(PC) Mrozek v. Eaton et al

Filing 25

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending Dismissal of Claims re 23 signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 1/8/2025. Referred to Judge Sherriff. Objections to F&R due within 14 days. (Deputy Clerk JPX)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BRADLEY JAMES MROZEK,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 1:24-cv-00664-KES-SAB (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS

v.
(ECF No. 28)
PATRICK EATON, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed December 6,

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2024.

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that

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“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate

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that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v.

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Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings

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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d

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1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be

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facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer

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that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss

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v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant

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has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

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liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d

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at 969.

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

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The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of
the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

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Plaintiff was housed at the Sierra Conservation Center and assigned to vocational welding

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training where he suffered and sustained a head injury and burns by falling metal debris. Plaintiff

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subsequently filed a report of unsafe work environment and thereafter he was denied access to the

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vocational welding shop by the instructor in retaliation. Defendant T. Isman also issued a false

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rules violation report which was dismissed.

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Defendant denied and interfered with Plaintiff’s request for access to vocational welding
to complete his rehabilitative training to provide credit towards his release date.
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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

Retaliation

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“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to

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be free from retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)

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(citing Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Within the prison context, a

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viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a

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state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

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conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

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(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson,

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408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). To state a cognizable retaliation claim, Plaintiff must

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establish a nexus between the retaliatory act and the protected activity. Grenning v. Klemme, 34

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F.Supp.3d 1144, 1153 (E.D. Wash. 2014). Mere verbal harassment or abuse does not violate the

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Constitution and, thus, does not give rise to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, threats do not rise to the

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level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Prisoners do not have a liberty interest in being free from false accusations of misconduct.

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This means that the falsification of a report, even when intentional, does not alone give rise to a

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claim under § 1983. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The prison inmate

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has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct

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which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”); Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F.

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Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that “a prisoner does not have a constitutional right

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to be free from wrongfully issued disciplinary reports[ ]”).

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However, there are two ways that allegations that an inmate has been subjected to a false

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disciplinary report can state a cognizable civil rights claim: (1) when the prisoner alleges that the

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false disciplinary report was filed in retaliation for his exercise of a constitutional right; and (2)

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when the prisoner alleges that they were not afforded procedural due process in a proceeding

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concerning a false report. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing
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retaliation claim against a correctional officer based upon the correctional officer’s false

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accusations of violating a prison rule); Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951 (holding that the filing of a false

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disciplinary charge against a prisoner is not actionable under § 1983 if prison officials provide the

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prisoner with procedural due process protections); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41

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(7th Cir. 1984) (same).

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A plaintiff must plead facts that suggest that retaliation for the exercise of protected

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conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s conduct. Action.

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Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d at 1270 (9th Cir. 2009); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d

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1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir.

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2019) (“[P]laintiff must show that the defendant’s retaliatory animus was ‘a “but-for” cause,

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meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the

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retaliatory motive.’ ”) (citation omitted). A causal connection between the adverse action and the

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protected conduct can be alleged by an allegation of a chronology of events from which

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retaliation can be inferred. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114. The filing of grievances and the

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pursuit of civil rights litigation against prison officials are both protected activities. Rhodes v.

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Robinson, 408 F.3d at 567-68. The plaintiff must allege either a chilling effect on future First

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Amendment activities, or that he suffered some other harm that is “more than minimal.” Watison

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v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114. “[A]n objective standard governs the chilling inquiry; a plaintiff does

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not have to show that ‘his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed,’ but rather that the adverse

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action at issue ‘would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment

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activities.’ ” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d at 568-

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69). Accordingly, the plaintiff need not allege an explicit, specific threat. Brodheim v. Cry, 584

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F.3d at 1270. A plaintiff successfully pleads that the action did not reasonably advance a

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legitimate correctional goal by alleging, in addition to a retaliatory motive, that the defendant’s

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actions were “arbitrary and capricious” or that they were “unnecessary to the maintenance of

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order in the institution.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114.

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Here, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a cognizable
retaliation claim against Defendant T. Isman based on the issuance of an alleged false rules
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violation and denial of access to vocational training because he exercised his rights under the First

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Amendment.

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B.

Denial of Vocational Training

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As Plaintiff was previously advised, to the extent Plaintiff contends that he has a legal

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right to vocational training, Plaintiff is advised that there is no constitutional right to education,

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rehabilitation, or employment in prison. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981)

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(deprivation of rehabilitation and educational programs does not violate Eighth Amendment);

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Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 450 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Prisoners have no constitutional right to

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educational or vocational opportunities during incarceration.”); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 757,

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762 (5th Cir.1988) (“[A] state has no constitutional obligation to provide basic educational or

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vocational training to prisoners.”); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1985) (no right

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to vocational course for rehabilitation); Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841,

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846 (9th Cir.1985) (general limitation of jobs and educational opportunities is not considered

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punishment); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254–55 (9th Cir.1982) (“there is no

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constitutional right to rehabilitation”); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir.1977)

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(state has no obligation to provide prisoners with educational programs); Chapman v. Plageman,

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417 F.Supp. 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[A]n inmate has no constitutional right to any particular

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job status while incarcerated.”); Harris v. Sivley, 951 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Prisoners have

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no constitutional right to a prison job.”); Bravot v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIVS050113-FCD-

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GGH-P, 2006 WL 47398, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2006) (“Since plaintiff does not have a

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constitutional right to a prison job, much less to a particular job, he is not entitled to due process

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procedural protections prior to being deprived of his work, nor is he constitutionally entitled to

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any back wages for the loss of that job nor to reinstatement in his old position, which

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reinstatement he has nevertheless apparently attained at this point.”); see also Rainer v. Chapman,

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513 F. App’x. 674, 675 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the district court properly dismissed the

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California prisoner-plaintiff’s “due process claims based on his removal from his work

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assignment and transfer from the facility where his job was located because these allegations did

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not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest”); Barno v. Ryan, 399 F.
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App’x. 272, 273 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that possible loss of a state prison job due to a

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California state prisoner’s classification as a sex offender did not violate the prisoner’s Fourteenth

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Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights).

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C.

Equal Protection

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Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

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treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

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School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from invidious

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discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Racial

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segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security and

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discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also protected

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from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d

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732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and

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religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled

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do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, No. CIV S-03-0324 FCD EFB P, 2007

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WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on

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denial of in-cell meals where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Harrison v.

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Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination

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on the basis of gender).

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In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

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Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional

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discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that

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such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v.

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Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class

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of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v.

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Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940

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F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).

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Plaintiff states that he was denied equal protection of the law. However, Plaintiff has

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failed to set forth facts demonstrating any of the Defendants acted with intentional discrimination.

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Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a suspect classification under the

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Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.

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D.

Further Leave to Amend

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If the court finds that a complaint or claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim,

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the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Leave to amend should be

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granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a

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plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Cato v.

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United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to

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amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that

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the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (citation omitted).

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However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a claim cannot be cured by amendment,

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the Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06.

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In light of Plaintiff’s failure to provide additional information about his claims despite

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specific instructions from the Court, further leave to amend would be futile and the second

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amended complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d

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1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would

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be futile.”). For this reason, further leave to amend the complaint should be denied.

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IV.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1.

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This action proceed on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant T. Isman;
and

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All other claims and Defendants be dismissed from the action for failure to state a
cognizable claim for relief.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
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(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written

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objections with the Court, limited to 15 pages in length, including exhibits. The document should

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be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is

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advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights

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on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v.

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Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 8, 2025
STANLEY A. BOONE
United States Magistrate Judge

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