applied. Nevertheless, because the defendant pointed to the investigation to 5 show that it took reasonable corrective action, the court concluded privilege was waived. Id., 59 Cal. 6 App. 4th at 123. The court explained: 7 8 9 If a defendant employer hopes to prevail by showing that it investigated an employee’s complaint and took action appropriate to the findings of the investigation, then it will have put the adequacy of the investigation directly at issue, and cannot stand on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine to preclude a thorough examination of its adequacy. 10 Wellpoint, 59 Cal. App. 4th at 128. The court also cautioned, however, that there should not be a 11 “blanket” nullification of the privilege and a plaintiff should not have “carte blanche access” to the 12 defendant’s investigative file. Id. at 122. Rather, documents may be withheld upon review by the 13 court. Id. Thus, the court in Wellpoint determined it was error for the trial court to require the 14 production of “all documents… pertaining to the… prelitigation investigation,” and indicated a 15 privilege log should be prepared by the defendant. Id. at 130. 16 In Kaiser, upon which Nexstar relies, the court distinguished Wellpoint from the facts before it, 17 because the investigation was performed by a non-attorney human resources specialist. Kaiser 18 Foundation, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1217 (1998). In Kaiser, the employer turned over the human resources 19 report—including over 90% of its investigation-related documents—but withheld some attorney-client 20 communications. See id. at 1225. The plaintiff sought to compel the production of the remainder of 21 the documents and the trial court granted the motion. The appellate court found this was an error, 22 because 23 24 25 if an employer has produced the substance of relevant in-house investigations performed by nonattorney personnel and seeks only to protect specific communications between those personnel and the employer’s attorneys, the protections afforded by the law for communications between attorneys and their clients are not waived by the employer's pleading of the adequacy of its prelitigation investigation as a defense to an action for employee discrimination or harassment. 26 27 Id., 66 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1219-1220. Further, the Kaiser appellate court held “disclosure of such 28 privileged communications is simply not essential for a thorough examination of the adequacy of the 9 1 2 investigation or a fair adjudication of the action.” Id. at 1227. The analysis here must begin with a determination as to which attorney Nexstar is attempting 3 to assert a privilege. Though Ms. Underwood was an attorney, Nexstar does not seek to assert the 4 attorney work product privilege as to her efforts. Rather, Nexstar is asserting an attorney-client 5 relationship with its defense counsel, Mr. Sevilla, and is asserting that his work product should be 6 protected. As framed, the factual circumstance is precisely that discussed in Kaiser and is 7 distinguished from Wellpoint, in which the defendant had not produced any portion of the 8 investigation file and relied upon the privilege to refuse to do so. 9 As in Kaiser, Nexstar has produced more than 90% of the investigation file. (See Doc. 90 at 10 12) The remaining documents were withheld on the grounds of attorney-client privilege or were 11 identified as attorney work product. The communications from Mr. Sevilla to Ms. Underwood clearly 12 are protected because they “would necessarily include Mr. Sevilla’s mental impressions and 13 evaluations as defense counsel.” (Id. at 13) Such communications related to an investigation—even 14 where the defendant has placed the scope and quality of its investigation in issue—are clearly 15 protected and may be withheld. See Kaiser, 66 Cal. App. 4th at 1227 (“neither the attorney-client 16 privilege nor the work product doctrine has been waived unless it is established through other 17 discovery that a significant part of any particular communication has already been disclosed to third 18 parties”). For the same reasons, communications by Ms. Underwood to Mr. Sevilla, to the extent they 19 reflect Mr. Sevilla’s mental processes, are protected. 20 The Court has conducted an in camera review of certain of the documents. (See Doc. 96) The 21 Court finds that PRIV03 shall be produced in redacted form. The defense is entitled to redact the 22 entirety of paragraphs 2 and 19. Nexstar shall provide a redacted copy of PRIV04 (the retainer 23 agreement) with paragraph 4 obliterated. The Court does not find that the remainder of these 24 documents implicate either an attorney-client communication or attorney work-product, given the 25 extent of the disclosure by Nexstar thus far. Indeed, PRIV04 appears to be a boilerplate document 26 prepared by EXTTI, with the exception of paragraph 4, which appears to reflect attorney work 27 product. 28 Nexstar shall also produce 900344. There is no showing how this document is privileged. 10 1 Though Ms. Bush is described as “Associate Counsel & VP Human Resources,” the Court has 2 confirmed that Ms. Bush has been an “inactive” member of the California Bar since 20002 and, 3 despite this Nexstar fails to demonstrate that her work product is protected. Inactive members of the 4 California Bar are ineligible to practice law. Z.A. v. San Bruno Park Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 1273, 1275 5 (9th Cir.1999) [“In the state of California, a person must be an active member of the California State 6 Bar in order to practice law.”]; Tavlor v. Chaing, 2009 WL 453050, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) 7 [The practice of law extends to other activities beyond court appearances.]; Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code, at 8 § 6125 [“No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State 9 Bar.”]; Rules of the State Bar of California, Title 2, Rights and Responsibilities of Members, Rule 10 2.30(B) [inactive members prohibited from “occupying a position in the employ of or rendering any 11 legal service for an active member, or occupying a position wherein he or she is called upon in any 12 capacity to give legal advice or counsel or examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, 13 document or law”]. As to the remaining documents, they clearly fall within the attorney work product and/or 14 15 attorney-client privilege. Also, the plaintiff is not entitled to further deposition responses from Ms. 16 Underwood to the extent she seeks information about the content of the discussions between defense 17 counsel and Ms. Underwood. 18 IV. Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: Plaintiff’s motion to compel additional 19 20 Conclusion and Order discovery (Docs. 89, 90) is GRANTED in PART. Nexstar SHALL produce the following: 21 1. PRIV03 with the entirety of paragraphs 2 and 19 redacted; 22 2. PRIV04 (the retainer agreement) with paragraph 4 obliterated; and 23 3. Document 900344; 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 2 28 The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). The record of the California State Bar is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 11 1 As to the remaining documents, the motion is DENIED. 2 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 18, 2019 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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