Hedrick et al v. Grant
Filing
149
ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 9/5/2014 ORDERING 139 Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED in PART. The total attorney' fees award is: $7,826.60. 141 (Reader, L)
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7
8
9
10
11
v.
13
15
16
17
18
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR AN
EXTENSION OF TIME AND GRANTING
IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES
Plaintiffs,
12
14
2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB
DARRIL HEDRICK, DALE
ROBINSON, KATHY LINDSEY,
MARTIN C. CANADA, DARRY
TYRONE PARKER, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
JAMES GRANT, as Sheriff of
Yuba County; Lieutenant FRED
J. ASBY, as Yuba County
Jailer; and JAMES PHARRIS,
ROY LANDERMAN, DOUG WALTZ,
HAROLD J. “SAM” SPERBECK,
JAMES MARTIN, as members of
the YUBA COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS,
Defendants.
19
20
Plaintiffs filed an untimely motion for attorney’s fees
21
22
under
42
23
certified
24
motion to terminate a consent decree governing conditions at the
25
Yuba County Jail (“the Jail”). Plaintiffs also move under Federal
26
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 6(b) for an extension of time to
27
file
28
motion.
the
U.S.C.
law
§
1988
students
motion
when
for
the
rendered
it
was
services
defending
filed.
1
their
against
Defendants
counsel
and
Defendants’
oppose
each
1
I.
MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
2
Plaintiffs filed their attorney’s fees motion after the
3
deadline for such motions prescribed in Local Rule 293(a). This
4
rule states in pertinent part: “Motions for awards of attorneys’
5
fees . . . shall be filed not later than twenty-eight (28) days
6
after entry of final judgment.” Defendants’ motion to terminate
7
the consent decree was denied in an order filed April 2, 2014.
8
Plaintiffs filed their attorney’s fees motion at 12:03 a.m., on
9
May
1,
2014,
which
is
twenty-nine
days
after
denial
of
10
Defendants’ motion. Since Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees motion was
11
filed approximately three minutes late, it was untimely.
12
Plaintiffs argue the “excusable neglect” standard in
13
Rule 6(b) authorizes them to be granted the extension of time
14
they seek and that they have satisfied this standard. Rule 6(b)
15
states, in pertinent part: “When an act may or must be done
16
within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend
17
the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the
18
party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ.
19
P.
20
deadline constitutes ‘excusable neglect,’ courts must apply a
21
four-factor
22
prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and
23
its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the
24
delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Ahanchian
25
v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010)
26
(citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507
27
U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).
28
6(b).
“To
determine
equitable
whether
test,
a
party’s
examining:
failure
(1)
the
to
meet
danger
Plaintiffs argue “there is no danger of prejudice to
2
a
of
.
1
. . Defendants” since Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Defendants’
2
counsel the attorney’s fees motion prior to the filing deadline.
3
(Pls.’
4
Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares: “After attempting and
5
failing to file the documents, [on April 30, 2014,] at 11:48 p.m.
6
I sent . . . five pdf files (motion and 4 attachments) in an
7
email message to . . . counsel for Defendants.” (Decl. of Carter
8
White in Support of Pls.’ Mot. For Extension of Time (“White
9
Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 141-1.) Plaintiffs have shown that it is
10
Mot.
for
Extension
of
Time,
3:1,
ECF
No.
141.)
unlikely that their tardiness prejudiced Defendants.
11
Plaintiffs further argue that the factor concerning the
12
extent
of
their
13
judicial proceedings, also weighs in favor of finding excusable
14
neglect.
15
Plaintiffs’
16
noticed the motion for hearing on a law and motion hearing date
17
provided by the courtroom deputy’s voice mail message, in which
18
she
19
circumstances involved with the late filing do not indicate that
20
Plaintiffs’
21
proceeding. See Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1262 (finding excusable
22
neglect where, inter alia, Plaintiff’s counsel’s three-day delay
23
in filing a summary judgment opposition “would not have adversely
24
affected either the summary judgment hearing date, which was ten
25
days away, or the trial, which was two and a half months away.”)
The
lists
26
tardiness,
only
and
proceeding
scheduled
available
tardiness
in
had
and
a
potential
scheduled
their
law
its
was
attorney’s
motion
negative
impact
on
the
the
hearing
that
fees
motion
that
hearing
impact
on
dates.
the
The
judicial
Plaintiffs’ counsel also avers their reason for the
27
tardiness
is
that
their
counsel
28
electronically file the Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees”
3
first
“attempted
to
1
“at approximately 11:30 p.m.” – one half hour before the filing
2
deadline – and thereafter experienced computer problems which
3
delayed filing until 12:03 a.m. (White Decl. ¶ 3.) “Although we
4
are sympathetic with the circumstances of [Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
5
computer] problems[,] . . . it seems to us that the problem was
6
really that [Plaintiffs’ counsel] waited until the last minute to
7
get [their] materials together. [Plaintiffs, counsel] apparently
8
neglected the old proverb that ‘sooner begun, sooner done.’ When
9
parties wait until the last minute to comply with a deadline,
10
they are playing with fire.” Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74
11
F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996).
12
weigh in favor of finding excusable neglect.
13
Therefore, this factor does not
Plaintiffs also argue their counsel acted in good faith
14
in
connection
with
the
tardiness.
Plaintiffs
emailed
the
15
attorney’s fees motion to Defendants’ counsel prior to the filing
16
deadline,
17
day after they filed their attorney’s fees motion. Plaintiffs
18
have shown that their counsel acted in good faith concerning the
19
late-filed attorney’s fees motion.
and filed their motion for an extension of time one
20
Plaintiffs have shown that three of the four factors
21
weigh significantly in favor of granting their motion for an
22
extension of time. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Rule 6(b) motion is
23
granted. See Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1225
24
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding excusable neglect despite Plaintiff’s
25
counsel’s “weak justification” for delay, since “there was no
26
evidence that [Plaintiff’s counsel] acted with anything less than
27
good faith,” and the delay caused only a “minimal” amount of
28
prejudice
to
Defendant
and
a
4
“minimal”
impact
on
judicial
1
proceedings.)
2
II.
ATTORNEY’S FEES MOTION
3
Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney’s fees under 42
4
U.S.C. § 1988 for all services rendered on their behalf defending
5
against
6
Defendants request that the ruling on the motion be deferred
7
until after the Ninth Circuit has decided Defendants’ appeal of
8
the denial of their motion to terminate the consent decree.
9
Defendants’
“The
motion
district
to
terminate
court[s]
retain[]
the
the
consent
power
decree.
to
award
10
attorneys’ fees after the notice of appeal from the decision on
11
the
12
Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983).
13
merits
ha[s]
been
filed.”
Masalosalo
by
Masalosalo
v.
17
Recognition of th[e] authority [to determine
fees while an appeal is pending] best serves
the policy against piecemeal appeals[,] . . .
prevent[s]
hasty
consideration
of
postjudgment
fee
motions
. . .
[and]
prevent[s] postponement of fee consideration
until after the circuit court mandate, when
the relevant circumstances will no longer be
fresh in the mind of the district judge.
18
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 34
19
(7th Cir. 1980)). “[T]he policy against piecemeal appeals” and
20
deciding attorney’s fees issues when “they are fresh in the mind
21
of the district judge” favor denying Defendants’ deferred ruling
22
request. Id.
14
15
16
23
a. Legal Standard
24
§ 1988 provides in pertinent part: In any action or
25
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections . . . 1983 . . .
26
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . .
27
. a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, . . . .” 42
28
U.S.C. § 1988(b).
5
1
“To determine the amount of a reasonable fee under §
2
1988,
3
courts generally ‘apply ... the lodestar method to determine what
4
constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Gonzalez v. City of
5
Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Costa v.
6
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)).
7
“Under the lodestar method, the district court ‘multiplies the
8
number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the
9
litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. “Second, ‘[t]he
10
district court may then adjust [the lodestar] upward or downward
11
based on,” the following factors:
12
district
courts
typically
proceed
in
two
steps.
First,
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform
the
legal
service
properly,
(4)
the
preclusion
of
other
employment
by
the
attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5)
the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances,
(8) the amount involved and the results
obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability
of
the
attorneys,
(10)
the
“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature
and length of the professional relationship
with the client, and (12) awards in similar
cases.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Id.
22
Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008), and id. at 1209,
23
n. 11. (quoting Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363,
24
n. 8 (9th Cir. 1996)).
25
b. Discussion
26
27
28
(alteration
in
original)
(quoting
Moreno
v.
City
of
i. Whether Plaintiffs Are Prevailing Parties for the
Purposes of § 1988
Plaintiffs argue they are prevailing parties under §
6
1
1988 since from September 2013 to April 2014 their counsel and
2
certified law students defended against Defendants’ motion to
3
terminate the consent decree. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs
4
are not prevailing parties since the denial of Defendants’ motion
5
“changed
6
Plaintiff[s] . . . and . . . Defendant[s].” (Def.’s Opp’n to
7
Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 3: 24-25, ECF No.
8
143.)
9
nothing
about
Attorney’s
are
recoverable
for
.
.
“postjudgment
12
633 F. Supp. 2d 834, 844 (D. Ariz. 2009) aff'd, 623 F.3d 1043
13
(9th Cir. 2010)(citing Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 777 (8th
14
Cir. 2002)); cf. Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d
15
446, 451 (9th Cir. 2010)(citing Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850,
16
855-57 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[A] party . . . may recover attorneys’
17
fees under § 1988 for monitoring compliance with [a consent]
18
decree,
19
judicially sanctioned relief.”); Webb v. Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829,
20
835
21
postjudgment enforcement of [a] district court’s . . . consent
22
decree
were
23
Act],”
which
24
1988.).
(9th
Cir.
2002)
(holding
compensable
limits
Since
monitoring
the
Plaintiffs
does
“includes
not
“attorney’s
under
fees
which
.
against efforts to terminate a consent decree.” Graves v. Arpaio,
such
decree,
between
11
when
consent
relationship
enforcement”
even
a
fees
legal
10
25
of
the
the
awardable
have
to
defended
result
fees
[Prison
defending
incurred
Litigation
prisoners
against
in
any
for
Reform
under
§
Defendants’
26
motion to terminate the consent decree, Plaintiffs are prevailing
27
parties entitled to an attorney’s fees award.
28
7
1
ii.
Whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act Limits
2
the Amount of Attorney’s Fees Plaintiffs Recover
3
Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to the full amount
4
of fees they seek and that what they request is not limited by
5
the
6
(“PLRA”) in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1).
fee
restriction
in
the
Prison
Litigation
Reform
7
The PLRA prescribes, in pertinent part:
8
Act’s
In any action brought by a prisoner who is
confined to any jail . . . , in which
attorney’s fees are authorized under section
1988 . . . , such fees shall not be awarded,
except to the extent that--
9
10
11
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably
incurred in proving an actual violation of
the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute
pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under
section 1988 . . . ; and
12
13
14
(B)(i)
the
amount
of
the
fee
is
proportionately related to the court ordered
relief for the violation; or
15
16
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably
incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for
the violation.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1)(A)-(B)(emphasis added).
Under
the
PLRA,
“a
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
fees
incurred in enforcing a judgment entered upon proof that the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Webb v. Ada
Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “the court . .
. must assure that the case is not being milked by a [plaintiff]
after
the
[judgment]
unreasonable
in
has
amount,
been
for
obtained,
work
not
for
fees
reasonably
that
are
performed
to
enforce the relief, or for work not directly related to enforcing
the relief.” Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2012).
8
1
Plaintiffs argue their fee request should be awarded
2
since the consent decree they defended was entered upon a finding
3
of
4
consistent with the PLRA’s requirement that fees for defending a
5
consent decree must concern a consent decree that was entered
6
upon proof of a constitutional violation.
constitutional
7
violations
Concerning
at
the
constitutional
Jail,
and
violations,
therefore
the
is
consent
8
decree states: “On November 12, 1976 the Court . . . filed its
9
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order granting . . .
10
[Plaintiffs’] motions for partial summary judgment[,]” concerning
11
“.
12
participation
13
Decree, 2:13-16, 2:3-5 ECF No. 120-1.) This Order was “subsumed”
14
into the consent decree, upon the Court’s final approval of the
15
consent decree on May 2, 1979. (Id. at 3:10-15.)1 Therefore,
16
Plaintiffs have shown they are entitled to attorney’s fees for
17
legal services rendered defending the portions of the consent
18
decree
19
participation
20
relevant portions of the decree”).2
21
.
.
[a]ccess
in
to
[l]egal
the
.
concerning
in
However,
.
access
the
the
Jail
other
[m]aterials,”
.
Jail
to
trusty
legal
trusty
and
materials
of
.
.
program.”
program
portions
“.
(Consent
and
(hereafter,
the
female
consent
female
“the
decree
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
The referenced Order is not in the Court’s filing system since it has
been archived, and the nature thereof has not been disputed.
2
Plaintiffs also argue that “in issuing a preliminary injunction [in
1976] . . . the Court found that conditions of confinement at the Jail
violated the Constitution,” and therefore “fees may be awarded in proportion
to the relief granted.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Attorney’s Fees (“Pls.’ Mot.”), 5:1921, ECF No. 139.) However, the Ninth Circuit has found that prisoners are not
entitled to attorney’s fees under the PLRA where prisoners obtain “temporary
relief . . . in the form of a preliminary injunction [that] [does] not
affirmatively establish that the [municipality] actually violated [the
prisoners’] protected rights.” Kimbrough v. California, 609 F.3d 1027, 1032
(9th Cir. 2010).
9
1
prescribe relief not related to the claims on which the partial
2
summary judgment was granted. Further, the parties “waive[ed] a
3
hearing and findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues
4
raised by the Complaint that are disposed of [in the consent
5
decree].” (Consent Decree 2:30-32.) Therefore, Plaintiffs have
6
not shown they are entitled to attorney’s fees for defending
7
those
8
accessing legal materials or female participation in the Jail’s
9
trusty program.
portions
of
the
consent
decree
that
do
not
concern
10
The Court’s decisions concerning whether law student
11
billings are compensable under the PLRA are in Appendix 1, which
12
is
13
contains
14
Plaintiffs have not explained precisely which billing entries
15
concern
16
entries
17
findings of fact and conclusions of law (“proposed findings”),
attached
a
the
are
to
this
copy
of
relevant
reduced
order,
the
and
law
portions
based
are
also
students’
of
on
the
below;
time
consent
whether
Appendix
sheets.3
decree,
Plaintiffs’
1
Since
certain
proposed
18
3
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants attached an annotated version of these
time sheets to their respective opening and opposition briefs. Plaintiffs’
counsel crossed out certain entries not claimed to be compensable and listed
at the bottom of each page the total number of hours claimed to be compensable
on that page. Defendants’ counsel circled entries in pen which Defendants
argue are “based on clerical tasks, unnecessary research, and unnecessary
billings not reasonably related to this litigation.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 7:5-6.).
Since the annotated time sheets attached to Defendants’ opposition brief
exclude certain pages of time sheets attached to Plaintiffs’ opening brief,
the Court created Appendix 1 by inserting the referenced excluded pages into
the time sheets attached to Defendants’ opposition brief.
The Court has used computer software to insert red markings to show
whether certain time sheet entries are compensable. Those entries inside a red
rectangular box are compensable. Where tasks are block-billed and only a
certain percentage of the block-billed tasks are compensable, an explanation
of which hours were deducted is inside a red rectangular box with an arrow
pointing to the relevant entry. The total number compensable hours within each
box is rounded to the nearest hundredth. When an entry is not compensable, an
explanation of why the entry is not compensable is inside a red rectangular
box with an arrow pointing to the entry. Finally, at the bottom of each page
the total number of hours awarded on that page is inside a red box.
10
1
filed on March, 19, 2014, or the declarations of detainees which
2
Plaintiffs
3
concerns a relevant portion of the consent decree. (ECF Nos. 129,
4
133-1,
5
Plaintiffs are not compensated for “fees that are unreasonable in
6
amount, for work not reasonably performed to enforce the relief,
7
or for work not directly related to enforcing the relief.” Balla,
8
677 F.3d at 919.
9
filed
133-2).
For
on
March
These
31,
2014,
decisions
example,
since
indicate
were
made
that
to
declarations
the
“assure
of
entry
that”
Erik-James
10
Pendergraph, Neil Ernest Carranza, Tiara Tyson, Shannon Silva,
11
Peter Azevedo, Patrick Perry, Jon Bechtel, and Jennelle Cropsey
12
do not contain any statement concerning access to legal material
13
or the Jail’s trusty program, Plaintiffs have not shown that they
14
are entitled to attorney’s fees for the hours billed concerning
15
these detainees. Further, each billing entry concerning detainee
16
Theron Holston is reduced by approximately 67% since only one of
17
three declarations submitted by Mr. Holston concerns the relevant
18
portions of the consent decree. Similarly, each entry concerning
19
detainee George Pasion is reduced by 75% since only one of four
20
declarations
21
portions
22
visits to the jail for unspecified purposes, Plaintiffs’ requests
23
for production of documents concerning unspecified subjects, and
24
entries related to preparation of Plaintiffs’ proposed findings
25
were reduced by 87.5%, since only one of eight sections in the
26
proposed
27
decree;
28
Additionally, entries which record services rendered concerning
of
submitted
the
findings
by
consent
decree.
concerns
specifically,
the
Mr.
a
Pasion
Moreover,
relevant
access
11
concern
to
entries
portion
legal
the
of
relevant
concerning
the
materials
consent
section.
1
individuals who are not mentioned in the proposed findings or who
2
did not produce a declaration that Plaintiffs filed on the case
3
docket
4
Plaintiffs
5
portions of the consent decree.
are
6
not
considered
have
Where
not
shown
Plaintiffs’
compensable
these
under
services
counsel
the
PLRA
concern
block-billed
since
relevant
tasks
both
7
related to and unrelated to the relevant portions of the consent
8
decree, the hours claimed in the entry were reduced based on the
9
description of the billed tasks to “‘fairly balance’ those hours
10
that were actually billed in block format.” Welch v. Metro. Life
11
Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Sorenson v.
12
Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).
13
For
example,
December
15,
2013
entry
number
57179
14
bills .2 hours and reads: “Read letter from Patrick Perry re
15
willing to meet; review declarations returned to CRC from Passion
16
and Holston.” Since the entry contains two sub-entries separated
17
by the semi-colon, the entry indicates that approximately one
18
half of the time was spent reading a letter and one half of the
19
time was spent reviewing declarations. Plaintiffs have not shown
20
that the time spent reading the Perry letter is compensable since
21
Perry’s declaration does not address the relevant portions of the
22
consent decree. To reflect this, the billing entry is reduced by
23
half (.1 hours). The remaining .1 hours is further reduced to
24
reflect
25
approximately 33% of the entry concerning Holston and 25% of the
26
entry
27
consent decree. After these reductions are made, the fee award is
28
.03 hours since it was rounded to the nearest hundredth.
that
Plaintiffs
concerning
Pasion
have
relate
12
not
to
shown
relevant
that
more
portions
of
than
the
1
Similarly,
for
any
block-billed
trips
to
the
jail,
2
Plaintiffs are credited with 2.5 hours of travel time. The travel
3
time estimate is based on the average of two separately billed
4
car trips to the jail, billed on February 11, 2014 (Entry No.
5
57746) and February 18, 2014 (Entry No. 57841). Further, where
6
two students entered separate billing entries for a jail visit on
7
the same day, the two students’ hours are credited as having
8
worked on the same tasks, unless an entry indicates otherwise.
9
In
addition
to
the
fees
sought
for
law
student
10
services, Plaintiffs seek 46 hours of fees for their counsel’s
11
services. Their counsel declares that these hours comprise eight
12
jail visits during which he accompanied law students; 1.5 hours
13
revising
14
Terminate;
15
Proposed Findings of Fact; and 1.5 hours revising Plaintiffs’
16
request for an order to seal. Plaintiffs have not submitted time
17
sheets of their counsel’s hours; however, review of the student
18
time
19
indicates that only a portion of these hours are compensable
20
under the PLRA. Specifically, the time sheets reveal that only
21
6.3 hours of fees should be awarded for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
22
jail
23
findings concerns relevant portions of the consent decree, this
24
document reveals that only .375 hours should be awarded for the
25
time Plaintiffs’ counsel spent revising it. Moreover, Plaintiffs
26
have not shown that attorney’s fees should be awarded for any
27
time spent revising the request for an order to seal, since
28
Plaintiffs’ request concerns medical records that have not been
Plaintiffs’
3
sheets
visits.
hours
and
Opposition
revising
the
Further,
Defendants’
Plaintiffs’
documents
since
to
only
13
Joint
Plaintiffs’
one
eighth
Motion
to
Statement
and
counsel
of
the
revised
proposed
1
shown to have a relationship to the relevant portions of the
2
consent decree.
3
The 1.5 hours Plaintiffs’ counsel spent revising the
4
opposition to Defendants’ motion to terminate are compensable,
5
since
6
reasonably incurred enforcing the relief ordered in the relevant
7
portions of the consent decree.
8
the
opposition
brief
evinces
that
these
fees
were
iii. Whether Law Students Worked Reasonable Hours
9
Defending Relevant Portions of The Consent Decree
10
The
parties
dispute
whether
law
students
worked
an
11
unreasonable number of hours. Specifically, the parties dispute
12
whether certain law student time sheet entries are redundant,
13
concern clerical tasks, concern unnecessary research, or are “not
14
reasonably
15
These disputes are only decided for those entries that concern
16
relevant portions of the consent decree.
17
related
to
this
litigation.”
(Defs.’
Mot.
7:6-7.)
Under the loadstar method, “a ‘reasonable’ number of
18
hours
equals
‘[t]he
19
reasonably have been billed to a private client.’” Gonzalez, 729
20
F.3d at 1202 (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d
21
at 1111). “The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the
22
appropriate
23
evidence in support of those hours worked.” Gates v. Deukmejian,
24
987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,
25
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). If the fee applicant submits vague
26
records, the district court may “simply reduce[] the fee [award]
27
to a reasonable amount.” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115,
28
1121 (9th Cir. 2000); see Neil v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 495 F.
hours
number
expended
in
of
hours
the
14
.
.
litigation
.
[which]
and
must
could
submit
1
App'x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating, “the district court
2
acted within its discretion in reducing Neil’s fee award by .3
3
hours
4
inadequately
5
chooses to “block bill some of its time rather than itemize each
6
task individually,” the court may “impose a reduction,” as long
7
as it ‘explain how[s] or why . . . the reduction . . . fairly
8
balance[s]’
9
format.” Welch, 480 F.3d at 948 (quoting Sorenson, 239 F.3d at
10
1146). Moreover, a plaintiff may not receive attorney’s fees for
11
clerical tasks. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th
12
Cir. 2009) (“When clerical tasks are billed at hourly rates, the
13
court
14
billing errors.”); Yates v. Vishal Corp., 11-CV-00643-JCS, 2014
15
WL 572528, at * 6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2014) (refusing to award
16
attorney’s fees for “purely clerical,” tasks “such as posting
17
letters
18
filing, calendaring, and preparing the summons and complaint for
19
filing.”)
to
account
should
for
for
an
explained.”)
those
hours
reduce
mail,
the
.
.
.
entry
Furthermore,
that
were
hours
photocopying,
that
where
a
actually
requested
vague
fee
billed
to
three-hole
was
account
punching,
and
applicant
in
block
for
the
internal
20
Each of the law students’ time sheet entries has been
21
reviewed. Certain time sheet entries concern clerical tasks or
22
are vague. Fees are not awarded for services recorded in these
23
entries. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 921 (reducing fees to account
24
for the billing of clerical work); Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214
25
F.3d at 1121 (stating fee award may be reduced where entries are
26
vague); Neil, 495 F. App'x at 847 (affirming reduction in fee
27
award for vague entry). Specific deductions to the law student
28
hours are presented in Appendix 1.
15
1
iv.
2
Hourly Rate For Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Law
Students
3
Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney’s fees based on a
4
rate
of
5
which
6
authorizes. (Pls.’ Mot. for Attorney’s Fees (“Pls.’ Mot.”), 10:
7
2-4, ECF No. 139.)
per
Plaintiffs
8
9
$211.15
hour
argue
Concerning
is
this,
for
Plaintiffs’
the
the
maximum
PLRA
counsel’s
hourly
prescribes,
services,
rate
the
in
PLRA
pertinent
part:
10
In any action brought by a prisoner who is
confined to any jail, . . . in which
attorney’s fees are authorized under [42
U.S.C. §] 1988 . . . [n]o award of attorney’s
fees . . . shall be based on an hourly rate
greater than 150 percent[(the “multiplier”)]
of the hourly rate established under section
3006A of Title 18 [(the Criminal Justice Act
[“CJA”])] for payment of court-appointed
counsel [(the “baseline rate”)].
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1),(3). The Ninth Circuit has stated the
18
baseline
19
Judicial Conference.” Webb v. Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 839 (9th
20
Cir. 2002); accord
21
2011)(setting the maximum hourly rate under the PLRA at “150
22
percent of $113”
23
the maximum hourly rate for court-appointed counsel to $113.”)
24
The rates authorized by the Judicial Conference are published in
25
the Guide to Judiciary Policy. See 7 Guide to Judiciary Policy §
26
230.16
27
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/CJAGui
28
delinesForms/vol7PartA/vol7PartAChapter2.aspx#230_16;
PLRA
hourly
rate
“is
the
amount
authorized
by
the
Perez v. Cate, 632 F.3d 553, 555-56 (9th Cir.
since the “Judicial Conference [had] increased
available
16
at
Gilman
v.
1
Brown, CIV. S-05-830 LKK/CK, 2014 WL 3735401, at *1 (E.D. Cal.
2
July 28, 2014)(quoting 7 Guide to Judiciary Policy § 230.16 for
3
the
4
Judicial Conference has changed the established hourly rate over
5
the past several years, the baseline rate of compensation under
6
the PLRA depends on when the services were performed. See Gilman,
7
2014 WL 3735401, at *1 (“[T]he baseline rate . . . depends on the
8
year the services were performed . . . .”)
rates
established
by
the
Judicial
Conference.)
Since
the
9
The Judicial Conference established a rate of $110 per
10
hour for services performed from September 1, 2013 to February
11
28, 2014, and a rate of $126 per hour for services performed from
12
March 1, 2014 to the present. The first entry in the time sheets
13
submitted
14
Plaintiffs seek fees for their counsel’s services through the
15
filing of their attorney’s fees reply brief on May 23, 2014.4
16
Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown they are entitled to a baseline
17
rate of $110 per hour for their counsel’s services prior to March
18
1,
19
services.5
20
4
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2014,
by
and
Plaintiffs
$126
per
is
hour
dated
for
September
their
3,
counsel’s
2013,
and
subsequent
Plaintiffs do not submit time sheets concerning their counsel’s work.
The time sheets submitted by Plaintiffs only record law student hours.
However, Plaintiffs seek compensation for their counsel’s service when he
accompanied law students on visits to the jail and revised certain court-filed
documents. Therefore, the dates on which Plaintiffs’ counsel performed these
tasks is determined by using the student time sheets and the case docket.
5
Plaintiffs argue that a rate of $141 should serve as the baseline rate
since the Honorable Julia S. Gibbons, Chair of the Committee on the Budget of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, testified before a Congressional
subcommittee that: “[The Judicial Conference] request[s] [Congress] . . . to
increase the . . . [CJA] rate to the statutorily authorized rate of $141 per
hour, effective January 1, 2011.” Statement of Honorable Julia S. Gibbons,
Chair Committee on the Budget of the Judicial Conference of the United States
before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government of the
Committee on Appropriations of the United States House of Representatives,
March 18, 2010, at 13, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/News/2010/docs/Judge_Gi
bbons_Judicial_Conference.pdf. “However, [P]laintiffs do not explain how
17
1
Plaintiffs
further
argue
that
the
maximum
PLRA
2
multiplier (150%) should be applied to their counsel’s baseline
3
hourly
4
Eastern District of California have received between $350 and
5
$450 per hour under § 1988. Defendants counter, arguing in a
6
conclusory
7
maximum multiplier for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s services.
rates,
since
manner
similarly
that
it
experienced
would
be
attorneys
inequitable
to
in
the
award
the
8
Under the loadstar method, the reasonable hourly rate
9
is “calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the
10
relevant legal community, and the general rule is that the rates
11
of attorneys practicing in the forum district, here the Eastern
12
District of California . . . are used.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405
13
(citation
14
district court should ‘tak[e] into consideration the experience,
15
skill, and reputation of the attorney . . . .” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d
16
at 1205 (first alteration in original) (quoting Dang v. Cross,
17
422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005)).
18
omitted).
“‘[T]he
“Within
burden
is
this
on
the
geographic
fee
community,
applicant
to
the
produce
19
satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line
20
with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
21
lawyers
22
reputation.’” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980
23
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11
24
(1984)).
25
attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate
26
27
28
of
reasonably
“Affidavits
of
comparable
the
skill,
plaintiffs’
experience
attorney
and
and
other
Congressional testimony, even from Judge Gibbons, could override the official,
published determination of the Judicial Conference itself[,]” set forth in the
Guide to Judiciary Policy. Gilman, 2014 WL 3735401, at *3. Therefore,
Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to a PLRA baseline rate of
$141.
18
1
determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of
2
the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps
3
Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Ingram
4
v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (indicating a
5
district court may “rely on its own familiarity with the legal
6
market” in determining a reasonable hourly rate); Moreno, 534
7
F.3d
8
awarded by other judges in the same locality in similar cases.”).
9
Plaintiffs argue the maximum PLRA multiplier of 150%
at
1115
applied
.
.
13
2014,
14
subsequent
15
reasonable, since in a civil rights case captioned Hunter v.
16
Cnty. of Sacramento, a case that was not governed by the PLRA,
17
the Court concluded a $350 hourly rate was reasonable for an
18
attorney
19
experience. 2:06-CV-00457-GEB, 2013 WL 5597134, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
20
Oct. 11, 2013). Defendants counter with the conclusory argument
21
that it would be inequitable to award Plaintiffs the maximum PLRA
22
multiplier; however, this argument fails to rebut Plaintiffs’
23
reasonable hourly rate evidence. Plaintiffs have shown that it is
24
reasonable
25
counsel’s services.
an
$189
services.
with
to
hourly
Plaintiffs
experience
apply
Plaintiffs
rate
the
for
argue
comparable
maximum
further
argue
Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs’
these
to
hourly
Plaintiffs’
PLRA
multiplier
they
are
for
fees
hourly rate for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s services prior to March 1,
entitle
rates
the
12
would
hourly
consider
counsel’s
This
baseline
.
11
and
the
can
should
services.
to
judges
10
26
be
(“District
to
their
a
$165
counsel’s
rates
are
counsel’s
for
entitled
their
to
the
27
maximum PLRA hourly rate for hours billed by the law students.
28
Plaintiffs submit a declaration from Andrew Bluth, an attorney at
19
1
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (“Pillsbury”) in support of
2
this argument. Bluth avers that law students at his firm bill
3
$315 per hour. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs have not shown
4
what Bluth avers is relevant to the determination of the law
5
student fees in this action, since Bluth does not describe the
6
nature of the services the law students rendered for Pillsbury
7
and how those services compare to the services rendered by the
8
law students in this action. Defendants further argue that law
9
students at Pillsbury bill a higher hourly rate than law students
10
have
received
under
§
11
1988
in
recent
cases
in
the
Eastern
District of California.
12
Bluth’s averments lack an explanation of the complexity
13
of the matters on which law students worked at Pillsbury and
14
therefore do not demonstrate that the hourly rates billed by law
15
students at the Pillsbury firm are for services comparable to the
16
services
17
District of California have awarded § 1988 fees for services
18
rendered by law clerks, including those who graduated from law
19
school, at hourly rates between $100 and $125. See Miller v.
20
Schmitz, 1:12-CV-00137-LJO, 2014 WL 642729, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
21
18, 2014)(setting hourly rate for law clerk who graduated from
22
law school at $100 per hour); Hall v. City of Fairfield, 2:10-CV-
23
0508 DAD, 2014 WL 1286001, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014)(same
24
at $125 per hour).
25
at
In
issue.
light
counsel
Further,
of
the
baseline
of
rates
evidence
the
Eastern
applicable
concerning
28
Plaintiffs have not shown that the law students’ hourly rate
expertise
20
of
the
in
the
to
27
and
lack
PLRA
in
Plaintiffs’
experience
the
decisions
26
the
and
recent
law
record
students,
1
should be approximately the same as their counsel’s PLRA baseline
2
rates of $110 per hour for services performed from September 1,
3
2013
4
performed from March 1, 2014 to the present. See Camacho, 523
5
F.3d at 980 (“‘[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce
6
satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line
7
with those prevailing in the community . . . .”); cf. Borunda v.
8
Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We have . . .
9
denied section 1988 fees on appeal . . . because counsel failed
10
to adequately brief the issues he presented, thereby requiring
11
the court to engage in independent research.”) Nor does any cited
12
case from the relevant community contain information justifying
13
what the law students’ rate should be in this case. However, it
14
is presumed that a lower hourly rate should apply to the law
15
students’ to account for their lack of expertise. See Barjon v.
16
Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 503 (9th Cir. 1997) (“presume[ing]” that an
17
attorney reduced the value of a request for “law clerk costs” “to
18
account for her law clerk’s lack of experience and expertise.”)
19
Therefore, the reasonable hourly rate for the law students is one
20
half of the PLRA baseline rates applicable to this action: $55
21
per
22
February 28, 2014, and $63 per hour for services performed from
23
March 1, 2014 to the present.
to
hour
February
for
28,
services
2014,
and
performed
$126
from
per
hour
September
for
1,
services
2013
to
24
v.
Whether Adjustment to the Loadstar is Warranted
25
Defendants argue that the loadstar figure should be
26
adjusted downward, contending “[P]laintiff achieved only limited
27
success” in opposing Defendants’ motion to terminate. (Defs.’
28
Opp’n, 4:20-22 (quoting Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, C2:06-CV21
1
00457-GEB, 2013 WL 5597134, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013).)
2
Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiffs attempted to expand
3
the scope of the consent decree and “were successful in none of
4
their efforts” to do so. (Defs.’ Opp’n 4:4-5.) However, PLRA
5
limits
6
“proportionately
7
proven civil rights] violation[] or . . . directly and reasonably
8
incurred
9
1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Defendants do not address this statutory
the
fees
in
recoverable
by
related
the
enforcing
on
fees
to
the
in
Plaintiffs
court
relief
this
ordered
ordered
portion
to
of
for
10
restriction
11
those
that
relief
for
violation.”
their
are
[a
§§
opposition.
Therefore, Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.
12
vi.
Whether Travel Expenses Should be Reimbursed
13
Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement for their counsel
14
and law students’ travel expenses. Defendants do not oppose this
15
portion of the motion.
16
Section 1988 “allows for recovery of reasonable out-of-
17
pocket expenses,” including travel costs, so long as they were
18
“reasonably expended.” Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th
19
Cir. 2013). However, Plaintiffs have not addressed whether the
20
PLRA’s
21
restricts
22
1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (stating “fee[s] [must be] proportionately
23
related to the court ordered relief for [a proven civil rights]
24
violation; or . . . directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing
25
the relief ordered for
26
not shown they should be reimbursed for travel expenses not shown
27
to concern the aforementioned pertinent portions of the consent
28
decree.
fee
limitation,
the
travel
prescribed
expenses
in
they
§§
may
1997e(d)(1)(A)-(B),
recover.
See
§§
violation.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs have
22
1
2
3
4
Plaintiffs seek the following reimbursements for travel
expenses:
Date
09/20/13
09/26/13
Destination
Marysville
Sacramento
Mileage
98
33
Rate
56.5
56.5
Amount
55.37
18.64
10/21/13
10/22/13
Marysville
San Bruno
98
164
56.5
56.5
55.37
92.66
11/12/13
11/25/13
12/06/13
01/17/14
01/31/14
Sacramento
Marysville
Marysville
Marysville
Lower Lake
37
98
98
98
208
56.5
56.5
56.5
56.0
56.0
20.90
55.37
55.37
54.88
116.48
02/11/14
02/14/14
Marysville
Marysville
98
98
56.0
56.0
54.88
54.88
02/18/14
02/25/14
Marysville
Marysville
98
98
56.0
56.0
Notes
54.88
54.88
Hearing on motion to terminate
consent decree
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
National Archives to research
Hedrick court case file
Meeting at Mexican Consulate
Konocti Conservation Camp, to
meet with inmate Perry
Students picked up documents
in response to RFP
744.56
16
Plaintiffs have not shown that the October 21, 2013
17
visit to Marysville should be reimbursed, since Plaintiffs do not
18
seek attorney’s fees for services performed during this visit and
19
Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that during the visit counsel and
20
law
21
[Plaintiffs’] previous counsel,” a service for which Plaintiffs’
22
counsel “would not bill a paying client.” (Decl. of Carter White
23
in Support of Pls.’ Mot. ¶ 12, ECF No. 139-2.)
24
failed to explain whether the meeting at the Mexican Consulate
25
concerns the relevant portions of the consent decree. Further,
26
Plaintiffs have not shown that the meeting with inmate Perry
27
concerns the relevant portions of the consent decree since the
students
attempted
to
“obtain
28
23
.
.
.
files
.
.
.
from
Plaintiffs have
1
filed Perry declarations do not concern access to legal materials
2
or female participation in the Jail’s trusty program. (Decl. of
3
Patrick Perry, ECF 133-1.) Moreover, review of the law student
4
billing records indicates that Plaintiffs have not shown that the
5
visits
6
February 11, 2014, February 18, 2014, and February 25, 2014,
7
concerned relevant portions of the consent decree. Therefore,
8
Plaintiffs have not shown these travel expenses are compensable.
to
9
the
Jail
on
December
6,
2013,
January
17,
2014,
vii. Whether Plaintiffs Are Awarded Fees for Time
10
Expended on The Fee Motion
11
Plaintiffs also seek fees for the hours their counsel
12
expended
composing
13
attorney’s fees motion. However, Plaintiffs have not submitted
14
any
15
expended on these tasks. Therefore, this portion of the motion is
16
denied. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397 (“The fee applicant . . .
17
must submit evidence in support of those hours worked.”).
evidence
18
the
opening
concerning
viii.
19
the
and
number
reply
of
briefs
hours
for
their
the
counsel
Whether Plaintiffs Are Awarded Interest on
Their Fee Award
20
Plaintiffs
seek
an
award
of
interest
on
their
fee
21
award, arguing interest should begin accruing the date on which
22
the fee award order issues. Defendants do not oppose this portion
23
of the motion. Since a party may recover interest on a § 1988 fee
24
award,
25
Mountanos,
26
interest may be awarded on § 1988 attorney’s fees); Jones v.
27
Cnty. of Sacramento, CIV S-09-1025 DAD, 2011 WL 3584332, at *19
28
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011)
this
portion
690
F.2d
of
the
742,
motion
748
(9th
is
granted.
Cir.
1982)
See
Spain
(holding
v.
that
(holding that “interest will begin
24
1
accruing on plaintiff’s award of fees on the date of this order .
2
. . .”)
3
ix.
4
For
Total Attorney’s Fees Award
the
stated
reasons,
Plaintiffs’
motion
for
5
attorney’s fees is granted in part. The total attorney’s fees
6
award is: $7,826.60. The award is calculated as follows:
7
8
Total
9
9/3/2013 – 2/28/2014
3/1/2013 –
10
5/23/2014
11
Hours
Rate
Hours
Rate
7.8
$165
.375
$189
$1357.88
108.34
$55
3.7
$63
$6,191.80
12
13
Plaintiffs’
14
Counsel
15
Law Students
16
17
Travel Expenses
$276.92
Total
$7,826.60
18
19
20
Dated:
September 5, 2014
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
25
1
APPENDIX 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
26
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 4 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
2.7
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 5 of 55
2.7
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 6 of 55
7.55
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 7 of 55
not shown to concern
relevant portions of
3.35
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 8 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
8.9
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 9 of 55
2.3
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 10 of 55
4.8
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 11 of 55
vague
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 12 of 55
clerical
2.35
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 13 of 55
1.2
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 14 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
2.45
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 15 of 55
Travel (2.5 hrs);
Other unspecified visit activities (6 2.5 = 3.5 hrs)
12.5% of unspecified jail visit
compensable (3.5 x .125 = .4375.)
Total compensable = 2.5 + .4375 =
2.94
# of entries = 2 (reread mot.; review
statute and privileges)
Reread mot. = compensable (.7
x .5 = .35)
Review statute and recreation
privileges not shown compensable.
Total compensable = .7 x.5 = .35
4.84
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 14 of 60
5.2
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 16 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
6.8
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 17 of 55
10.65
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 18 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
2.3
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 19 of 55
clerical
clerical
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 20 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = 5.55
x .125 = .69
12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = .75
x .125 = .09
12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = .35
x .125 = .04
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree
4.02
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 20 of 60
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = .55
x .125 = .07
.07
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 21 of 55
12.5% shown
compensable
Total Compensable = 2.5
x .125 = .31
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree
.31
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 22 of 55
clerical
# of entries = 2 (check
email (clerical); review
notes from Henrick
meeting (not shown to
concern relevant portions
of decree))
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 23 of 55
clerical
clerical
1.10
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 24 of 55
clerical
.6
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 25 of 60
4
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 26 of 60
# of entries: 2 (check items have
been copied (.45hrs); draft letter
(.45hrs)).
Entry 1: Check items have been
copies = Clerical
Entry 2: Draft letter = Compensable
Total compensable = .45 hrs.
.65
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 27 of 60
1.55
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 25 of 55
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 26 of 55
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree
# of entries = 2 (create roster (1.7 hrs); make
mailing label and prepare intro letter (1.7hrs).
Create roster = clerical
Make mailing label = clerical
Prepare intro letters = compensable (1.7 x .5
=.85)
Total Compensable = 1.7 x. 5 = .85
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
vague
1
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 27 of 55
not related to
relevant portions of
decree
.2
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 28 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
1.3
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 29 of 55
clerical
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
1.10
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 30 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
Total compensable =
3.43 (see Entry No.
56929 (below) for
explanation)
# of entries: 2 (Travel (2.5 hrs.); Interviews (5.7 2.5 = 3.2))
# of interviews: 2 (Pasion (1.6); Holston (1.6))
100% Travel time compensable (2.5)
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x 1.6 = .4)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x 1.6 = .528)
Total compensable = 2.5 + .4 + .528 = 3.43
6.86
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 31 of 55
# of entries = 2 (Holston (.55 hrs);
Pasion (.55 hrs))
33% Holston compensable (.55 x .33
= .1815)
25% Pasion Compensable (.55 x. 25
= .1375)
Total Compensable = .1815 +.1375
= .32
# of entries = 2 (Holston (.35 hrs);
Pasion (.35 hrs))
33% Holston compensable (.35
x .33 = .1155) 25% Pasion
Compensable (.35 x. 25 = .0875 )
Total Compensable = .1155
+.0875 = .2
# of entries = 2 (review email (.2 hrs);
research inmates (.2 hrs)
50% Rackley compensable; Rackley is
33% of "review email" sub-entry (.5 x .2
x .33 = .033)
100% inmate research compensable
(.2)
Total Compensable = .2 + .033 = .23
clerical
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
1
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 32 of 55
# of entries = 2 (start drafting (.275);
find sample decl. and review L.R.
(.275))
33% Holston Compensable (.33
x .275 = .09075
100% other tasks compensable
Total compensable = .09075 + .275
= .37
# Decl = 3
1 Decl compensable (library)
Total compensable = .33 x 1.25
= .41
# Decl. = 4
1 Decl compensable (library)
Total compensable = .25 x .7 = .18
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
# of entries = 3 (#1. "Review
email" (.165 hrs) = not shown to
concern relevant portions of
decree; #2. Print (.165 hrs) =
clerical; #3. Review ICE
standards: (ICE recreation
standards (.0825 hrs) not shown to
concern relevant portions of the
decree; ICE library standards
compensable (.0825 hrs))
Total compensable = .08
# of entries: 2 (Travel (2.5 hrs.); vist &
review (5.1 -2.5 = 2.6))
100% Travel compensable (2.5)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x 2.6
= .858)
Total compensable = 2.5 + .858 =
3.36
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree (vague as to which
inmates this entry concerns)
4.4
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 33 of 55
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree (vague as to which inmates
this entry refers)
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree
Total compensable = 3.36 (same trip
as Entry No. 56944 on previous page)
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree
clerical
# of entries: 3 (update decl. (.15 hrs);
read Suliman's letter (.15 hrs); read
Silva and Singh letters (.15 hrs).
Entry 1: 2 Decls updated: Holston
(.075); Pasion (.075) ;
33% Holston compensable (.33 x .075
=.02475)
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x .075
= .01875)
Entry 2: Not shown to be compensable
since unclear whether relates to
consent decree or tort claim procedure
research referenced in Entry No.
56998.
Entry 3: Not shown to concern relevant
portions of the consent decree.
Total compensable: .02475 + .01875
= .04
3.4
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 34 of 55
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree, since unclear
whether relates to consent decree
or tort claim procedure research
referenced in Entry No. 56998.
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
#of entries: 3 (write letters (.467 hrs);
assemble packets (.467 hrs); mail
(.467 hours).
Entry 1: Write letters: Holston
(.2335); Pasion (.2335)
33% Holston compensable (.33
x .2335 = .077055)
25% Pasion compensable (.25
x .2335 = .058375)
Entry 2: Clerical
Entry 3: Clerical
Total compensable = .077055
+ .058375 = .14
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
.14
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 35 of 55
# of entries: 2 (Perry (.1 hr) ; Review
Decls. (.1 hr))
# decl. reviews: 2 (Pasion (.05); Holston
(.05))
Perry not compensable
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x .05
= .0125)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x .05
= .0165)
Total compensable = .0125+ .0165
= .03
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
# of entries: 2 (Perry (.1 hr.) ; Pasion
(.05) & Holston (.05))
Perry not compensable
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x .05
= .0125)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x .05
= .0165)
Total compensable time = .0125
+ .0165 = .03
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
.06
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 36 of 55
clerical
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
vague; clerical
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 37 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 38 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
1.5
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 39 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 40 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 41 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 42 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
printing = clerical;
other task not
shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree
.45
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 43 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
# of entries: 3 (#1-2
scheduling visits;
clerical; #3 Bechtel
declaration: not
shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree)
.1
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 44 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.1
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 45 of 55
not shown to
concern
relevant
portions of
decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 46 of 55
clerical; visit not
shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.15
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 47 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
clerical; not shown
to concern relevant
portions of decree
2.7
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 48 of 55
12.5% Unspecified RFP
compensable
Total compensable = .125 x 1.20
= .15
12.5% Unspecified RFP
compensable
Total compensable = .125 x .15
= .02
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
Not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree. See Entries
Nos. 57755-57746.
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.92
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 49 of 55
clerical
# of entries = 2 (Talk to White re
RFP (.1); Pick Up Car (.1))
12.5% of RFP Compensable (.0125)
Pick up car not compensable. See
Entry No. 57840 (below).
Total = .0125
# of entries: 3 ((Travel) (1.25 hr);
Wait (.075); Review (.075)).
Travel & wait not compensable
because visit not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree (2hrs).
See Entry No. 57840 (below).
12.5% unspecified RFP review
compensable
Total Compensable = 125 x .075
= .01
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
clerical/not shown
to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.02
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 50 of 55
clerical / not shown
to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% unspecified RFP
compensable
Total Compensable
= .125 x 4.3 = .54
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.54
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 54 of 60
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% RFP compensable
Total Compensable = .125 x .5
= .06
.06
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 55 of 60
not shown to
concern
relevant
portions of
decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
1.95
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 51 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% Joint Statement Compensable
Total compensable = .125 x 1 = .13
33% of sections drafted concern
relevant portions of decree
(library)
Total compensable = .33 x 7.2
= 2.38
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
2.66
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 52 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
# of entries: 2 (finished ICE section
(2.10 hrs); "edit my half" of
undisputed facts (2.10hrs))
Finish ICE section = not
compensable
33% of "edit my half" compensable
(see Entry No. 58019)
Total compensable = .33 x 2.10
= .69
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree since access to
legal materials (library) section
already written
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% undisputed facts
compensable
Total Compensable = .125 x .05
= .01
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.7
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 53 of 55
12.5% undipsuted facts
compensable
Total compensable = .125
x .4 = .05
12.5% undipsuted facts
compensable
Total compensable = .125
x .3 = .04
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
since access to
legal materials
(library) sections
already written
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.09
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 54 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
0
Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 55 of 55
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
.25
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