Chacoan v. Rohrer et al

Filing 208

ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on 03/27/12 ORDERING that plaintiff's 201 Motion for New Trial is DENIED. (Benson, A.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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HIPOLITO M. CHACOAN,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:05-cv-02276-MCE-KJN

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DR. ROHRER, et al.,

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Defendants.

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This case proceeded to a jury trial on January 30, 2012. On

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February 3, 2012, the jury reached a verdict in favor of

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Defendants Dr. Traquina and Dr. Naku.

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new trial pursuant to Federal Rule1 of Civil Procedure 59.

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Plaintiff now moves for a

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All future references to “rule” or “rules” are to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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STANDARD

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Under Rule 59(a), the court may grant a new trial “for any

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reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an

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action at law in federal court.”

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example, the Court may grant a new trial if “the verdict is

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contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon

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evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound discretion

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of the court, a miscarriage of justice.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).

For

Silver Sage Partners,

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Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 818-819

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(9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

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ANALYSIS

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Plaintiff asserts two general arguments in support of the

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motion for a new trial.

First, Plaintiff argues that the jury’s

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verdict in favor of both Dr. Naku and Dr. Traquina was contrary

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to the clear weight of the evidence.

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that the court’s decision to not instruct the jury on Plaintiff’s

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proffered special instructions constituted legal error.2

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Second, Plaintiff maintains

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Plaintiff also argued that the court should grant a new
trial as to Defendant Naku because of his repeated acts of
misconduct while testifying at trial. The court finds this
argument unavailing. Specifically, nothing about Dr. Naku’s
initial refusal to directly answer questions during examination
could have possibly prejudiced Plaintiff. Indeed, contrary to
Plaintiff’s contention, if anything, Dr. Naku’s conduct on the
witness stand would have prejudiced himself, not Plaintiff.
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A.

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Clear Weight of the Evidence

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Plaintiff’s argument as to Dr. Traquina rests on his

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contention that Dr. Traquina, the chief medical officer at the

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prison where Plaintiff was incarcerated, knew that patients were

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“falling through the cracks,” yet did nothing to alleviate the

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problem.

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medical operation Dr. Traquina oversaw resulted in Plaintiff’s

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injury.

Plaintiff maintains that this fatal error in the

Thus, Plaintiff argues, the jury’s finding that

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Defendant was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

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medical need was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.

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Dr. Traquina counters that, even if, as Plaintiff maintains,

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Dr. Traquina was aware that some inmates with routine problems

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were “falling through the cracks,” that, in and of itself, does

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not demonstrate the jury’s conclusion that Dr. Traquina was not

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deliberately indifferent to Chacoan’s serious medical needs was

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clearly contradicted by the weight of the evidence presented at

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trial.

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budgetary restraints that required a concentration on high risk

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patients.

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delayed, [Dr. Traquina] relied on their complaints, either

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written or oral; letters or telephone calls from their families;

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or formal inmate grievances, also known as 602 appeals.”

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(Dr. Traquina’s Opp’n, filed March 5, 2012, [ECF No. 205] at

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3:7-10.)

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notice, he personally reviewed the inmates case to rectify

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existing problems.

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Dr. Traquina testified that he was under serious

Moreover, for “routine patients whose care was

Dr. Traquina also points out that when he received such

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Thus, Dr. Traquina avers the jury’s finding — that Dr. Traquina

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was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical

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needs — did not conflict with the clear weight of the evidence.

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With regard to Defendant Dr. Naku, Plaintiff argues that the

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jury’s conclusion that Dr. Naku was not deliberately indifferent

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to Plaintiff’s medical needs was contrary to the clear weight of

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the evidence because he testified that, despite being aware of

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Plaintiff’s ear condition, he took no steps to ensure that

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Plaintiff received the surgery he needed.

Naku counters that the

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jury did not erroneously find that he was not deliberately

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indifferent to Plaintiff’s ear condition because Dr. Naku is not

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an ear, nose and throat specialist.

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evidence showed that he consistently provided Plaintiff with

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antibiotics which, according to Dr. Lustig, Plaintiff’s surgeon

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at the University of California Medical Center, San Francisco, is

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an appropriate manner to treat infections associated with

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Plaintiff’s ear condition.

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Naku also notes that the

The court must apply a stringent standard to Plaintiff’s

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argument that the verdict reached cannot be reconciled with the

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weight of the evidence.

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734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984).

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be granted on this ground only if the verdict is against the

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"great weight" of the evidence or if "it is quite clear that the

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jury has reached a seriously erroneous result."

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Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp.,

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A motion for new trial may

Id., see also

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It would amount to an abuse of discretion on the part of the

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court to grant a new trial on any lesser showing, and the court

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cannot extend relief simply because it would have arrived at a

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different verdict.

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Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Silver Sage Partner, LTD v. City of Desert

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented a

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compelling argument for granting the extraordinary remedy sought.

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In the Court’s view, there was sufficient evidence from which the

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jury could have reached its conclusion that neither Dr. Naku nor

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Dr. Traquina were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

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medical needs.

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conflicting evidence regarding whether Dr. Traquina was

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deliberately indifferent.

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referenced this conflicting evidence in denying Dr. Traquina’s

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Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law.

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the jury found credible Dr. Traquina’s testimony that, given the

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circumstances, he took sufficient precautions to ensure that

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those prisoners with serious medical needs did not slip through

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the cracks.

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similar to that employed by Dr. Traquina and that some routine

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scheduling matters still fell through the cracks.

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the Court cannot find that the jury’s determination that

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Dr. Traquina was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

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serious medical need was contrary to the overwhelming weight of

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the evidence.

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As to Dr. Traquina, the parties presented

Indeed, the court specifically

It is clear that

Indeed, Dr. Lustig testified that his system was

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To this end,

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Plaintiff’s arguments with regard to Dr. Naku are similarly

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unavailing.

Specifically, the evidence showed that, even if it

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was not the ideal course of action, Dr. Naku saw Plaintiff on a

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number of occasions and administered the treatment he thought

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appropriate at the time — the same treatment Dr. Lustig

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testified was appropriate for Plaintiff’s ear condition.

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evidence, combined with the fact that Dr. Naku was not an ear,

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nose and throat specialist, provided the jury with sufficient

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evidence to find that Dr. Naku was not deliberately indifferent

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to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Consequently Plaintiff’s

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motion for new trial against Dr. Naku on grounds of insufficiency

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of the evidence must be denied.

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B.

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Plaintiff’s Special Jury Instructions

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Plaintiff’s second argument in seeking a new trial rests

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with his contention that the court committed clear legal error by

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failing to give special jury instructions 20a and 21a.

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special instruction 20a requested the court to deviate from the

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Ninth Circuit’s Model Jury instructions regarding supervisory

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liability under 42. U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983).

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argues that his proffered special instruction regarding

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supervisory liability should have been given in light of the

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Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202

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(9th Cir. 2011).

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Proposed

Plaintiff

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Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that Starr changed the scope of

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supervisory liability in this Circuit, and thus, the Ninth

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Circuit’s model civil jury instruction 9.3 — the instruction the

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court ultimately gave — was insufficient to apprise the jury of

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the current contours of supervisory liability under Section 1983.

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Plaintiff’s proposed special instruction 21a requested the court

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give a specific instruction regarding what constitutes a serious

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medical need in accordance with Lolli v. Cnty of Orange, 351 F.3d

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410 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Plaintiff argues that this instructions

should have been given to avoid jury confusion.

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Defendant contends that failure to give proposed instruction

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20a was not in error because Starr did not alter the law upon

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which the standard jury instruction used by the court was based.

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Defendant further maintains that Plaintiff has offered no

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evidence to show that failure to give Plaintiff’s proposed jury

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instruction 21a misled the jury in any regard.

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Defendants argue that, by following the Ninth Circuit’s Model

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Instruction 9.25 regarding deliberate indifference to serious

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medical need, the court did not abuse its discretion.

Further,

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A new trial may be required when the court offers incorrect

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jury instructions that “infect[] the deliberative process of the

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jury with regard to its evaluation of the” claims presented.

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Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1549 (11th Cir. 1996).

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The district “court’s formulation of the jury instructions” is

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within the discretion of the court.

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Magazing, Inc., 85 F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Masson v. New Yorker

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A challenge to the district court’s composition of the jury

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instructions cannot be successfully challenged unless “the

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instructions, considered as a whole, were inadequate or

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misleading.”

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Id.

The court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s contention that the

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court clearly committed legal error by omitting Plaintiff’s

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proposed special jury instructions and instead relying on the

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Ninth Circuit’s Model Civil Jury Instructions for Plaintiff’s

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Section 1983 claims.

First, contrary to Plaintiff’s contention,

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Starr did not create a new legal standard regarding supervisory

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liability under § 1983; it merely held that the United States

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Supreme Court's ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

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did not eliminate supervisory liability from the scope of Section

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1983.

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reaffirmed the long-standing 9th Circuit standards governing

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supervisory liability under Section 1983. Id. at 2262-2263.

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this end, the court did not err in utilizing Ninth Circuit Model

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Jury Instruction 9.3.

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Id. at 2258.

After concluding that it did not, the court

To

Second, Plaintiff’s contention that the court’s failure to

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give Plaintiff’s requested jury instruction defining serious

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medical need necessitates a new trial is similarly unpersuasive.

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Indeed, Plaintiff’s contention is belied by his own previous

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filings — Plaintiff, in his trial brief, expressly stated that

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it was undisputed that Mr. Chacoan has a serious medical need.3

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Indeed, “Defendants [did] not dispute that [P]laintiff has
a serious medical need. . . . Rather, they dispute[d] whether
they acted with deliberate indifference.” (Findings &
Recommendation, filed May 14, 2009, [ECF No. 91] at 11:24-26.)
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(Pl.’s Trial Brief, filed Nov. 17, 2011, [ECF No 140] at 9:19.)

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If there was no dispute as to whether Plaintiff had a serious

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medical need, the Court cannot surmise how lack of an instruction

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as to what constitutes a serious medical need detrimentally

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misled or confused the jury.

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not commit error in denying Plaintiff’s request to include

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Plaintiff’s proffered special instruction 21a.

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Thus, the Court finds that it did

Plaintiff has simply failed to show that the court’s
employment of the Ninth Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions

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constituted such clear error to merit the extraordinary remedy of

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a new trial.

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basis of denying Plaintiff’s requested special jury instructions

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is denied.

Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for a
new trial is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 27, 2012

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_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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