Hedrick et al v. Grant

Filing 149

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 9/5/2014 ORDERING 139 Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees is GRANTED in PART. The total attorney' fees award is: $7,826.60. 141 (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7
8
9
10
11

v.

13

15
16
17
18

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR AN
EXTENSION OF TIME AND GRANTING
IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES

Plaintiffs,

12

14

2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB

DARRIL HEDRICK, DALE
ROBINSON, KATHY LINDSEY,
MARTIN C. CANADA, DARRY
TYRONE PARKER, individually
and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

JAMES GRANT, as Sheriff of
Yuba County; Lieutenant FRED
J. ASBY, as Yuba County
Jailer; and JAMES PHARRIS,
ROY LANDERMAN, DOUG WALTZ,
HAROLD J. “SAM” SPERBECK,
JAMES MARTIN, as members of
the YUBA COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS,
Defendants.

19
20

Plaintiffs filed an untimely motion for attorney’s fees

21
22

under

42

23

certified

24

motion to terminate a consent decree governing conditions at the

25

Yuba County Jail (“the Jail”). Plaintiffs also move under Federal

26

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 6(b) for an extension of time to

27

file

28

motion.

the

U.S.C.
law

§

1988

students

motion

when

for

the

rendered

it

was

services

defending

filed.

1

their
against

Defendants

counsel

and

Defendants’

oppose

each

1

I.

MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME

2

Plaintiffs filed their attorney’s fees motion after the

3

deadline for such motions prescribed in Local Rule 293(a). This

4

rule states in pertinent part: “Motions for awards of attorneys’

5

fees . . . shall be filed not later than twenty-eight (28) days

6

after entry of final judgment.” Defendants’ motion to terminate

7

the consent decree was denied in an order filed April 2, 2014.

8

Plaintiffs filed their attorney’s fees motion at 12:03 a.m., on

9

May

1,

2014,

which

is

twenty-nine

days

after

denial

of

10

Defendants’ motion. Since Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees motion was

11

filed approximately three minutes late, it was untimely.

12

Plaintiffs argue the “excusable neglect” standard in

13

Rule 6(b) authorizes them to be granted the extension of time

14

they seek and that they have satisfied this standard. Rule 6(b)

15

states, in pertinent part: “When an act may or must be done

16

within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend

17

the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the

18

party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ.

19

P.

20

deadline constitutes ‘excusable neglect,’ courts must apply a

21

four-factor

22

prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and

23

its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the

24

delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Ahanchian

25

v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010)

26

(citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507

27

U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).

28

6(b).

“To

determine

equitable

whether

test,

a

party’s

examining:

failure

(1)

the

to

meet

danger

Plaintiffs argue “there is no danger of prejudice to
2

a

of

.

1

. . Defendants” since Plaintiffs’ counsel emailed Defendants’

2

counsel the attorney’s fees motion prior to the filing deadline.

3

(Pls.’

4

Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares: “After attempting and

5

failing to file the documents, [on April 30, 2014,] at 11:48 p.m.

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I sent . . . five pdf files (motion and 4 attachments) in an

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email message to . . . counsel for Defendants.” (Decl. of Carter

8

White in Support of Pls.’ Mot. For Extension of Time (“White

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Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 141-1.) Plaintiffs have shown that it is

10

Mot.

for

Extension

of

Time,

3:1,

ECF

No.

141.)

unlikely that their tardiness prejudiced Defendants.

11

Plaintiffs further argue that the factor concerning the

12

extent

of

their

13

judicial proceedings, also weighs in favor of finding excusable

14

neglect.

15

Plaintiffs’

16

noticed the motion for hearing on a law and motion hearing date

17

provided by the courtroom deputy’s voice mail message, in which

18

she

19

circumstances involved with the late filing do not indicate that

20

Plaintiffs’

21

proceeding. See Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1262 (finding excusable

22

neglect where, inter alia, Plaintiff’s counsel’s three-day delay

23

in filing a summary judgment opposition “would not have adversely

24

affected either the summary judgment hearing date, which was ten

25

days away, or the trial, which was two and a half months away.”)

The

lists

26

tardiness,

only

and

proceeding

scheduled

available

tardiness

in

had

and

a

potential

scheduled

their

law

its

was

attorney’s

motion

negative

impact

on

the

the

hearing

that

fees

motion

that

hearing

impact

on

dates.

the

The

judicial

Plaintiffs’ counsel also avers their reason for the

27

tardiness

is

that

their

counsel

28

electronically file the Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees”
3

first

“attempted

to

1

“at approximately 11:30 p.m.” – one half hour before the filing

2

deadline – and thereafter experienced computer problems which

3

delayed filing until 12:03 a.m. (White Decl. ¶ 3.) “Although we

4

are sympathetic with the circumstances of [Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

5

computer] problems[,] . . . it seems to us that the problem was

6

really that [Plaintiffs’ counsel] waited until the last minute to

7

get [their] materials together. [Plaintiffs, counsel] apparently

8

neglected the old proverb that ‘sooner begun, sooner done.’ When

9

parties wait until the last minute to comply with a deadline,

10

they are playing with fire.” Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74

11

F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996).

12

weigh in favor of finding excusable neglect.

13

Therefore, this factor does not

Plaintiffs also argue their counsel acted in good faith

14

in

connection

with

the

tardiness.

Plaintiffs

emailed

the

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attorney’s fees motion to Defendants’ counsel prior to the filing

16

deadline,

17

day after they filed their attorney’s fees motion. Plaintiffs

18

have shown that their counsel acted in good faith concerning the

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late-filed attorney’s fees motion.

and filed their motion for an extension of time one

20

Plaintiffs have shown that three of the four factors

21

weigh significantly in favor of granting their motion for an

22

extension of time. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Rule 6(b) motion is

23

granted. See Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1225

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(9th Cir. 2000) (finding excusable neglect despite Plaintiff’s

25

counsel’s “weak justification” for delay, since “there was no

26

evidence that [Plaintiff’s counsel] acted with anything less than

27

good faith,” and the delay caused only a “minimal” amount of

28

prejudice

to

Defendant

and

a
4

“minimal”

impact

on

judicial

1

proceedings.)

2

II.

ATTORNEY’S FEES MOTION

3

Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney’s fees under 42

4

U.S.C. § 1988 for all services rendered on their behalf defending

5

against

6

Defendants request that the ruling on the motion be deferred

7

until after the Ninth Circuit has decided Defendants’ appeal of

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the denial of their motion to terminate the consent decree.

9

Defendants’

“The

motion

district

to

terminate

court[s]

retain[]

the

the

consent

power

decree.

to

award

10

attorneys’ fees after the notice of appeal from the decision on

11

the

12

Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983).

13

merits

ha[s]

been

filed.”

Masalosalo

by

Masalosalo

v.

17

Recognition of th[e] authority [to determine
fees while an appeal is pending] best serves
the policy against piecemeal appeals[,] . . .
prevent[s]
hasty
consideration
of
postjudgment
fee
motions
. . .
[and]
prevent[s] postponement of fee consideration
until after the circuit court mandate, when
the relevant circumstances will no longer be
fresh in the mind of the district judge.

18

Id. (citations omitted) (citing Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 34

19

(7th Cir. 1980)). “[T]he policy against piecemeal appeals” and

20

deciding attorney’s fees issues when “they are fresh in the mind

21

of the district judge” favor denying Defendants’ deferred ruling

22

request. Id.

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16

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a. Legal Standard

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§ 1988 provides in pertinent part: In any action or

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proceeding to enforce a provision of sections . . . 1983 . . .

26

the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . .

27

. a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, . . . .” 42

28

U.S.C. § 1988(b).
5

1

“To determine the amount of a reasonable fee under §

2

1988,

3

courts generally ‘apply ... the lodestar method to determine what

4

constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Gonzalez v. City of

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Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Costa v.

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Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)).

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“Under the lodestar method, the district court ‘multiplies the

8

number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

9

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. “Second, ‘[t]he

10

district court may then adjust [the lodestar] upward or downward

11

based on,” the following factors:

12

district

courts

typically

proceed

in

two

steps.

First,

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform
the
legal
service
properly,
(4)
the
preclusion
of
other
employment
by
the
attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5)
the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances,
(8) the amount involved and the results
obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability
of
the
attorneys,
(10)
the
“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature
and length of the professional relationship
with the client, and (12) awards in similar
cases.

13
14
15
16
17
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19
20
21

Id.

22

Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008), and id. at 1209,

23

n. 11. (quoting Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363,

24

n. 8 (9th Cir. 1996)).

25

b. Discussion

26
27
28

(alteration

in

original)

(quoting

Moreno

v.

City

of

i. Whether Plaintiffs Are Prevailing Parties for the
Purposes of § 1988
Plaintiffs argue they are prevailing parties under §
6

1

1988 since from September 2013 to April 2014 their counsel and

2

certified law students defended against Defendants’ motion to

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terminate the consent decree. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs

4

are not prevailing parties since the denial of Defendants’ motion

5

“changed

6

Plaintiff[s] . . . and . . . Defendant[s].” (Def.’s Opp’n to

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Pl.’s Mot. for Attorney’s Fees (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 3: 24-25, ECF No.

8

143.)

9

nothing

about

Attorney’s

are

recoverable

for

.

.

“postjudgment

12

633 F. Supp. 2d 834, 844 (D. Ariz. 2009) aff'd, 623 F.3d 1043

13

(9th Cir. 2010)(citing Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 777 (8th

14

Cir. 2002)); cf. Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d

15

446, 451 (9th Cir. 2010)(citing Keith v. Volpe, 833 F.2d 850,

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855-57 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[A] party . . . may recover attorneys’

17

fees under § 1988 for monitoring compliance with [a consent]

18

decree,

19

judicially sanctioned relief.”); Webb v. Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829,

20

835

21

postjudgment enforcement of [a] district court’s . . . consent

22

decree

were

23

Act],”

which

24

1988.).

(9th

Cir.

2002)

(holding

compensable
limits

Since

monitoring

the

Plaintiffs

does

“includes

not

“attorney’s

under
fees

which

.

against efforts to terminate a consent decree.” Graves v. Arpaio,

such

decree,

between

11

when

consent

relationship

enforcement”

even

a

fees

legal

10

25

of

the

the

awardable

have

to

defended

result

fees

[Prison

defending

incurred

Litigation
prisoners

against

in

any

for

Reform
under

§

Defendants’

26

motion to terminate the consent decree, Plaintiffs are prevailing

27

parties entitled to an attorney’s fees award.

28
7

1

ii.

Whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act Limits

2

the Amount of Attorney’s Fees Plaintiffs Recover

3

Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to the full amount

4

of fees they seek and that what they request is not limited by

5

the

6

(“PLRA”) in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1).

fee

restriction

in

the

Prison

Litigation

Reform

7

The PLRA prescribes, in pertinent part:

8

Act’s

In any action brought by a prisoner who is
confined to any jail . . . , in which
attorney’s fees are authorized under section
1988 . . . , such fees shall not be awarded,
except to the extent that--

9
10
11

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably
incurred in proving an actual violation of
the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute
pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under
section 1988 . . . ; and

12
13
14

(B)(i)
the
amount
of
the
fee
is
proportionately related to the court ordered
relief for the violation; or

15
16

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably
incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for
the violation.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1)(A)-(B)(emphasis added).
Under

the

PLRA,

“a

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

fees

incurred in enforcing a judgment entered upon proof that the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Webb v. Ada
Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “the court . .
. must assure that the case is not being milked by a [plaintiff]
after

the

[judgment]

unreasonable

in

has

amount,

been

for

obtained,

work

not

for

fees

reasonably

that

are

performed

to

enforce the relief, or for work not directly related to enforcing
the relief.” Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 2012).
8

1

Plaintiffs argue their fee request should be awarded

2

since the consent decree they defended was entered upon a finding

3

of

4

consistent with the PLRA’s requirement that fees for defending a

5

consent decree must concern a consent decree that was entered

6

upon proof of a constitutional violation.

constitutional

7

violations

Concerning

at

the

constitutional

Jail,

and

violations,

therefore

the

is

consent

8

decree states: “On November 12, 1976 the Court . . . filed its

9

Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order granting . . .

10

[Plaintiffs’] motions for partial summary judgment[,]” concerning

11

“.

12

participation

13

Decree, 2:13-16, 2:3-5 ECF No. 120-1.) This Order was “subsumed”

14

into the consent decree, upon the Court’s final approval of the

15

consent decree on May 2, 1979. (Id. at 3:10-15.)1 Therefore,

16

Plaintiffs have shown they are entitled to attorney’s fees for

17

legal services rendered defending the portions of the consent

18

decree

19

participation

20

relevant portions of the decree”).2

21

.

.

[a]ccess
in

to

[l]egal

the

.

concerning
in

However,

.

access
the

the

Jail

other

[m]aterials,”
.

Jail

to

trusty

legal

trusty

and

materials

of

.

.

program.”

program

portions

“.

(Consent

and

(hereafter,

the

female

consent

female
“the

decree

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1

The referenced Order is not in the Court’s filing system since it has
been archived, and the nature thereof has not been disputed.
2
Plaintiffs also argue that “in issuing a preliminary injunction [in
1976] . . . the Court found that conditions of confinement at the Jail
violated the Constitution,” and therefore “fees may be awarded in proportion
to the relief granted.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Attorney’s Fees (“Pls.’ Mot.”), 5:1921, ECF No. 139.) However, the Ninth Circuit has found that prisoners are not
entitled to attorney’s fees under the PLRA where prisoners obtain “temporary
relief . . . in the form of a preliminary injunction [that] [does] not
affirmatively establish that the [municipality] actually violated [the
prisoners’] protected rights.” Kimbrough v. California, 609 F.3d 1027, 1032
(9th Cir. 2010).

9

1

prescribe relief not related to the claims on which the partial

2

summary judgment was granted. Further, the parties “waive[ed] a

3

hearing and findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues

4

raised by the Complaint that are disposed of [in the consent

5

decree].” (Consent Decree 2:30-32.) Therefore, Plaintiffs have

6

not shown they are entitled to attorney’s fees for defending

7

those

8

accessing legal materials or female participation in the Jail’s

9

trusty program.

portions

of

the

consent

decree

that

do

not

concern

10

The Court’s decisions concerning whether law student

11

billings are compensable under the PLRA are in Appendix 1, which

12

is

13

contains

14

Plaintiffs have not explained precisely which billing entries

15

concern

16

entries

17

findings of fact and conclusions of law (“proposed findings”),

attached
a

the
are

to

this

copy

of

relevant
reduced

order,
the

and

law

portions
based

are

also

students’

of

on

the

below;
time

consent

whether

Appendix

sheets.3

decree,

Plaintiffs’

1

Since

certain
proposed

18
3

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants attached an annotated version of these
time sheets to their respective opening and opposition briefs. Plaintiffs’
counsel crossed out certain entries not claimed to be compensable and listed
at the bottom of each page the total number of hours claimed to be compensable
on that page. Defendants’ counsel circled entries in pen which Defendants
argue are “based on clerical tasks, unnecessary research, and unnecessary
billings not reasonably related to this litigation.” (Defs.’ Opp’n 7:5-6.).
Since the annotated time sheets attached to Defendants’ opposition brief
exclude certain pages of time sheets attached to Plaintiffs’ opening brief,
the Court created Appendix 1 by inserting the referenced excluded pages into
the time sheets attached to Defendants’ opposition brief.
The Court has used computer software to insert red markings to show
whether certain time sheet entries are compensable. Those entries inside a red
rectangular box are compensable. Where tasks are block-billed and only a
certain percentage of the block-billed tasks are compensable, an explanation
of which hours were deducted is inside a red rectangular box with an arrow
pointing to the relevant entry. The total number compensable hours within each
box is rounded to the nearest hundredth. When an entry is not compensable, an
explanation of why the entry is not compensable is inside a red rectangular
box with an arrow pointing to the entry. Finally, at the bottom of each page
the total number of hours awarded on that page is inside a red box.

10

1

filed on March, 19, 2014, or the declarations of detainees which

2

Plaintiffs

3

concerns a relevant portion of the consent decree. (ECF Nos. 129,

4

133-1,

5

Plaintiffs are not compensated for “fees that are unreasonable in

6

amount, for work not reasonably performed to enforce the relief,

7

or for work not directly related to enforcing the relief.” Balla,

8

677 F.3d at 919.

9

filed

133-2).

For

on

March

These

31,

2014,

decisions

example,

since

indicate

were

made

that

to

declarations

the

“assure

of

entry

that”

Erik-James

10

Pendergraph, Neil Ernest Carranza, Tiara Tyson, Shannon Silva,

11

Peter Azevedo, Patrick Perry, Jon Bechtel, and Jennelle Cropsey

12

do not contain any statement concerning access to legal material

13

or the Jail’s trusty program, Plaintiffs have not shown that they

14

are entitled to attorney’s fees for the hours billed concerning

15

these detainees. Further, each billing entry concerning detainee

16

Theron Holston is reduced by approximately 67% since only one of

17

three declarations submitted by Mr. Holston concerns the relevant

18

portions of the consent decree. Similarly, each entry concerning

19

detainee George Pasion is reduced by 75% since only one of four

20

declarations

21

portions

22

visits to the jail for unspecified purposes, Plaintiffs’ requests

23

for production of documents concerning unspecified subjects, and

24

entries related to preparation of Plaintiffs’ proposed findings

25

were reduced by 87.5%, since only one of eight sections in the

26

proposed

27

decree;

28

Additionally, entries which record services rendered concerning

of

submitted
the

findings

by

consent

decree.

concerns

specifically,

the

Mr.

a

Pasion

Moreover,

relevant

access

11

concern

to

entries

portion
legal

the

of

relevant
concerning

the

materials

consent
section.

1

individuals who are not mentioned in the proposed findings or who

2

did not produce a declaration that Plaintiffs filed on the case

3

docket

4

Plaintiffs

5

portions of the consent decree.

are

6

not

considered

have

Where

not

shown

Plaintiffs’

compensable
these

under

services

counsel

the

PLRA

concern

block-billed

since

relevant

tasks

both

7

related to and unrelated to the relevant portions of the consent

8

decree, the hours claimed in the entry were reduced based on the

9

description of the billed tasks to “‘fairly balance’ those hours

10

that were actually billed in block format.” Welch v. Metro. Life

11

Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Sorenson v.

12

Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

13

For

example,

December

15,

2013

entry

number

57179

14

bills .2 hours and reads: “Read letter from Patrick Perry re

15

willing to meet; review declarations returned to CRC from Passion

16

and Holston.” Since the entry contains two sub-entries separated

17

by the semi-colon, the entry indicates that approximately one

18

half of the time was spent reading a letter and one half of the

19

time was spent reviewing declarations. Plaintiffs have not shown

20

that the time spent reading the Perry letter is compensable since

21

Perry’s declaration does not address the relevant portions of the

22

consent decree. To reflect this, the billing entry is reduced by

23

half (.1 hours). The remaining .1 hours is further reduced to

24

reflect

25

approximately 33% of the entry concerning Holston and 25% of the

26

entry

27

consent decree. After these reductions are made, the fee award is

28

.03 hours since it was rounded to the nearest hundredth.

that

Plaintiffs

concerning

Pasion

have

relate

12

not

to

shown

relevant

that

more

portions

of

than

the

1

Similarly,

for

any

block-billed

trips

to

the

jail,

2

Plaintiffs are credited with 2.5 hours of travel time. The travel

3

time estimate is based on the average of two separately billed

4

car trips to the jail, billed on February 11, 2014 (Entry No.

5

57746) and February 18, 2014 (Entry No. 57841). Further, where

6

two students entered separate billing entries for a jail visit on

7

the same day, the two students’ hours are credited as having

8

worked on the same tasks, unless an entry indicates otherwise.

9

In

addition

to

the

fees

sought

for

law

student

10

services, Plaintiffs seek 46 hours of fees for their counsel’s

11

services. Their counsel declares that these hours comprise eight

12

jail visits during which he accompanied law students; 1.5 hours

13

revising

14

Terminate;

15

Proposed Findings of Fact; and 1.5 hours revising Plaintiffs’

16

request for an order to seal. Plaintiffs have not submitted time

17

sheets of their counsel’s hours; however, review of the student

18

time

19

indicates that only a portion of these hours are compensable

20

under the PLRA. Specifically, the time sheets reveal that only

21

6.3 hours of fees should be awarded for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

22

jail

23

findings concerns relevant portions of the consent decree, this

24

document reveals that only .375 hours should be awarded for the

25

time Plaintiffs’ counsel spent revising it. Moreover, Plaintiffs

26

have not shown that attorney’s fees should be awarded for any

27

time spent revising the request for an order to seal, since

28

Plaintiffs’ request concerns medical records that have not been

Plaintiffs’
3

sheets

visits.

hours

and

Opposition
revising

the

Further,

Defendants’

Plaintiffs’

documents

since

to

only

13

Joint

Plaintiffs’

one

eighth

Motion

to

Statement

and

counsel

of

the

revised

proposed

1

shown to have a relationship to the relevant portions of the

2

consent decree.

3

The 1.5 hours Plaintiffs’ counsel spent revising the

4

opposition to Defendants’ motion to terminate are compensable,

5

since

6

reasonably incurred enforcing the relief ordered in the relevant

7

portions of the consent decree.

8

the

opposition

brief

evinces

that

these

fees

were

iii. Whether Law Students Worked Reasonable Hours

9

Defending Relevant Portions of The Consent Decree

10

The

parties

dispute

whether

law

students

worked

an

11

unreasonable number of hours. Specifically, the parties dispute

12

whether certain law student time sheet entries are redundant,

13

concern clerical tasks, concern unnecessary research, or are “not

14

reasonably

15

These disputes are only decided for those entries that concern

16

relevant portions of the consent decree.

17

related

to

this

litigation.”

(Defs.’

Mot.

7:6-7.)

Under the loadstar method, “a ‘reasonable’ number of

18

hours

equals

‘[t]he

19

reasonably have been billed to a private client.’” Gonzalez, 729

20

F.3d at 1202 (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno, 534 F.3d

21

at 1111). “The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the

22

appropriate

23

evidence in support of those hours worked.” Gates v. Deukmejian,

24

987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart,

25

461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). If the fee applicant submits vague

26

records, the district court may “simply reduce[] the fee [award]

27

to a reasonable amount.” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115,

28

1121 (9th Cir. 2000); see Neil v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 495 F.

hours

number

expended

in

of

hours

the

14

.

.

litigation

.

[which]

and

must

could

submit

1

App'x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating, “the district court

2

acted within its discretion in reducing Neil’s fee award by .3

3

hours

4

inadequately

5

chooses to “block bill some of its time rather than itemize each

6

task individually,” the court may “impose a reduction,” as long

7

as it ‘explain how[s] or why . . . the reduction . . . fairly

8

balance[s]’

9

format.” Welch, 480 F.3d at 948 (quoting Sorenson, 239 F.3d at

10

1146). Moreover, a plaintiff may not receive attorney’s fees for

11

clerical tasks. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th

12

Cir. 2009) (“When clerical tasks are billed at hourly rates, the

13

court

14

billing errors.”); Yates v. Vishal Corp., 11-CV-00643-JCS, 2014

15

WL 572528, at * 6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2014) (refusing to award

16

attorney’s fees for “purely clerical,” tasks “such as posting

17

letters

18

filing, calendaring, and preparing the summons and complaint for

19

filing.”)

to

account

should

for

for

an

explained.”)

those

hours

reduce

mail,

the

.

.

.

entry

Furthermore,

that

were

hours

photocopying,

that

where

a

actually

requested

vague

fee

billed

to

three-hole

was

account

punching,

and

applicant

in

block

for

the

internal

20

Each of the law students’ time sheet entries has been

21

reviewed. Certain time sheet entries concern clerical tasks or

22

are vague. Fees are not awarded for services recorded in these

23

entries. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 921 (reducing fees to account

24

for the billing of clerical work); Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214

25

F.3d at 1121 (stating fee award may be reduced where entries are

26

vague); Neil, 495 F. App'x at 847 (affirming reduction in fee

27

award for vague entry). Specific deductions to the law student

28

hours are presented in Appendix 1.
15

1

iv.

2

Hourly Rate For Plaintiffs’ Counsel and Law
Students

3

Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney’s fees based on a

4

rate

of

5

which

6

authorizes. (Pls.’ Mot. for Attorney’s Fees (“Pls.’ Mot.”), 10:

7

2-4, ECF No. 139.)

per

Plaintiffs

8
9

$211.15

hour

argue

Concerning

is

this,

for

Plaintiffs’

the

the

maximum

PLRA

counsel’s

hourly

prescribes,

services,

rate

the

in

PLRA

pertinent

part:

10

In any action brought by a prisoner who is
confined to any jail, . . . in which
attorney’s fees are authorized under [42
U.S.C. §] 1988 . . . [n]o award of attorney’s
fees . . . shall be based on an hourly rate
greater than 150 percent[(the “multiplier”)]
of the hourly rate established under section
3006A of Title 18 [(the Criminal Justice Act
[“CJA”])] for payment of court-appointed
counsel [(the “baseline rate”)].

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1),(3). The Ninth Circuit has stated the

18

baseline

19

Judicial Conference.” Webb v. Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 839 (9th

20

Cir. 2002); accord

21

2011)(setting the maximum hourly rate under the PLRA at “150

22

percent of $113”

23

the maximum hourly rate for court-appointed counsel to $113.”)

24

The rates authorized by the Judicial Conference are published in

25

the Guide to Judiciary Policy. See 7 Guide to Judiciary Policy §

26

230.16

27

http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/CJAGui

28

delinesForms/vol7PartA/vol7PartAChapter2.aspx#230_16;

PLRA

hourly

rate

“is

the

amount

authorized

by

the

Perez v. Cate, 632 F.3d 553, 555-56 (9th Cir.

since the “Judicial Conference [had] increased

available

16

at

Gilman

v.

1

Brown, CIV. S-05-830 LKK/CK, 2014 WL 3735401, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

2

July 28, 2014)(quoting 7 Guide to Judiciary Policy § 230.16 for

3

the

4

Judicial Conference has changed the established hourly rate over

5

the past several years, the baseline rate of compensation under

6

the PLRA depends on when the services were performed. See Gilman,

7

2014 WL 3735401, at *1 (“[T]he baseline rate . . . depends on the

8

year the services were performed . . . .”)

rates

established

by

the

Judicial

Conference.)

Since

the

9

The Judicial Conference established a rate of $110 per

10

hour for services performed from September 1, 2013 to February

11

28, 2014, and a rate of $126 per hour for services performed from

12

March 1, 2014 to the present. The first entry in the time sheets

13

submitted

14

Plaintiffs seek fees for their counsel’s services through the

15

filing of their attorney’s fees reply brief on May 23, 2014.4

16

Therefore, Plaintiffs have shown they are entitled to a baseline

17

rate of $110 per hour for their counsel’s services prior to March

18

1,

19

services.5

20

4

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2014,

by

and

Plaintiffs

$126

per

is

hour

dated

for

September

their

3,

counsel’s

2013,

and

subsequent

Plaintiffs do not submit time sheets concerning their counsel’s work.
The time sheets submitted by Plaintiffs only record law student hours.
However, Plaintiffs seek compensation for their counsel’s service when he
accompanied law students on visits to the jail and revised certain court-filed
documents. Therefore, the dates on which Plaintiffs’ counsel performed these
tasks is determined by using the student time sheets and the case docket.
5
Plaintiffs argue that a rate of $141 should serve as the baseline rate
since the Honorable Julia S. Gibbons, Chair of the Committee on the Budget of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, testified before a Congressional
subcommittee that: “[The Judicial Conference] request[s] [Congress] . . . to
increase the . . . [CJA] rate to the statutorily authorized rate of $141 per
hour, effective January 1, 2011.” Statement of Honorable Julia S. Gibbons,
Chair Committee on the Budget of the Judicial Conference of the United States
before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government of the
Committee on Appropriations of the United States House of Representatives,
March 18, 2010, at 13, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/News/2010/docs/Judge_Gi
bbons_Judicial_Conference.pdf. “However, [P]laintiffs do not explain how

17

1

Plaintiffs

further

argue

that

the

maximum

PLRA

2

multiplier (150%) should be applied to their counsel’s baseline

3

hourly

4

Eastern District of California have received between $350 and

5

$450 per hour under § 1988. Defendants counter, arguing in a

6

conclusory

7

maximum multiplier for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s services.

rates,

since

manner

similarly

that

it

experienced

would

be

attorneys

inequitable

to

in

the

award

the

8

Under the loadstar method, the reasonable hourly rate

9

is “calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the

10

relevant legal community, and the general rule is that the rates

11

of attorneys practicing in the forum district, here the Eastern

12

District of California . . . are used.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405

13

(citation

14

district court should ‘tak[e] into consideration the experience,

15

skill, and reputation of the attorney . . . .” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d

16

at 1205 (first alteration in original) (quoting Dang v. Cross,

17

422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005)).

18

omitted).

“‘[T]he

“Within

burden

is

this

on

the

geographic

fee

community,

applicant

to

the

produce

19

satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line

20

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

21

lawyers

22

reputation.’” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980

23

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11

24

(1984)).

25

attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate

26
27
28

of

reasonably

“Affidavits

of

comparable

the

skill,

plaintiffs’

experience

attorney

and

and

other

Congressional testimony, even from Judge Gibbons, could override the official,
published determination of the Judicial Conference itself[,]” set forth in the
Guide to Judiciary Policy. Gilman, 2014 WL 3735401, at *3. Therefore,
Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to a PLRA baseline rate of
$141.

18

1

determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of

2

the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps

3

Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Ingram

4

v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (indicating a

5

district court may “rely on its own familiarity with the legal

6

market” in determining a reasonable hourly rate); Moreno, 534

7

F.3d

8

awarded by other judges in the same locality in similar cases.”).

9

Plaintiffs argue the maximum PLRA multiplier of 150%

at

1115

applied

.

.

13

2014,

14

subsequent

15

reasonable, since in a civil rights case captioned Hunter v.

16

Cnty. of Sacramento, a case that was not governed by the PLRA,

17

the Court concluded a $350 hourly rate was reasonable for an

18

attorney

19

experience. 2:06-CV-00457-GEB, 2013 WL 5597134, at *8 (E.D. Cal.

20

Oct. 11, 2013). Defendants counter with the conclusory argument

21

that it would be inequitable to award Plaintiffs the maximum PLRA

22

multiplier; however, this argument fails to rebut Plaintiffs’

23

reasonable hourly rate evidence. Plaintiffs have shown that it is

24

reasonable

25

counsel’s services.

an

$189

services.

with

to

hourly

Plaintiffs

experience

apply

Plaintiffs

rate

the

for

argue

comparable

maximum

further

argue

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs’
these

to

hourly

Plaintiffs’

PLRA

multiplier

they

are

for

fees

hourly rate for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s services prior to March 1,

entitle

rates

the

12

would

hourly

consider

counsel’s

This

baseline

.

11

and

the

can

should

services.

to

judges

10

26

be

(“District

to

their
a

$165

counsel’s
rates

are

counsel’s

for

entitled

their

to

the

27

maximum PLRA hourly rate for hours billed by the law students.

28

Plaintiffs submit a declaration from Andrew Bluth, an attorney at
19

1

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP (“Pillsbury”) in support of

2

this argument. Bluth avers that law students at his firm bill

3

$315 per hour. Defendants counter that Plaintiffs have not shown

4

what Bluth avers is relevant to the determination of the law

5

student fees in this action, since Bluth does not describe the

6

nature of the services the law students rendered for Pillsbury

7

and how those services compare to the services rendered by the

8

law students in this action. Defendants further argue that law

9

students at Pillsbury bill a higher hourly rate than law students

10

have

received

under

§

11

1988

in

recent

cases

in

the

Eastern

District of California.

12

Bluth’s averments lack an explanation of the complexity

13

of the matters on which law students worked at Pillsbury and

14

therefore do not demonstrate that the hourly rates billed by law

15

students at the Pillsbury firm are for services comparable to the

16

services

17

District of California have awarded § 1988 fees for services

18

rendered by law clerks, including those who graduated from law

19

school, at hourly rates between $100 and $125. See Miller v.

20

Schmitz, 1:12-CV-00137-LJO, 2014 WL 642729, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb.

21

18, 2014)(setting hourly rate for law clerk who graduated from

22

law school at $100 per hour); Hall v. City of Fairfield, 2:10-CV-

23

0508 DAD, 2014 WL 1286001, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014)(same

24

at $125 per hour).

25

at

In

issue.

light
counsel

Further,

of

the

baseline

of

rates

evidence

the

Eastern

applicable

concerning

28

Plaintiffs have not shown that the law students’ hourly rate

expertise

20

of

the

in

the

to

27

and

lack

PLRA

in

Plaintiffs’

experience

the

decisions

26

the

and

recent

law

record

students,

1

should be approximately the same as their counsel’s PLRA baseline

2

rates of $110 per hour for services performed from September 1,

3

2013

4

performed from March 1, 2014 to the present. See Camacho, 523

5

F.3d at 980 (“‘[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce

6

satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line

7

with those prevailing in the community . . . .”); cf. Borunda v.

8

Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We have . . .

9

denied section 1988 fees on appeal . . . because counsel failed

10

to adequately brief the issues he presented, thereby requiring

11

the court to engage in independent research.”) Nor does any cited

12

case from the relevant community contain information justifying

13

what the law students’ rate should be in this case. However, it

14

is presumed that a lower hourly rate should apply to the law

15

students’ to account for their lack of expertise. See Barjon v.

16

Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 503 (9th Cir. 1997) (“presume[ing]” that an

17

attorney reduced the value of a request for “law clerk costs” “to

18

account for her law clerk’s lack of experience and expertise.”)

19

Therefore, the reasonable hourly rate for the law students is one

20

half of the PLRA baseline rates applicable to this action: $55

21

per

22

February 28, 2014, and $63 per hour for services performed from

23

March 1, 2014 to the present.

to

hour

February

for

28,

services

2014,

and

performed

$126

from

per

hour

September

for

1,

services

2013

to

24

v.

Whether Adjustment to the Loadstar is Warranted

25

Defendants argue that the loadstar figure should be

26

adjusted downward, contending “[P]laintiff achieved only limited

27

success” in opposing Defendants’ motion to terminate. (Defs.’

28

Opp’n, 4:20-22 (quoting Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, C2:06-CV21

1

00457-GEB, 2013 WL 5597134, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013).)

2

Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiffs attempted to expand

3

the scope of the consent decree and “were successful in none of

4

their efforts” to do so. (Defs.’ Opp’n 4:4-5.) However, PLRA

5

limits

6

“proportionately

7

proven civil rights] violation[] or . . . directly and reasonably

8

incurred

9

1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Defendants do not address this statutory

the

fees

in

recoverable

by

related

the

enforcing

on

fees

to

the

in

Plaintiffs
court

relief

this

ordered

ordered

portion

to

of

for

10

restriction

11

those

that

relief

for

violation.”

their

are
[a

§§

opposition.

Therefore, Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.

12

vi.

Whether Travel Expenses Should be Reimbursed

13

Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement for their counsel

14

and law students’ travel expenses. Defendants do not oppose this

15

portion of the motion.

16

Section 1988 “allows for recovery of reasonable out-of-

17

pocket expenses,” including travel costs, so long as they were

18

“reasonably expended.” Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th

19

Cir. 2013). However, Plaintiffs have not addressed whether the

20

PLRA’s

21

restricts

22

1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (stating “fee[s] [must be] proportionately

23

related to the court ordered relief for [a proven civil rights]

24

violation; or . . . directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing

25

the relief ordered for

26

not shown they should be reimbursed for travel expenses not shown

27

to concern the aforementioned pertinent portions of the consent

28

decree.

fee

limitation,
the

travel

prescribed
expenses

in

they

§§
may

1997e(d)(1)(A)-(B),
recover.

See

§§

violation.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs have

22

1
2
3
4

Plaintiffs seek the following reimbursements for travel
expenses:
Date
09/20/13
09/26/13

Destination
Marysville
Sacramento

Mileage
98
33

Rate
56.5
56.5

Amount
55.37
18.64

10/21/13
10/22/13

Marysville
San Bruno

98
164

56.5
56.5

55.37
92.66

11/12/13
11/25/13
12/06/13
01/17/14
01/31/14

Sacramento
Marysville
Marysville
Marysville
Lower Lake

37
98
98
98
208

56.5
56.5
56.5
56.0
56.0

20.90
55.37
55.37
54.88
116.48

02/11/14
02/14/14

Marysville
Marysville

98
98

56.0
56.0

54.88
54.88

02/18/14
02/25/14

Marysville
Marysville

98
98

56.0
56.0

Notes

54.88
54.88

Hearing on motion to terminate
consent decree

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Total

National Archives to research
Hedrick court case file
Meeting at Mexican Consulate

Konocti Conservation Camp, to
meet with inmate Perry

Students picked up documents
in response to RFP

744.56

16

Plaintiffs have not shown that the October 21, 2013

17

visit to Marysville should be reimbursed, since Plaintiffs do not

18

seek attorney’s fees for services performed during this visit and

19

Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that during the visit counsel and

20

law

21

[Plaintiffs’] previous counsel,” a service for which Plaintiffs’

22

counsel “would not bill a paying client.” (Decl. of Carter White

23

in Support of Pls.’ Mot. ¶ 12, ECF No. 139-2.)

24

failed to explain whether the meeting at the Mexican Consulate

25

concerns the relevant portions of the consent decree. Further,

26

Plaintiffs have not shown that the meeting with inmate Perry

27

concerns the relevant portions of the consent decree since the

students

attempted

to

“obtain

28
23

.

.

.

files

.

.

.

from

Plaintiffs have

1

filed Perry declarations do not concern access to legal materials

2

or female participation in the Jail’s trusty program. (Decl. of

3

Patrick Perry, ECF 133-1.) Moreover, review of the law student

4

billing records indicates that Plaintiffs have not shown that the

5

visits

6

February 11, 2014, February 18, 2014, and February 25, 2014,

7

concerned relevant portions of the consent decree. Therefore,

8

Plaintiffs have not shown these travel expenses are compensable.

to

9

the

Jail

on

December

6,

2013,

January

17,

2014,

vii. Whether Plaintiffs Are Awarded Fees for Time

10

Expended on The Fee Motion

11

Plaintiffs also seek fees for the hours their counsel

12

expended

composing

13

attorney’s fees motion. However, Plaintiffs have not submitted

14

any

15

expended on these tasks. Therefore, this portion of the motion is

16

denied. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397 (“The fee applicant . . .

17

must submit evidence in support of those hours worked.”).

evidence

18

the

opening

concerning

viii.

19

the

and

number

reply

of

briefs

hours

for

their

the

counsel

Whether Plaintiffs Are Awarded Interest on
Their Fee Award

20

Plaintiffs

seek

an

award

of

interest

on

their

fee

21

award, arguing interest should begin accruing the date on which

22

the fee award order issues. Defendants do not oppose this portion

23

of the motion. Since a party may recover interest on a § 1988 fee

24

award,

25

Mountanos,

26

interest may be awarded on § 1988 attorney’s fees); Jones v.

27

Cnty. of Sacramento, CIV S-09-1025 DAD, 2011 WL 3584332, at *19

28

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011)

this

portion
690

F.2d

of

the

742,

motion

748

(9th

is

granted.

Cir.

1982)

See

Spain

(holding

v.

that

(holding that “interest will begin
24

1

accruing on plaintiff’s award of fees on the date of this order .

2

. . .”)

3

ix.

4

For

Total Attorney’s Fees Award
the

stated

reasons,

Plaintiffs’

motion

for

5

attorney’s fees is granted in part. The total attorney’s fees

6

award is: $7,826.60. The award is calculated as follows:

7
8

Total

9

9/3/2013 – 2/28/2014

3/1/2013 –

10

5/23/2014

11

Hours

Rate

Hours

Rate

7.8

$165

.375

$189

$1357.88

108.34

$55

3.7

$63

$6,191.80

12
13

Plaintiffs’

14

Counsel

15

Law Students

16
17

Travel Expenses

$276.92

Total

$7,826.60

18
19
20

Dated:

September 5, 2014

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
25

1

APPENDIX 1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
26

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 4 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

2.7

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 5 of 55

2.7

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 6 of 55

7.55

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 7 of 55

not shown to concern
relevant portions of

3.35

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 8 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

8.9

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 9 of 55

2.3

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 10 of 55

4.8

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 11 of 55

vague

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 12 of 55

clerical

2.35

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 13 of 55

1.2

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 14 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

2.45

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 15 of 55

Travel (2.5 hrs);
Other unspecified visit activities (6 2.5 = 3.5 hrs)
12.5% of unspecified jail visit
compensable (3.5 x .125 = .4375.)
Total compensable = 2.5 + .4375 =
2.94

# of entries = 2 (reread mot.; review
statute and privileges)
Reread mot. = compensable (.7
x .5 = .35)
Review statute and recreation
privileges not shown compensable.
Total compensable = .7 x.5 = .35

4.84

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 14 of 60

5.2

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 16 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

6.8

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 17 of 55

10.65

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 18 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

2.3

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 19 of 55

clerical

clerical

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 20 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = 5.55
x .125 = .69

12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = .75
x .125 = .09
12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = .35
x .125 = .04
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree

4.02

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 20 of 60

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

12.5% shown compensable
Total Compensable = .55
x .125 = .07

.07

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 21 of 55

12.5% shown
compensable
Total Compensable = 2.5
x .125 = .31
not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree

not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree

.31

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 22 of 55

clerical

# of entries = 2 (check
email (clerical); review
notes from Henrick
meeting (not shown to
concern relevant portions
of decree))

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 23 of 55

clerical

clerical

1.10

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 24 of 55

clerical

.6

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 25 of 60

4

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 26 of 60

# of entries: 2 (check items have
been copied (.45hrs); draft letter
(.45hrs)).
Entry 1: Check items have been
copies = Clerical
Entry 2: Draft letter = Compensable
Total compensable = .45 hrs.

.65

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 27 of 60

1.55

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 25 of 55

not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree

not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 26 of 55

not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree

# of entries = 2 (create roster (1.7 hrs); make
mailing label and prepare intro letter (1.7hrs).
Create roster = clerical
Make mailing label = clerical
Prepare intro letters = compensable (1.7 x .5
=.85)
Total Compensable = 1.7 x. 5 = .85

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

vague

1

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 27 of 55

not related to
relevant portions of
decree

.2

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 28 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

1.3

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 29 of 55

clerical

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

1.10

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 30 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

Total compensable =
3.43 (see Entry No.
56929 (below) for
explanation)

# of entries: 2 (Travel (2.5 hrs.); Interviews (5.7 2.5 = 3.2))
# of interviews: 2 (Pasion (1.6); Holston (1.6))
100% Travel time compensable (2.5)
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x 1.6 = .4)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x 1.6 = .528)
Total compensable = 2.5 + .4 + .528 = 3.43

6.86

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 31 of 55

# of entries = 2 (Holston (.55 hrs);
Pasion (.55 hrs))
33% Holston compensable (.55 x .33
= .1815)
25% Pasion Compensable (.55 x. 25
= .1375)
Total Compensable = .1815 +.1375
= .32
# of entries = 2 (Holston (.35 hrs);
Pasion (.35 hrs))
33% Holston compensable (.35
x .33 = .1155) 25% Pasion
Compensable (.35 x. 25 = .0875 )
Total Compensable = .1155
+.0875 = .2

# of entries = 2 (review email (.2 hrs);
research inmates (.2 hrs)
50% Rackley compensable; Rackley is
33% of "review email" sub-entry (.5 x .2
x .33 = .033)
100% inmate research compensable
(.2)
Total Compensable = .2 + .033 = .23

clerical
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

1

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 32 of 55

# of entries = 2 (start drafting (.275);
find sample decl. and review L.R.
(.275))
33% Holston Compensable (.33
x .275 = .09075
100% other tasks compensable
Total compensable = .09075 + .275
= .37
# Decl = 3
1 Decl compensable (library)
Total compensable = .33 x 1.25
= .41
# Decl. = 4
1 Decl compensable (library)
Total compensable = .25 x .7 = .18
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
# of entries = 3 (#1. "Review
email" (.165 hrs) = not shown to
concern relevant portions of
decree; #2. Print (.165 hrs) =
clerical; #3. Review ICE
standards: (ICE recreation
standards (.0825 hrs) not shown to
concern relevant portions of the
decree; ICE library standards
compensable (.0825 hrs))
Total compensable = .08
# of entries: 2 (Travel (2.5 hrs.); vist &
review (5.1 -2.5 = 2.6))
100% Travel compensable (2.5)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x 2.6
= .858)
Total compensable = 2.5 + .858 =
3.36
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree (vague as to which
inmates this entry concerns)
4.4

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 33 of 55

not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree (vague as to which inmates
this entry refers)
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree
Total compensable = 3.36 (same trip
as Entry No. 56944 on previous page)
not shown to concern relevant portions
of decree
clerical
# of entries: 3 (update decl. (.15 hrs);
read Suliman's letter (.15 hrs); read
Silva and Singh letters (.15 hrs).
Entry 1: 2 Decls updated: Holston
(.075); Pasion (.075) ;
33% Holston compensable (.33 x .075
=.02475)
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x .075
= .01875)
Entry 2: Not shown to be compensable
since unclear whether relates to
consent decree or tort claim procedure
research referenced in Entry No.
56998.
Entry 3: Not shown to concern relevant
portions of the consent decree.
Total compensable: .02475 + .01875
= .04

3.4

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 34 of 55

not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree, since unclear
whether relates to consent decree
or tort claim procedure research
referenced in Entry No. 56998.
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
#of entries: 3 (write letters (.467 hrs);
assemble packets (.467 hrs); mail
(.467 hours).
Entry 1: Write letters: Holston
(.2335); Pasion (.2335)
33% Holston compensable (.33
x .2335 = .077055)
25% Pasion compensable (.25
x .2335 = .058375)
Entry 2: Clerical
Entry 3: Clerical
Total compensable = .077055
+ .058375 = .14
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree

.14

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 35 of 55

# of entries: 2 (Perry (.1 hr) ; Review
Decls. (.1 hr))
# decl. reviews: 2 (Pasion (.05); Holston
(.05))
Perry not compensable
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x .05
= .0125)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x .05
= .0165)
Total compensable = .0125+ .0165
= .03
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree
# of entries: 2 (Perry (.1 hr.) ; Pasion
(.05) & Holston (.05))
Perry not compensable
25% Pasion compensable (.25 x .05
= .0125)
33% Holston compensable (.33 x .05
= .0165)
Total compensable time = .0125
+ .0165 = .03
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree

.06

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 36 of 55

clerical

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

vague; clerical

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 37 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 38 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

1.5

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 39 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 40 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 41 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 42 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
printing = clerical;
other task not
shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree

.45

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 43 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

# of entries: 3 (#1-2
scheduling visits;
clerical; #3 Bechtel
declaration: not
shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree)
.1

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 44 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.1

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 45 of 55

not shown to
concern
relevant
portions of
decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 46 of 55

clerical; visit not
shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to concern
relevant portions of
decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.15

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 47 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

clerical; not shown
to concern relevant
portions of decree

2.7

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 48 of 55

12.5% Unspecified RFP
compensable
Total compensable = .125 x 1.20
= .15
12.5% Unspecified RFP
compensable
Total compensable = .125 x .15
= .02

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
Not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree. See Entries
Nos. 57755-57746.

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.92

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 49 of 55

clerical
# of entries = 2 (Talk to White re
RFP (.1); Pick Up Car (.1))
12.5% of RFP Compensable (.0125)
Pick up car not compensable. See
Entry No. 57840 (below).
Total = .0125
# of entries: 3 ((Travel) (1.25 hr);
Wait (.075); Review (.075)).
Travel & wait not compensable
because visit not shown to concern
relevant portions of decree (2hrs).
See Entry No. 57840 (below).
12.5% unspecified RFP review
compensable
Total Compensable = 125 x .075
= .01
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
clerical/not shown
to concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.02

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 50 of 55

clerical / not shown
to concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

12.5% unspecified RFP
compensable
Total Compensable
= .125 x 4.3 = .54

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.54

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 54 of 60

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% RFP compensable
Total Compensable = .125 x .5
= .06

.06

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 139-3 Filed 05/01/14 Page 55 of 60

not shown to
concern
relevant
portions of
decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

1.95

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 51 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

12.5% Joint Statement Compensable
Total compensable = .125 x 1 = .13

33% of sections drafted concern
relevant portions of decree
(library)
Total compensable = .33 x 7.2
= 2.38

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

2.66

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 52 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

# of entries: 2 (finished ICE section
(2.10 hrs); "edit my half" of
undisputed facts (2.10hrs))
Finish ICE section = not
compensable
33% of "edit my half" compensable
(see Entry No. 58019)
Total compensable = .33 x 2.10
= .69
not shown to concern relevant
portions of decree since access to
legal materials (library) section
already written
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
12.5% undisputed facts
compensable
Total Compensable = .125 x .05
= .01

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.7

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 53 of 55

12.5% undipsuted facts
compensable
Total compensable = .125
x .4 = .05
12.5% undipsuted facts
compensable
Total compensable = .125
x .3 = .04

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
since access to
legal materials
(library) sections
already written
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.09

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 54 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

0

Case 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-EFB Document 143-1 Filed 05/16/14 Page 55 of 55

not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree
not shown to
concern relevant
portions of decree

.25