USA v. El Dorado County, et al
Filing
416
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., on 7/8/11, GRANTING 394 the County's Motion for Construction, Enforcement, and Modification of Partial Consent Decree. The parties are ordered to submit a status report not later than 10 days following the date this Memorandum and Order is filed. (Kastilahn, A)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12
13
14
15
No. 2:01-cv-01520-MCE-GGH
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
EL DORADO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;
and CITY OF SOUTH LAKE TAHOE,
CALIFORNIA,
16
Defendants.
17
______________________________
18
AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS
______________________________
19
20
----oo0oo----
21
22
This litigation was filed by the United States in 2001,
23
pursuant to the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental
24
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et
25
seq. (“CERCLA”).
26
to remediate pollution discovered on the site of a former
27
landfill dump.
28
Systems lands near Meyers, California.
The government sought to recover response costs
That landfill was located within National Forest
1
1
Although the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) initially
2
sited, constructed and operated the so-called Meyers landfill,
3
beginning in the mid 1950’s it was run under the auspices of the
4
County of El Dorado (“County”).
5
waste in 1971.
6
The facility stopped accepting
After groundwater contamination was discovered at the site
7
in the 1990’s, the USFS insisted that the County and several
8
other entities bear responsibility for remediation efforts.
9
present lawsuit ensued.
The
After years of litigation, the various
10
defendants sued by the USFS began to enter into Partial Consent
11
Decrees in order to resolve the claims asserted against them.
12
The last of those Partial Consent Decrees was entered into with
13
Defendant County in August of 2010.
14
modify that Partial Consent Decree (“PCD”) on grounds that the
15
design plans it incorporated, as prepared on behalf of the
16
government, 1) contained numerous inaccuracies and
17
misrepresentations regarding site conditions; 2) were
18
substantially defective and not constructible as drafted; and
19
3) were not prepared in accordance with the standard of care
20
applicable to professional engineers.
21
County’s Motion will be granted.1
22
///
23
///
24
///
25
///
The County now moves to
As set forth below, the
26
27
28
1
Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,
the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.
Local Rule 230(g).
2
1
BACKGROUND
2
3
Under the terms of the PCD between the USFS and the County,2
4
the County agreed to consolidate the buried waste mass at the
5
former Meyers landfill by capping the area with a synthetic
6
liner.
7
rainwater and snowmelt could infiltrate the garbage and leach
8
potential contaminants into the site’s groundwater.
9
Gerri Silva, ¶ 9.
That cap was designed to reduce the potential that
See Decl. Of
This was to be accomplished pursuant to the
10
USFS’s so-called “100% Final Remedial Design” (hereinafter
11
“Design”), a plan consisting of detailed design drawings and
12
specifications created by the USFS and its consulting and design
13
firm, the Energy and Environmental Research Group (“ERRG”).
14
According to the County, while it participated in some meetings
15
about the plan as it was being developed, it was not asked to,
16
nor did it prepare, the Design itself.
17
contrary, the County maintains it had access to the landfill site
18
only under very limited circumstances as permitted by the USFS.
19
The County alleges that access did not include verification of
20
the plans and specifications as contained in the Design.
21
at ¶ 11.
Id. at ¶ 12.
To the
See id.
22
Although the USFS was itself a potentially responsible party
23
for remediation efforts under CERCLA as the owner of the landfill
24
site, the County claims it decided to enter into the PCD after
25
the government threatened to issue a Unilateral Administrative
26
Order (“UAO”) mandating cleanup by the County.
27
2
28
The PCD was approved by the Court and filed on August 20,
2010 (ECF No. 389).
3
1
The County explained that issuance of such a UAO would force it
2
to implement the Design with no financial assistance from the
3
government, and could further have resulted in the imposition of
4
additional daily and treble damages.
5
decision to settle was further motivated by the fact that a UAO
6
could also have prevented the County from obtaining indemnity
7
under its insurance policies, funds the County needed in order to
8
fund any settlement.
9
Id. at ¶ 15.
The County’s
Id. at ¶¶ 16, 21.
According to the County, it agreed to construct the Design
10
based on bids predicated on the accuracy of the specifications
11
contained in the Design.
12
some $3.43 million, once construction began the County contends
13
that serious survey, site investigation and engineering errors
14
within the Design came to light.
15
plan errors, the initially anticipated cost for the project has
16
escalated to some $7.5 million, and after two subsequent
17
redesigns of the plans the County alleges that even more
18
additional costs may be required.
19
Although the winning bid came in at
As a result of those alleged
The errors within the Design plans were significant.
Due to
20
a surveying error, the elevation of the buried waste to be
21
relocated was significantly lower than reflected in the plans.
22
The County alleges this meant that instead of having to relocate
23
33,900 cubic yards of waste as shown in the Design estimate, in
24
fact approximately 60,000 cubic yards of waste had to be moved.
25
Decl. of Greg Stanton, ¶ 5.
26
///
27
///
28
///
4
1
Additionally, large amounts of waste were found beyond the
2
parameters depicted in the Design drawings (see Ex. B to Decl. of
3
Bryan A. Stirrat), which also meant that substantially more waste
4
than anticipated had to be excavated and relocated.
5
Decl., ¶ 6.
6
clay layer in the area where the Design called for a French drain
7
to be installed, the County’s contractor had to replace an
8
additional 30,000 cubic yards of soil over the drain site.
9
Stanton Decl., ¶ 7.
Stanton
Further, because of inaccuracies in the depth of the
The cost estimate incorporated within the Design contained
10
11
calculations of the units of work needed to construct the
12
project.
13
to bid the job, and ultimately proved to be grossly understated
14
as a result of the above-described errors, among others.
15
Design plans as a whole reflected the need to relocate only
16
33,900 cubic yards of waste.
17
have currently been moved, the County claims that just the waste
18
removal portion of the required work virtually tripled during
19
construction.
20
flaws in the Design documents have already caused the USFS to
21
redesign the project once, and according to the County the
22
government is currently engaged in the second significant design
23
of the remedial design drawings, plans and specifications.
24
///
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
///
Those calculations were used by the County’s contractor
The
Because some 106,000 cubic tons
See Stanton Decl., ¶ 13.
5
As indicated above, the
1
In seeking relief from the terms of the PCD as presently
2
constituted, the County alleges that the “100% Final Remedial
3
Design Plan”, as the name would appear to suggest, expressly
4
represented just what the implementation of the Design entailed,
5
both with respect to the scope and quantity of work to be
6
performed as well as the surface and subsurface conditions
7
present at the landfill.3
8
Design therefore carried with it an implied warranty that the
9
Design was both free of any major defect and prepared in
The County argues that said “Final”
10
accordance with the standard of care applicable to professional
11
engineers and surveys.
12
use on its own property, and because the County relied on the
13
accuracy of the Design in agreeing to the PCD, the County
14
contends it would be unfair to saddle it with the cost overruns
15
associated with actually constructing the Design.
16
the County asks this Court to rescind or modify the PCF going
17
forward in order to relieve the County of the consequences of the
18
USFS’ misrepresentations as set forth in the design.
19
///
20
///
21
///
Because the USFS prepared the Design for
Consequently,
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
According to the Crawford Declaration submitted in support
of this Motion, a Final 100% Design is, according to the
standards of the engineering profession, supposed to be
constructible and sufficiently refined and detailed to be
suitable for bidding. Crawford Decl., ¶ 11. Here, the Design’s
cost estimate expressly represented that it was “considered to be
accurate within a range of plus 15% to minus 10%.” Silva Decl.,
Ex. E. Here, given the fact that the County’s initial bid of
$3.43 million has already increased to some $7.5 million and may
escalate still further, it appears that the anticipated margin of
error was plainly not satisfied.
6
1
In opposing the County’s request, the government does not
2
dispute the inaccuracies contained within the Design plan, as
3
enumerated by the County and discussed above.
4
government contends that because the terms of the PCD obligate
5
the County to perform such additional work as to attain
6
“performance standards” in remediating contaminants present at
7
the site, it is the County that remains responsible for doing
8
whatever work is necessary to construct the Design despite the
9
admitted faults contained within that Design as prepared.
Instead, the
10
11
STANDARD
12
13
Because a consent decree operates as a final judgment
14
between the parties, “it is accompanied by finality as stark as
15
an adjudication after a full trial.”
16
Inc., v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 560 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
17
Particularly since a consent decree is invoked upon “the
18
deliberate choice of the parties, a movant’s burden for
19
modification of a consent order is particularly heavy.”
20
561.
21
W.L. Gore & Associates,
Id. at
Under the terms of the PCD at issue here the Court retains
22
jurisdiction for the duration of any performance contemplated by
23
the PCD to construe or modify the PCD as “may be necessary or
24
appropriate.”
25
within it “shall be deemed to alter the Court’s power to enforce,
26
supervise, or approve modification to [the PCD].”
27
///
28
///
PCD, ¶ 116.
The PCD goes on to state that nothing
7
Id. at ¶ 120.
1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(5) authorizes the
2
Court to modify the PCD if the County establishes that “applying
3
it prospectively is no longer equitable.
4
60(b)(5).
5
establishing a “significant change either in factual conditions
6
or in law.”
7
367, 384 (1992).
8
Fed. R. Civ. P.
The movant, here the County, bears the burden of
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
Even if the County can make the requisite factual showing of
9
change, as it attempts to do by way of this Motion, the Court
10
should still not necessarily modify the PCD if the events it
11
identified “actually were anticipated at the time it entered into
12
[the] decree.”
13
(9th Cir. 2005), quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385.
United States v. Asarco Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 979
14
15
ANALYSIS
16
17
Where a project owner like the USFS provides detailed design
18
plans and specifications, the government, and not the contracting
19
party (here the County) bears the risk if such plans and
20
specifications are ultimately determined to be deficient.
21
the County points out, this theory of implied warranty for design
22
plans and specifications has been recognized for almost a hundred
23
years and stems from the United States Supreme Court’s decision
24
in United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
25
the government contracted for construction of a dry dock at its
26
Brooklyn Navy Yard in accordance with detailed plans prepared by
27
the government.
28
related to alleged defects associated with those plans.
As
In Spearin,
A dispute arose concerning additional costs
8
1
The Court upheld a government against the United States and in
2
favor of its contractor, noting that “if the contractor is bound
3
to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the
4
owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the
5
consequences of defects in the plans and specifications.”
6
136.
7
Id. at
Subsequent decisions following recognize the same principle
8
that such detailed plans carry with them an implied warranty.
9
Blount Bros. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1003, 1007 (Fed.
10
Cir. 1989); Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d
11
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
12
Placing Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 369 (1992); “[i]n
13
exchange for the right to direct specifically how a project shall
14
be performed, the government warrants that its directions are not
15
defective.”
16
entitled to reimbursement for increased costs due to defective
17
plans and specifications.
18
Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1285, 1290 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
19
Id. at 375.
As the court remarked in Concrete
It is well settled that a contractor is
See, e.g., L.W. Foster Sportwear Co.,
The so-called Spearin doctrine recognizes that if the owner,
20
here the USFS, produces design specifications setting forth in
21
precise detail how the work is to be performed with
22
specifications permitting no deviation, the owner is responsible
23
for defects in those documents.
24
States, 15 Cl. Ct. 50, 56 (1988); aff’d, 878 F.2d 1445 (Fed Cir.
25
1989).
26
///
27
///
28
///
Haehn Mgmt. Co. v. United
9
1
That scenario contrasts with circumstances where the owner issues
2
only general performance specifications, leaving both the
3
responsibility to prepare a detailed design, and the risk
4
attendant therewith, to a contractor like the County.
5
Stuyvesant Dredging, 834 F.2d at 1582.
6
See
Whether or not the PCD is a detailed design document as
7
opposed to a simple mandate that general performance
8
specifications be reached is the issue on which enforcement of
9
the PCD now turns.
The County points out the Remedial Design
10
itself calls it a 100% Final Design, consists of detailed designs
11
over 800 pages in length, and is certified by both a professional
12
engineer and a professional geologist.
13
that the PCD requires that the Design be followed to the letter.
14
County’s Mot., 12:9-16.
15
costs associated with the USFS’ defective design must fall
16
squarely on the government’s shoulders.
17
The County further claims
Consequently, the County argues that the
The government, on the other hand, states that the document
18
established only performance standards, and that the PCD
19
specifically contemplates that the government can require the
20
County to perform additional work to meet those standards.
21
supporting that contention, the government cites paragraph 13 of
22
the PCD, which states in relevant part that the PCD does not
23
constitute “a warranty or representation of any kind by [the
24
government] that compliance with the work requirements... will
25
achieve the Performance Standards” as set forth in the Plan’s
26
Record of Decision and Statement of Work.
27
///
28
///
10
PCD at ¶ 13.
In
1
The PCD goes on to state that the County’s compliance with such
2
standards “does not foreclose the Forest Service from seeking
3
additional work to achieve applicable performance standards.”
4
Id.
5
The Court does not find the government’s position to be
6
persuasive in this regard.
7
the right to demand that additional work be undertaken after
8
completion of the Design itself in order to achieve desired
9
performance standards, that does not affect the County’s right to
10
rely on the detailed plans contained in the Design to satisfy its
11
initial obligation.
12
be no question that the plans and specifications fall within
13
Spearin’s purview.
14
detailed design specifications approved by its professionals and
15
required that the County adhere to the scope and method of work
16
incorporated in the Design.
17
specifications prepared by the USFS and contained within the
18
Design, performance standards simply establish an overall
19
objective and allow the contractor to determine how to meet that
20
objective.
21
For purposes of Spearin, it is clear that the Design at issue
22
here consists of detailed design specifications rather than
23
overall performance objectives.
Although the government may well have
With respect to the Design itself, there can
The government owned the property, developed
Unlike the detailed plans and
Haehn Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. at 56.
There can be no question here, given the evidence before
24
25
the Court, that the USFS Design contained significant errors
26
resulting in substantially increased costs to the County in
27
construction of the Design.
28
///
11
1
Spearin accordingly mandates that at least with regard to
2
completing the initial Design, the government is responsible for
3
additional work occasioned by defects in the Design.
4
This conclusion does not preclude the government from later
5
seeking, under the terms of the PCD, additional work to satisfy
6
overall performance standards.
7
additional work may be required, however, does not absolve the
8
government of responsibility for errors contained within the
9
Design itself.
The possibility that such
The fact that additional work may ultimately be
10
required even after the Design is completed, as stipulated in the
11
PCD, does not put the County on notice that the Design plan
12
itself was not constructible as prepared, contained incorrect
13
survey elevations, misrepresented the extent of waste as shown on
14
the plans, or contained misleading information on subsurface
15
conditions.
16
contained within the Design plans may have been “somewhat off the
17
mark.”
18
under the circumstances to assign to the County the
19
responsibility for both those errors and others contained within
20
the USFS Design.
21
the government, and the PCD has to be modified accordingly.
22
///
23
///
24
///
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
///
Even the government appears to concede that the data
Opp., 1:15.
The Court finds that it would be inequitable
Such responsibility must instead be borne by
12
1
CONCLUSION
2
3
The County’s Motion for Construction, Enforcement, and
4
Modification of Partial Consent Decree (ECF No. 394) is GRANTED.
5
The County’s obligation to continue construction of the Design,
6
or any new designs prepared by the USFS for contaminant
7
remediation on the former Meyers landfill site, is suspended
8
pending further order of this Court.
9
for additional costs paid by the County to construct the Final
The government’s liability
10
100% Remedial Design, and for any costs incurred by the County in
11
completing said Design in the future, will be determined by
12
separate evidentiary hearing.
13
and confer 1) with respect to any discovery needed in advance of
14
such a hearing; 2) the anticipated length of the hearing itself
15
and whether it should be assigned to a special magistrate for
16
adjudication; and 3) suggested dates for the hearing so that it
17
may be scheduled as soon as reasonably feasible.
18
ordered to submit that information to the Court, by way of Status
19
Report, not later than ten (10) days following the date this
20
Memorandum and Order is filed.
21
22
The parties are directed to meet
The parties are
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 8, 2011
23
24
25
_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
26
27
28
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?