Rosenda Flores et al v. City of California City et al

Filing 40

ORDER GRANTING Defendants' 31 Motion to Dismiss, Motion for a More Definite Statement, and Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 4/30/2019. (Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ROSENDA FLORES, et al.,

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No. 1:18-cv-00703-DAD-JLT

Plaintiffs,

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v.
CITY OF CALIFORNIA CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR A
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

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(Doc. No. 31)
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This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss, motion for a more

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definite statement, and motion to strike portions of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint

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(“SAC”). (Doc. No. 31.) A hearing on the motions was held on April 2, 2019. Attorney Olaf

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Landsgaard appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiffs, and attorney Gary Smith appeared

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telephonically on behalf of defendants. The court has considered the parties’ briefs and oral

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arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, will grant defendants’ motion in its entirety.

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BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss and strike portions of plaintiffs’

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first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 11.) The undersigned referred that motion to the

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assigned magistrate judge on September 6, 2018. (See Doc. No. 14.) On September 25, 2018, the

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magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations, recommending that the motion to dismiss
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the FAC be granted. (Doc. No. 19.) Therein, the magistrate judge found that plaintiffs failed to

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allege sufficient facts to support their municipal liability claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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and recommended that plaintiffs’ claims against defendant City of California City (the “City”) be

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dismissed with leave to amend. (Id. at 6.) The magistrate judge also determined that plaintiffs

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had included material in the FAC “only for harassment purposes,” and recommended the striking

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of allegations related to “defendant Huizar’s previous arrest and conviction and claims that he is a

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child molester.” (Id. at 7.) Finally, the magistrate judge recommended that plaintiffs’ request for

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dismissal of their class claims be granted. (Id. at 6.) On January 2, 2019, the undersigned issued

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an order adopting these recommendations in full. (Doc. No. 25.)

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On January 9, 2019, plaintiffs filed their SAC. (Doc. No. 26.) The SAC alleges facts and

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asserts claims that are substantially similar to those in the FAC. (Compare Doc. No. 26, with

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Doc. No. 8.) Like its predecessor, the SAC is drafted in a confusing fashion, with factual

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allegations peppered throughout. Despite this lack of clarity, however, the gravamen of the SAC

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appears to be that, on the night of July 18, 2017, police officers employed by the City forcefully

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entered plaintiffs’ home without a warrant or authority, seized plaintiffs, arrested plaintiff Ciriaco

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Flores, searched plaintiffs’ home, and employed excessive force during the entire ordeal. (Doc.

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No. 26 at 2–3.) Based on these allegations, plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (1) a

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trespass claim against defendant Whiting, the City, and Does 1–10; (2) an equal protection and

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due process claim that appears to be asserted against defendant Huizar and the City; (3) a § 1983

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claim alleging violations of plaintiffs’ Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment

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rights that appears to be asserted against defendant Whiting and Does 1–10; (4) another equal

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protection and due process claim against all individual defendants; (5) a wrongful arrest claim

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against all defendants; and (6) a false imprisonment claim against all defendants. (Id. at 10–26.)

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Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, exemplary damages,

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attorneys’ fees and costs, other costs, and any other relief the court deems proper. (Id. at 27–28.)

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On February 15, 2019, defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

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municipal liability claims, as well as a motion for a more definite statement and a motion to strike

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portions of the SAC. (Doc. No. 31.) On March 1, 2019, plaintiffs filed their opposition to the

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pending motions, and on March 26, 2019, defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 36, 37.)

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LEGAL STANDARDS

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A.

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

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The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal

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sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.

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1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

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sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

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F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A

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claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the

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court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light

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most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v.

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United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the court need not assume the truth

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of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v.

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Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed

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factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

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accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and

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conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to

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assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have

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violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,

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Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

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B.

Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(e)

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Rule 12(e) states that a party may move for a more definite statement if the pleading is “so

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vague and ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

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The moving party “must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. Such

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motions are “not favored by the courts since pleadings in federal courts are only required to fairly

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notify the opposing party of the nature of the claim.” Griffin v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 817 F. Supp. 2d

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1152, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 854 F. Supp. 626, 629 (D.

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Ariz. 1994)). Therefore, motions for a more definite statement “should not be granted unless the

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defendant cannot frame a responsive pleading.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525

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F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981).

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C.

Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
Rule 12(f) states that a court may strike from a complaint “any redundant, immaterial,

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impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has

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no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded[,] [and]

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‘[i]mpertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the

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issues in question.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation

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omitted), rev’d on other grounds by 510 U.S. 517 (2004). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to

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strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious

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issues.” Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However,

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motions to strike are generally disfavored and “should not be granted unless it is clear that the

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matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”

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Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citation and quotation

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marks omitted). Whether to grant a motion to strike is within the sound discretion of the court,

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but the court must view the pleading in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and

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resolve any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged allegations in favor of the non-moving

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party. See In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. v. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000).

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ANALYSIS

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Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims, arguing that these

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claims fail to state a cognizable claim for relief. (Doc. No. 31 at 2.) Defendants also move for

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more definite statements with regard to plaintiffs’ second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action.

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(Id. at 2–3.) Finally, defendants move to strike other portions of the SAC. (Id. at 2.)

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Plaintiffs’ opposition, like the SAC, is difficult to decipher. (See Doc. No. 36.) The filing

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is devoid of any headings, cites to cases that appear to be inapplicable to the issues presented in

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the motion to dismiss, and is generally difficult to follow. Nevertheless, it appears that plaintiffs

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object to the contention that their municipal liability claims are not sufficiently pled and argue

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that the claims for which defendants seek more definite statements are sufficiently alleged. (Id. at

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3–4.) Plaintiffs do not object to defendants’ motion to strike.

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A.

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell Claims
Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against the City. Defendants contend that

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this allegation, brought on a theory of Monell liability, fails to include sufficient factual

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allegations to establish the existence of a policy or custom even if proven to be true. (Doc. No.

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31 at 6–8); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court

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agrees.

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It is well-established that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

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tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

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superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 692; see also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown,

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520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). To state a Monell claim against the City, a plaintiff “must demonstrate

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that an ‘official policy, custom, or pattern’ on the part of [the city] was ‘the actionable cause of

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the claimed injury.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

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Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008)). A Monell claim can be

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established in one of three ways. See Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th

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Cir. 2014). First, a local government may be held liable when it acts “pursuant to an expressly

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adopted policy.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir.

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2004). Second, a public entity may be held liable for a “longstanding practice or custom.”
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Thomas, 763 F.3d at 1170. Such circumstances may arise when, for instance, the public entity

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“fail[s] to implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations” or when it fails

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to adequately train its employees. Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1143 (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d

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1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (“A

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municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on

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a failure to train.”); Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(requiring a plaintiff asserting a claim based on a failure to train to allege facts showing that

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defendants “disregarded the known or obvious consequence that a particular omission in their

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training program would cause municipal employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights”)

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(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61); Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (“A pattern

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of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to

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demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”) (citation omitted). “A

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custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated

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constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or

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reprimanded.” Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). “Third, a

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local government may be held liable under § 1983 when ‘the individual who committed the

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constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority’ or such an official ‘ratified a

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subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’” Clouthier v. County of

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Santa Clara, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342,

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1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833

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F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016).
As was the case with the original complaint, plaintiffs’ SAC fails to provide any factual

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allegations supporting their conclusions that the defendant City maintains unconstitutional

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policies, procedures, or customs that caused the alleged constitutional violations. With respect to

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plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims, the SAC alleges only the following:

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(1)

Plaintiff Ciriaco Flores’ “arrest was achieved using excessive force and a policy against

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the citizens of the California City to keep and bear arms in their homes.” (Doc. No. 26

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at 3.)
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(2)

“Under the direction of defendant FRANK GARCIA HUIZAR, with the approval of the

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Mayor and the administration, the City of California City quit issuing concealed weapon

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permits, sought to do away with reserve officers, and established a policy against

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homeowners keeping and bearing arms within their homes.” (Id.)

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(3)

“Plaintiff sues the entity Defendants . . . for carrying out a policy or custom, including

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zero tolerance of homeowner’s [sic] owning or possessing firearms and zero tolerance of

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any person not employed by the City . . . to have a shotgun, rifle, or handgun in their

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home, forceable entry into occupied homes after 10:00 p.m., inadequate training, and

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deliberately poor report writing.” (Id. at 4.)

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(4)

“[O]n Tuesday, June 16, 2015, . . . officer[s] with the California City Police

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Department . . . enter[ed] [a Black woman’s] home . . . then forced their way inside and

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injured [the woman]. While [the woman] was on the floor, topped by [one officer],

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[another officer] kicked her . . . then pulled [a] gun and threatened to shoot [the woman’s]

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14-year old daughter. . . . Th[is] entry to the home . . . was made without a warrant and

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without probable cause.” (Id. at 7–8.)

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(5)

“Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the forced entry into homes of minorities and

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others without a search warrant against the wishes of the occupants is a policy taught by

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The City.” (Id. at 8.)

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(6)

such as Frank Garcia Huizar, who lie on their applications.” (Id.)

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“It has also been the policy of the City . . ., from 2011 to 2016, to hire and keep officers,

(7)

The City “caused and encouraged a policy that California City police officers could

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trespass into their home without probable cause or reasonable suspicion . . . with the

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intention of caring [sic] out a policy against Hispanics to keep and bear arms in their

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homes.” (Id. at 8–9.)

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(8)

“[F]orced entry into homes of Hispanics and Blacks without a warrant is a pattern and

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policy of the City . . . as was the policy to deprive all non-police of the right to keep and

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bear arms within the City.” (Id. at 9.)

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(9)

under the direction of Lt. Huizar.” (Id. at 11.)

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(10)

“The arrest and prosecution of Flores was based on a policy against citizens of California
City’s right to keep and bear arms initiated by defendant Lt. Huizar.” (Id. at 22.)

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“[R]etaliatory and vindictive charging is a common custom and practice of defendants

(11)

“DEFENDANTS have maintained policies, procedures, practices, and/or customs of

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discriminating against persons men who assert their rights to quiet enjoyment of their

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homes—and the right to demand a search warrant before entry could be made into their

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homes. Said policies, procedures, customs and practices evidence a deliberate

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indifference to the constitutional rights of PLAINTIFF and other non-public officials. . . .

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This indifference is and was manifested by the failure to change, correct, revoke, or

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rescind these policies, procedures, practices and/or customs in light of prior knowledge by

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DEFENDANTS of indistinguishably similar incidents of unjustified arrests.” (Id. at 24.)

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This is the extent of plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their municipal liability claim.

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These conclusory allegations, however, are unsupported by any specific factual allegations. If

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plaintiffs believe that an unlawful city policy caused the alleged constitutional violations, that

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policy must be specifically identified, and if plaintiffs believe that unlawful city practices or

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customs caused the alleged constitutional violations, facts—rather than mere conclusions—must

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be alleged to demonstrate that such practices or customs are widespread. Shelley v. County of San

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Joaquin, 954 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, ‘a bare

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allegation that government officials’ conduct conformed to some unidentified government policy

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or custom’ is insufficient; instead, plaintiffs’ complaint must include ‘factual allegations that . . .

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plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to

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be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.’”) (quoting AE ex rel.

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Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)). Moreover, the fact that officers

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employed by the City allegedly forced their way into a Black woman’s home and employed

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excessive force against her does not establish a custom or policy of “ent[ering] into the homes of

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minorities and others without a search warrant” because, as the Ninth Circuit has stated, “one or

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two incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy.” Oyenik v. Corizon Health, Inc.,
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696 Fed. App’x 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2017)1; see also Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

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1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it

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must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct

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has become a traditional method of carrying out that policy.”); Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231,

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1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A single constitutional deprivation ordinarily is insufficient to establish a

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longstanding practice or custom.”).

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Plaintiffs have failed to identify an unlawful City policy in their SAC, nor have they

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alleged facts supporting the conclusion that the City maintains unconstitutional customs or

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practices that caused the alleged constitutional violations. Simply describing allegedly

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problematic or illegal behavior and appending the phrase “pursuant to a custom or policy” to that

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description is not sufficient to plead municipal liability. AE ex rel. Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637

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(explaining that Monell claims “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must

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contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing

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party to defend itself effectively”).

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Given the absence of factual allegations in the SAC supporting plaintiffs’ claim of an

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unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom which caused the constitutional violations alleged

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here, and because the court previously dismissed plaintiffs’ FAC with leave to amend to cure the

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same deficiency, the court concludes that granting further leave to amend the Monell claims at

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this juncture would be futile. Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiffs’ Monell claims

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against the City without further leave to amend. United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham,

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Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[L]eave to amend should be granted unless the district

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court ‘determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’”)

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(quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)). However, plaintiffs’ Monell

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claims will also be dismissed without prejudice, subject to plaintiffs’ filing of a motion to amend

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the complaint in the future if facts supporting these claims are uncovered during the discovery

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phase of this litigation making the filing of such a motion appropriate.

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Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule
36–3(b).
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B.

Motion for a More Definite Statement
Defendants next argue that several of plaintiffs’ causes of action are “impermissibly broad

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and lack specificity.” (Doc. No. 31 at 9.) For instance, defendants take issue with plaintiffs’

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second cause of action alleging violations of equal protection and due process, arguing that this

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claim fails to identify which defendants it is asserted against. (Id.) Moreover, defendants

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contend that this cause of action is duplicative of plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, which also

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alleges equal protection and due process violations, but specifies that it is asserted against all

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defendants. (Id.) Finally, defendants argue that the third cause of action—which is styled as

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“Cause of Action #3: 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” and alleges violations of plaintiffs’ Second, Fourth,

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Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Doc. No. 26 at 14)—fails to identify the

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defendants against whom it is asserted and fails to clarify the basis for each of the asserted

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constitutional violations. (Doc. No. 31 at 9–10.)

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The court will grant defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. While the SAC’s

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second and third causes of action refer to various defendants, the SAC fails to state who these

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causes of actions are asserted against with sufficient specificity. Neither defendants nor the court

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should have to parse through plaintiffs’ allegations and causes of action to determine which cause

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of action is asserted against which named defendant. Similarly, plaintiff’s third cause of action

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“is so indefinite that the defendant[s] cannot ascertain the nature of the claim[s] being asserted.”

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Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Under the umbrella of

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“42 U.S.C. § 1983,” this third cause of action alleges violations of five different constitutional

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amendments, yet the SAC does not clarify the factual basis for each of the alleged constitutional

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violations. Defendants cannot be reasonably expected to frame a response to such a vague and

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ambiguous cause of action.

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Moreover, many of plaintiffs’ causes of action appear to be duplicative. For example, the

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third cause of action alleges violations of plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but

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the second and fourth causes of action also independently allege violations of plaintiffs’ equal

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protection and due process rights. (See Doc. No. 26 at 11–21.) Similarly, plaintiffs’ sixth cause

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of action for false imprisonment appears to be duplicative of their fifth cause of action for
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wrongful arrest. (See id. at 21–26); see also Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891

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(9th Cir. 2001) (“Under California law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are not

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separate torts, as false arrest is ‘but one way of committing a false imprisonment.’”) (citation

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omitted); Moore v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 5 Cal. App. 3d 728, 735 (1970) (“[S]ince an

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arrest involves detention or restraint, false arrest always involves an imprisonment, and a suit for

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false imprisonment automatically embraces the wrongful arrest; and two separate torts are not

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involved.”).
Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. In

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addition to clearly indicating which defendants each cause of action is asserted against, plaintiffs

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are directed to consolidate their causes of action if they elect to file a third amended complaint.

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Plaintiffs should not, for example, allege three different causes of action alleging violations of

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their equal protection and due process rights. Moreover, in any third amended complaint,

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plaintiffs are directed to divide their third cause of action, if it is realleged, into independent

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causes of action, so that each constitutional violation is plead separately and not collectively

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under the umbrella of “42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Finally, to the extent possible, plaintiffs are directed

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to plead all the factual allegations in one section of their third amended complaint.

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C.

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Motion to Strike
Next, defendants move to strike references to a class action or a class and paragraph 111

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of the SAC, which reads “Defendant Frank Garcia Huizar had been convicted of reckless

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discharge of a gun for firing his service revolver out of a car at a building, while drunk and off

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duty.” (Doc. No. 31 at 8–9.)

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In its prior order, the undersigned adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that

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plaintiffs’ class claims be dismissed. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) Given that the court has already

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dismissed those claims, the court will strike from the SAC any reference to a class, Rule 23, or a

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class action, and directs plaintiffs to not include any reference to a class, Rule 23, or a class action

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in any third amended complaint they might elect to file.

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Next, in those same findings and recommendations, the magistrate judge found that “the
plaintiffs refer to Frank Garcia Huizar in an inflammatory manner without providing factual
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support for the references.” (See Doc. No. 19 at 3.) Throughout the FAC, the plaintiffs alleged

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that Huizar was “corrupt,” a “convicted gun handler,” and was fired from his position, without

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either providing factual allegations supporting these assertions or explaining how the alleged

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conviction or filing are relevant to the matter now before the court. The magistrate judge

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recommended striking these allegations from the FAC as impertinent and immaterial to the action

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and the undersigned adopted that recommendation. (Doc. No. 25 at 4.) Here, the allegations

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about defendant Huizar in paragraph 111 of the SAC suffer from the same defects as the

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allegations referring to him in the FAC. Plaintiffs have failed to offer any explanation for how

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facts relating to defendant Huizar allegedly discharging a gun from a vehicle while off duty and

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drunk are relevant to the alleged violations of their constitutional rights asserted in their SAC.

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Consequently, the allegations related to defendant Huizar’s prior conviction as well as other

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inflammatory material will be stricken from the SAC. Any third amended complaint that

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plaintiffs elect to file shall not include any allegations about defendant Huizar that are impertinent

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or immaterial to this action. Plaintiffs failure to abide by this order will likely result in the

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imposition of sanctions.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above:

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1.

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Defendants’ motions (Doc. No. 31) are granted in full, and:
a.

Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims are dismissed without leave to amend

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and without prejudice to the filing of a future motion seeking further leave

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to amend if facts supporting such claims are uncovered during the

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discovery phase of this case; and

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b.

Plaintiffs’ other claims are dismissed with leave to amend and any third

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amended complaint plaintiffs may elect to file shall:

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i.

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Clearly state which defendant(s) each cause of action is asserted
against;

ii.

Divide into separate causes of action the constitutional violations
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
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iii.

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To the extent possible, set forth all factual allegations in support of
their claims in one section;

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iv.

Not include any reference to a class or class action;

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v.

Not include any allegations with respect to defendant Huizar that are

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impertinent and immaterial to this action; and

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vi.

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Be filed and served within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

April 30, 2019
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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