Dawe v. Corrections USA et al

Filing 570

ORDER signed by Senior Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 3/17/11 ORDERING Defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law are DENIED. (Doc. No. 533) Defendants' motion for a new trial (Doc. No. 534) is GRANTED on the grounds of (a) whether the punitive damage award for Harkins' false imprisonment claim against CUSA was unconstitutionally excessive; (b) whether the punitive damage award for Dawe's defamation claim against CCPOA was unconstitutionally excessive; (c) whe ther the punitive damage awards for FIMA's claims against CCPOA were unconstitutionally excessive; and (d) whether the punitive damage awards for Harkins' defamation claim against CCPOA was unconstitutionally excessive. It is OTHERWISE DENI ED. Plaintiffs shall inform the court within twenty-one (21) days of the issuance of this order as to whether they will (a) stipulate to the remitted punitive damage awards described herein; (b) seek a new trial; or (c) intend to appeal this order.(Matson, R)

Dawe v. Corrections USA, et al

Doc. 570

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 NO. CIV. S-07-1790 LKK/EFB 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 v. O R D E R CORRECTIONS USA, a California Corporation; CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, a California Corporation; JAMES BAIARDI, an individual; DONALD JOSEPH BAUMANN, an individual, Defendants. / AND CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS & RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS / Defendants have moved for a new trial and renewed their motions for judgment as a matter of law. Only two questions raise serious questions: (1) whether the punitive damage award is Plaintiffs, BRIAN DAWE; FLAT IRON MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATES, LLC, formerly known as FLAT IRON MOUNTAIN ASSOCIATES, a Partnership, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

unconstitutionally excessive and violates defendants' due process 1
Dockets.Justia.com

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rights1 and (2) whether FIMA's verdict for intentional interference with contract fails as a matter of law because CCPOA cannot be liable for interfering with the CUSA contract. The motions are denied as to all other arguments. I. Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Award

After awarding plaintiffs significant compensatory damages, the jury also awarded plaintiffs very large punitive damages awards from two of the four defendants. The court summarizes the relevant awards below: Claim Compensatory Award Punitive Award Ratio of Punitive Award to Compensatory Award 0.25:1

Brian Dawe's ("Dawe") Claims Against Corrections USA ("CUSA") Flat Iron Mountain Associates, LLC's ("FIMA") Claims Against CUSA

Defamation

$100,000

$25,000

Breach of Contract Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing2

$111,000 $0

The court only addresses whether the award must be remitted to comport with due process. There is sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants' conduct was reprehensible. The jury found in favor of FIMA, yet awarded no compensatory damages. 2
2

1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Gary Harkins' ("Harkins") Claims Against CUSA Dawe and FIMA's Claims Against CUSA

Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations3 TOTAL TOTAL (including breach of contract claims) TOTAL (excluding breach of contract claims) Breach of Contract Defamation False Imprisonment TOTAL (including breach of contract claim) TOTAL (excluding breach of contract claim)

$1

$25,000

25,000:1

$111,001 $211,001

$25,000 $50,000

0.23:1 0.24:1

$100,001

$50,000

0.50:1

$6,000 $28,000 $2,000 $36,000 $25,000 $10,000 $35,000 0.89:1 5:1 0.97:1

$30,000

$35,000

1.17:1

The verdict form headings indicated that the claim applied to FIMA and Dawe's claim for intentional interference with prospective economic relations. The jury, however, was only given the opportunity to choose between finding in favor of FIMA and against CUSA or finding in favor of CUSA and against FIMA. For this reason, the court only considers this jury award as for FIMA. 3

3

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Dawe's Claims Against California Correctional Peace Officers' Association ("CCPOA") FIMA's Claims Against CCPOA

Defamation

$1,639,405

$3,000,000

1.83:1

Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations4 TOTAL

$333,000

$3,000,000

9.01:1

$1

$3,000,000

3,000,000:1

$333,001 $315,000

$6,000,000 $1,000,000

18.02:1 3.17:1

Harkins' Claims Against CCPOA

Defamation

While the Supreme Court has not set "concrete constitutional limits 16 on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and 17 the punitive damages award," it has announced a principle that, "in 18 practice, 19 punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will 20 satisfy due process." State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 21 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). The Court has further suggested that a 22 4-to-1 23 impropriety." 24 because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award 25 26
4

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Same issue as to FIMA's claim against CUSA. 4

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may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. Id. (internal quotation omitted). For example, the Ninth Circuit found that a punitive damages award of $5,000 was appropriate where a plaintiff was awarded $3 in nominal damages. Mendez v. County of San Bernadino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court's remittur of punitive damage award of $250,000 to $5,000). However, "When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff." State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. This case involved numerous plaintiffs, defendants, and causes of action. As an initial matter, the court must determine which ratios to consider before it concludes whether those ratios are excessive. Defendants argue that each cause of action should be separately considered. Plaintiffs contend that the damages should be considered as awarded against each defendant. There is little authority on this question. However, in Bains LLC v. ARCO Products Comp., 405 F.3d 764, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit evaluated the issue. It found that, "On the facts of this case, in determining the correct amount of punitive damages, the jury could properly consider not only the one dollar in nominal damages awarded for discrimination under § 1981, but also the $50,000 in 5

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compensatory damages awarded for breach of contract . . . ." because the conduct supporting both claims was "intertwined." Id. The Circuit did not set forth a test, but rather noted that in the case before it the proper ratio was the total amount of punitive damages compared with the total amount of compensatory damages where the conduct underlying both claims was related. Defendants argue that the verdict form issued in this case prohibits

consolidation. Under the terms of Bains LLC, however, that is simply not the case. A claim for breach of contract can never support an award of punitive damages, yet the Ninth Circuit considered the compensatory damages awarded for breach of contract when determining the proper award of punitive damages. Defendants cited Bains LLC numerous times, yet did not address this finding in their briefs. Defendants also raised for the first time in reply that a punitive award that is 10% of the net worth of an entity is presumptively unconstitutional. Plaintiffs contend that the

argument is waived, or alternatively not an accurate statement of the law. In support of the net worth argument, defendants rely on the following analysis in a district court opinion: [Defendant] contends that the punitive damages award was excessive because most California courts have stated that punitive damages should not be allowed to exceed 10% of the defendant's net worth. Storage Services v. Oosterbaan, 214 Cal. App. 498 (1989), citing Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 381, 393-96 (1984) (Survey of punitive damages as percentages of net worth in a sampling of 15 cases from 1950-1984 indicates that punitive damage awards are generally about 10% of the defendant's net worth). 6

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Eldorado Stone, LLC v. Renaissance Stone, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60885 (S.D. Cal. 2007). I begin by noting that El Dorado is based upon a survey where the reasons for a particular result are neither articulated or known. It does not appear to this court to be of any value in considering the instant case. In Southern Union Co. v. Irvin, 563 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2009), however, which was issued after State Farm, the Ninth Circuit considered the value that a defendant's net worth should have in determining whether a punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive. Judge Reinhardt's concurrence is helpful on this

question, even though ultimately firm answers are not to be found. In any event, Judge Reinhardt explains, If punitive damages are to achieve the twin purposes of deterrence and punishment, . . . we must consider the impact of a damage award upon the particular defendant in determining the constitutional limit. The appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory damages may vary with the amount of the compensatory damages and the net worth of the defendant. In some cases, although the conduct may be similar, because of lower compensatory damages or the defendant's higher net worth, a higher ratio may be necessary to achieve a deterrent or punitive effect. In other cases, where the variables are the opposite, a lower ratio may be appropriate. For example, if $10,000 in compensatory damages is awarded against a defendant with a net worth of $50,000, then $10,000 in punitive damages may be an appropriate amount to achieve both the punitive and deterrent purposes. The same amount of punitives awarded against a company earning $1 billion a year, with a net worth of $50 billion, would hardly serve either of these objectives. Finally, this appears to be a fact based test. Of note, however, the Ninth Circuit found a punitive damage award of $1,185,217.14 appropriate where 7 compensatory damages were

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$395,072.38, a ratio of three to one. 1. Awards Against CUSA

Upon consideration of the facts before it, the court finds that all the punitive damages awards for Dawe and FIMA need not be remitted to comport with due process. CUSA does not seek to remit the award to Dawe. As to FIMA, the court sees two alternative understandings of how the award should be calculated under Bains LLC. FIMA's claims of breach of contract and intentional

interference prospective economic relations are intertwined. Thus, when the two are calculated together, the ratio of punitive damages is 0.23:1, well within the bounds of State Farm. Alternatively, Dawe's claims against CUSA could be intertwined with FIMA's claims against CUSA. These ratios also comport with due process. The court cannot, however, determine that Harkins' false imprisonment claim is intertwined with his other claims against CUSA. The question, then, becomes whether a ratio of 5:1 is impermissible where Harkins was only awarded a relatively small amount of compensatory damages. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court determines that this punitive damages award should be remitted to $6,000, a ratio of three to one. The court also determines that these punitive damages awards are appropriate under Southern Union Co. in light of all the evidence before it. 2. Awards Against CCPOA

After a close review of all the evidence in this case, the court finds that the punitive damages awarded against CCPOA must 8

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all be remitted to a ratio of one to one. Specifically, the court finds that the punitive damages be remitted as follows: Claim Compensatory Award Jury Award for Punitive Damages $3,000,000 Remitted Punitive Damages Award $1,639,405

Dawe's Claims Against California Correctional Peace Officers' Association ("CCPOA") FIMA's Claims Against CCPOA

Defamation

$1,639,405

Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations TOTAL

$333,000

$3,000,000

$333,000

$1

$3,000,000

$1

$333,001 $315,000

$6,000,000 $1,000,000

$333,001 $315,000

Harkins' Claims Against CCPOA

Defamation

The court further finds that these remitted awards comport with due process relative to CCPOA's net worth. II. Liability for Interference with Contract

CCPOA has filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's interference with contract claims against CCPOA. Specifically, CCPOA argues that it cannot be liable for interfering

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with the contract between CUSA and FIMA because "the only alleged `interference' attibuted to CCPOA were actions taken by Mike Jimenez, who was the incorporator and a board member of CUSA." Def.'s Renewed Mots. J. Matter Law ("RJMOL"), Doc. No. 533, 5 (Nov. 22. 2010). FIMA opposes this motion on several grounds. First, it contends that a reasonable jury could have found that Jimenez was acting on behalf of CCPOA at the time that the conduct supporting this claim occurred. Second, FIMA argues that the jury could have also reasonably concluded that conduct of defendant Donald Baumann ("Baumann"), CCPOA Chapter President, interfered with the contract between FIMA and CUSA even though the jury found that Baumann was not liable for interference with this contract. The parties generally agree as to the standard the court should apply. The parties agree that CCPOA can only be found liable for interference with contract if the CCPOA agents who engaged in the interfering conduct were not employees of CUSA or otherwise acting as agents of CUSA at the time of the interfering conduct, and this standard seems to be supported under California law. See Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 24 (Cal. 1990); Mintz v. Blue Cross of California, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1594, 1604 (2009). Here, the law is clear that Jimenez could not act on behalf of CUSA because he was merely an incorporator and board member. See Woods v. Fox Broadcasting Sub., Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 344, 356 (2005)

(petition for review denied at 2005 Cal. Lexis 9494) ("[O]ur courts have allowed contract interference claims to be stated against owners, officers, and directors of the company whose contract was 10

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the subject of the litigation.") (emphasis in original). Thus, CCPOA's motion is denied on this ground. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows: (1) Defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law are DENIED. (Doc. No. 533) (2) Defendants' motion for a new trial (Doc. No. 534) is GRANTED on the grounds of (a) whether the punitive damage against award CUSA for was Harkins' false imprisonment claim (b)

unconstitutionally

excessive;

whether the punitive damage award for Dawe's defamation claim against CCPOA was unconstitutionally excessive; (c) whether the punitive damage awards for FIMA's claims against CCPOA were unconstitutionally excessive; and (d) whether the punitive damage awards for Harkins'

defamation claim against CCPOA was unconstitutionally excessive. It is OTHERWISE DENIED. (3) Plaintiffs shall inform the court within twenty-one (21) days of the issuance of this order as to whether they will (a) stipulate to the remitted punitive damage awards described herein; (b) seek a new trial; or (c) intend to appeal this order. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March 17, 2011.

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