L.H. et al v. Schwarzenegger et al
Filing
653
ORDER granting 617 Motion to Compel signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 9/13/11. (Kaminski, H)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
11
JERRY VALDIVIA, ALFRED YANCY,
and HOSSIE WELCH, on their own
behalf and on behalf of the class
of all persons similarly situated,
12
NO. CIV. S-94-671 LKK/GGH
Plaintiffs,
13
v.
14
15
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Governor of
the State of California, et al.,
16
Defendants.
/
17
18
19
L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R.,
on behalf of themselves and
all other similarly
situated juvenile parolees
in California,
NO. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH
20
21
22
Plaintiffs,
v.
O R D E R
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., Governor of
the State of California, et al.,
23
Defendants.
24
/
25
L.H. v. Brown and Valdivia v. Brown are two class actions
26
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1343 for violations of the Due
1
1
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by California parolees
2
against the Governor. Valdivia was filed by adult parolees and L.H.
3
by juvenile parolees. Pending before the court is a motion by
4
plaintiffs to compel defendants to pay plaintiffs’ counsel’s rate
5
for work already performed in 2010. For the reasons stated below,
6
plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED.
I. Procedural Background
7
8
9
Plaintiffs
stipulated
have
order
for
prevailed
in
permanent
both
cases,
injunctive
obtaining
relief.
a
Valdivia
10
Permanent Injunctive Relief Order, March 9, 2004, ECF No. 1034.
11
Pursuant to an order issued by this court on July 8, 2004, ECF No.
12
1087,
13
defendants’ counsel for fees and costs incurred in obtaining and
14
monitoring compliance with the March 9, 2004 Injunction. The order
15
requires plaintiffs’ counsel to identify the billing rates sought
16
by plaintiffs’ counsel for that year. Defendants then have thirty
17
days in which to object to the fees sought. Plaintiffs are to file
18
a yearly motion to compel payment of any disputed items that remain
19
after a meet and confer period. If an unusually large number of
20
hours, or a significant issue is in dispute, plaintiffs may bring
21
a quarterly motion to compel fees.
plaintiffs’
counsel
submit
quarterly
statements
to
22
Plaintiffs brought such a motion on May 17, 2011. The parties
23
are currently unable to agree on the appropriate rates to be
24
charged for work performed in 2010.
25
The original hearing date on plaintiffs’ motion was vacated,
26
and a decision on the motion was stayed pending a decision in
2
1
Armstrong v. Brown, in the Northern District of California on a
2
similar motion by the same attorneys. ECF No. 641. A decision in
3
that case was rendered on July 8, 2011, and plaintiffs re-noticed
4
their motion with this court.
II. Standard
5
6
The Supreme Court has adopted a two-pronged approach to the
7
calculation of a reasonable attorneys’ fees under any statute that
8
permits recovery of attorneys’ fees. See Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, 433
9
n. 7 (“The standards set forth in this [§ 1988] opinion are
10
generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized
11
an award of fees to a prevailing party.”); Fadhl v. City and County
12
of San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649, 650 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1988). A court
13
must first calculate a lodestar figure by multiplying the number
14
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable
15
hourly rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Cunningham
16
v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
17
denied, 493 U.S. 1035 (1990). While this lodestar figure is
18
presumed
19
circumstances a court may adjust the award upward or downward to
20
take into account special factors. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897.
to
represent
an
appropriate
fee,
under
certain
21
The party seeking an award of attorneys’ fees bears the burden
22
of establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested.
23
Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir.
24
2008). The opposing party then has the “burden of rebuttal that
25
requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging
26
the accuracy and reasonableness of the facts asserted by the
3
1
prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Id.
III. Analysis
2
3
In an order issued on March 6, 2009, this court agreed with
4
plaintiffs that the “relevant legal community” for the purpose of
5
calculating plaintiffs’ counsel’s rates is the San Francisco Bay
6
Area, rather than Sacramento. The court found plaintiffs’ tendered
7
evidence to be persuasive that there were no Sacramento firms
8
experienced and capable enough, and willing to undertake the case.
9
March 6, 2009 Order in L.H., ECF No. 530. The court approved rates
10
ranging from $295 per hour to $640 per hour for work performed in
11
2008. ECF No. 530. During the first quarter of 2009, plaintiffs’
12
counsel agreed to accept the 2008 rates for work performed in 2009.
13
Plaintiff’s current motion seeks an order from this court
14
compelling defendants to pay rates for work performed in 2010
15
ranging from $275 to $800 for attorneys with Rosen, Bien, and
16
Galvan; Bingham McCutcheon; Prison Law office; and Youth Law
17
Center. See Bien Decl., Ex. 33, 34. Plaintiffs assert that the
18
rates are reasonable and consistent with the “prevailing rates in
19
[the Bay] Area for attorneys with similar levels of experience
20
performing work of similar complexity.” Bien Decl. 31, ECF No. 618.
21
Further, according to plaintiffs, the overall rate increases are
22
modest, especially since “the rate for each individual time-keeper
23
usually
24
experienced.” Id.1 Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from
increases
each
year,
as
the
individual
becomes
more
25
1
26
Whether such customary practice obtains in this era of
economic downturn is at least questionable, defendant, however, has
4
1
attorneys explaining their background and qualifications with
2
respect to this case. The declarations further describe how each
3
of the firms representing plaintiffs in this case arrived at their
4
2010 billing rates. Defendants do not dispute that the rates
5
themselves in line with the prevailing market rates in the Bay
6
Area.
7
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ requested fees for work
8
performed in 2010 represent an unreasonable increase over the 2008
9
rates. By defendants’ calculations, the rate of increase from 2008
10
to 2010 ranges from 16% (for Prison Law Office attorneys) to 50%
11
(for Bingham McCutcheon attorneys). Defendants argue that the
12
increases are unreasonable, given the economic realities of the
13
local legal market, as well as the state’s “unprecedented budget
14
problems arising out of a protracted recession affecting the entire
15
country.” Defs.’ Opp’n 1, ECF No. 636.
16
Despite defendants’ citation of district court cases from
17
other circuits, in the Ninth Circuit it is not appropriate for a
18
district court judge to disallow particular rate increases, when
19
the rates themselves are reasonable. “‘Holding the line’ on fees
20
at a certain level goes well beyond the discretion of the district
21
court.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir.
22
2008).
23
methodology for awarding fees that the Supreme Court and our court
24
has adopted. . . If the lodestar leads to an hourly rate that is
A
holding-the-line
policy
25
26
tendered no evidence on this matter.
5
“is
inconsistent
with
the
1
higher than past practice, the court must award that rate without
2
regard to any contrary practice.” Id.
3
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has “held that the court has
4
discretion to apply the rates in effect at the time the work was
5
performed,” but that it is “an abuse of discretion. . . to apply
6
market rates in effect more than two years before the work was
7
performed.” Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir.
8
2003).
9
Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10
92415 (N.D. Cal. 2010)(Wilken), is easily distinguished from the
11
instant case, since it “concerned a fee request under the Equal
12
Access
13
limiting hourly rates to $125 per hour unless ‘an increase in the
14
cost
15
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved,
16
justifies a higher fee.” Armstrong v. Brown, No. C 9402307 (N.D.
17
Cal. 2011)(Wilken)(internal citations omitted). Here, there is no
18
such restriction.
19
District of California, approved these very fees.
to
of
Justice
living
Act,
or
a
which
contains
special
factor,
an
explicit
such
as
provision
the
limited
Indeed, Judge Wilken, sitting in the Northern
20
The court concludes that by submitting declarations that
21
establish that the rates requested are in line with prevailing
22
rates
23
comparable
24
plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing the reasonableness
charged
by
other
experience
San
Francisco
working
on
25
26
6
Bay
Area
similarly
attorneys
complex
of
cases,
the
rates
requested.2
1
of
Defendants
2
reasonableness of the rates, nor the reasonableness of the hours
3
spent. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to compel fees, ECF No. 617
4
is GRANTED.
5
not
rebutted
the
IT IS SO ORDERED.
6
have
DATED: September 13, 2011.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2
25
26
The court notes that the rates considered “reasonable” among
lawyers seems quite remarkable, nevertheless, “reasonableness” is
measured by the prevailing rate and no contrary evidence has been
tendered on that issue.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?