Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports US, et al

Filing 171

ORDER signed by Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 8/19/11 ORDERING 164 Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs ADA claims for lack of standing is granted; Defendants motion to dismiss plain tiffs claim breach of contract in violation of the ADA for failure to state a claim is granted. This claim is dismissed with prejudice; Defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs state law claims is denied; Plaintiff is granted leave of twenty-one (21) days to file an amended complaint in which he may only amend allegations in his complaint concerning whether he encountered certain barriers and remove allegations concerning the breach of contract claim.(Matson, R)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

BYRON CHAPMAN,
NO. CIV. S-04-1339 LKK/DAD

12
13

Plaintiff,
v.
O R D E R

14

PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC.,

15

Defendant.
/

16
17

Plaintiff brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities

18

Act and California law challenging the accessibility of defendant

19

public accommodation. Currently before the court is defendants

20

motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, defendants

21

motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND

22
23

A.

Plaintiff’s Original (2004) Complaint

24

On July 13, 2004, plaintiff Byron Chapman (“plaintiff” or

25

“Chapman”) filed his original complaint against defendant Pier 1

26

Imports (U.S.). Inc. (“defendant” or “Pier 1"). Plaintiff alleged
1

1

that he “requires the use of a motorized wheelchair and a vehicle

2

with a lift system to transport his motorized wheelchair when

3

traveling . . . in public” due to a spinal cord injury. Compl.,

4

Doc. No. 1, at ¶ 7. While plaintiff alleged that he encountered

5

architectural barriers that denied him full and equal access when

6

visiting the store, he did not identify any specific barriers that

7

he encountered. Id. at ¶ 18. Rather, plaintiff only provided the

8

following allegation: “Attached as Exhibit A is a true and accurate

9

list, to the extent known by Chapman, (with photos) of the barriers

10

that denied him access to the Store, or which he seeks to remove

11

on behalf of others . . . .” Id. at ¶ 19 (emphasis added). The use

12

of the word “or” in this sentence made it impossible to determine

13

which barriers, if any, denied plaintiff access to the store as

14

opposed to those that did not deny him access during his visits,

15

but for which he nonetheless sought injunctive relief.

16

B.

Ninth Circuit Decision

17

On June 19, 2006, this court granted plaintiff’s motion for

18

summary judgment as to seven barriers listed in a report of the

19

facilities and denied defendant’s motion as to those barriers. Pier

20

1 appealed this decision arguing that plaintiff lacked standing as

21

to these seven barriers because he had not personally encountered

22

them and, consequently, they did not deter him from returning to

23

the store. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944

24

(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit

25

reversed this court’s grant of summary judgment and found plaintiff

26

lacked

standing

as

to

the

barriers
2

he

had

not

personally

1

encountered. Id.

2

Thereafter,

plaintiff

petitioned

for

and

was

granted

a

3

rehearing en banc. On January 7, 2011, the en banc panel issued an

4

opinion holding that an ADA plaintiff has standing to sue for

5

injunctive relief as to both encountered and unencountered barriers

6

related to his disability when that plaintiff suffers an injury-in-

7

fact by encountering a barrier that deprives him of full and equal

8

enjoyment of the facility due to his particular disability. Id. The

9

panel

confirmed

the

established

rule

that

a

plaintiff

“must

10

demonstrate that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, that the injury

11

is traceable to [Pier 1]’s actions, and that the injury can be

12

redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 946 (internal citation

13

omitted). The court further emphasized that, “to establish standing

14

to pursue injunctive relief, which is the only relief available to

15

private plaintiffs under the ADA, he must demonstrate a real and

16

immediate threat of repeated injury in the future.” Id. (internal

17

quotation omitted). After recognizing that “the causation and

18

redressability elements of standing are not at issue,” the Circuit

19

focused its inquiry on “whether Chapman has suffered an injury-in-

20

fact and whether he has demonstrated a likelihood of future injury

21

sufficient to support injunctive relief.” Id.

22

In

order

to

demonstrate

an

injury-in-fact,

the

Circuit

23

explained, a disabled individual must encounter a barrier that

24

interferes with his “full and equal enjoyment” of a facility. Id.

25

at 947 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). Standing is demonstrated

26

where plaintiff alleges a violation of the ADA Accessibility
3

1

Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (“ADAAG”) that relates to

2

his disability. Id. To demonstrate standing to pursue injunctive

3

relief, a plaintiff must also demonstrate “a sufficient likelihood

4

that he will again be wronged in a similar way.” Id. at 948

5

(internal quotation omitted). In the context of a disability access

6

claim, a plaintiff can show such standing by “[d]emonstrating an

7

intent to return to a noncompliant accommodation . . . [or that]

8

he is deterred from visiting a noncompliant public accommodation

9

because he has encountered barriers related to his disability

10

there.” Id. at 949. “If Chapman has standing to pursue injunctive

11

relief as to some of the barriers that he actually encountered,

12

then he has standing to seek an order requiring the removal of all

13

barriers at [Pier 1] that are related to his disability and that

14

he is likely to encounter on future visits.” Id. at 951.

15

After confirming the standard for demonstrating standing for

16

disability access cases, the en banc panel found that Chapman

17

failed to allege the essential elements of Article III standing.

18

Id. at 954. The Circuit explained that,

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Chapman leaves the federal court to guess which, if
any, of the alleged violations deprived him of the
same full and equal access that a person who is not
wheelchair bound would enjoy when shopping at Pier
One. Nor does he identify how any of the alleged
violations threatens to deprive him of full and equal
access due to his disability if he were to return to
the Store, or how any of them deter him from visiting
the Store due to his disability. Although Chapman may
establish standing as to unencountered barriers
related to his disability, the list of barriers
incorporated into his complaint does nothing more than
perform a wholesale audit of the defendant's premises.

26
4

1
2

Id. at 955 (internal quotation omitted).
C.

Plaintiff’s First Amended (2011) Complaint
1.

3

Allegations Concerning Encountered Barriers

4

The

5

standing

6

describing the barriers. For this reason, the court here quotes the

7

relevant paragraph of Chapman’s complaint:

8

entire

dispute

concerns

the

as

to

whether

sentence

plaintiff

structure

of

his

has

alleged

allegations

23

Chapman visited the store and encountered barriers
(both physical and intangible) that interfered with if not outright denied - his ability to use and enjoy
the goods, services, privileges, and accommodations
offered at the store. To the extent known by Chapman,
these barriers currently include the following:
•
A customer service counter for disabled
patrons that is between 28 and 34 inches
above the floor, which has the requisite
clear space (i.e., not cluttered by
merchandise) and which is open at all times.
Because Chapman is in a wheelchair, he needs
an accessible counter to make purchases at
the store. Failing to provide such a counter
interferes with his ability to avail himself
of the store’s goods and services.
•
Aisles that are not a minimum of 36-inches
wide. Because Chapman is in a wheelchair, he
needs paths of travel that is [sic] at least
36-inches wide so that his wheelchair does
not run into merchandise, other patrons, or
the sides of the aisles themselves. Failure
to provide a clear floor space interferes
with his ability to traverse the store.
. . .
Chapman intends to return to Pier 1's store within a
year (for a shopping excursion); and anticipates
suffering, or has suffered (or both) objective
discrimination because the store lacks an accessible
counter and has aisles that are too narrow, which
create a real and immediate threat of future injury.

24

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. No. 159, ¶¶ 11, 13 (emphasis

25

in original). The dispute concerns whether, from these allegations,

26

the court can reasonably infer that Chapman actually encountered

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

5

1

the customer service counter and aisles. Specifically, the question

2

is whether the use of the phrase, “To the extent known by Chapman,”

3

and the term, “currently,” prevents the court from making the

4

inference that Chapman encountered these identified barriers.
2.

5

Allegations Concerning Discrimination through
Contract

6
7

In the FAC, plaintiff also adds allegations that, “Pier 1

8

executed a contract stating that they would provide and maintain

9

[certain] accessible elements. By failing to do so, Pier 1 has

10

breached its contract with Chapman, and discriminated against him

11

through the use of a contract.” Id. at ¶ 12. Further, Chapman

12

represents to the court in his complaint that, “[T]he parties

13

agreed via a contract that Pier 1 would maintain the store in an

14

accessible manner; in exchange, Chapman agreed to a stipulated

15

judgment.” Id. at ¶ 21 (emphasis in original). In a footnote to the

16

sentence,

17

contract are subject to a confidentiality provision and cannot be

18

repeated here.” Id. at ¶ 21 n.1.

plaintiff

alleges

that,

“The

precise

terms

of

the

19

D.

2007 Joint Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment

20

On June 19, 2007, after the court had issued the summary

21

judgment order that Pier 1 appealed, the parties filed a joint

22

stipulation for entry of final judgment. The parties stipulated

23

that Pier 1 was to remove certain barriers within one hundred and

24

twenty days and make a final modification within ninety days after

25

Pier 1's appeal is exhausted. Joint Stip., Doc. No. 115, ¶¶ 12, 13.

26

The court entered the stipulated final judgment on June 25, 2007.
6

1

Doc. No. 116. In this order, the court specifically retained

2

jurisdiction over the case for purposes of enforcing the final

3

judgment. Id.

4
5
6

Both plaintiff and defendant represented to the court in this
filing that,

14

This Stipulation and the attached Final Judgment
contain the entire agreement and understanding between
the parties concerning the subject civil action, and
supercedes and replaces all prior negotiations,
proposed agreements and agreements, written or oral.
Each of the parties acknowledges that no other party,
nor any agent or attorney of such party, has made any
promise, representation or warranty whatsoever,
expressed or implied, which is not contained in this
Stipulation or the attached Final Judgment, to induce
him or it to execute this Stipulation or the attached
Final Judgment. Each of the parties further
acknowledges that he or it is not executing this
Stipulation or the attached Final Judgment in reliance
on any promise, representation or warranty not
contained in this Stipulation or the attached Final
Judgment.

15

Joint Stip. at ¶ 4. This representation to the court is in direct

16

conflict with plaintiff’s representation to the court in his FAC

17

that he agreed to the stipulated judgment in exchange for other

18

confidential terms.1

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

II. STANDARDS

19
20

A.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

21

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke the

22

jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of establishing

23

that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S.

24
25
26

1

The court does note that the joint stipulation references
a separately entered settlement agreement as to several issues not
addressed in the joint stipulation. Id. at ¶ 10.
7

1

269, 278 (1936); Assoc. of Medical Colleges v. United States, 217

2

F.3d 770, 778-779 (9th Cir. 2000). On a motion to dismiss pursuant

3

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied

4

vary according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

5

Here, the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack.
the

federal

6

is,

7

jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their

8

face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction.

9

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
motion

defendants

of

this

contend

type,

the

that

the

That

plaintiff

allegations

is

of

Safe Air for
In a Rule

10

12(b)(1)

entitled

to

11

safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

12

is made. See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir.

13

1994), Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir.

14

1990); see also 2-12 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 12.30

15

(2009).

16

be true, and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to

17

allege an element necessary

18

Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036,

19

1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003), Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n.1

20

(9th Cir. 2001).

The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to

for subject matter jurisdiction.

21

B.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

22

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion challenges a complaint’s

23

compliance with the pleading requirements provided by the Federal

24

Rules.

25

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

26

the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading

8

The complaint must give

1

defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

2

which it rests.”

3

(2007) (internal quotation and modification omitted).

4

Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported by

5

factual allegations.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.

6

Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

7

framework of a complaint,” neither legal conclusions nor conclusory

8

statements are themselves sufficient, and such statements are not

9

entitled to a presumption of truth.

“While legal conclusions can provide the

Id. at 1949-50.

Iqbal and

10

Twombly therefore prescribe a two step process for evaluation of

11

motions to dismiss.

12

factual allegations, and the court then determines whether these

13

allegations,

14

favorable to the plaintiff, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement

15

to relief.”

taken

The court first identifies the non-conclusory

as

true

and

construed

in

the

light

most

Id.; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).

16

“Plausibility,” as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does not

17

refer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in proving the

18

allegations.

19

factual allegations, when assumed to be true, “allow[] the court

20

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

21

the

22

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

23

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

24

acted unlawfully.”

25

complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking a

26

cognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient facts alleged

Instead, it refers to whether the non-conclusory

misconduct

alleged.”

Iqbal,

129

S.Ct.

at

1949.

“The

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

9

A

1

under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

2

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
III. ANALYSIS

3
4

A.

5

As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit set forth what plaintiff

6

must allege to demonstrate standing. In short, to demonstrate that

7

he suffered an injury-in-fact, plaintiff must allege that he

8

encountered a barrier that interferes with his full and equal

9

enjoyment of the public accommodation. A plaintiff has demonstrated

10

such interference if the alleged barrier violates ADAAG standards

11

that relate to his disability.

12

Standing

Defendant raises two arguments as to why plaintiff has not

13

alleged

sufficient

14

contends that plaintiff did not allege that he actually encountered

15

any barriers in its store. Second, Pier 1 argues that Chapman did

16

not allege that any of the listed barriers actually interfered with

17

his full and equal enjoyment of the store. The first dispute

18

entirely derives from plaintiff’s ambiguous choice

19

Instead of simply stating that he encountered the two identified

20

barriers, plaintiff muddled his allegation with an unnecessary

21

phrase and adjective. Specifically, instead of clearly stating,

22

“These

23

barriers,” plaintiff alleged, “To the extent known by Chapman,

24

these barriers currently include the following.” In his opposition,

25

plaintiff states that he can amend his complaint to remove this

26

ambiguity.

barriers

facts

are”

or

to

demonstrate

“Chapman

10

standing.

encountered

the

First,

it

of words.

following

1

On August 17, 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued a further opinion

2

explicating its previous en banc decision. Specifically, in Oliver

3

v. Ralphs Grocery Company, the Circuit determined that similar

4

language in a complaint filed by the same plaintiff’s counsel in

5

this action failed to specify which, if any, barriers the plaintiff

6

had personally encountered. ___ F.3d ____, No. 09-56447, at 10890

7

(9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2011). In Oliver, however, plaintiff had alleged

8

that, “To the extent known by Oliver, the barriers at Food 4 Less

9

included, but are not limited to” certain barriers. Id. at 10886.

10

Here, Chapan has not used the open-ended “included, but not limited

11

to” language, but nonetheless, incorporated the identical ambiguous

12

phrase, “To the extent known by [plaintiff]”. Without finding that

13

plaintiff’s obscure allegations fail to meet pleading requirements

14

to demonstrate standing to sue, the court nonetheless instructs

15

plaintiff to file a second amended complaint in which he clearly

16

and simply alleges which barriers he has encountered. Doing so will

17

avoid any future confusion and allow this case to proceed.

18

Defendant also contends that plaintiff has not alleged facts

19

from which the court can plausibly infer that plaintiff has alleged

20

that the identified barriers actually interfered with his full use

21

and enjoyment of Pier 1. Assuming that plaintiff corrects the

22

syntactic errors discussed above, the court considers whether

23

plaintiff’s

24

discussed in the previous section, the Ninth Circuit found that a

25

plaintiff can allege interference with the full use and enjoyment

26

of a public accommodation by showing that the barrier violates

descriptions

of

the

11

barriers

are

sufficient.

As

1

ADAAG standards for full and equal enjoyment if the standard

2

relates to plaintiff’s disability. Plaintiff has alleged that the

3

customer service counter is not between 28 and 34 inches above the

4

floor and that the aisles are not a minimum of 36 inches wide. The

5

ADAAG sets forth the following technical requirements:

6
7
8

4.32.4 Height of Tables or Counters: The tops of
accessible tables and counters shall be from 28 in to
34 in (710 mm to 865 mm) above the finish floor or
ground.
4.3.3 Width. The minimum clear width of an accessible
route shall be 36 in (915 mm) except at doors.

9
10

Plaintiff

has

11

disability in that the required height and width allow him to

12

access

13

plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient for the court to plausibly

14

infer that the identified barriers, assuming the introductory

15

sentence is corrected to remove the ambiguity discussed above,

16

interfered with his full and equal enjoyment of Pier 1.

the

alleged

counter

that

space

these

and

requirements

maneuver

his

relate

to

wheelchair.

his

Thus,

17

B.

Discrimination Through Contract

18

Plaintiff also brings what appears to be a straightforward

19

breach of contract claim, but attempts to do so as a violation of

20

the ADA. He alleges that Pier 1 breached a contract with Chapman

21

that it would provide and maintain certain accessible elements. FAC

22

¶¶ 12, 21. Instead of bringing a straightforward breach of contract

23

claim, however, plaintiff argues that by breaching this contract

24

Pier 1 has discriminated against him through the use of a contract.

25

The relevant section of the ADA provides that,

26

It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or
12

1

4

class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or
disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or
through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements
with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from
a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to
other individuals.

5

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The plain meaning

6

of this statute does not allow for plaintiff’s theory of recovery.

7

The language clearly prohibits a public accommodation from entering

8

into a contract to avoid its responsibilities under the act, and

9

does not provide any prohibition against breaching a contract to

10

remove barriers. Such an interpretation also conforms with the

11

legislative history of the section. H.R. Rep. No. 101–485(II) at

12

104, reprinted at 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 387 (“[T]he reference to

13

contractual arrangements is to make clear that an entity may not

14

do

15

prohibited from doing directly under this Act.”). Thus, plaintiff’s

16

breach of contract claim is dismissed with prejudice insofar as it

17

is brought as a violation of the ADA.

2
3

indirectly

through

contractual

arrangements

what

it

is

18

C.

19

While plaintiff has not stated a claim for discrimination

20

through the use of a contract under the ADA, he has alleged facts

21

to

22

circumstances, the court would ordinarily instruct plaintiff to

23

file an amended complaint bringing a separate cause of action for

24

breach

25

concerns that prevent such a conclusion.

26

Regular Breach of Contract Claim

support

of

a

regular

contract.

breach

However,

of

contract

here

there

claim.

are

Under

several

these

unusual

First, the court must consider the implications of the Ninth
13

1

Circuit’s finding that, “Chapman lacked standing at the outset of

2

this litigation to assert the ADA claims.” If the court did not

3

have jurisdiction over this matter when filed, then the final

4

judgment order it entered approving the joint stipulation is also

5

vacated. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007,

6

1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that no precedential effect should

7

be given to the determination of an issue that should never have

8

been decided). Specifically, if the Ninth Circuit did not find that

9

this court lacked jurisdiction from the outset of the litigation

10

over plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff could simply move to enforce the

11

stipulated judgment, jurisdiction over which was specifically

12

reserved by court order. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

13

511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433

14

(9th

15

implicitly found that this court lacked jurisdiction to enter the

16

order approving the stipulated judgment and reserving jurisdiction

17

over enforcement of it and, thus, the order retaining jurisdiction

18

was implicitly vacated. Accordingly, the court must interpret the

19

joint stipulation as a standard settlement agreement. The court

20

also understands that the parties entered an additional private

21

settlement, which is referenced in the joint stipulation. A breach

22

of either agreement may constitute a breach of contract claim under

23

state law.

Cir.

1995).

In

this

case,

however,

the

Ninth

Circuit

24

Second, the question still remains as to whether plaintiff

25

could bring such a state law claim in this court. “[P]endant

26

jurisdiction may be exercised when federal and state claims have
14

1

a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ and would ‘ordinarily be

2

expected to [be tried] all in one judicial proceeding.” Osborn v.

3

Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245 (2007) (quoting Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383

4

U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil

5

action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

6

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other

7

claims that are so related to claims in the action within such

8

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

9

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).

10

While clearly related, the contract claims do not share a common

11

nucleus of facts with the ADA claims. Specifically, they do not

12

concern

13

infringed upon his full and equal enjoyment of the accommodation.

14

Rather, the contract claims, the court assumes, would consist of

15

defendant’s failure to perform certain obligations. For this

16

reason, the court finds that it would be futile to allow plaintiff

17

to file an amended complaint bringing a breach of contract claim.

18

This, of course, does not preclude plaintiff from bringing a new

19

action against defendant for breach of contract in state court or,

20

if there is a basis for jurisdiction, in federal court.2

whether

plaintiff

encountered

certain

barriers

that

21
2

22
23
24
25
26

The court must further note serious contradictions between
the FAC and the record in this case. Specifically, plaintiff has
alleged in the FAC that he entered a contract, whose terms are
subject to a confidentiality provision, in which Chapman agreed to
a stipulated judgment. The terms of the stipulation, which was
filed in this case to persuade the court to enter judgment,
however, explicitly state that it was not executed in reliance on
any terms not contained in the stipulated judgment, which is not
confidential. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, an attorney making any
representation to the court “certifies that to the best of the
15

1
2

D.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

3

Defendant lastly argues that this court should decline to

4

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law

5

claims premised upon the same factual allegations supporting his

6

ADA claim because state law issues predominate.3 Assuming that

7

plaintiff will amend his complaint to clearly allege that he

8

encountered the challenged barriers, the court now considers the

9

merits of this argument. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a court may

10

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a related state

11

claim if “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State

12

law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or

13

claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3)

14

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

15

original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry under the circumstances . . . the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” Here, it appears that either both
parties made a knowingly false representation to the court when
filing the joint stipulation or plaintiff made a knowingly false
representation in his complaint. Nonetheless, the court declines
to require further explanation from the parties because it is not
granting plaintiff leave to add a breach of contract claim in this
case. Thus, the court does not make any determination as to whether
the representations made by the parties in this case are
sanctionable under Rule 11.
3

Defendant also argues that the court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims if the court
dismisses plaintiff’s ADA claim. The court does not discuss this
question because it is granting plaintiff leave to amend his ADA
claim.
16

1

are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Pier 1

2

cites to a few district court orders finding that state law issues

3

predominate in cases where ADA claims were brought with state law

4

claims. It refers the court to no precedential authority requiring

5

the court to follow their reasoning in the instant case.

6

Courts in this district, however, have routinely found that

7

the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is proper in cases very

8

similar to the case at bar. See Johnson v. United Rental Northwest,

9

Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00204-JAM-EFB, 2011 WL 2746110, at *4 (E.D. Cal.

10

Jul. 13, 2011); Johnson v. Makinen, No. 2:09-CV-796 FCD KJM, 2009

11

WL 2137130, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 15, 2009); Johnson v. Barlow, No.

12

CIV. S-06-01150 WBS GGH, 2007 WL 1723617, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 9,

13

2007).

14

supplemental

15

preclude

16

jurisdiction over a state law claim under the Unruh Act [in an ADA

17

case].” Barlow, 2007 WL 1723617, at *3. They emphasized that the

18

burdens of proof and standards of liability are identical for both

19

ADA and Unruh Act claims. Id. This court here adopts this reasoning

20

and,

21

plaintiff’s state law claims.

These

a

courts

reasoned

jurisdiction
district

therefore,

in

court

exercises

that

these

from

declining
cases

ever

“would

asserting

supplemental

to

exercise

effectively
supplemental

jurisdiction

22

IV. CONCLUSION

23

For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows:

24

(1)

over

25
26

Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 164) is granted
in part and denied in part.

(2)

Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claims for
17

1
2

lack of standing is granted.
(3)

Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim breach

3

of contract in violation of the ADA for failure to state

4

a

5

prejudice.4

6

(4)

7
8

claim

is

granted.

This

claim

is

dismissed

with

Defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state law
claims is denied.

(5)

9

Plaintiff is granted leave of twenty-one (21) days to
file an amended complaint in which he may only amend

10

allegations

in

11

encountered

certain

12

concerning the breach of contract claim.

13

DATED:

complaint
barriers

concerning
and

remove

whether

he

allegations

IT IS SO ORDERED.

14

his

August 19, 2011.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

4

The court is in no way precluding plaintiff from bringing
a claim for breach of contract under state law in a separate
action.
18