Lucas v. Finn

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Circuit Judge N. Randy Smith on 9/8/10 ORDERING that Petitioner's habeas petition is dismissed on all grounds without prejudice. CASE CLOSED.(Becknal, R)

(HC) Lucas v. Finn

Doc. 20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 DANIEL R. LUCAS, vs. CLAUDE FINN, WARDEN No. 2:07-CV-01455-NRS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORDER T h e Petitioner's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus b y a Person in State Custody (habeas petition) now comes before the court for d ecisio n . The court dismisses Petitioner's habeas petition. BACKGROUND B ecau se the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, the co u rt highlights here only the events giving rise to the current federal action. Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first degree murder and sentenced to an in d e te rm in a te life sentence. The California Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH") fo u n d Petitioner unsuitable for parole in a consideration hearing on February 23, 2 0 0 6 . Petitioner challenges this BPH finding, arguing that the BPH's denial of his p a r o le was not supported by "some evidence" and therefore violated his federal D u e Process rights. In a reasoned opinion, the Orange County Superior Court ru led that there was "some evidence" to support the BPH's finding. The California
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C o u rt of Appeal and the California Supreme Court both summarily denied relief. Petitioner then filed his habeas petition with this federal district court. The State filed its Answer and the Petitioner filed his Traverse. On February 26, 2009, the co u rt issued an administrative stay on this case pending the Ninth Circuit's d ecisio n in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). This co u rt now lifts that stay and decides this matter. HABEAS PETITION I n his habeas petition, Petitioner alleged three grounds for habeas relief, w h ich really collapse into one:1 his Due Process rights were violated when the B P H found him unsuitable for parole in the absence of "some evidence" of future d a n g e ro u s n e ss . This argument fails, and the court dismisses Petitioner's habeas p etitio n without prejudice. This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a p e r so n in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that h e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United S tates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("A E D P A "), an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the a d ju d ic atio n of the claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by th e Supreme Court of the United States;" or "resulted in a decision that was based o n an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in th e State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "[A] federal habeas court may
Petitioner argues that the BPH failed to actually consider all the relevant factors, outlined in Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b), in making its suitability determination. The extent to which the BPH must consider all these factors is a matter of state law outside the purview of this court's habeas jurisdiction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67­68 (1991). 2
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n o t issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment th a t the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law e rr o n e o u s ly or incorrectly." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75­76 (2003) (q u o tin g Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)). "Rather, that application m u s t be objectively unreasonable." Id. at 76. For purposes of AEDPA review, this court looks to the last reasoned state co u rt decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U .S . 797, 803 (1991). The Superior Court's decision constitutes the last reasoned state court decision in this case, as both the Court of Appeal and the California S u p rem e Court summarily dismissed Petitioner's habeas petition. Hunter v. A isp u ro , 982 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the Court must determine w h eth er the Superior Court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition "resulted in a d ecisio n that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab lish ed Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" o r "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A. Whether the BPH's Parole Suitability Finding Warrants Habeas Relief P e titio n e r argues that the BPH erroneously found him unsuitable for parole, b ecau se it based its decision entirely on the commitment offense and not on w h eth er Petitioner poses a current threat to public safety. The court disagrees. T h e Ninth Circuit recently held that "[i]t is . . . our obligation . . . to review th e merits of a federal habeas petition brought by a California prisoner who asserts th at the decision to deny him parole was not supported by `some evidence' of his cu rren t dangerousness. Under AEDPA, this means that we review `whether the C alifo rn ia judicial decision approving the governor's [or parole board's] decision
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r eje ctin g parole was an unreasonable application of the California some evidence req u irem en t, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of th e evidence." Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing H a yw a rd v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 563 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal q u o tatio n marks omitted)). In Hayward, the Ninth Circuit clarified California's "some evidence" stan d ard . "Under California law, denial of parole must be supported by `some e v id e n c e ,' but review of the [BPH's] decision is `extremely deferential." Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (footnote omitted). "The crucial determinant of whether th e prisoner gets parole in California is `consideration of the public safety." Id. at 5 6 1 (footnote omitted). "Thus, in California, the offense of conviction may be co n sid ered , but the consideration must address the determining factor, `a current th r e at to public safety.'" Id. at 562 (quoting In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (C al. 2008)). The Superior Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of the C alifo rn ia "some evidence" standard. The BPH found Petitioner unsuitable for p a r o le based on: (1) the heinous nature of the crime; (2) Petitioner's unstable social an d drug abuse history; (3) major stressors in Petitioner's life (i.e., the then-recent d e a th s of Petitioner's wife and mother) that could induce a retreat into drug abuse; an d (4) Petitioner's lack of concrete plans to stay active in drug rehabilitation upon h is release. Pet. Exh. C p.56­58, 65; see also Pet. Exh. D. p. 2­4. The BPH noted th e many positive factors weighing in Petitioner's favor, but concluded that the risk o f Petitioner falling back into drugs and the danger that such a relapse posed to s o c ie ty outweighed the positive factors. Pet. Exh. C p. 65. This was not an u n reaso n ab le conclusion.

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M o reo v er, the BPH's focus on the heinous nature of Petitioner's crime and fa ilu re to show remorse and insight into the crime does not doom the BPH's fin d in g . In In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 584 (Cal. 2008), the California Supreme C o u rt held that the nature of the commitment offense may provide "some ev id en ce" of future dangerousness. Specifically, it held that, because the in ten tio n al nature of the Petitioner's crime in that case offered insight into the P e titio n e r's future conduct, it could provide the requisite "some evidence." Id. The court distinguished those cases where the commitment offense was an isolated in cid en t that was unlikely to reoccur, in which case focus on the commitment o ffen se would be inappropriate. Id. The court also noted that a petitioner's lack o f insight into the commitment offense could further provide "some evidence" of f u tu r e dangerousness to the public. The present case is consistent with Shaputis. The BPH found that, while Petitioner's crime was an isolated incident, Petitioner's h isto ry of drug abuse during stressful times posed too much of a risk to the public safety to justify parole. Pet. Exh. C p. 60­65; see also Pet. Exh. D. p. 2­4. The B P H also found that, while Petitioner had successfully undergone some therapy, h is psychologist had noted that Petitioner had not fully come to terms with the crim e. Pet. Exh. C p. 65. Even were the court to disagree with the BPH's finding, the court is bound b y its limited review. The California Supreme Court declared: [T ]h e precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole su itab ility are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of the [ B P H ] . . . It is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far outweighs ev id en ce demonstrating unsuitability for parole. As long as the [B P H 's] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as a p p lie d to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal stan d ard s, the court's review is limited to ascertaining whether there is so m e evidence in the record that supports the [BPH's] decision.
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In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d at 585 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the BPH conducted a detailed hearing, in which it acknowledged both th e factors weighing in favor of, and against, a finding of parole suitability. In lig h t of the BPH's thorough hearing and the reasonable considerations of public safety, the court defers to the BPH's finding and the Superior Court's affirmation o f it. The court denies Petitioner's claim for habeas relief.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: P etitio n er's habeas petition is dismissed on all grounds without p r e ju d ic e . D A T E D : September 8, 2010

Honorable N. Randy Smith N in th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge

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