Deocampo, et al. v. City of Vallejo, et al.

Filing 248

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 1/24/2017 re 237 Plaintiffs' SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION for AWARD ATTORNEY FEES and 240 Defendants' MOTION for LEAVE TO DEPOST MONEY: IT IS ORDERED that 237 plaintiffs' second supplemental motion for attorney's fees be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in the amount of $32,132.50. Defendants' motion for leave to deposit money with the court 240 is DENIED. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 13 JASON EUGENE DEOCAMPO; JESUS SEBASTIAN GRANT; and JAQUEZS TYREE BERRY, Plaintiffs, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 v. CIV. NO. 2:06-1283 WBS CMK MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSIT MONEY WITH THE COURT JASON POTTS, individually and in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer; JEREMY PATZER, individually and in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer; ERIC JENSEN, individually and in his capacity as a Vallejo police officer; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants. 22 23 ----oo0oo---- 24 25 Plaintiffs Jason Eugene Deocampo, Jesus Grant, and 26 Jaquezs Berry brought this action against defendants Jason Potts, 27 Jeremy Patzer, and Eric Jensen arising out of alleged police 28 misconduct. In 2013, a jury found that Potts and Jensen had used 1 1 excessive force in the course of arresting Deocampo and awarded 2 Deocampo $50,000 in damages. 3 plaintiffs $314,497.73 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4 1988. 5 $21,868.75 in supplemental attorney’s fees for time spent by 6 plaintiffs’ counsel litigating the original fees motion and 7 addressing a motion for relief from judgment filed by defendants 8 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (“Rule 60(b)”). 9 (Docket No. 228.) (Docket No. 204.) 10 The court subsequently awarded The court later awarded plaintiffs Plaintiffs now move for an award of attorney’s fees for 11 time spent opposing defendants’ appeal of the denial of their 12 Rule 60(b) motion and in preparing their second supplemental fee 13 application. 14 and also move to deposit the judgment and fee awards with the 15 court based on the County of Solano’s claims against Deocampo for 16 Deocampo’s unpaid support payments. 17 I. 18 (Docket No. 237.) Defendants oppose this motion (Docket No. 240.) Fee Application 1. 19 Timeliness of Fee Application Defendants first oppose plaintiffs’ fee application 20 contending that the application was untimely. After the court 21 denied plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion, plaintiffs appealed to the 22 Ninth Circuit, which affirmed on September 8, 2016. 23 then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which 24 the Ninth Circuit denied on October 25, 2016. 25 timely filed with the Ninth Circuit their unopposed motion to 26 transfer consideration of attorney’s fees on appeal on November 27 7, 2016. 28 plaintiffs filed their motion for attorney’s fees with this court Defendants Plaintiffs then After the Ninth Circuit granted the motion to transfer, 2 1 on December 17, 2016.1 2 Defendants concede that the motion to transfer was 3 timely. 4 to transfer, plaintiffs were required to file their application 5 for attorney’s fees within fourteen days of the Ninth Circuit’s 6 denial of defendants’ petition for rehearing. 7 Circuit denied the petition for rehearing on October 25, 2016, 8 defendants claim that the deadline for any motion for attorney’s 9 fees was November 8, 2016 and thus plaintiffs’ December 17, 2016 10 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Because the Ninth motion for fees is untimely. 11 12 However, they contend that, notwithstanding the motion Ninth Circuit Rule 9–1.6(a), which governs applications for attorney’s fees on appeal, reads: Absent a statutory provision to the contrary, a request for attorneys’ fees shall be filed no later than 14 days after the expiration of the period within which a petition for rehearing may be filed, unless a timely petition for rehearing is filed. If a timely petition for rehearing is filed, the request for attorneys fees shall be filed no later than 14 days after the Court’s disposition of the petition. However, Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.8 allows fee applicants to request the transfer of attorney’s fees motions to the district court by filing “within the time permitted in Circuit Rule 39-1.6 . . . a motion to transfer consideration of attorneys fees on appeal to the district court . . . from which the appeal was taken.” As discussed by this court in Hobson v. Orthodontic Centers of America, Civ. No. 02-0886 WBS PAN, 2007 WL 1795731, at 1 The motion to transfer sought, in the alternative, to extend the time to file a motion for attorney’s fees. The Ninth Circuit’s order granting the motion to transfer did not address the request for an extension of time. 3 1 *2 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 2007), reading these two rules together, 2 “[w]hen a motion to transfer is filed, it is not clear that the 3 attorney’s fee motion itself has to be filed at all with the 4 Ninth Circuit.” 5 explained “because the Rules seek to implement a remedial statute 6 whose goal is to reward plaintiffs whose attorneys win civil 7 rights cases, they should be construed in favor of the 8 plaintiff.” 9 2009 WL 2485552, * 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009) (holding that Another court looking at this same issue Freitag v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., NO. C00-2278 TEH, 10 plaintiff who timely filed a motion to transfer her fee 11 application to the district court was not required to also file 12 her fee application within the same fourteen-day deadline). 13 Thus, given the ambiguity regarding whether a party must file an 14 application for appellate attorney’s fees within fourteen days of 15 final disposition of the appeal when it has also filed a motion 16 to transfer, the court construes Rules 39-1.6 and 39-1.8 in favor 17 of plaintiffs and holds that plaintiffs’ motion for supplemental 18 attorney’s fees was not untimely in light of plaintiffs’ timely 19 motion to transfer.2 20 2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendants’ cited cases are not to the contrary. Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2005), holds only that a district court may not rule on an appellate fee application unless and until the request has been transferred to the district court by the circuit court. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 543 F.3d 1152, 1164 (9th Cir 2008), holds only that under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a prevailing party may request attorney’s fees from the district court notwithstanding Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.6, as the EAJA explains that the prevailing party may seek fees “in any court having jurisdiction of that action.” Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1208-10 (9th Cir. 2015), establishes only that appellate fees may not be immediately available for a party that wins an interlocutory 4 1 The court notes that shortly after the Ninth Circuit 2 granted plaintiff’s motion to transfer, this court scheduled a 3 status conference regarding the request for fees, and plaintiff 4 filed their motion shortly before that status conference. 5 Circuit Rule 39-1 require that a fee applicant timely file a 6 motion for attorney's fees in the Ninth Circuit, this court finds 7 good cause for Deocampo’s delay under Federal Rule of Appellate 8 Procedure 26(b) because no prejudice resulted to defendants. 9 Defendants were able to fully brief and present oral argument of Should 10 the matter on the merits and do not claim that any prejudice 11 resulted from any delay. 12 (finding good cause for fee applicant’s delay in filing his 13 request for appellate attorney’s fees because defendants were not 14 prejudiced by the delay). 15 the merits of plaintiff’s fee application. See Hobson, 2007 WL 1795731, at *2 Accordingly, the court will consider 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 appeal, as such fees are available only when the party becomes a “prevailing party.” Finally, California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, No. CIV S-00-1689 FCD GGH, 2008 WL 4453627, *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (Damrell, J.), explains only that the Ninth Circuit’s transfer of consideration of an appellate fee request does not constitute a determination by the Ninth Circuit that fees should be awarded. Cummings, 402 F.3d at 948, does state that “Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1.8 authorizes [the appeals court] to transfer a timely-filed fees-on-appeal request to the district court for consideration” (emphasis added), which may suggest that a fee application must be filed within fourteen days even where the applicant files a motion to transfer. However, this statement should be considered dicta, to the extent it could be construed as imposing such a requirement, as the issue in Cummings was whether a district court could rule on a request for appellate attorney’s fees where the plaintiffs had not filed their request for fees with the Ninth Circuit, nor had they made a motion to transfer consideration of the request to the district court. 5 1 2. 2 Fee Award Plaintiffs seek to recover a total of $30,012.50 in 3 attorney’s fees for time spent opposing defendants’ appeal. As 4 the court explained in its previous orders granting attorney’s 5 fees, plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees because they 6 were the prevailing parties in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 7 1988(b). 8 awarding fees to plaintiffs, and do not dispute that plaintiffs 9 are entitled to a supplemental award of fees for work on the Defendants did not appeal the court’s prior orders 10 appeal, provided that the application was timely. 11 primarily dispute the size of the supplemental fee award 12 requested by plaintiffs. 13 Rather, they Courts typically determine the amount of a fee award 14 under § 1988 in two stages. First, courts apply the “‘lodestar’ 15 method to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s 16 fee.” 17 2013) (citations omitted). 18 lodestar figure, district courts may adjust that figure pursuant 19 to a variety of factors.” 20 quotation marks omitted); see also Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, 21 Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (enumerating factors on 22 which courts may rely in adjusting the lodestar figure); Morales 23 v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1996) 24 (same). Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. Second, “[a]fter computing the Id. at 1209 (citation and internal 25 A. Reasonable Number of Hours 26 Under the lodestar method, “a district court must start 27 by determining how many hours were reasonably expended on the 28 litigation,” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 6 1 (9th Cir. 2008), and “should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, 2 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,’” McCown v. City of Fontana, 3 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. 4 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). 5 by the Ninth Circuit’s admonition that, as a general rule, “the 6 court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment 7 as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” 8 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. 9 That standard is qualified Plaintiffs’ counsel indicate that their firm staffed 10 four attorneys on the appeal and that those attorneys spent a 11 total of 110.00 hours opposing defendants’ appeal. 12 argue that this time should be reduced because there was no need 13 to staff four attorneys on the appeal or to require multiple 14 attorneys to do the same work, such as reviewing defendants’ 15 briefs and reviewing the record in this case, conferencing on the 16 appeal, moot court practice, and attending oral argument. 17 Defendants also argue that the total number of hours was 18 excessive given that the issues addressed on appeal were 19 identical to those in their Rule 60(b) motion. Defendants 20 But as numerous district courts have recognized, 21 staffing multiple attorneys on a single task may improve a 22 party’s chance of success in litigation and does not always 23 constitute unnecessary duplication of effort. 24 Holding Corp. v. Nat’l Farm Fin. Corp., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 25 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[D]ivision of responsibility may make it 26 necessary for more than one attorney to attend activities such as 27 depositions and hearings. 28 for planning strategy, eliciting testimony or evaluating facts or See, e.g., PSM Multiple attorneys may be essential 7 1 law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United 2 States v. City & Cty. of S.F., 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 3 1990) (noting that “the presence of several attorneys at strategy 4 sessions for complex civil rights class actions may be crucial to 5 the case”). 6 plaintiffs’ counsel’s “professional judgment” as to how much time 7 they were required to spend successfully opposing the appeal. 8 See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. 9 plaintiffs’ billing entries, the court cannot identify a single Moreover, this court will not second-guess Having independently reviewed 10 one that is sufficiently excessive to justify reducing or 11 disallowing the time billed for the appeal. 12 See id. Defendants then argue, as they have in response to 13 plaintiffs’ other fee applications, that the court should reduce 14 the hours billed by plaintiffs’ attorneys because many of those 15 hours were improperly block billed. 16 keeping method by which each lawyer . . . enters the total . . . 17 time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time 18 expended on specific tasks.” 19 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal 20 quotation marks omitted). 21 are block-billed, see id. at 948, it may also choose not to 22 reduce hours that are purportedly block billed if the 23 corresponding time entries “are detailed enough for the [c]ourt 24 to assess the reasonableness of the hours billed,” Campbell v. 25 Nat’l Passenger R.R. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 26 2010). 27 28 “Block billing is the time- Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 Although a court may reduce hours that The court recognizes that plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing entries could be more specific and do not break down the amount 8 1 of time spent on each task within a given time entry. 2 Nevertheless, the court finds that almost all of the entries are 3 sufficiently detailed to assess the reasonableness of the hours 4 billed. 5 exceptions are Burris’s and Curry’s time entries on September 8, 6 2016 and Curry’s entry on October 25, 2016. 7 See Campbell, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. The only In Curry’s two entries, she bills 4.0 hours for phone 8 conferences with Burris regarding the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 9 “and immediate considerations” as well as “draft press release” 10 and “draft synopsis of opinion for publication.” 11 appear to be for work largely done on marketing the firm’s work 12 to the public, rather than work on the appeal itself. 13 on September 8, 2016, Burris bills .3 hours for a phone 14 conference with Curry regarding the Ninth Circuit’s decision and 15 a press release. 16 entries, the court cannot tell how much time was spent on the 17 phone conferences, which would be appropriately billed to a 18 client, and the marketing work, which would not. 19 461 U.S. at 434 (“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s 20 client are also not properly billed to one’s adversary.”). 21 the court will apply a three-hour reduction to Curry’s total 22 requested hours and a .2-hour reduction to Burris’ total 23 requested hours. 24 to hours that defendants characterize as block-billed. 25 Both entries Similarly, Given the use of block billing on these See Hensley, Thus, The court will not otherwise apply a reduction In sum, the court finds that attorney John L. Burris 26 reasonably billed 4.3 hours, DeWitt M. Lacy reasonably billed 8.0 27 hours, attorney Ayana C. Curry reasonably billed 88.5 hours, and 28 attorney Benjamin Nisenbaum reasonably billed 6.0 hours for their 9 1 work on the appeal. 2 B. Reasonable Hourly Rate 3 “In addition to computing a reasonable number of hours, 4 the district court must determine a reasonable hourly rate to use 5 for attorneys . . . in computing the lodestar amount.” 6 729 F.3d at 1205 (citation omitted). 7 not defined “by reference to the rates actually charged by the 8 prevailing party.” 9 (9th Cir. 1986). Gonzalez, A reasonable hourly rate is Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 Rather, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently 10 held that reasonable fees ‘are to be calculated according to the 11 prevailing market rates in the relevant community.’” 12 v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046 13 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 14 (1984)). 15 Van Skike The court previously determined, and the parties agree, 16 that Burris is entitled to a reasonable hourly rate of $400 and 17 that Lacy is entitled to a reasonable hourly rate of $175. 18 court also previously held that Curry and Nisenbaum were entitled 19 to a reasonable hourly rate of $250. 20 Curry and Nisenbaum were admitted to the California bar in 2001 21 and 2002; 2) courts in this district have found that an hourly 22 rate between $250 and $280 is reasonable for attorneys with ten 23 or more years of experience in civil rights cases; 3) the court 24 had previously awarded attorney Gayla Libet, an attorney with 25 almost three decades of experience, an hourly rate of $280 in 26 this case; and 4) it would be excessive to award Curry and 27 Nisenbaum, who have practiced for two decades less than Libet, 28 the same hourly rate. The court explained that 1) (Docket No. 228 at 6-7.) 10 The 1 Plaintiffs ask that the court apply a reasonable hourly 2 rate of $275 for Curry’s and Nisenbaum’s feesbased on their 3 additional appellate and trial experience gained through other 4 cases during the pendency of the appeal. 5 that it previously awarded Curry and Nisenbaum an hourly rate of 6 $250, but it notes that 1) two and half years have passed since 7 that fee award, 2) the court previously determined that 8 prevailing rate for attorneys with Curry’s and Nisenbaum’s 9 experience was $250 to $280 an hour, 3) both attorneys have The court recognizes 10 gained significant additional experience since the court’s prior 11 fee award, and 4) this appeal presented a novel issue. 12 of these factors, the court determines that both Curry and 13 Nisenbaum are entitled to a reasonable hourly rate of $275 for 14 their work on the appeal.3 In light 15 C. Adjustments to the Lodestar 16 Once the court has computed the lodestar, there is a 17 “‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable fee.” 18 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 19 City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). 20 the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the district court must 21 consider “whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively 22 reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr factors that 23 are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” 24 Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64 (citations omitted). However, Those factors 25 26 27 28 3 The court also notes that while this case was litigated in the Eastern District of California and the court’s chambers are in Sacramento, the appeal was argued in San Francisco, where the prevailing market rates are significantly higher than in Sacramento. 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 include: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr, 526 F.2d at 670. “The court should consider the factors established by Kerr, but need not discuss each factor.” Eiden v. Thrifty Payless Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1983)). Here, defendants’ appeal sought relief from the jury and attorney’s fee awards, which collectively amount to about $386,000, on the basis that they were liabilities of the City of Vallejo and were thereby discharged in its Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Thus, the appeal not only threatened the viability of the entire judgment, but raised critical issues at the intersection of bankruptcy and civil rights law that demanded the expertise of experienced civil rights attorneys. The fact that the parties litigated these issues before this court does not obviate the need for further work researching and briefing the appeal and preparing for oral argument. Thus, the court rejects defendants’ contention that the Kerr factors warrant reduction of a supplemental attorney’s fee award, and the court need not apply any adjustment to the lodestar. 12 1 In sum, the court finds that Burris reasonably billed 2 4.3 hours at an hourly rate of $400, that Curry reasonably billed 3 88.5 hours at an hourly rate of $275, that Nisenbaum reasonably 4 billed 6.0 hours at an hourly rate of $275, and that Lacy 5 reasonably billed 8.0 hours at an hourly rate of $175. 6 results in an attorney’s fee award of $29,107.50, computed as 7 follows: This 8 Burris: 4.3 x $400 = $1,720.00 9 Curry: 88.5 x $275 = $24,337.50 10 Nisenbaum: 6.0 x $275 = $1,650.00 11 Lacy: 8.0 x $175 = $1,400.00 12 $29,107.50 13 D. Supplemental Fees on Fees 14 In its prior order granting supplemental attorney’s 15 fees, the court stated that plaintiffs’ attorneys were entitled 16 to recover “fees on fees” for their work litigating the 17 attorney’s fees disputes in this case and awarded supplemental 18 attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,248.75 for such work. 19 Plaintiffs now seek supplemental attorney’s fees for 11 hours of 20 work by attorney Curry for her work preparing the instant fee 21 application at a rate of $275 an hour, for a total of $3,025 in 22 fees. 23 application are flawed by impermissible block billing and are 24 excessive given that plaintiffs have already filed two other 25 attorney’s fees motions. 26 billing statements and finds that none of the entries she 27 recorded for the fee application are excessive or lack sufficient Defendants contend that the fees Curry billed for the fee However, the court has reviewed her 28 13 1 detail in light of the posture of this case.4 2 also apply the $275 hourly rate it previously found appropriate 3 for Curry’s work in this case. 4 The court will Accordingly, the court finds that Curry is entitled to 5 $3,025 in supplemental attorney’s fees for her work on the fee 6 application, reflecting 11 hours of work at a reasonable hourly 7 rate of $275. 8 $29,107.50 for time spent opposing defendants’ appeal, this 9 results in a total attorney’s fee award of $32,132.50. 10 II. Combined with the supplemental fee award of Motion to Deposit 11 Defendants request to deposit the full amount of the 12 judgment against them with the court, including any award of 13 attorney’s fees, based on the County of Solano’s claim against 14 Deocampo for unpaid support payments, in order to cease incurring 15 interest “during the pendency of the dispute between Deocampo and 16 the County of Solano.” 17 their motion, the County of Solano Department of Child Support 18 Services has filed a declaration and various state court 19 documents, including judgments obtained by the County against 20 Deocampo, in support of its claim that Deocampo owes $182,786.43 21 in past due child support payments. 22 (Docket No. 240.) Since defendants filed (Docket No. 245 at 5.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67 (“Rule 67”), 23 “a party-- upon notice to every other party, and by leave of 24 court--may deposit with the court all or any part of” of a sum of 25 money. 26 4 27 28 The purpose of this rule is “to relieve the depositor of The court notes that second supplemental fee application presented the new issues of the timeliness of an appellate fee application and an adjustment in the reasonable hourly rate for two attorneys. 14 1 responsibility for a fund in dispute.” 2 Ala. Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1474 (5th Cir. 1987). 3 decision whether to allow the deposit of funds is left to the 4 discretion of the district court. 5 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1989). 6 Gulf States Util. Co. v. The Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d The court declines to exercise its discretion to allow 7 a deposit of the judgment against defendants, as the County’s 8 claims have no relevance to the claims Deocampo made against 9 defendants in this case.5 The court recognizes that a claimant 10 to a disputed fund need not necessarily be a party to the case. 11 See Alstom Caribe, Inc. v. George P. Reintjes Co., 484 F.3d 106, 12 114 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 13 is unaware of any case, and the defendants and the County of 14 Solano have cited none, where a court allowed a deposit based on 15 a non-party’s claim on the judgment due to a preexisting debt 16 under state law that has no connection to the events at issue in 17 the underlying case. 18 County in this court, and its lien in state court is against the 19 City of Vallejo, which is not a party to this case.6 20 is presently no “dispute” under Rule 67 over the jury award and 21 attorney’s fee awards that the court needs to resolve. 22 Nevertheless, the court Moreover, no lien has been filed by the Thus, there The court also notes that neither defendants nor the 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 The court expresses no opinion on the validity of the County of Solano’s claims against Deocampo or the City of Vallejo for unpaid support. 6 Plaintiff’s counsel Pamela Price filed a lien in this court in response to the Motion to Deposit, though Ms. Price’s co-counsel represented at oral argument that this lien would be withdrawn if the motion to deposit was denied. 15 1 County have cited any authority establishing that this court has 2 jurisdiction to resolve the underlying dispute between Deocampo 3 and the County of Solano. 4 to intervene in this case and intervention would likely not be 5 appropriate even if it had sought to intervene. 6 of David Efron, P.C. v. Candelario, 842 F.3d 780, 784 (1st Cir. 7 2016) (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1) whether a 8 federal court has ancillary jurisdiction over intervenor claims 9 “will depend on whether the claim of the would-be intervenor is The County of Solano has never sought See Law Offices 10 so related to the original action that it may properly be 11 regarded as ancillary to it”) (citation omitted). 12 to deposit funds with the court makes no sense unless it is clear 13 that the court has power to resolve any dispute over the funds. 14 Because the County’s claims against Deocampo have no relation to 15 this case and neither defendants nor the County have established 16 that the court could resolve the County’s claims to any funds 17 deposited with the court, the court must deny the motion for 18 leave to deposit. 19 Granting leave IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ second 20 supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (Docket No. 237) be, and 21 the same hereby is, GRANTED in the amount of $32,132.50. 22 Defendants’ motion for leave to deposit money with the court 23 (Docket No. 240) is DENIED. 24 Dated: January 24, 2017 25 26 27 28 16

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