Hawkins v. Wong
Filing
250
ORDER denying 243 Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 8/6/13. (Kastilahn, A)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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JEFFREY JAY HAWKINS,
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Petitioner,
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No. 2:96-cv-01155-TLN-EFB
vs.
CAPITAL CASE
KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden at San
Quentin State Prison,
Respondent.
ORDER
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This matter is before the Court on Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.
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(ECF No. 243.) For the reasons set forth below, Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is
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DENIED.
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I.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Jeffrey Jay Hawkins, a state prisoner on California’s Death Row,
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proceeding through counsel, has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 2254. On October 19, 2006, Petitioner filed a motion for evidentiary hearing. (ECF
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No. 216.) On September 2, 2010, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations
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granting an evidentiary hearing as to Claims A, B, R, S, and the ineffective assistance sub-
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claims of Claim W. (ECF No. 222.) Thereafter, both parties filed objections to the findings
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and recommendations. (ECF No. 226−227.) Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s
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objections. (ECF No. 233.) Upon the order of the magistrate judge, both parties filed
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supplemental briefing on the impact of Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011)
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(hereafter “Pinholster”). (ECF Nos. 335−336.)
On July 8, 2013, this Court issued an order adopting the magistrate judge’s
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findings and recommendations in full, including granting Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary
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hearing as to Claims A, B, R, S, and the ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims of Claim
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W. (ECF No. 240.) On July 16, 2013, Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
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contending that this Court committed clear error in granting Petitioner’s request for an
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evidentiary hearing for claims A, B, R, S and the ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims of
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Claim W. (ECF No. 243.)
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II.
STANDARD
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a
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petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief for any claim decided on the merits in state
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court proceedings unless he can demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of a claim: (1)
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“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved unreasonable application of, clearly
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established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) was
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“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
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State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In determining whether state courts have run
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afoul of § 2254(d), a federal court looks to the last reasoned state court decision. Avila v.
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Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established
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United States Supreme Court precedents “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law
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set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially
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indistinguishable from a decision” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different
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result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of §
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2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
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governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that
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principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405−06 (2000).
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A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its
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independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal
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law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.
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Likewise, in considering whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable
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under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “cannot find that the state court made an unreasonable
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determination of the facts in [a] case simply because [it] would reverse in similar circumstances
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if this case came before [it] on direct appeal.” Hurles v. Ryan, 706 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir.
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2013) (citing Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, for a petition to be
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granted, a federal court must conclude that when applying the normal standards of appellate
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review, a court could not reasonably conclude that the state court finding is supported by the
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record before it. Id. “Ordinarily, we cloak the state court’s factual findings in a presumption of
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correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, we afford such deference only if the state
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court’s fact-finding process survives our intrinsic review pursuant to AEDPA’s ‘unreasonable
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determination’ clause.” Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038 (citing Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)). “To find
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the state court’s fact finding process defective in a material way, or, perhaps, completely
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lacking, ‘we must more than merely doubt whether the process operated properly. Rather, we
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must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be
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unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’” Id. at 1030
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(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000).
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Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pinholster, for a petitioner to be
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granted an evidentiary hearing, the court must first conclude that the state-court decision was
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either an “unreasonable application” of federal law under § 2254(d)(1) or an “unreasonable
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determination” of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1401−02; see also
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Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1026, 1042 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the Supreme
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Court’s holding in Pinholster, which was limited to § 2254(d)(1) also applies to decisions made
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under § 2254(d)(2)). Further, in determining whether a state court decision is unreasonable
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under § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2), the court’s review is restricted to the record before the state court.
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Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1401; Gulbrandson, 711 F.3d at 1042 n.5. Analysis under § 2254(d) is
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required even where the state court has summarily denied the claim. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at
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1402.
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III.
ANALYSIS
Respondent contends that this Court erred in granting Petitioner’s motion
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because the magistrate judge did not make a finding under § 2254(d), and the state court’s
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decision should thus be afforded deference. (ECF No. 243 at 2.) This contention is a clear
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misrepresentation of the Court’s Order. The Order signed by this Court discussed that a
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hearing may not be granted unless this Court finds that the state court’s adjudication of the
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claims “was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and
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thus not entitled to deference under § 2254(d)(1), or that the state court unreasonably
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determined the facts and thus deference is not mandated pursuant to § 2254(d)(2).” (Order,
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ECF No. 240 at 3 (citing Pinholster).) In determining that each of these claims required an
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evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge determined, and this Court affirmed, that the state
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court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). (See ECF
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No. 240 (quoting ECF No. 222 at 111−12 (“In determining the propriety of an evidentiary
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hearing, the magistrate judge expressly noted that ‘a federal court may not grant an evidentiary
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hearing without first determining whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable
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determination of the facts.’”)).)
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Furthermore, to the extent that Respondent argues that Pinholster bars this Court
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from granting Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, it is mistaken. In Pinholster, the
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Supreme Court held that a court is restricted from using evidence that was not before the state
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court in determining whether the Petitioner has met his or her burden of showing that the state
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court’s decision was unreasonable pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1401. In
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contrast, this Court’s decision is pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), and is based on the record that was
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before the state court. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a state court makes
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factual findings without an evidentiary hearing or other opportunity for the petitioner to present
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evidence, the fact-finding process on those issues is unreasonable and thus satisfies the standard
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set forth in § 2254(d). See Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038–1039.
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Respondent contends that this Court must show deference to the state court’s
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fact-finding; however, this contention runs afoul of Ninth Circuit precedent: “We have held
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repeatedly that where a state court makes factual findings without an evidentiary hearing or
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other opportunity for the petitioner to present evidence, ‘the fact-finding process itself is
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deficient’ and not entitled to deference.” Id. at 1038 (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001 (“If, for
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example, a state court makes evidentiary findings without holding a hearing and giving
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petitioner an opportunity to present evidence, such findings clearly result in an unreasonable
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determination of the facts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Perez v. Rosario, 459
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F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2006) (amended) (“In many circumstances, a state court’s
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determination of the facts without an evidentiary hearing creates a presumption of
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unreasonableness.”); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (“where the
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petitioner establishes a colorable claim for relief and has never been afforded a state or federal
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hearing on this claim, we must remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.”); Nunes
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v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003) (“But with the state court having refused [the
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petitioner] an evidentiary hearing, we need not of course defer to the state court’s factual
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findings—if that is indeed how those stated findings should be characterized—when they were
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made without such a hearing.”); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1999)
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(according no deference where written statements by the trial judge to defense counsel “were
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not subject to any of the usual judicial procedures designed to ensure accuracy”). Thus,
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because the state court’s fact-finding process was found to be unreasonable, the state court’s
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decision is not afforded deference under AEDPA.
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As explained above, this Court is cognizant of the Supreme Court’s holding in
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Pinholster and the deference normally afforded to state court decisions under AEDPA and
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finds that its Order complied with both Pinholster and the applicable Ninth Circuit precedent.
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See Hurles, 706 F.3d at 1038–1039; Earp, 431 F.3d at 1166−67; Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001.
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Respondent’s motion fails to address the Ninth Circuit decisions relied on by the Court. As
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such, the Court finds Respondent’s motion to be uninformed and unpersuasive.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No.
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243) is hereby DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
August 6, 2013
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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge
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