Deocampo, et al. v. City of Vallejo, et al.

Filing 248

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 1/24/2017 re 237 Plaintiffs' SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION for AWARD ATTORNEY FEES and 240 Defendants' MOTION for LEAVE TO DEPOST MONEY: IT IS ORDERED that 237 plaintiffs' second supplemental motion for attorney's fees be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in the amount of $32,132.50. Defendants' motion for leave to deposit money with the court 240 is DENIED. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JASON EUGENE DEOCAMPO; JESUS
SEBASTIAN GRANT; and JAQUEZS
TYREE BERRY,
Plaintiffs,

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v.

CIV. NO. 2:06-1283 WBS CMK
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SECOND
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO DEPOSIT MONEY WITH THE
COURT

JASON POTTS, individually and
in his capacity as a Vallejo
police officer; JEREMY
PATZER, individually and in
his capacity as a Vallejo
police officer; ERIC JENSEN,
individually and in his
capacity as a Vallejo police
officer; and DOES 1 through
25, inclusive,
Defendants.

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Plaintiffs Jason Eugene Deocampo, Jesus Grant, and

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Jaquezs Berry brought this action against defendants Jason Potts,

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Jeremy Patzer, and Eric Jensen arising out of alleged police

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misconduct.

In 2013, a jury found that Potts and Jensen had used
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excessive force in the course of arresting Deocampo and awarded

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Deocampo $50,000 in damages.

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plaintiffs $314,497.73 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

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1988.

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$21,868.75 in supplemental attorney’s fees for time spent by

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plaintiffs’ counsel litigating the original fees motion and

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addressing a motion for relief from judgment filed by defendants

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (“Rule 60(b)”).

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(Docket No. 228.)

(Docket No. 204.)

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The court subsequently awarded

The court later awarded plaintiffs

Plaintiffs now move for an award of attorney’s fees for

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time spent opposing defendants’ appeal of the denial of their

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Rule 60(b) motion and in preparing their second supplemental fee

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application.

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and also move to deposit the judgment and fee awards with the

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court based on the County of Solano’s claims against Deocampo for

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Deocampo’s unpaid support payments.

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I.

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(Docket No. 237.)

Defendants oppose this motion

(Docket No. 240.)

Fee Application
1.

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Timeliness of Fee Application
Defendants first oppose plaintiffs’ fee application

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contending that the application was untimely.

After the court

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denied plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion, plaintiffs appealed to the

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Ninth Circuit, which affirmed on September 8, 2016.

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then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which

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the Ninth Circuit denied on October 25, 2016.

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timely filed with the Ninth Circuit their unopposed motion to

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transfer consideration of attorney’s fees on appeal on November

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7, 2016.

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plaintiffs filed their motion for attorney’s fees with this court

Defendants

Plaintiffs then

After the Ninth Circuit granted the motion to transfer,

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on December 17, 2016.1

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Defendants concede that the motion to transfer was

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timely.

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to transfer, plaintiffs were required to file their application

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for attorney’s fees within fourteen days of the Ninth Circuit’s

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denial of defendants’ petition for rehearing.

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Circuit denied the petition for rehearing on October 25, 2016,

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defendants claim that the deadline for any motion for attorney’s

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fees was November 8, 2016 and thus plaintiffs’ December 17, 2016

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Because the Ninth

motion for fees is untimely.

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However, they contend that, notwithstanding the motion

Ninth Circuit Rule 9–1.6(a), which governs applications
for attorney’s fees on appeal, reads:
Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, a
request for attorneys’ fees shall be filed no later
than 14 days after the expiration of the period within
which a petition for rehearing may be filed, unless a
timely petition for rehearing is filed. If a timely
petition for rehearing is filed, the request for
attorneys fees shall be filed no later than 14 days
after the Court’s disposition of the petition.
However, Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.8 allows fee
applicants to request the transfer of attorney’s fees motions to
the district court by filing “within the time permitted in
Circuit Rule 39-1.6 . . . a motion to transfer consideration of
attorneys fees on appeal to the district court . . . from which
the appeal was taken.”
As discussed by this court in Hobson v. Orthodontic
Centers of America, Civ. No. 02-0886 WBS PAN, 2007 WL 1795731, at

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The motion to transfer sought, in the alternative, to
extend the time to file a motion for attorney’s fees. The Ninth
Circuit’s order granting the motion to transfer did not address
the request for an extension of time.
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*2 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2007), reading these two rules together,

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“[w]hen a motion to transfer is filed, it is not clear that the

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attorney’s fee motion itself has to be filed at all with the

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Ninth Circuit.”

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explained “because the Rules seek to implement a remedial statute

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whose goal is to reward plaintiffs whose attorneys win civil

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rights cases, they should be construed in favor of the

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plaintiff.”

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2009 WL 2485552, * 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009) (holding that

Another court looking at this same issue

Freitag v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., NO. C00-2278 TEH,

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plaintiff who timely filed a motion to transfer her fee

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application to the district court was not required to also file

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her fee application within the same fourteen-day deadline).

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Thus, given the ambiguity regarding whether a party must file an

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application for appellate attorney’s fees within fourteen days of

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final disposition of the appeal when it has also filed a motion

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to transfer, the court construes Rules 39-1.6 and 39-1.8 in favor

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of plaintiffs and holds that plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental

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attorney’s fees was not untimely in light of plaintiffs’ timely

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motion to transfer.2

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Defendants’ cited cases are not to the contrary.
Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2005), holds
only that a district court may not rule on an appellate fee
application unless and until the request has been transferred to
the district court by the circuit court.
Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 543 F.3d 1152, 1164 (9th Cir
2008), holds only that under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a prevailing party may
request attorney’s fees from the district court notwithstanding
Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6, as the EAJA explains that the
prevailing party may seek fees “in any court having jurisdiction
of that action.” Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1208-10 (9th
Cir. 2015), establishes only that appellate fees may not be
immediately available for a party that wins an interlocutory
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The court notes that shortly after the Ninth Circuit

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granted plaintiff’s motion to transfer, this court scheduled a

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status conference regarding the request for fees, and plaintiff

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filed their motion shortly before that status conference.

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Circuit Rule 39-1 require that a fee applicant timely file a

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motion for attorney's fees in the Ninth Circuit, this court finds

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good cause for Deocampo’s delay under Federal Rule of Appellate

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Procedure 26(b) because no prejudice resulted to defendants.

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Defendants were able to fully brief and present oral argument of

Should

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the matter on the merits and do not claim that any prejudice

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resulted from any delay.

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(finding good cause for fee applicant’s delay in filing his

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request for appellate attorney’s fees because defendants were not

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prejudiced by the delay).

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the merits of plaintiff’s fee application.

See Hobson, 2007 WL 1795731, at *2

Accordingly, the court will consider

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appeal, as such fees are available only when the party becomes a
“prevailing party.” Finally, California Pro-Life Council, Inc.
v. Randolph, No. CIV S-00-1689 FCD GGH, 2008 WL 4453627, *10
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (Damrell, J.), explains only that the
Ninth Circuit’s transfer of consideration of an appellate fee
request does not constitute a determination by the Ninth Circuit
that fees should be awarded.
Cummings, 402 F.3d at 948, does state that “Ninth
Circuit Rule 39-1.8 authorizes [the appeals court] to transfer a
timely-filed fees-on-appeal request to the district court for
consideration” (emphasis added), which may suggest that a fee
application must be filed within fourteen days even where the
applicant files a motion to transfer. However, this statement
should be considered dicta, to the extent it could be construed
as imposing such a requirement, as the issue in Cummings was
whether a district court could rule on a request for appellate
attorney’s fees where the plaintiffs had not filed their request
for fees with the Ninth Circuit, nor had they made a motion to
transfer consideration of the request to the district court.
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2.

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Fee Award
Plaintiffs seek to recover a total of $30,012.50 in

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attorney’s fees for time spent opposing defendants’ appeal.

As

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the court explained in its previous orders granting attorney’s

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fees, plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees because they

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were the prevailing parties in an action under 42 U.S.C. §

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1988(b).

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awarding fees to plaintiffs, and do not dispute that plaintiffs

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are entitled to a supplemental award of fees for work on the

Defendants did not appeal the court’s prior orders

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appeal, provided that the application was timely.

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primarily dispute the size of the supplemental fee award

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requested by plaintiffs.

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Rather, they

Courts typically determine the amount of a fee award

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under § 1988 in two stages.

First, courts apply the “‘lodestar’

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method to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s

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fee.”

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2013) (citations omitted).

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lodestar figure, district courts may adjust that figure pursuant

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to a variety of factors.”

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quotation marks omitted); see also Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras,

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Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (enumerating factors on

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which courts may rely in adjusting the lodestar figure); Morales

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v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1996)

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(same).

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir.
Second, “[a]fter computing the

Id. at 1209 (citation and internal

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A.

Reasonable Number of Hours

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Under the lodestar method, “a district court must start

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by determining how many hours were reasonably expended on the

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litigation,” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111
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(9th Cir. 2008), and “should exclude hours ‘that are excessive,

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redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’” McCown v. City of Fontana,

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565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v.

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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).

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by the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that, as a general rule, “the

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court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment

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as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.”

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Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112.

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That standard is qualified

Plaintiffs’ counsel indicate that their firm staffed

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four attorneys on the appeal and that those attorneys spent a

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total of 110.00 hours opposing defendants’ appeal.

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argue that this time should be reduced because there was no need

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to staff four attorneys on the appeal or to require multiple

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attorneys to do the same work, such as reviewing defendants’

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briefs and reviewing the record in this case, conferencing on the

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appeal, moot court practice, and attending oral argument.

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Defendants also argue that the total number of hours was

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excessive given that the issues addressed on appeal were

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identical to those in their Rule 60(b) motion.

Defendants

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But as numerous district courts have recognized,

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staffing multiple attorneys on a single task may improve a

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party’s chance of success in litigation and does not always

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constitute unnecessary duplication of effort.

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Holding Corp. v. Nat’l Farm Fin. Corp., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1136,

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1157 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[D]ivision of responsibility may make it

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necessary for more than one attorney to attend activities such as

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depositions and hearings.

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for planning strategy, eliciting testimony or evaluating facts or

See, e.g., PSM

Multiple attorneys may be essential

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law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United

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States v. City & Cty. of S.F., 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Cal.

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1990) (noting that “the presence of several attorneys at strategy

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sessions for complex civil rights class actions may be crucial to

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the case”).

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plaintiffs’ counsel’s “professional judgment” as to how much time

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they were required to spend successfully opposing the appeal.

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See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112.

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plaintiffs’ billing entries, the court cannot identify a single

Moreover, this court will not second-guess

Having independently reviewed

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one that is sufficiently excessive to justify reducing or

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disallowing the time billed for the appeal.

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See id.

Defendants then argue, as they have in response to

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plaintiffs’ other fee applications, that the court should reduce

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the hours billed by plaintiffs’ attorneys because many of those

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hours were improperly block billed.

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keeping method by which each lawyer . . . enters the total . . .

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time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time

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expended on specific tasks.”

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F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal

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quotation marks omitted).

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are block-billed, see id. at 948, it may also choose not to

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reduce hours that are purportedly block billed if the

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corresponding time entries “are detailed enough for the [c]ourt

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to assess the reasonableness of the hours billed,” Campbell v.

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Nat’l Passenger R.R. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1103 (N.D. Cal.

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2010).

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“Block billing is the time-

Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480

Although a court may reduce hours that

The court recognizes that plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing
entries could be more specific and do not break down the amount
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of time spent on each task within a given time entry.

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Nevertheless, the court finds that almost all of the entries are

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sufficiently detailed to assess the reasonableness of the hours

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billed.

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exceptions are Burris’s and Curry’s time entries on September 8,

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2016 and Curry’s entry on October 25, 2016.

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See Campbell, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.

The only

In Curry’s two entries, she bills 4.0 hours for phone

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conferences with Burris regarding the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

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“and immediate considerations” as well as “draft press release”

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and “draft synopsis of opinion for publication.”

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appear to be for work largely done on marketing the firm’s work

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to the public, rather than work on the appeal itself.

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on September 8, 2016, Burris bills .3 hours for a phone

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conference with Curry regarding the Ninth Circuit’s decision and

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a press release.

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entries, the court cannot tell how much time was spent on the

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phone conferences, which would be appropriately billed to a

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client, and the marketing work, which would not.

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461 U.S. at 434 (“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s

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client are also not properly billed to one’s adversary.”).

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the court will apply a three-hour reduction to Curry’s total

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requested hours and a .2-hour reduction to Burris’ total

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requested hours.

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to hours that defendants characterize as block-billed.

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Both entries

Similarly,

Given the use of block billing on these

See Hensley,

Thus,

The court will not otherwise apply a reduction

In sum, the court finds that attorney John L. Burris

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reasonably billed 4.3 hours, DeWitt M. Lacy reasonably billed 8.0

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hours, attorney Ayana C. Curry reasonably billed 88.5 hours, and

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attorney Benjamin Nisenbaum reasonably billed 6.0 hours for their
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work on the appeal.

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B.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

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“In addition to computing a reasonable number of hours,

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the district court must determine a reasonable hourly rate to use

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for attorneys . . . in computing the lodestar amount.”

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729 F.3d at 1205 (citation omitted).

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not defined “by reference to the rates actually charged by the

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prevailing party.”

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(9th Cir. 1986).

Gonzalez,

A reasonable hourly rate is

Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210
Rather, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently

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held that reasonable fees ‘are to be calculated according to the

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prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’”

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v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046

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(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

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(1984)).

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Van Skike

The court previously determined, and the parties agree,

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that Burris is entitled to a reasonable hourly rate of $400 and

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that Lacy is entitled to a reasonable hourly rate of $175.

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court also previously held that Curry and Nisenbaum were entitled

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to a reasonable hourly rate of $250.

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Curry and Nisenbaum were admitted to the California bar in 2001

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and 2002; 2) courts in this district have found that an hourly

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rate between $250 and $280 is reasonable for attorneys with ten

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or more years of experience in civil rights cases; 3) the court

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had previously awarded attorney Gayla Libet, an attorney with

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almost three decades of experience, an hourly rate of $280 in

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this case; and 4) it would be excessive to award Curry and

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Nisenbaum, who have practiced for two decades less than Libet,

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the same hourly rate.

The court explained that 1)

(Docket No. 228 at 6-7.)
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The

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Plaintiffs ask that the court apply a reasonable hourly

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rate of $275 for Curry’s and Nisenbaum’s feesbased on their

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additional appellate and trial experience gained through other

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cases during the pendency of the appeal.

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that it previously awarded Curry and Nisenbaum an hourly rate of

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$250, but it notes that 1) two and half years have passed since

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that fee award, 2) the court previously determined that

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prevailing rate for attorneys with Curry’s and Nisenbaum’s

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experience was $250 to $280 an hour, 3) both attorneys have

The court recognizes

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gained significant additional experience since the court’s prior

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fee award, and 4) this appeal presented a novel issue.

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of these factors, the court determines that both Curry and

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Nisenbaum are entitled to a reasonable hourly rate of $275 for

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their work on the appeal.3

In light

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C.

Adjustments to the Lodestar

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Once the court has computed the lodestar, there is a

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“‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable fee.”

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Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

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City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)).

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the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the district court must

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consider “whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively

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reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr factors that

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are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.”

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Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64 (citations omitted).

However,

Those factors

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The court also notes that while this case was litigated
in the Eastern District of California and the court’s chambers
are in Sacramento, the appeal was argued in San Francisco, where
the prevailing market rates are significantly higher than in
Sacramento.
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include:
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)
the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due
to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time
limitations
imposed
by
the
client
or
the
circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the
case, (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client, and (12) awards in
similar cases.
Kerr, 526 F.2d at 670.

“The court should consider the factors

established by Kerr, but need not discuss each factor.”

Eiden v.

Thrifty Payless Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 n.4 (E.D. Cal.
2005) (citing Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069, 1073
(9th Cir. 1983)).
Here, defendants’ appeal sought relief from the jury
and attorney’s fee awards, which collectively amount to about
$386,000, on the basis that they were liabilities of the City of
Vallejo and were thereby discharged in its Chapter 9 bankruptcy.
Thus, the appeal not only threatened the viability of the entire
judgment, but raised critical issues at the intersection of
bankruptcy and civil rights law that demanded the expertise of
experienced civil rights attorneys.

The fact that the parties

litigated these issues before this court does not obviate the
need for further work researching and briefing the appeal and
preparing for oral argument.

Thus, the court rejects defendants’

contention that the Kerr factors warrant reduction of a
supplemental attorney’s fee award, and the court need not apply
any adjustment to the lodestar.
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In sum, the court finds that Burris reasonably billed

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4.3 hours at an hourly rate of $400, that Curry reasonably billed

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88.5 hours at an hourly rate of $275, that Nisenbaum reasonably

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billed 6.0 hours at an hourly rate of $275, and that Lacy

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reasonably billed 8.0 hours at an hourly rate of $175.

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results in an attorney’s fee award of $29,107.50, computed as

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follows:

This

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Burris:

4.3

x

$400

=

$1,720.00

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Curry:

88.5

x

$275

=

$24,337.50

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Nisenbaum:

6.0

x

$275

=

$1,650.00

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Lacy:

8.0

x

$175

=

$1,400.00

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$29,107.50

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D.

Supplemental Fees on Fees

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In its prior order granting supplemental attorney’s

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fees, the court stated that plaintiffs’ attorneys were entitled

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to recover “fees on fees” for their work litigating the

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attorney’s fees disputes in this case and awarded supplemental

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attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,248.75 for such work.

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Plaintiffs now seek supplemental attorney’s fees for 11 hours of

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work by attorney Curry for her work preparing the instant fee

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application at a rate of $275 an hour, for a total of $3,025 in

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fees.

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application are flawed by impermissible block billing and are

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excessive given that plaintiffs have already filed two other

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attorney’s fees motions.

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billing statements and finds that none of the entries she

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recorded for the fee application are excessive or lack sufficient

Defendants contend that the fees Curry billed for the fee

However, the court has reviewed her

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detail in light of the posture of this case.4

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also apply the $275 hourly rate it previously found appropriate

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for Curry’s work in this case.

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The court will

Accordingly, the court finds that Curry is entitled to

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$3,025 in supplemental attorney’s fees for her work on the fee

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application, reflecting 11 hours of work at a reasonable hourly

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rate of $275.

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$29,107.50 for time spent opposing defendants’ appeal, this

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results in a total attorney’s fee award of $32,132.50.

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II.

Combined with the supplemental fee award of

Motion to Deposit

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Defendants request to deposit the full amount of the

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judgment against them with the court, including any award of

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attorney’s fees, based on the County of Solano’s claim against

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Deocampo for unpaid support payments, in order to cease incurring

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interest “during the pendency of the dispute between Deocampo and

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the County of Solano.”

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their motion, the County of Solano Department of Child Support

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Services has filed a declaration and various state court

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documents, including judgments obtained by the County against

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Deocampo, in support of its claim that Deocampo owes $182,786.43

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in past due child support payments.

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(Docket No. 240.)

Since defendants filed

(Docket No. 245 at 5.)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67 (“Rule 67”),

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“a party-- upon notice to every other party, and by leave of

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court--may deposit with the court all or any part of” of a sum of

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money.

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The purpose of this rule is “to relieve the depositor of

The court notes that second supplemental fee
application presented the new issues of the timeliness of an
appellate fee application and an adjustment in the reasonable
hourly rate for two attorneys.
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responsibility for a fund in dispute.”

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Ala. Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1474 (5th Cir. 1987).

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decision whether to allow the deposit of funds is left to the

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discretion of the district court.

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687, 694 (10th Cir. 1989).

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Gulf States Util. Co. v.
The

Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d

The court declines to exercise its discretion to allow

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a deposit of the judgment against defendants, as the County’s

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claims have no relevance to the claims Deocampo made against

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defendants in this case.5

The court recognizes that a claimant

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to a disputed fund need not necessarily be a party to the case.

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See Alstom Caribe, Inc. v. George P. Reintjes Co., 484 F.3d 106,

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114 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

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is unaware of any case, and the defendants and the County of

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Solano have cited none, where a court allowed a deposit based on

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a non-party’s claim on the judgment due to a preexisting debt

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under state law that has no connection to the events at issue in

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the underlying case.

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County in this court, and its lien in state court is against the

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City of Vallejo, which is not a party to this case.6

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is presently no “dispute” under Rule 67 over the jury award and

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attorney’s fee awards that the court needs to resolve.

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Nevertheless, the court

Moreover, no lien has been filed by the

Thus, there

The court also notes that neither defendants nor the

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5

The court expresses no opinion on the validity of the
County of Solano’s claims against Deocampo or the City of Vallejo
for unpaid support.
6

Plaintiff’s counsel Pamela Price filed a lien in this
court in response to the Motion to Deposit, though Ms. Price’s
co-counsel represented at oral argument that this lien would be
withdrawn if the motion to deposit was denied.
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County have cited any authority establishing that this court has

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jurisdiction to resolve the underlying dispute between Deocampo

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and the County of Solano.

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to intervene in this case and intervention would likely not be

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appropriate even if it had sought to intervene.

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of David Efron, P.C. v. Candelario, 842 F.3d 780, 784 (1st Cir.

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2016) (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1) whether a

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federal court has ancillary jurisdiction over intervenor claims

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“will depend on whether the claim of the would-be intervenor is

The County of Solano has never sought

See Law Offices

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so related to the original action that it may properly be

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regarded as ancillary to it”) (citation omitted).

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to deposit funds with the court makes no sense unless it is clear

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that the court has power to resolve any dispute over the funds.

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Because the County’s claims against Deocampo have no relation to

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this case and neither defendants nor the County have established

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that the court could resolve the County’s claims to any funds

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deposited with the court, the court must deny the motion for

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leave to deposit.

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Granting leave

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ second

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supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (Docket No. 237) be, and

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the same hereby is, GRANTED in the amount of $32,132.50.

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Defendants’ motion for leave to deposit money with the court

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(Docket No. 240) is DENIED.

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Dated:

January 24, 2017

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