Thomas v. Schwarzenegger et al

Filing 38

ORDER signed by District Judge Otis D. Wright, II on 9/27/2011 DENYING 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Zignago, K.)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KENNETH S. THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,
Governor of the State of California,
JAMES E. TILTON, Director of
CDCR
Defendant.
______________________________

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No. 2:07-CV-02310 ODW

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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On August 17, 2011 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment [35]. There

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has been no opposition. For the reasons stated herein, that motion is denied.

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PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

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In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed June 20, 2008, Plaintiff complains

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of over-crowding which he alleges is detrimental to his mental, medical and dental well-

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being. He acknowledges that the prison has a grievance procedure in place and that he

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has not utilized the grievance procedure “because defendants have already proven by

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actions that they will not address this issue anywhere else but in Federal Court . . .” (SAC

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p. 2 ¶ II. B.) Ordinarily, this could be fatal to Plaintiff’s ability to initiate a civil action in

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federal court. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, (“PLRA”) 42 U.S.C. §1997e, “No

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action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or

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any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

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until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

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As support for his view that he need not resort to administrative remedies prior to

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filing suit, Plaintiff makes reference in his pleading to other litigation challenging the over-

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crowed conditions in the California State Prison system. The court assumes Plaintiff is

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referring to Coleman v. Brown filed in 1990. Coleman was a class action suit brought on

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behalf of seriously mentally ill persons in California prisons. The second class action was

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Plata v. Brown filed in 2001. The Plata action involved medical care which fell below

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constitutionally mandated minimum levels. Both cases attribute the prison system’s

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inability to deliver constitutionally adequate mental health and medical treatment and care

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to the over-crowded conditions of California’s state prisons.

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Both cases, tried to two different district court judges, reached the same conclusion:

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the prisons would be unable to adequately address the issues of care of the prisoners until

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such time as the over-crowding situation was remedied. In Coleman the state stipulated

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to a consent decree which required it to address the prison conditions. The state had failed

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to comply with the injunction five years later.

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In Plata a Special Master was appointed who concluded that over-crowding was at

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the heart of the prison system’s inability to attract and hire sufficient medical staff and the

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physical facilities were inadequate to address the medical needs of such a large population.

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It was only after a three-judge court was empaneled and a lengthy trial resulted in

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an order to reduce the state’s prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity has the

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state undertaken any measures to remedy the overcrowding. Even then, it was only after

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appealing, unsuccessfully, to the United States Supreme Court, See , Brown v. Plata, __

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U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed2d 969.

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Against that background, it is understandable that Plaintiff concluded that the

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administrative grievance procedure would not be effective in addressing his complaint.

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Indeed, orders by federal district judges have previously proven ineffective in achieving a

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remedy to over-crowding in the prison system. Moreover, the fact that one class member

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had exhausted administrative remedies is sufficient to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion

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requirement for another member of the class. Gates v. Cook, (5th Cir. 2004) 376 F.3d 323.

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The fact that one inmate exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to claim at

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issue at a preliminary injunction hearing regarding an inmates’ class action against prison

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officials regarding prison conditions was sufficient to satisfy exhaustion requirement of

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PLRA for other class members. John v. Berge, W. D. Wis. 2001, 172 F. Supp.2d 1128.

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On the merits, state contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because it was

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not deliberately indifferent to Thomas’ conditions of confinement and secondly, the state

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is entitled to qualified immunity because no constitutional rights have been violated.

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2.

THE FACT

OF

OVER-CROWDING

IN

CALIFORNIA STATE PRISONS HAS BEEN

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ESTABLISHED, AS HAS THE FACT THAT THE OVER-CROWDING HAS RESULTED IN CONDITIONS

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WITHIN THE PRISON WHICH FALL BELOW EIGHTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS.

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Findings made in two separate lawsuits support the assertion that there is severe

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overcrowding in this state’s prisons. “A similar conclusions was reached by the Little

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Hoover Commission, a bipartisan and independent state body, which stated that

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‘[o]vercrowded conditions inside the prison walls are unsafe for inmates and staff.’”

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(citation omitted.) Sections 1.A, 1.B and 1.C of the Supreme Court opinion in Brown v.

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Plata describe in shocking detail the conditions prevalent in this state’s prisons. There

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is no need to repeat them here. Suffice it to say that the question of whether there are

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Eight Amendment violations occasioned by prison overcrowding has been resolved.

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Defendants cannot make a credible argument they were unaware of the

inhumane conditions within the prison and were unable to remedy those conditions.

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Section 1983 contains no state-of-mind independent of that necessary to state a

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violation of the underlying constitutional right” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-330.

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Therefore the inquiry is not whether defendants intended to violate plaintiff’s Eighth

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Amendment, but whether the conditions which were permitted to exist were done either

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intentionally or with reckless indifference to the health and safety of the prison inmates.

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That question cannot be answered in the negative as a matter of law.

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The court might infer that with the level of attention surrounding the Coleman and

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Plata class action suits, prison officials throughout the state were keenly aware that prison

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overcrowding was considered by some to be a major contributing factor in the prison

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system’s inability to deliver minimally adequate medical and mental health treatment to

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prison inmates. It had also been identified as a cause of increased inmate on inmate

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violence and posed safety concerns to staff as well. It would have been very surprising if

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defendants were unmindful of either of these two pieces of litigation, the consent decree

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where the state indicated it would reduce prison population, or the lengthy trial before the

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three-judge court. In fact, ignorance of these events might even be considered a

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deliberate indifference to the conditions of those being held in state custody.

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The court finds that there is at least a triable issue of fact whether defendants were

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aware of the conditions within its own prisons and the class action lawsuits filed due to

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those conditions, and displayed a deliberate indifference to the suffering caused by those

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conditions..

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B

Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity.

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Defendants argue that they violated no constitutional right and their conduct was

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reasonable. In determining eligibility for qualified immunity this court must first consider

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whether the facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . .

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. show [that] the [defendants’] conduct violated a constitutional right[.]” Saucier v. Katz,

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533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774

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(2007).

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the time of the alleged violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. These are pure legal issues to

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be decided by the court. Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007.)

Second, this court must determine whether the right was clearly established at

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The constitutional violation has been decided and affirmed by the Supreme Court.

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(See Brown v. Plata, supra). Moreover, the effects of the overcrowding spread far beyond

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those in need of medical treatment. As noted in the Plata decision by the Supreme Court:

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Even prisoners with no present physical or mental illness may become afflicted, and

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all prisoners in California are at risk so long as the State continues to provide

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inadequate care. Prisoners in the general population will become sick, and will

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become members of the plaintiff classes, with routine frequency; and overcrowding

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may prevent the timely diagnosis and care necessary to provide effective treatment

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and to prevent further spread of disease.” Brown v. Plata,_U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 1910,

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1940 (2010).

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Moreover, there has been a concomitant rise in the level of violence in the prisons as well

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as an increased incidence of suicides and other preventable deaths. (Id.) The fact that

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conditions in the prisons have degraded to inhumane levels is not open to serious debate.

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Whether any of these conditions have impacted plaintiff is a question which the court

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is not in a position to answer on the current state of the record. Even taken in the light

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most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the court is not now prepared to find as a

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matter of law that a constitutional violation has been visited upon Plaintiff. As for the

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second prong of the inquiry, i.e. whether the overcrowding in question violated clearly

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established right to be free from violations of the Eighth Amendment must await further

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factual development of the circumstances of plaintiff’s incarceration.

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In the final analysis, there are factual issues in dispute which preclude summary
judgment at this time.

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DATED: September 27, 2011

______________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II,
DISTRICT JUDGE