Sargent v. Clay

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Circuit Judge N. Randy Smith on 8/5/2010 ORDERING that petitioner's habeas petition is DISMISSED on all grounds without prejudice.CASE CLOSED.(Duong, D)

( HC )Sar gen t v. Clay

Do c. 20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 JEFFREY S. SARGENT, vs. I.D. CLAY, WARDEN No. 2:07-CV-02001-NRS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ORDER T h e Petitioner's Federal Habeas Corpus petition now comes before the court fo r decision. The court dismisses Petitioner's habeas petition. BACKGROUND B ecau se the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, the co u rt highlights here only the events giving rise to the current federal action. Petitioner was convicted in 1978 for first degree murder committed during a b u rg lary and robbery. Petitioner pleaded guilty in exchange for a plea bargain. He h as been in prison ever since. He has been denied parole a number of times and n o w challenges the California Board of Parole's ("CBP") most recent denial of his p aro le in 2005, alleging a number of constitutional errors. Petitioner brought his c la im s to the California Superior Court, which denied his petition in a reasoned o p in io n . Petitioner then appealed that decision to both the California Court of A p p ea l and the California Supreme Court. The State concedes that Petitioner's
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claim s have all been properly exhausted. On February 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a w rit of habeas corpus with this court. Having received the State's Answer and P e titio n e r's Traverse, the court now decides this matter. I. HABEAS PETITION I n his habeas petition, Petitioner alleged four grounds: (1) the CBP denied P etitio n er parole on June 27, 2005 which violated the terms and conditions of P e titio n e r's plea bargain; (2) the CBP has failed to establish regulatory procedures f o r determining when to defer subsequent parole consideration hearings for more th a n a year; (3) the CBP's policy of using mechanical restraints on inmates at p aro le consideration hearings violates the Equal Protection Clause of the F o u rteen th Amendment; and (4) the CBP's failure to set a term under its sen ten cin g matrix at his 2005 hearing violated both the Eighth Amendment and the E q u al Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Each argument fails, and th e court dismisses Petitioner's habeas petition without prejudice. This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a p e r so n in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that h e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United S tates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("A E D P A "), an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the a d ju d ic atio n of the claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by th e Supreme Court of the United States;" or "resulted in a decision that was based

Petitioner raises a fifth habeas claim: the Superior Court's decision denying his habeas petition involved an unreasonable application of the facts to the law. This is merely a restatement of all his earlier claims, and therefore the court does not address it separately. 2

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o n an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in th e State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "[A] federal habeas court may n o t issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment th a t the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law e rr o n e o u s ly or incorrectly." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75­76 (2003) (q u o tin g Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000)). "Rather, that application m u s t be objectively unreasonable." Id. at 76. Moreover, Habeas Rule 4 requires the Court to make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it p lain ly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases. For purposes of AEDPA review, this Court looks to the last reasoned state co u rt decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U .S . 797, 803­04 (1991). The Superior Court's decision constitutes the last reaso n ed state court decision in this case, as both the Court of Appeal and the C alifo rn ia Supreme Court summarily dismissed Petitioner's habeas petition. Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the Court must d eterm in e whether the Superior Court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition "resu lted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable ap p licatio n of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme C o u r t of the United States;" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an u n reaso n ab le determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the S tate court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A. Whether the CBP's finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole warrants habeas r e lie f
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P etitio n er argues that the CBP's failure to find him suitable for parole in 2 0 0 5 violated the terms of his plea bargain agreement. This argument fails. As the S u p erio r Court noted, "Petitioner has presented no evidence of a plea agreement th at he would be found suitable for parole at any specific time." Petitioner's P e titio n Exh. A. Moreover, it appears that Petitioner's plea bargain has been h o n o red . In declaring that he had no choice but to ensure that Petitioner spent the r es t of his life in prison, the sentencing judge noted that, though Petitioner d eserv ed the death penalty as a result of his crime, "[Petitioner] escaped this fate b y an agreement with the District Attorney that the allegations of special c ir cu m s ta n c es would be stricken if the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree m u r d e r ." Petitioner's Answer Exh. 4. In fact, the sentencing judge made special n o te to assure that "defendant will be confined in State prison for the rest of his lif e." Id.2 Thus, the state court's decision denying habeas relief on this basis was n e ith e r "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established F ed eral law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was it an unreasonable determination o f the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).3

It does appear that at a parole suitability hearing in 1987, an officer made the statement that, "if [the CBP] hit you with every single thing we could hit you with, . . . you'd do 27 years, 27 years of which you have 13 and a half in." Exh. 7 Part B. This statement came in the context of discussing Petitioner's sentencing matrix. It does not say anything about the existence of a plea bargain, in which the state promised Petitioner anything less than a life sentence. Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the state violated its own matrix calculation, that is a matter of state law beyond the scope of the court's review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67­68 (1991). Though he doesn't squarely challenge the CBP's failure to find him suitable for parole on the basis that the decision lacked some evidence of future dangerousness, the State has apparently construed his argument as alleging as much. See Answer pgs. 6­7. In the interest of being thorough, the court notes that, even if Petitioner had made such an argument, it fails. Under the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 2010) (mandate pending), we "review `whether the California judicial decision approving the governor's [or parole board's] decision rejecting parole was an `unreasonable application' of the California `some evidence' requirement, or was `based on an unreasonable determination of the 4
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B . Whether the CBP has failed to establish regulatory procedures for determining w h e n to defer subsequent parole consideration hearings for more than a year R elyin g on California Penal Code section 3041.5, Petitioner argues that the

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p aro le board failed to schedule regular hearings to determine suitability for parole.
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Whether the CBP did this or not is entirely a matter of state law outside the
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ju risd ictio n of a federal habeas court. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67­68 ("[I]t is not the
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p r o v in c e of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state7

law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding
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w h e th e r a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
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S tates."). The court, therefore, denies relief on this basis.
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C. Whether the CBP's policy of using mechanical restraints on inmates at parole co n sid eratio n hearings violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth A m en d m en t P e titio n e r challenges the CBP's use of mechanical restraints on inmates at

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th e parole hearing, alleging specifically that this was a violation of the Equal
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P ro tectio n Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument fails for two
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reaso n s.
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F irst, it is not clear on what basis Petitioner invokes the Equal Protection
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C la u s e. He has not alleged that he is in some sort of suspect class or that other
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s im ila rly situated individuals are treated differently (indeed, he admits that, under
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th e CBP's policy, all inmates are put in mechanical restraints).
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Second, though there is a constitutional right to be free from shackles during
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th e guilt phase of a trial, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), Petitioner does
22 23 24 25 26 facts in light of the evidence.'" (quoting Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). There was certainly nothing unreasonable about the CBP's determination that Petitioner was "not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released form [sic] prison." Petitioner's Answer Exh. 6. The CBP noted Petitioner's poor institutional behavior, his past criminal history and failed attempts to correct his criminality, his unstable social history, and his history of substance abuse. Therefore, there was clearly "some evidence" of future dangerousness to justify denying Petitioner parole. 5

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n o t cite, nor can we find, any case law establishing a right to be free from such restrain ts during a parole hearing. B ecau se there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent estab lish in g a right to be free from restraints during a parole hearing and because th e r e is certainly no right to be free from that under the Equal Protection Clause, th e Superior Court's adjudication of this issue was not "contrary to, or involved an u n reaso n ab le application of, clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

D. Whether the CBP's failure to set a term under its sentencing matrix at his 2005 h earin g violated either the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of 10 th e Fourteenth Amendment
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F in ally, Petitioner argues that the CBP's failure to set a term under its sen ten cin g matrix resulted in his receiving a "maximum sentence which is a d is p r o p o r tio n a te sentence." Thus, Petitioner claims that this failure to set a term w as a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. This claim is entirely without m erit. There is nothing disproportionate about sentencing a defendant to life in p riso n for murder. See United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 211 (9th Cir. 1991) ( "[ I]t is clear that a mandatory life sentence for murder does not constitute cruel an d unusual punishment."). Petitioner's argument that the CBP's failure to set a term violated the Equal P r o te ctio n Clause is equally without merit. Indeed, Petitioner fails to make an a rg u m e n t as to how the CBP's actions even amounted to a violation of the Equal P ro tectio n Clause. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Conclusory alleg atio n s which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant h ab eas relief.") (citing Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970)). T h u s , the state court's decision denying habeas relief on this basis was n e ith e r "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
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F ed eral law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was it an unreasonable determination o f the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).4

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: P etitio n er's habeas petition is dismissed on all grounds without p r e ju d ic e .

D A T E D : August 5, 2010

Honorable N. Randy Smith N in th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge

Petitioner also seems to suggest that CBP's actions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, "the right to jury trial," and "due process of the laws." Again, because Petitioner makes only conclusory allegations as to these claims, the court denies habeas relief on this basis. Also, to the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the CBP erred in following proper California state procedure, that is a state law question that this federal habeas court is without jurisdiction to consider. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67­68. 7

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