Hightower v. High Desert State Prison et al
Filing
114
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 9/4/2012 recommending that 97 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by W. Patton be denied. Matter referred to Judge Morrison C. England. Jr.; Any party may filed Objections to F&R within 14 days after being served.(Waggoner, D)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
CURTIS HIGHTOWER,
Plaintiff,
11
No. 2:08-cv-00228 MCE EFB P
vs.
12
13
HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, et al.,
14
Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
/
15
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42
16
17
U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining defendant in this action, Patton, moves for summary judgment.
18
Dckt. No. 97. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the motion be
19
denied.
20
I.
21
Background
This action proceeds on the verified amended complaint filed on December 14, 2009.
22
Dckt. No. 29. Plaintiff attests that defendant used excessive force against him on March 6, 2007.
23
Id. at 3-7.1 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant escorted plaintiff out of a single-man
24
holding cage at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) on that date. Plaintiff alleges that the
25
1
26
Page numbers cited herein refer to those assigned by the court’s electronic docketing
system and not those assigned by the parties.
1
1
defendant, while applying handcuffs to plaintiff, said “Let me show you something.” Id. at 4.
2
Plaintiff claims that he turned his head slightly to see defendant drop the right hand of the cuffs
3
and that defendant then twisted plaintiff’s left arm with the cuff on it, pulling plaintiff’s arm out
4
of the cage and lifting it upwards, which caused plaintiff’s shoulder to get pinched by the
5
opening of the cage. Id. Plaintiff asserts that because this position was very painful, he
6
reflexively pulled his right hand into the cage. Id. Allegedly, defendant then yelled, “Put your
7
hand back out of the cage!” Id. Plaintiff then responded, “I can’t, I can’t!” Id. But then,
8
painfully, plaintiff was able to put his hand back out. Id. at 4-5. Defendant eased on plaintiff’s
9
arm and backed him out of the cage, fully handcuffed. Id. at 5.
10
According to the complaint, Correctional Officer Gullion escorted plaintiff a short
11
distance while defendant yelled at him from behind. Id. Plaintiff did not realize defendant was
12
yelling at him until he turned his head slightly to check. Id. Defendant then said, “Bring him
13
back!” Id. Gullion brought him back, and defendant “got an attitude” with plaintiff, “yelling
14
one thing or another.” Id. Defendant and Gullion placed plaintiff’s chest and face against the
15
window of the “MTA” office, with plaintiff’s feet about a foot from the wall to avoid stepping
16
on some boxes. Id. Plaintiff tilted his head back to look left and right, “but never with an
17
attitude towards an Officer.” Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original). Defendant told Gullion to “take
18
him to the ground,” which both officers then did. Id. at 6.
19
Plaintiff says he felt weight and pressure on his back with his legs held up in a “hog tie”
20
type of position.” Id. Plaintiff started to yell, “What the fuck, what the fuck!” Id. Defendant
21
and Gullion responded, “Stop resisting!” Id. Plaintiff, however, was not able to resist from the
22
“hog tie” position. Id. Plaintiff started to breathe heavily with the weight on his back and felt a
23
surge of adrenaline, which caused him to drool onto his face. Id. He did not spit or try to spit on
24
either officer. Id.
25
Defendant punched plaintiff around his left eye with a closed fist, yelling, “Stop spitting,
26
stop spitting!” Id. Defendant punched plaintiff again in the same location. Id. Plaintiff yelled,
2
1
“I’m not spitting, what the fuck! Stop! I’m sorry.” Id. Plaintiff held still, but defendant
2
punched him again, six or seven times total. Id. Defendant and Gullion had plaintiff’s legs lifted
3
so high that his chin scraped the concrete as he turned his head between each punch. Id.
4
Defendant then struck plaintiff hard with his knee, twice. Id. at 7. Plaintiff “felt a big thud” on
5
his head and a “big crack” around his eye. Id. Plaintiff’s eye swelled shut and blood dripped
6
down his face and shirt to the ground. Id.
7
8
Plaintiff’s eye injury required surgery with a lengthy recovery and allegedly it is
permanently damaged. Id.
9
According to defendant, during the incident in question he “had to use force against
10
[plaintiff] to defend myself.” Decl. of W. Patton ISO Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter
11
“Patton Decl.”) ¶ 2. Defendant’s account of the incident is that plaintiff resisted defendant’s and
12
Gullion’s attempts to restrain him. Id. ¶ 3.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
To control Hightower and prevent further resistance, Officer Gullion and I had to
take Inmate Hightower to the floor. After hitting the floor, Officer Gullion
straddled Hightower and I maneuvered around in front of Hightower. Hightower
then tried to break free from our holds by attempting to twist and turn away from
them and wiggle away from our grasp. Hightower’s attempt to free himself from
our hold caused me concern because I did not know what Hightower was thinking
or where Hightower was going to go, and Hightower was not complying with our
orders. Several times, I ordered Hightower to “stop resisting.” Hightower then
attempted to roll over onto his back, and I tried to turn him down. At that point,
Hightower turned up and spit at me. To stop further spitting, I punched
Hightower by bringing my right hand to stomach level, extending it out to strike
Hightower, and bringing it back. I ordered Hightower to stop spitting. Due to
Hightower’s facial expressions, I believed he was going to spit again. Therefore,
I punched him a second time. This whole incident took place before I could pull
out my pepper spray canister or baton out of the holster. After the second punch,
the rest of the staff piled on top of inmate Hightower. Hightower was still kicking
but the staff was able to get Hightower to comply based on the fact that he had
five people on top of him.
22
23
Id. ¶¶ 4- 14.
24
Plaintiff was charged with a rule violation (battery on a peace officer) for his conduct
25
during the incident. Decl. of C. Demant ISO Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter “Demant
26
Decl.”), Ex. A. The hearing officer found him guilty based on: (1) a disciplinary report filed by
3
1
a Correctional Officer M. Ackernecht, who wrote that, as he assisted Gullion and defendant in
2
subduing plaintiff, plaintiff kicked him five times, (2) a report by a Lieutenant Cummings who
3
wrote that defendant saw plaintiff kick Ackernecht forcibly on his upper body with enough force
4
that it hit him backwards, (3) a medical report documenting plaintiff’s injuries, which the hearing
5
officer found consistent with the description of the incident in the rules violation report, and (4)
6
the hearing officer’s finding that plaintiff’s testimony that he did not intend to resist was not
7
credible in the face of evidence that plaintiff kicked Ackernecht five times. Id. Plaintiff was
8
assessed 150 days of lost credit. Id.
9
II.
Motion for Summary Judgment
10
A. Summary Judgment Standards
11
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material
12
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary
13
judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant
14
to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury
15
to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600
16
(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v.
17
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment
18
motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
19
jury.
20
The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
21
or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to
22
“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for
23
trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
24
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally,
25
under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting
26
the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if
4
1
any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
2
U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving
3
party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing
4
party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
5
Anderson., 477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995).
6
A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is
7
crucial to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party
8
seeking summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When
9
the opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving
10
party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v. National
11
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters
12
which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-
13
24 (1986). (“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive
14
issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,
15
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment
16
should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
17
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
18
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a
19
circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district
20
court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is
21
satisfied.” Id. at 323.
22
To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a
23
material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s)
24
that is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S.
25
at 248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
26
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). Whether a factual dispute is
5
1
material is determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the
2
opposing party is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its
3
claim that party fails in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning
4
an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
5
immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
6
Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine
7
the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in
8
question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial
9
on the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual
10
claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion.
11
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit
12
or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue
13
for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to
14
demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such
15
that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson,
16
477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial.
17
The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s
18
evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255;
19
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the
20
proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American
21
Int’l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J.,
22
dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts
23
at issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441
24
(9th Cir. 1995). On the other hand,“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
25
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita,
26
475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment.
6
1
Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply
2
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken
3
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
4
‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. If the evidence presented and any reasonable inferences that might
5
be drawn from it could not support a judgment in favor of the opposing party, there is no genuine
6
issue. Celotex., 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, Rule 56 serves to screen cases lacking any genuine
7
dispute over an issue that is determinative of the outcome of the case.
8
9
Concurrently with the motion for summary judgment, defendant served plaintiff with a
notice that advised him of the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the
10
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dckt. No. 97; citing Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th
11
Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d
12
409 (9th Cir. 1988).
13
B. Analysis
14
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
15
(1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), because it necessarily conflicts with and
16
challenges the disciplinary finding that plaintiff committed a rules violation.
17
The Supreme Court noted in Heck and earlier in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
18
(1973) the historic role of the writ of habeas corpus as the vehicle for a confined individual to
19
attack the legality of his or her custody and obtain release and concluded that, because the
20
habeas statute dealt specifically with such a situation, it must be utilized rather than the more
21
general § 1983 where a prisoner attacks (1) the fact of confinement or (2) the duration of
22
confinement. Id. at 484-500.
23
In Heck, the Court further clarified what suits may not be brought under § 1983 but must
24
instead be pursued via petition for writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). There, the court
25
held that a state prisoner may not bring a damages claim under § 1983 attacking the
26
constitutionality of his criminal conviction unless and until the underlying conviction is
7
1
invalidated via habeas corpus or similar proceeding, because success in the § 1983 damages
2
action would necessarily establish the invalidity of the conviction and attendant confinement. Id.
3
at 478, 486-87. The Court emphasized that this rule, sometimes referred to as the “favorable
4
termination rule,” applies only where success in the civil rights suit would necessarily imply that
5
the conviction or sentence were invalid. Id. at 486-87 and n. 6-7.
6
The Court took up the interplay between federal civil rights actions and writs of habeas
7
corpus again in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). In that case, the Court clarified that
8
the favorable termination rule applies to a state inmate who challenges a disciplinary action for
9
which he was assessed a credit loss, even where the inmate seeks no injunction restoring the lost
10
credits, if success in a civil rights action would necessarily imply that the credits should not have
11
been revoked. Id. at 643-44, 646-47.
12
Conversely, in Muhammad v. Close, 544 U.S. 749 (2004), an inmate could challenge his
13
pre-disciplinary hearing detention under § 1983 without first invalidating the discipline imposed,
14
because success in the action would not show his underlying criminal conviction to be invalid
15
nor shorten the duration of his sentence by requiring the restoration of revoked credits. The
16
Court clarified that Heck’s favorable termination rule does not apply categorically to all suits
17
challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 754. Prison disciplinary proceedings do not
18
implicate the validity of the “fact of confinement” (see Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500) because “these
19
administrative determinations do not as such raise any implication about the validity of the
20
underlying conviction[.]” Muhammad, 544 U.S. at 754. Such proceedings may implicate the
21
“duration of confinement” (see Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500), if credits were revoked. Muhammad,
22
544 U.S. at 754. Because the plaintiff in Muhammad lost no credits as a result of the discipline
23
imposed, and because prison disciplinary hearings by their nature do not address the underlying
24
conviction, the plaintiff’s § 1983 action could not be “construed as seeking a judgment at odds
25
with his conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be served in accordance with the
26
underlying sentence.” Id. at 754-55.
8
1
In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Court surveyed the line of cases
2
beginning with Preiser in determining that inmates challenging state parole procedures could
3
proceed under § 1983. While the prisoners’ ultimate goal was arguably to obtain speedier
4
release under more favorable parole procedures, their success in obtaining such procedures in
5
their § 1983 suit would not necessarily mean speedier release – parole was not guaranteed under
6
the different procedures. Id. at 82. The Court emphasized that the favorable termination rule is
7
limited to situations in which success in the § 1983 action would necessarily invalidate
8
confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)
9
(noting that the Court has “stress[ed] the importance of the term ‘necessarily.’”).
10
The Court reiterated the availability of § 1983 where success in the suit would not
11
necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s underlying conviction nor shorten his sentence in Skinner v.
12
Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298-99 (2011). There, it held that a state prisoner
13
seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence could assert his claim under § 1983, even though
14
his ultimate aim was to use the evidence to support a claim of innocence. Id. at 1293. Success in
15
the § 1983 suit would only provide the inmate with access to the DNA evidence, which could
16
prove to be inculpatory, exculpatory, or neither. Id. The Court noted that none of its cases “has
17
recognized habeas as the sole remedy, or even an available one, where the relief sought would
18
neither terminate custody, accelerate the future date of release from custody, nor reduce the level
19
of custody.” Id. at 1299 (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 86, Scalia, J., concurring, internal
20
quotation marks omitted) & 1299 n.13.
21
Returning to the facts of this case, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim is barred
22
because a finding in his favor would be fundamentally inconsistent with the disciplinary
23
conviction. Defendant appears to argue that a disciplinary finding that has not been overturned
24
will always bar a subsequent § 1983 based on the same underlying incident, regardless of
25
whether credits have been revoked. That argument fails, as the U.S. Supreme Court has made
26
clear that the “conviction” with which a § 1983 suit must not conflict is the underlying criminal
9
1
conviction, not a disciplinary finding. Muhammad, 544 U.S. at 754-55. Success in this action
2
would not imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s criminal conviction, and accordingly the factual
3
findings made by the disciplinary hearing officer do not bear on the viability of this § 1983
4
action under the Heck rule.
5
However, plaintiff in this case did suffer a credits loss. Plaintiff offers no evidence that
6
he has obtained an order invalidating the revocation of credits. In such a situation, Heck and its
7
associated cases bar suit where a finding in the plaintiff’s favor will necessarily imply the
8
invalidity of the revocation of credits, thus necessitating the restoration of those credits and a
9
consequent speedier release from prison. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643-44, 646-47.
10
In Heck, the Court repeatedly emphasized that a § 1983 claim is not cognizable only
11
where a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
12
or the duration of his sentence. 512 U.S. at 481-82, 487, 487 n.6-7. To illustrate the principle,
13
the Court provided two examples. In the first, the hypothetical plaintiff sustained a conviction
14
for resisting arrest – defined as intentionally preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful
15
arrest. Id. at 487 n.6 (emphasis in original). A subsequent § 1983 action premised on violation
16
of the plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures would not be cognizable, because, to
17
prevail, the plaintiff would have to negate an element of the offense of conviction (that the arrest
18
had been lawful). Id. Thus, success in the § 1983 action would imply the invalidity of the
19
conviction. In the second example, the hypothetical plaintiff suffered a conviction based on
20
evidence obtained during a police search. Id. at 487 n.7. The plaintiff’s subsequent § 1983
21
action challenged the search as unreasonable. Id. Because the evidence could have been
22
admissible in the criminal trial even if the search was unreasonable under doctrines like
23
independent source and inevitable discovery, a judgment for the plaintiff in the § 1983 action
24
would not necessarily invalidate the conviction. Id.
25
26
Here, a finding that defendant’s use of force was excessive in violation of the Eighth
Amendment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary finding of battery. To
10
1
succeed on an excessive force claim, plaintiff must establish that defendant unnecessarily and
2
wantonly inflicted pain. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). On the evidence currently
3
before the court, a factfinder could conclude that, even though plaintiff committed battery on an
4
officer, defendant nevertheless subjected plaintiff to unnecessary and wanton pain. See id. at
5
321 (noting that the following factors are relevant to a determination of whether a use of force
6
violated the Eighth Amendment: (1) the need for the use of force; (2) the relationship between
7
the need for force and the amount used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the
8
threat the officers reasonably perceived the plaintiff to pose to staff and inmate safety; and (5)
9
any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response). The disciplinary hearing
10
officer here made no finding that the amount of force used by defendant was necessary to subdue
11
plaintiff, and a correctional officer is not free to use whatever amount of force he or she wishes
12
to subdue the individual once a prisoner resists. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. Accordingly, it is
13
possible on the evidence presented by both sides in this case for a factfinder to conclude that
14
plaintiff committed battery but that defendant nevertheless used an unconstitutionally excessive
15
level of force in response.2 Such a finding would not invalidate plaintiff’s disciplinary
16
conviction. Accordingly, as a judgment for plaintiff on his Eighth Amendment claim would not
17
necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary revocation of credits, that claim is not barred
18
by Heck.
19
Defendant next argues that summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff cannot
20
show that defendant unnecessarily and wantonly subjected him to pain (i.e., that defendant’s use
21
of force was unreasonable). The evidence on this point is entirely disputed. Defendant attests
22
that he punched plaintiff twice only because plaintiff was forcefully resisting efforts to restrain
23
him and because plaintiff spit at him. Patton Decl. ¶¶ 3-14. Plaintiff attests that he did not
24
forcefully resist defendant nor spit at him but that defendant nevertheless punched him six or
25
2
26
The two are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the former could well incite or motivate
the latter.
11
1
seven times and came down on plaintiff’s face with his knee twice. Dckt. No. 29 at 5-8.
2
Whichever version is to be credited will have to be determined at trial. Viewing the evidence in
3
the light most favorable to plaintiff, a factfinder could conclude that defendant’s use of force was
4
excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
5
Lastly, defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because no right was
6
violated, and if it was, it was not clearly established. Dckt 98 at 16; See Saucier v. Katz, 533
7
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The argument for qualified immunity is predicated on defendant’s version
8
of the facts (that plaintiff was resisting and spitting) which plaintiff disputes in material regards.
9
As set forth above, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff may establish a
10
constitutional violation. Moreover, the right of a prisoner to be free from excessive force has
11
been clearly established for decades and, assuming plaintiff’s version as true, a reasonable
12
officer in defendant’s position would know that using the force alleged here violates the
13
constitution. Thus, the issues of qualified immunity are intertwined with the disputed issues of
14
material fact as to the merits of the alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, defendant is
15
not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
16
III.
17
18
Order and Recommendation
For the reasons stated above it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant’s February
16, 2012 motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 97) be denied.
19
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
20
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days
21
after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
22
objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
23
“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections
24
////
25
////
26
////
12
1
within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.
2
Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
3
Dated: September 4, 2012.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?