Schaupp et al v. County of Stanislaus et al

Filing 17

ORDER Sua Sponte Dismissing this action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 11/18/2020 CASE CLOSED (Martin-Gill, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CAROLYN SCHAUPP, et al.,

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No. 1:20-cv-01221-DAD-BAM

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al.,

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ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING THIS
ACTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER
JURISDICTION

Defendants.

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On August 28, 2020, plaintiffs Carolyn Schaupp and Carolyn Schaupp, Sr. (collectively,

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“plaintiffs”1) commenced this action against defendants County of Stanislaus; the Stanislaus

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County Superior Court; Frank Sousa; Edward Izzo; and multiple other individuals who are

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apparently associated with the Stanislaus County. (Doc. No. 1.) The complaint—which alleges

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claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

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The complaint alleges that plaintiff Schaupp intends to represent her minor children—D.S.,
L.S., and P.I.—in this action. (Compl. at ¶¶ 8–10.) The Ninth Circuit has held that “a nonattorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.
The choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who under state law cannot determine
their own legal actions.” Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal
citation omitted). Accordingly, the court will address the claims as being brought by only
plaintiffs Schaupp and Schaupp, Sr. See Laycook v. Cty. of Fresno, No. 1:18-cv-01263-LJOSAB, 2018 WL 4998136, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018) (“Plaintiff cannot bring this action to
assert the rights of his children without retaining counsel. The Court shall therefore only consider
the claims raised in this action as they pertain to Plaintiff.”).
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U.S. 658 (1978), and several state law causes of action—states that this court has subject matter

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jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Id. at 3.) The allegations of the

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complaint appear, however, to amount to a challenge to orders issued by the Stanislaus County

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Superior Court that removed plaintiff Schaupp’s children from her care. (See id. at ¶¶ 33–43.)

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“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

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Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a

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waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the

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responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court.” Emrich v. Touche Ross &

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Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,

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562 U.S. 428, 434–35 (2011) (noting objections to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised post-

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trial). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of

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establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377

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(internal citation omitted).

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As one judge of this court has recently observed under similar circumstances:
Although plaintiff’s complaint is cast in terms of federal law
violations, it is clear from the content of the complaint and the
remedies sought . . . that he is essentially contesting the state court
judgment regarding his child support and custody obligations. This
amounts to a de facto appeal of the state court judgment. See Cooper
v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To determine
whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, we pay close
attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.”). The
court does not have jurisdiction to hear such a case.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from
hearing cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To determine if the RookerFeldman doctrine bars a case a court must first determine if the
federal action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court
judicial decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
If it does not, “the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v. City of
Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). If a court determines that
the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal,” however, the court cannot
hear the de facto appeal portion of the case and, [a]s part of that
refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that
is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court
in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158; see also Bell, 709
F.3d at 897 (“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman
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is not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is
rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”).
A complaint is a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision where the
plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the
state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel,
341 F.3d at 1163.

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In seeking a remedy by which this court invalidates a state court
decision and amends the state court record, plaintiff is clearly asking
this court to “review the final determinations of a state court in
judicial proceedings,” which is at the core of Rooker-Feldman’s
prohibition. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000).
Requests to vacate a family court order and child support debt are
generally considered de facto appeals. Riley v. Knowles, No. 1:16CV-0057-JLT, 2016 WL 259336, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016).
Indeed, requests to the federal courts to reverse the outcomes of
family law issues, such as divorce proceedings or child custody
determinations, are generally treated as de facto appeals barred by
Rooker-Feldman. See Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx.
826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, plaintiff’s action constitutes
a “forbidden de facto appeal” and the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case.

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Davis v. California Dep’t of Child Services, No. 2:20-cv-01393 TLN-AC (PS), 2020 WL

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5039243, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Davis v.

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California Dep’t of Child Support Servs., No. 2:20-cv-01393-TLN-AC, 2020 WL 5943974 (E.D.

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Cal. Oct. 7, 2020); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702–04 (1992) (holding that

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the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts

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of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees”); Clemons v. McGlynn, No. 2:18-

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cv-2463-TLN-EFB PS, 2019 WL 4747646, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (“Because the core

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issue in this action concerns matters relating to child custody, this court lacks subject matter

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jurisdiction.”), findings and recommendations adopted, 2019 WL 5960103 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13,

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2019).

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On October 13, 2020, plaintiffs were ordered to show cause why this case should not be

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dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 (Doc. No. 15.) Plaintiffs were given

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fourteen (14) days to respond to that order. (Id.) The deadline for plaintiffs to respond to the

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order to show cause has expired and no response thereto has been filed by plaintiffs.

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Accordingly, for the reasons explained above the court dismisses plaintiffs’ complaint for

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lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

November 18, 2020
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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On October 13, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge also issued an order to show cause why the
claims of plaintiffs Carolyn Schaupp, Sr., L.S., D.S., and P.I. should not be dismissed for failure
to comply with a court order and failure to prosecute. (Doc. No. 16.) Plaintiffs were given
fourteen (14) days to respond. (Id. at 2.) The magistrate judge warned plaintiffs that failure to
comply with that order would result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. (Id.) The
deadline for plaintiffs to respond to the magistrate judge’s order to show cause has expired and no
response thereto has been filed by plaintiffs.
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