(PC)Valdez v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation et al

Filing 24

ORDER to Randomly Assign to District Judge; FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss 1 Action Without Prejudice signed by Magistrate Judge Helena M. Barch-Kuchta on 6/10/2024. Referred to Judge Jennifer L. Thurston. Objections to F&R due within Fourteen (14) Days. (Sant Agata, S)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

JORGE LUIS VALDEZ,

12

Plaintiff,

13

Case No. 1:23-cv-01729-HBK (PC)
ORDER TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN TO
DISTRICT JUDGE

v.

14

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE1

CDCR, et al.,

15

Defendants.

14-DAY DEADLINE

16
17
Plaintiff Jorge Luis Valdez is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

18
19

this civil rights action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the

20

District Court dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court

21

order and prosecute this action.
BACKGROUND

22

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

23
24

(Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On April 15, 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A the Court issued a

25

screening order finding the Complaint failed to state a federal claim against any Defendant. (See

26

generally Doc. No. 22). The Court afforded Plaintiff three options to exercise no later than May

27
1

28

This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302
(E.D. Cal. 2023).

1

27, 2024: (1) file an amended complaint; (2) file a notice that he intends to stand on his

2

Complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the district court dismiss for reasons stated

3

in the April 15, 2024 Screening Order; or (3) file a notice to voluntarily dismiss this action,

4

without prejudice, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because no defendant had yet

5

been served. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff was required to deliver his response to the Court’s

6

Screening Order to correctional officials for mailing no later than May 27, 2024. (Id. at 11 ¶ 1).
The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order

7
8

or seek an extension of time to comply” the undersigned “will recommend that the district court

9

dismiss this case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and prosecute

10

this action.” (Id. ¶ 2). As of the date of this of these Findings and Recommendations,2 Plaintiff

11

has failed to submit a response to the Court’s April 15, 2024 Screening Order, or request a further

12

extension of time to comply, and the time to do so has expired. (See docket.)

13

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

14

A. Legal Standard

15

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action

16

when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court

17

order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889

18

(9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, this Court’s Local Rules, which correspond with

19

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . .

20

any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions

21

. . . within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent

22

power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including

23

dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th

24

Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey

25

a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61

26

(9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone

27
2

28

The undersigned allocated fourteen (14) days for mailing from the court-ordered deadline before issuing
these Finding and Recommendations.

2

1

v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with

2

a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure

3

to prosecute and to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the

4

Court must consider the following factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

5

litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants;

6

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less

7

drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir.

8

1988).

9
10

B. Analysis
After considering each of the above-stated factors, the undersigned concludes dismissal

11

without prejudice is warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of

12

litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California

13

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999).

14

Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be

15

overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due to the delay in

16

filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operates

17

under a declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial

18

Emergency in the Eastern District of California. This Court’s time is better spent on its other

19

matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot

20

effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to litigate his/her case or respond to a court

21

order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

22

Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’

23

memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third

24

factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice

25

to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the

26

unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir.

27

1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action,

28

the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3

1

The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the

2

disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002).

3

However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case

4

toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is

5

the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217,

6

1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on

7

multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.”

8

Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary

9

dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court

10

order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the

11

docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”).

12

Further, as set forth in the Screening Order, the Court already determined that the Complaint, as

13

pled, failed to state a claim, so this factor does not weigh in favor of the Plaintiff.

14

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in

15

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262;

16

Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s April 15, 2024 Order

17

expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to respond to the Court’s Order would result in a

18

recommendation of dismissal of this action. (Doc. No. 22 at 11 ¶ 2). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate

19

warning that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the instant dismissal is a

20

dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby

21

satisfying the fifth factor.

22

After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned

23

recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local Rule 110.

24

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

25

The Clerk of Court randomly assign this case to a district judge for consideration of these

26

Findings and Recommendations.

27

It is further RECOMMENDED:

28

This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to obey court orders
4

1

and failure to prosecute.

2

NOTICE TO PARTIES

3

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

4

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

5

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written

6

objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned,

7

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The assigned District Judge

8

will review these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s

9

failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on

10

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

11
12
13

Dated:

June 10, 2024
HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5