Cecil v. Rocky Mountain Railway and Mining Museum et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM,and ORDER signed by District Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., on 1/5/17 ORDERING that Defendants' 68 Motion for Relief from Judgment is GRANTED. (Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LYNN T. CECIL and SUZIE CECIL,
trustees of the CECIL FAMILY
REVOCAVBLE TRUST; RICK CECIL,
and LYNETTE CECIL,
Plaintiffs,

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

v.

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No. 2:07-cv-00419-MCE-CKD

ROCKY MOUNTAIN RAILWAY AND
MINING MUSEUM, a Colorado nonprofit corporation, and YREKA
WESTERN RAILROAD, a California
corporation,
Defendant.

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Defendants have filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b)(5). ECF No. 68. The gravamen of their argument is the

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contention that the judgment has been paid in full. The Court agrees that the judgment

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has been satisfied, and therefore Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.1

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Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this
matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. L. R. 230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

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Judgment in this case was entered on June 13, 2008, in the amount of

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$146,447.38. Plaintiffs were then also awarded $24,660.50 in attorney’s fees. The

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judgment was then assigned by Plaintiffs to John C. Nixon and Lisa L. Nixon, Trustees

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of the John and Lisa Nixon Family Trust. Defendant Yreka Western Railroad then

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agreed with Railroad Service & Supply Co., Inc. (“RS&S”) that Yreka would provide the

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full amount for RS&S to purchase the judgment from the Nixon Trust. On August 11,

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2009, a Yreka affiliate transferred the full amount of the judgment, including interest as

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of that date, totaling $264,422.68 to RS&S. The Nixon Trust accordingly assigned the

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judgment to RS&S.

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In May 2016, RS&S filed an enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the

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District of Colorado against Defendants, seeking to collect on the judgment. That court

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stayed its proceedings pending a resolution of this Motion.

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ANALYSIS

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Under Rule 60(b)(5), relief from final judgment can be granted because “the

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judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged.” A motion for such relief must be

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brought “within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Reasonable time “depends

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upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason

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for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon,

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and prejudice to other parties.” Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981)

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(per curiam).

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Because the relevant facts are not in dispute, the facts in this section are drawn from both
parties’ moving papers, sometimes verbatim. ECF Nos. 65, 71–72.

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RS&S makes two arguments in opposition to Defendants’ Motion: (1) the motion

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is untimely, and (2) the judgment was not satisfied, but merely transferred. The Court

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addresses each in turn.

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A. Timeliness of the Motion

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RS&S argues that Defendants’ motion is untimely primarily because they “ha[d]

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knowledge of the purported grounds for the motion since at least August of 2009,” but

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“have asserted no reason whatsoever for the delay of over seven years in bringing the

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instant motion.” Opp’n to Mot. for Relief from J., ECF No. 71, at 3. It claims that

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“controlling Ninth Circuit authority,” namely Ashford v. Steuart, requires this Court to find

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the Motion untimely. However, neither Ashford nor the other cases cited by RS&S are

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directly on point. In Ashford, the Ninth Circuit did not consider a Rule 60(b)(5) motion,

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but rather a Rule 60(b)(1) motion premised on judicial mistake. 657 F.2d at 1055. The

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Ninth Circuit gave “great weight” to the interest in finality because the time for appeal

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had passed and no reason had been given for failing to timely appeal the decision. Id.

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Here, finality is not betrayed by entertaining Defendants’ Motion. Instead, Defendants

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are seeking a final determination that their obligation under the judgment has been

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fulfilled.

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Nor is Mikels v. Estep, Case No. 12-cv-00056-EMC, 2016 WL 1056067 (N.D. Cal.

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Mar. 17, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15602 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2016), directly on point. At

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issue in that case was the applicability of a change in the law to relieving the plaintiff

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from the judgment. Id. at *3. Again, finality was given the most weight and was best

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served by not revisiting the disposition of the case a year after the change in the law

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occurred, and over two years after judgment had been entered. Accordingly, RS&S has

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not demonstrated that “controlling Ninth Circuit authority” precludes Defendants’ motion.

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Instead, the Court looks to the specific details of this case to determine whether the

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delay was reasonable.

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Defendants here did not unreasonably delay in bringing their Rule 60(b)(5)
Motion, but instead brought it just a few months after they discovered their need of it.
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Defendants declare that they were unaware that no Satisfaction of Judgment was filed

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until it obtained notice of RS&S’s Colorado enforcement action in June 2016.

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Defendants obtained a stay in that case in September 2016 and filed the instant motion

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the following month.

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Nor has RS&S established any prejudice would result from granting Defendants’

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motion. While RS&S claims to have “incurred many thousands of dollars of attorneys’

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fees and costs seeking to enforce the judgment since 2009,” Opp’n to Mot. for Relief

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from J., at 3, it provides no support for this claim. RS&S received the full amount of the

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judgment on August 11, 2009, and the only evidence of RS&S incurring legal fees or

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costs is the filing of their suit in Colorado, which was stayed, and their opposition to the

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instant motion.

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B. Whether the Judgment Has Been Satisfied

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Since Defendants’ motion is timely, the Court must next determine whether the

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judgment has been satisfied and the requested relief should be granted. RS&S claims

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that the judgment was not satisfied because “there was never any agreement for [the

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Yreka affiliate] to pay off the judgment, but instead the agreement was that [the Yreka

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affiliate] would purchase the judgment and pay a brokerage fee.” Opp’n to Mot. for

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Relief from J., at 4. RS&S would have this Court rely on a technical distinction between

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satisfying and purchasing the judgment to deny Defendants’ motion, providing no

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substantive reasons for why it should be able to collect the judgment. Indeed, it urges

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the Court to embrace the fundamental unfairness created by doing so and force the

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Yreka affiliate “to recoup [its] payments or otherwise seek redress against RS&S[]” for

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they payment it made to RS&S. Opp’n to Mot. for Relief from J., at 17. The distinction

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advocated by RS&S is one without a difference. RS&S received the full value of the

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judgment, and therefore the judgment is satisfied.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons above, Defendants’ Motion for Relief from Judgment, ECF
No. 68, is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 5, 2017

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