Dixon v. O'Connor, et al

Filing 71

ORDER signed by Senior Judge Lloyd D. George on 3/30/2012 GRANTING 49 Motion to Dismiss. CASE CLOSED. (Donati, J)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANIEL STEVE DIXON,

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2:08-cv-01546-LDG

Plaintiff,
ORDER

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v.

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J.S. O’CONNOR, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Defendants Knipp, Martel, Grannis and O’Connor have filed a motion to dismiss (#49,

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opposition #64, reply #67). The motion, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), challenges whether

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the plaintiff’s complaint states “a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

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12(b)(6). In ruling upon this motion, the court is governed by the relaxed requirement of Rule

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8(a)(2) that the complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief.” As summarized by the Supreme Court, a plaintiff must allege

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“only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Nevertheless, while a complaint “does not need detailed

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factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

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requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

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action will not do.” Id. (citations omitted). In deciding whether the factual allegations state a

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claim, the court accepts those allegations as true, as “Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . .

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dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams,

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490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

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In October 2007, plaintiff worked in the Mule Creek States Prison fabric products shop.

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On October 11, 2007, plaintiff attended a safety meeting for employees, and was given permission

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by his supervisor Phyllis Childress to speak to a group of inmates regarding pending prison

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grievances (602s). Officer Costales instructed plaintiff to stop speaking to other inmates. Plaintiff

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then expressed to Costales, “Why is everything so difficult now; things ran smoothly before C/O

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O’Connor and C/O Martin were assigned to Work Change.” After the meeting, Costales advised

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plaintiff that it was inappropriate to address the other inmates regarding the 602s, and that it

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amounted to “inciting.” Costales also noted that plaintiff was not wearing the appropriate work

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shirt at the time.

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Following the meeting between plaintiff and Costales, defendant O’Connor notified

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plaintiff that he was required to wear appropriate shoes in the work shop. Plaintiff complained to

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Sergeant Bueno that O’Connor was retaliating against him because of a 602 he had previously

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filed against O’Connor, and claimed that he had a medical chrono allowing him to wear the shoes.

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Bueno instructed plaintiff to show his medical shoes and chrono to the Lieutenant on duty. The

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Lieutenant then directed Sergeant Bueno to advise defendant O’Connor to allow plaintiff to wear

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the medical shoes at work.

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Plaintiff further alleges that on October 15, 2007, he was asked by Prison Industry

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Authority Administrator Anderson about, and confirmed that he stated on October 11, 2007, in

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front of the other inmates that there were no problems before officers O’Connor and Martin started

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working there. Anderson then explained that such a statement was “inciting” and directed

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Costales to issue a Rules Violation Report to plaintiff. At a disciplinary hearing plaintiff was

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found not guilty of inciting, possibly because he had been given permission by the supervisor to

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address the other inmates. Plaintiff was then allowed to return to work.

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On October 26, 2009, Captain G.A. Machado issued a memorandum reiterating a

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prohibition of any non-state issued shoes in the work place. On November 14, 2007, defendant

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O/Connor told plaintiff, as he arrived to work, that he was required to wear state-issued shoes to

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work, not the non-state issued shoes he had on. Plaintiff advised defendant O’Connor that he had

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a medical chrono for the shoes, but O’Connor instructed him that state issued shoes were required.

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On November 27, 2007, plaintiff was interviewed by Sergeant Bueno regarding a prison

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grievance in which plaintiff sought, among other changes, that retaliatory actions against plaintiff

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be stopped. The appeal was not fully granted because no retaliation was found against plaintiff.

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Defendant Knipp denied the appeal at a second level, and defendant Grannis issued a director’s

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level decision denying the appeal.

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On May 7, 2009, a supervisor issued plaintiff a general informational chrono noting that he

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had committed sewing errors. Plaintiff submitted a grievance alleging that the chrono was issued

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at the direction of Costales in retaliation against plaintiff for filing the previous 602. On June 22,

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2009, defendant Martel issued a memorandum finding that plaintiff’s grievance did not meet the

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requirements to be classified as a staff complaint. On August 18, 2009, Associate Warden Fallon

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denied plaintiff’s appeal, and on November 12, 2009, defendant Grannis denied plaintiff’s appeal

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at the director’s level. That review advised plaintiff that prison industry staff were charged with

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the responsibility to document performance concerns.

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Liability for a civil rights violation may not be based on the theory of respondeat superior,

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or any other theory of vicarious liability. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-

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92 (1978). Plaintiff must allege the causal link between the supervisor and the claimed

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constitutional violation. Id. at 694.

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Here, plaintiff has not alleged the personal involvement of defendant Knipp, Martel, or

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Grannis, beyond reviewing or ruling on plaintiff’s appeals. Plaintiff has no cognizable

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constitutional claim based on defendants’ alleged involvement in denying his administrative

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appeals in this case. Plaintiff has alleged no link between the underlying wrongful conduct upon

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which the grievances and appeals were based, and the review of them by defendants Knipp, Martel

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and Grannis. Just because these defendants did not rule in plaintiff’s favor does not make them

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liable for the alleged underlying constitutional deprivation.

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Regarding plaintiff’s allegations against defendant O’Connor, plaintiff has not alleged that

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defendant O’Connor was aware of any substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff if the prison

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policy requiring the wearing of state issued shoes was enforced. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

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825, 847 (1994) (a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support the inference of deliberate

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indifference, that is that the named prison official knew of, and disregarded, a substantial risk of

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serious harm to plaintiff “by failing to take reasonsable measures to abate it”). Even if plaintiff

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alleges that he told defendant O’Connor that he had a medical chrono for the shoes, plaintiff does

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not allege that he in fact presented such documentation to O’Connor at the time he was denied

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entry into the work area. Plaintiff allegations, at most, take issue with O’Connor’s strict

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compliance with the prison regulations dealing with exceptions to prison policies.

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Nor does plaintiff adequately state a claim of retaliation against defendant O’Connor. In

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the prison context, to state a claim for retaliation, a complaint must allege “(1) an assertion that a

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state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected

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conduct and that such action (4) chilled plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, and (4) the action did

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not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

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68 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must afford appropriate deference to prison officials when

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evaluating the proffered legitimate correctional reasons for the alleged retaliatory conduct. See

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Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that

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there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions in question. Id. at 808. The

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prisoner must submit evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish a link between the

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exercise of his constitutional rights and the alleged retaliatory action. Id. at 806. Here, plaintiff

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fails to state a claim of retaliation against defendant O’Connor because O’Connor’s alleged

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conduct in enforcing the shoe rule and directives from prison officials advanced a legitimate

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penological goal.

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Finally, as defendants have argued, each is entitled to qualified immunity based on

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plaintiff’s allegations. Given the circumstances, defendants O’Connor, Knipp, Martel or Grannis,

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would all have believed that their conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law.

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THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that defendants Knipp’s, Martel’s, Grannis’ and
O’Connor’s motion to dismiss (#49) is GRANTED.

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Dated this ____ day of March, 2012.

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________________________
Lloyd D. George
United States District Judge

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